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Abstract Df Thesis 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTH-EAST COAL PORTS, 1815-1914; 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF ENGINEERING 
The development of the ports of the North-East was a direct consequence of the region's 
increasing coal production; existing ports were expanded and new facilities created. 
Improvement required capital and it became necessary to form commissions to administer 
the ports, subsuming the powers of individuals and companies. Through them the greatest 
and most beneficial developments took place. 
Of an engineering nature, improvements involved rail transport, trans-shipment facilities, 
the building of docks and breakwaters, and river deepening and straightening. The advice 
of the nation's most eminent engineers was acted upon and, through the works undertaken, 
coal shipments f rom the North-East increased from 3 to 35 million tons per annum over the 
century which began in 1815. 
Certain ports were over-capitalised, others starved of funds, but by 1914 all competed 
on equal terms. Based on throughput, all exhibited similar capital expenditure and annual 
revenue. Development was not uniform but, generally, capital expenditure resulted in 
increased coal throughput and revenue. Docks were built as necessary, their costs comparable 
with those of other U. K. ports. Their value was marginal although two of them were so 
efficient that they were equalled in unit throughput only by Cardiff, the principal port 
of the analagous South Wales coalfield. 
Mining, railways and ports were inter-dependent, collieries owning staiths and several 
railways themselves operating docks. In 1865 the ports came to experience the virtual 
territorial monopoly of the North Eastern Railway, its financial power unrivalled. Itself 
operating docks, it came to determine the strategy of coal shipments. 
This thesis explores the evolution of the ports and their railways, the contribution 
made by the engineering profession to the development of both, the formation of the region's 
port authorities and the relationships which existed within and without the governing bodies. 
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Notes 
- In the text of this thesis abbreviations' have necessarily been used. 
The principle adopted has been to state in full the company or authority 
at the beginning of each chapter, followed immediately by the abbreviation 
later used. 
Imperial measurements have been adopted throughout as it was this 
system which was in use during the period considered. The metric equivalents 
of the Imperial units are as follows: 
I inch 25.4 mm. 
1 foot 0.304 m. 
1 mile 1.609 km. 
1 acre 0.4047 hectare. 
I square mile 259 hectares. 
I U. K. ton 1.016 tonnes. 
I chaldron 2.65 tons, or 53 cwt. 
The maps included in the text have been prepared from many sources; 
they should - be considered only as diagrammatic although approximate scales 
are shown on each of them. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
North-eastern England has been described as "a finite entity, rich 
in its legacy of the centuries of industrial development and marked by 
I 
a relatively simple frame", the Northumberland and Durham coalfield. 
The coal-bearing strata, the Carboniferous series, dip eastwards to the 
sea - and under it - but the coal seams, shallow in the west, are overlain 
by Permian limestone in the eastern area of County Durham. Rivers flow 
generally from west to east but they differ in the configuration of their 
navigable lengths. The Tyne, its catchment embracing the greatest area, 
has developed meander haughs above Newcastle whereas below the town it 
runs between steep banks which, although impeding development, proved ad- 
vantageous for the trans-shipment of coal; to a smaller scale the Wear 
is similar. Second in magnitude, the river Tees follows a meandering 
course in its lower reaches but at Stockton - in its unimproved state 
- it entered an area of tidal flats, discharging to the sea through an 
extensive estuary. 
2 Over their usable lengths, both the rivers- Coquet 
and Blyth flow through low-lying ground. 
The mining of coal and its transport to the rivers Tyne and Wear, 
traditionally by waggonway, dominated the region's economy before 1815. 
From that date the pattern changed as a result of three major factors, 
the successful winning of Hetton colliery, the inauguration of the Stockton 
and Darlington Railway and the development of steam power for both rail 
locomotion and for ship propulsion. The first proved the existence of 
coal beneath the limestone of eastern Durham and so opened the way to 
the establishment of ports at Seaham and Hartlepool; the second led to 
the Tees and, later, West Hartlepool 'becoming coal-shipping ports; and 
the third brought to both land and sea transport a new effectiveness. 
These changes enabled the region to meet the growing demands for coal, 
for local use, for shipment to south-east England and, increasingly, for 
use abroad. Increased production of coal brought with it a growth in 
1 
the region's settlements, an expanding network of railways, the formation 
of new ports and the development of the earlier-utilised rivers. 
The century which began in 1815 was one of continuous - but not uniform 
- growth in the North-East. Before the inauguration of the first railways 
little development had taken place but their construction, together with 
increased mining output, brought about a significant colonisation of the 
region, this phase ending at mid-century. Afterwards followed extensive 
new mining developments, major engineering and shipbuilding activity and 
the almost unknown large-scale provision of port facilities, the last- 
named based almost entirely on coal and its shipment. 
3 Even on the 
Tees, its prosperity from mid-century centred on iron and steel, one of 
the major industrial phenomena was the vast transport requirements of 
the iron industry. 
Mining activity was not uniform: at first erratic but spreading 
generally southwards from the Tyne and Wear, it then pushed northwards 
into the steam-coal areas of Northumberland; later, mining in west Durham 
flourished as a result of the gas-making -requirements of London while 
the last phase of mining expansion witnessed the development of large 
undersea collieries on the Durham coast. Rail transport improved by 
the use of bigger waggons, more powerful locomotives and improved track, 
steel rails being adopted in place of iron. So far as shipping was concerned, 
steam supplemented wind-power; iron, and later steel, replaced wood in 
the hulls of ships; ship sizes, speeds and utilisation increased. 
Between railway and ship lay the ports. Other than the importation 
of timber and iron ore, little notice need be taken of any commodity other 
than coal; although glass-making, chemical manufacturing and engineering 
were in evidence on a large scale their significance in relation to the 
north-eastern ports was relatively small. Perhaps the only factor of 
significance was ship-buildingo its relationship close to both shipping 
and port development. Shipbuilding, although by nature cyclical, expanded 
2 
during the period considered and its continuing growth, and that of the 
shipment of coal, masked the fact that Britain, in the later years of 
the 19th century, had suffered a slowing-down of its growth rate. 
Forming as they do a coherent industry, it is impossible to separate 
completely the four principal elements in the development of the North- 
East, the production, rail transport, trans-shipment and shipment of coal. 
Of these four, it is port development which has perhaps been least studied. 
Mining, railways and shipping have been chronicled and analysed, both 
by contemporary and by twentieth century authors, but the development 
of the region's ports, as an entity, has not yet been investigated. 
Although individual rivers and towns have been studied, the inter-relation- 
ships have not been explored, neither has their growth between 1815 and 
1914 been considered fully with regard to the influence of the region's 
railways, especially the North Eastern Railway. As the carrier of 
minerals on a massive scale and of a size such as to enable it to dictate 
the pattern of the region's development, the power and territorial monopoly 
of the North Eastern Railway were such as to engender the criticism and 
apprehension of port authorities and municipalities alike. 
Although inter-port rivalry within the North-East was significant, 
competition with ports outside the region was almost non-existent. The 
major ports of the U. K. - London, Liverpool, Hull and Glasgow - did not 
compete with the North-East in any way; it was only the threat of losing 
a proportion of the coal trade to Hull which led the North Eastern Railway 
to be criticised for its policies. The major competition to the North 
East., in theory if not in fact, was South Wales, the development of the 
two regions running in parallel. It is significant that South Wales 
sought markets different from those of the North-East and it is perhaps 
because of this fact that its ability to compete passed almost without 
mention in the region. Nevertheless, so similar was its development 
that it forms a useful comparator against which to assess - in broad terms 
3 
- the growth of the ports of the North-East. 
Over the hundred year period the export of coal came to occupy a 
much greater importance but, nevertheless, "so completely did coal dominate 
coastal shipping that the trade in all other minerals taken together could 
not match it in volume. ,4 This study is concerned with the development 
of the port facilities required for this most significant element of the 
Nation's economy. Its objects are to investigate the factors which led 
to the establishment of new ports, the reasons which caused the formation 
of commissions to undertake river improvements, the rivalries which existed 
between the various port authorities and the conflicts which prevailed 
within each of them. It is intended, too, to seek confirmation of the 
power and influence of the railways upon port development, especially the 
ability of the North Eastern Railway - with its massive resources and 
itself a major dock operator - almost at will to inject capital into a 
chosen port and so reap the benefits of the resulting growth in its trade. 
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2. PORT DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO 1815 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior to 1815, the two rivers in the North East which had undergone 
the most significant improvements were the Wear and the Tees, a result 
of the formation of the River Wear Commission in 1717 and of the Tees 
Navigation Company in 1808. The Tyne, the region's principal river, 
had been almost neglected under the conservatorship of the Newcastle 
Corporation. Of the other ports, the Coquet was under the jurisdiction 
of the Dukes of Northumberland and the Blyth under the Delaval and, later, 
the Ridley families. Like the Wear, the Tees had earlier been the responsibility 
of the Bishop of Durham. Seaton Sluice (or Hartley) was owned by the 
Delaval family and Hartlepool had traditionally been the port of the 
Bishop of Durham. Superimposed on this pattern of conservatorship was 
the ownership of tidal lands by the Crown, the protection of navigation 
by the Admiralty, the interests of riparian owners and the control of 
navigation by Trinity House, the Brethren in Newcastle being responsible 
for navigation between Holy Island in the north and Whitby in the south. 
Of the region's ports, only the Tees and Hartlepool traded exclusively 
in non-coal merchandise and, of the coal-shipping ports, the Tyne and 
Wear were predominant; before 1815 their supremacy was unchallenged. 
2.2 River Tyne 
In 1613, the conservancy of the river Tyne passed from the Crown 
to the Corporation of Newcastle. Although several industries - glass 
making, shipbuilding, engineering and chemical manufacture - were to 
be established on the river it was the coal industry which depended most 
upon it; between 1613 and 1815, shipments increased from 240,000 to 
1.83m tons. 1 Coal was shipped principally via waggonways to riverside 
staiths and then, by mearis of keels, * downriver to colliers. The exploitation 
of collieries both upstream and downstream of Newcastle had led to the 
* By 1815, keels were of 21 tons capacity. 
5 
construction of a network of waggonways. Extending up to eight miles 
in length and in a generally north-south direction, some of them were 
able to discharge direct into ships, so eliminating the use of keels, 
still used by the collieries above Newcastle bridge. 
To extend and improve navigation, the construction of canals was 
several times considered but never executed. In 1710 a canal was proposed 
to extend the river westwards from Newburn to Hexham 
2 
and in 1767 a suggestion 
was made to by-pass, by means of a canal, a severe bend in the river 
at Stella 
3, 
a scheme reviewed by John Smeaton in 1778. Further canals 
were proposed to link the Tyne with Carlisle, and even the west coast. 
Detailed by Hadfield they may be summarised as follows: William Chapman 
produced several reports in 1795; a scheme was produced by Ralph Dodd; 
further suggestions emanated jointly from Chapman and William Jessop; 
Jonathan Thompson produced a scheme; and in 1796 reports were made by 
John Sutcliffe, Robert Whitworth and Chapman. It was not until 1810 
that a prospectus was issued for a canal to Hexham but it proved impossible 
to raise the capital necessary and nothing further ensued. 
4 Communication 
between the Tyne and the Wear was never good, only two waggonways - from 
the Mount Moor area - running between them. In 1796 Dodd suggested 
that a canal be formed along the Wear to Durham and, via the river Team, 
56 to the Tyne at Redheugh. The scheme was reported upon by Whitworth 
who noted Smeaton's earlier consideration of it, but in spite of support 
from the area's principal coal owners, no further progress was made. 
Neither the construction of waggonways and staiths nor the proposals 
for canals resulted in the Corporation effecting improvements to the 
river. Surveys by Captain Grenville Collins in 1723 and John Fryer 
in 1782 showed seven feet of water on the bar at low tide. John Rennie 
had recorded a lower figure in 1816, with shallower water up -river. 
Disputes between shipowners and Corporation were frequent, the letter, perhaps 
unjustifiably, being accused of having contributed to the river's oeterioration. 
6 
Such were the feelings of the North and South Shields shipowners that 
they called upon Dodd in 1796 to report on the harbour. He declined 
to suggest improvements to the river itself, which "in many points, stands 
unrivalled as first in this Island "97 but he did recommend docks at Coble 
Dene - later adopted - and at Mill Dam, referring to an "absurd ideal' 
13 
on the part of the Corporation to fill the site with ballast. He also 
propounded the need for a north pier which, in turn, would provide a 
site for a dock or a new town. No action was taken. 
In 1802 Chapman, *at the request of the Corporation, reported on 
the removal of two of the worst obstructions in the river's channel 
9 
but, in spite of the fact that the Corporation had been indicted - but 
acquitted - for the river having been obstructed, his views were rejected. 
Before 1815 the only significant improvement made to the river was the 
construction, in 1810, of new leading lights but it is significant that 
this work had been undertaken, not by the Corporation, but by the Newcaastle 
Trinity House. 10 Quays and staiths had 
. 
meanwhile been financed privately, 
to the Corporation's approval, but such were the river's restrictions 
that navigation was dependent upon the tidal range - some 12 feet - and 
only ships of shallow draught were able to use the river safely at all 
states of the tide. 
2.3 River Wear 
As on the Tyne, the production and shipment of Coal from the Wear 
Was of long standing, shipments rising from 120,000 to 895,000 tons between 
1609 and 1815.1 Of lesser importance were salt making, glass production 
and shipbuilding with, unlike the Tyne, the manufacture and shipment 
of lime. It was, however, the coal trade which called for river improvements 
and it led in 1717 to the formation of the River Wear Commission, responsible 
for the river from Sunderlandp not a good natural harbour, to Durham 
City. Before the birth of the commission the Bishop. of Durham, c 1670, 
had perhaps built a pier and a move to form a commission in 1706 had 
7 
been defeated by the Newcastle Trinity House. The successful transfer 
of powers in 1717 was notunopposed, principally regarding the levying 
of a duty on coal and its collection by a body dominated by the principal 
coalowners, amongst them the Lambton and Tempest - later Londonderry 
- families 
2, but it resulted in a 66 - strong body, although realistically 
providing that a quorum should comprise only seven. 
From its inception the commission received reports from several 
engineers, James Fawcett, William Lellam, John Thomas and Charles Labeleye 
who, in a report of 1748 suggested that the commissioners should appoint 
a resident engineer to supervise all improvement works. In 1752 William 
Vincent was so appointed. In 1747 the commission had been reconstituted, 
but not before a quay had been built, together with a south pier assessed 
by Skempton as a major work of maritime construction; 
3 
additionally 
the formation of a north pie. r had been discussed. 
Following Vincent, further improvements were made to the river under 
the direction of a succession of engineers. * The channel was deepened, 
the south pier extended and realigned and a north pier provided. Built 
initially as a temporary structure it was rebuilt in masonry by 1793, 
reducing dramatically the river's silting. In the last years of the 
century a steam dredger, the first in the countrY4 , was purchased by 
the commissioners but it was not until the appointment of Matthew Shout 
that the forming of a dock was suggested-, of a size to accommodate 200 
to 300 ships. Faced with this proposal, the commissioners requested 
Jessop to report upon it, his view being that such construction, although 
5 feasible, would prove expensive . Jessop considered other items - such 
as pier extensions and the reclamation of land to the south of the entrance 
- more important but it was under Shout that a further dredger was bought 
in 1810 and the piers' extensions completed in 1816, marking an end to 
the first phase of the development of the Wear. 
By this time the pattern of coal shipments was showing change. 
Between 1752 and 1815 the River Wear Commission's engineers were William Vincent, Joseph Robson, 
James Shout, John Shout, Robert Shout, Jonathan Pickernell and Matthew Shout. 
8 
The Newbottle railway ran directly to Sunderland, so reducing the number 
of keels in use, and the building of other railways was to continue this 
trend. The revenue of the River Wear Commission rose from L1,234 in 
1748 to L5,490 in 1803,6 this income being used wholly to finance the 
port's improvement and Miller gives totals of expenditure as Z33,000 
between 1717 and 1738 and E420,000 between 1747 and 1830.7 In comparison 
with the Tyne, expenditure was impressive. 
2.4 River Tees 
In the 12th century Yarm was the only port on the river Tees and 
its position was later consolidated by the construction of a bridge there, 
the lowest on the river. Due to the river's sinuous course, navigation 
was difficult and in the 18th century Yarm was threatened by Stockton, 
especially when the bridge was brought into use in 1769. A further 
advantage held by Stockton was the fact that in 1680 the Customs House 
had been transferred there from Hartlepool, then in decline. The construction 
of a canal in the area had been first proposed by George Dixon in the 
1760 s, envisaging it as transporting coal from Cockfield Fell to the 
Tees. I Due to lack of available capital it did not proceed but, later, 
further plans were made for a canal from the south west Durham coalfield 
to Stockton and Darlington, a move backed by the Pease and Backhouse 
families. 2A report on the feasibility of the project was prepared 
by James Brindley and Whitworth in 1769 and they estimated that the canal, 
some 27 miles long, would cost c L64,000; 
3 its revenue would derive 
from the carriage of c 100,000 tons of coal and 3,000 tons of lead annually. 
The trade figures were disputed by the opposition; their views prevailed 
and the scheme was abandoned. A further canal was proposed in 1773 
by William Brown, a Newcastle colliery viewer, to link the Earl of Darlington's 
colliery to the Tees 
4 
and later it was suggested that the rivers Swale 
and Tees be linked. In 1810 a further variant of the canal from the 
south west Durham coalfield was propounded, joining the Tees at Darlington. 
5 
9 
None of these schemes was put into effect. 
The idea of straightening the river Tees has been credited to Edmund 
Harvey but it is possible that his proposal, made in 1769, was a result 
of the survey undertaken earlier by Whitworth. The project was adopted 
by William Sleigh, mayor of Stockton, and Pickernell was engaged as 
engineer. He recommended that a cut be made through a loop downstream 
from Stockton but, again, no action resulted. In 1796 Dodd, when reporting 
upon a further canal project, noted that the Tees, "with some necessary 
improvements, may be made the first river in this part of the Kingdom, 
the Tyne excepted ,6a canal should, in hib.: view, be formed to link 
the Tees to Durham City. 7 
In 1802, a committee was formed to investigate the improvement 
of the river. It found it woefully inadequate; ships were forced 
to discharge cargoes into lighters, long delays were suffered due to 
lack of water and ships of up to 200 tons, built at Stockton, were forced 
into being towed to sea. The-- river, though, if deepened would 
admit laden Vessels of 160 or 200 tons burthen to come up 
from Sea to the Wharfs at Stockton for the delivery of their 
Cargoes, when the wind is suitable in one tide. Such dispatch 
may be an inducement to have Goods ordered to this Port which 
have hitherto been received by the way of York, Hull etc., 
to those inland Towns which lie at no great distance from 
this Port. 8 
No estimate of cost was made and it was left to Chapman, in 1804, to 
do this. He approved of Pickernell's' plans but envisaged the river's 
flow doing much of the channel widening, noting that the material excavated - 
or washed - from the cut would lodge in the old loop "where the tide 
will be languid, because of its length of course, being upwards of two 
miles and a quarter, whilst that of the proposed Channel will only be 
200 yards"9. To emphasise the feasibility of his proposals he commented 
that similar work had been carried out on the Ganges and the Rhine. 
To undertake the river's improvement, the Tees Navigation Company 
was formed in 1808 to be responsible for the river from Stockton to 
lo 
the sea. 
10 It was empowered to raise capital of 0,000, with facilities 
for borrowing a further E5,000, and to charge dues, based on tonnage, 
on ships using the river. Chapman was appointed as engineer, the views 
of Rennie were sought, improvements were put in hand and the cut completed 
in 1810, having cost some L12,000, L8,000 of which was for construction 
work, compared with Chapman's estimate of 0,184.11 
Meetings of the Company were held in Stockton and such was its success 
that a dividend of 10', 'D was paid in 1814, totally absorbing the revenue 
of E1,204, some 501% greater than had originally been anticipated. 
12 
Like the Tyne, the Tees was to experience much rivalry among the towns 
on it, Stockton, Yarm, and, in effect, Darlington. By 1815, Yarm was 
in decline vis 6 vis Stockton which through the 1808 Act had gained control 
of the river but its dominance was not complete, due to the influence 
of Darlington Quakers such as Pease and Backhouse, shareholders in the 
Tees Navigation Company. 
2.5 River Blyth 
The first of the region's many wooden waggonways was built in 1605 
to transport coal from collieries at Bedlington, Cowpen and Bebside to 
the rivet at Blyth for shipment; the mines' output was c 3,000 tons 
p. a. when the lines were closed in 1614.1 In 1699 the Plessey waggonway, 
four miles long, was built to carry coal northwards to Blyth and it survived 
until 1813, during part of its life having been in the hands of the Ridley 
family, from 1730 land and coal owners. It was later supplemented by 
other lines. The quantities of coal shipped at Blyth are difficult 
to ascertain as it was not classed as an independent port. Nevertheless, 
it would seem that from some 58,000 tons in 1723,2 shipments rose to 
c 123,000 tons by 1816, although the throughput from Hartley, some three 
miles to the south, is included in the latter figure. 
3 Hartley, or 
Seaton Sluice, had been used by the Delaval family since c 1670 and sluicing 
arrangements, a cutting - completed in 1764 - through rock to form a 
11 
new entrance 
4, 
and new piers had all been constructed subsequently. 
5 
Before 1815, the river Blyth had been slightly improved: quays had 
been built on the south shore; a pilot's watch-house was built in 1730; 
the North Dyke (or Pier), 1200 ft long, was built to protect the river's 
entrance in 1765; and in 1788 new leading lights were provided, the high 
light a substantial 
'lighthouse, later heightened. 6 Harbour improvements 
do not seem greatly to have improved the depth of water available. At 
high water it amounted only to 14 feet, providing some two feet at low 
tide and so forcing ships to lie grounded when loading, a phenomenon not 
unique to the Blyth. 
2.6 Hartlepool 
During the 13th century the port of Hartlepool was protected by means 
of a chain across the entrance. By 1473 the Old Pier had been built 
and it was repaired extensively in 1588 and 1719; by 1723 it was reported 
as being somewhat decayed. By 1808 the harbour had silted up to such 
an extent that it was used as agricultural land and the harbour's small 
trade was restricted virtually to farm produce. 
1 Mining near Hartlepool 
had been unsuccessfully attempted in 1735 and 1808. 
The port was reported upon by Dodd in 1795. He noted that its south- 
facing haven was unusual for the North East but he foresaw its improve- 
ment by the forming of a wet dock there and considered that there was 
not "a more eligible situation in the whole island for a naval depot or 
2 harbour for ships of war" . To achieve his object, he proposed to form 
a break-water from the peninsular to the mainland. 1,330 ft in length 
it would incorporate gates for access and drainage. 
Dodd's proposals were not taken up and in 1B09 Matthew Shout was 
asked to report upon the condition of the pier, damaged by heavy seas. 
Shout proposed that repairs should be in the form of heavy blocks of masonry, 
larger than anything used earlier. 
3 Such, however, had been the decline 
of the port that by the 19th century it was used only by fishermen and 
at their instigation, and with little income, an Act of Parliament was 
12 
acquired in 1813, its object the establishment of a commission to improve 
navigation and raise revenue from shipping for that purpose. 
4 
2.7 Summary 
In the century preceding 1815, the output of coal, both nationally 
and in the North East, increased, although the region's share fell; 
exports, increasing prior to the Napoleonic Wars were reduced as a result 
of them. 
Coal Output and Shipments: 1700-18151 
Coal, 000 tons 1700 1750 1775 1800 1815 
U. K. Output 
N. E. Output 
2985 
1290 
5230 
1955 
8850 
2990 
15045 
4450 
22265 
5395 
NE/UK % 43 37 34 30 24 
NE Shipments 
NE Exports 
750 
50 
1119 
120 
1692 
200 
2482 
150 
2988 
150 
Exports to 6 12 17 6 5 
Growth was not uniform and the annual Compound rates for three separate 
periods show national production rising at an increasing rate with the 
production of the North East's collieries also rising, but at a decreasing 
rate. 
2 Coal Statistics: annual compound percentage increase; 1750-1815, 
1750-1775 1775-1800 1800-1815 
U. K. output 2.13 2.15 2.65 
N. E. output 1.7 1.6 1.3 
Tyne shipments 1.0 1.8 1.1 
Wear shipments 2.1 1.3 0.7 
In the region, the coal exporting rivers were the Jyne, Wear and 
Blyth, the two first-named between 1750 and 1B15 shipping from 95 to 
9 al 7, o of the coal leaving the North East. The ratio of shipment was approximately 
2: 1 in favour of the Tyne, compared with the Wear, but the following 
13 
table would seem to indicate that the formation of the River Wear Commission 
had strengthened the position of that river, but only for half a century. 
The later success of the Tyne was due to the opening of further collieries 
using improved mining techniques and pumping rather than to river improvement. 
Shipments of Coal from North East Ports: 1750-1815.? 
1750 1775 1800 1815 
Shipments 000 tons Ilt 10 000 tons 4 000 tons Of 4 000 tons 0*0 
Tyne 763 66 986 60 1550 64 1883 65 
Wear 344 29 580 35 803 33 898 32 
Blyth 50? 
-I 
5 
-I 
75? 
I 
5 80 
I 
3 
I 
100 
T 
3 
By 1815 the Tyne had changed little but the Wear - with fewer natural 
advantages - had been greatly improved by dredgingt channel protection 
and by the formation of piers. Paradoxically, though, it was on the 
Tees - with less traffic - where the most imaginative improvement had 
taken place, the shortening of the river below Stockton by some two miles. 
In two respects, the North East diverged from national patterns in that 
neither canals nor docks were built in the region. With an extensive 
network of waggonways leading to Tyne and Wear, it is unsurprising that 
canals were not constructed, principally due to an inability to attract 
capital , but is of interest to note that almost without exception, the 
lines proposed for them were later adopted by the railway companies. 
Prior to 1815, dock construction in the U. K. had proceeded to such an 
extent that an aggregate dock area of 840 acres had been provided at 
London, Liverpool, Bristol and Hull. 
4 In the region only the Tyne and 
Wear possessed trade to warrant, such construction but the Newcastle Corporation 
was unwilling to finance such an enterprise while the River Wear Commission 
then saw its role simply as that of river improvement. The diversity 
of the colliery interests, with heavy capital investment in waggonways 
and river staiths 9 militated against any reorganisation resulting from 
14 
dock construction. Nevertheless, the need for improved accommodation 
for shipping was evident, both from the point of view of providing a 
greater, constant, depth and also in the provision of additional areas 
of water for the mooring of ships. The Tyne and Wear especially suffered 
from frequent overcrowding. 
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3. PRE-RAILWAY RIVER MANAGEMENT, 1815-1830, 
3.1. Introduction 
During the Napoleonic wars the ports of the North-East had suffered 
from a reduction in their export trade. In 1815, with the prospect 
of greater freedom in -the coal trade and an expansion of their foreign 
markets, the membersof the Common Council of Newcastle instructed their 
two - Members of Parliament, Matthew White Ridley and Cuthbert Ellison 
- significantly they were both coal-owners - to present to the Prince 
Regent aný address concerning "the late glorious and extensive victory 
obtained by the allied armies. "' 
In 1815, the ports of Tyne and Wear, with Blyth, shipped 2.9B8m 
tons of coal, approximately 95% of it for London and east coast use. 
Total output from the region amounted to 5.395m'* tons, 
2a 
quarter of 
the U. K. total, and the coal was transported principally by waggonways, 
where over a period of some 20 years the change from wooden construction 
to iron had been taking place. 
3 Carriage was exclusively by the chaldron 
waggon, nominally of 53 cwt capacity, drawn by horse or, up inclines, 
by ropes. With a general traffic from higher to lower ground it was 
possible in places to use self-acting inclines, patented in 1750 and 
first adapted on Tyneside in 1784; 
4 
stationary winding engines were 
becoming more common. The fifteen years comprising this period were 
to see the successful adoption of steam locomotion and the formation 
of the region's first railway built under Parliamentary powers. 
Simultaneously, de. velopments in mining enabled operations to proceed 
more effectively, among them more efficient steam-operated mine pumps, 
better winding engines and improved ventilation. The more general use 
of iron tubbing in the sinking of mine shafts -a technique later adopted 
for tunneling - used at Wallsend and *Walker in 1792 led to the formation 
of the deeper Durham collieries, such as Hetton, sunk to a depth of c 
900ft. 5 
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Map 1: The North-East, c 1815 
In the North-East, the interaction among the three branches of engineering 
- civil, mechanical and mining - was marked, men such as Chapman, Buddle, 
Wood, Thompson and Stephenson being active in all fields. Their works 
included the perfecting of steam locomotion, the construction of a part 
of the area's waggonway system, - the building of timber staiths and, later, 
of the coal drops which had been first used in 1812. They were to be 
responsible also for the early railway construction. Much has been 
written on the region's waggonways by Lewis, Lee and Flinn and their 
details need not here be discussed; whatever method wqs adopted they 
may be looked upon simply as a means of transporting coal- to the region's 
ports. 
From the waggonways, the coal was transferred either to keels or 
ships by means of staiths and drops. The up-river waggonways could 
discharge only into keels, which then carried coal down-river to waiting 
colliers, trans-shipment being by basket or manual casting. The large 
number of keels in use on the Tyne and Wear, and to a lesser extent at 
Blyth, combined with the vast shipping traffic, led to excessive and 
unacceptable congestion in the lower sections of the rivers; in turn, 
their inadequate facilities led to a need for better means of trans-shipment 
and for river improvements which would provide the collier fleets with 
greater protection in harbour and with an increased depth of water in 
the rivers themselves, so avoiding the often necessary grounding of ships 
when loading. 
River improvements varied from minimal on the Tyne and Blyth to 
extensive on the Wear and Tees; at the end of this period the almost 
unprecedented development of Seaham Harbour was undertaken. Compared 
with Seaham, the scope of works on the other rivers was restricted but 
nonetheless all were directed towards the same end, the furtherance of 
the coal trade; this trade was to change the nature of the river Tees 
completely. 
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3.2. River Tyne 
Although the river Tyne had for many years been a major port, little 
had been done to improve it and it was not until 1813 that John Rennie 
(1761-1821) was called upon to inspect and survey the river. Following 
very comprehensive surveys made for him by Francis Giles (1787-1847) 
and John Rennie Jnr. , (1794-1874)1 he submitted his report to the Newcastle 
Common Council in 1816. Indicative of the Council's attitude towards 
its river - to obtain the greatest benefit for the least cost - it was 
not until 1836 that the then newly-formed River Committee heard the report 
read and ordered that it should be printed. 
2 
Rennie began his report, somewhat ominously, by stating that there 
was, perhaps, no other river in Britain "on which it is more difficult 
a 
to give a satisfactory opinion, as to the best mode of improving its 
3 
navigation, than the river Tyne" As Rennie saw it, the problem was 
that two incompatible qualities were to be sought, width and depth; 
increasing one would decrease the other. As a result he advised against 
solid longitudinal retaining walls and instead advocated the construction 
of groynes , filling between them with dredged material and then joining 
their river extremities by rubble walls built to half-tide height. 
By so reclaiming land the surface area of the river - below the Newcastle 
bridge - would be reduced from 13ý4 to 896 acres and to make up for the 
volume of water lost. he recommbnded-removýng sevekal-of the'river's sEindbanks. 
Rationalising the channel would raise high-water levels up-river, increase 
the scouring* effect of the ebb tide and so augment the depth of water 
over the bar by two feet. 
Considering the mouth of the river, Rennie drew comparisons with 
Aberdeen which in 1770 had been very similar to the Tyne's present state-. 
There, advice of John Smeaton (1.7'24-1792) had been, sought and his suggestions 
as to the form the entrance works should take had been adopted, with 
great success. This example could well be adopted for the Tyne and 
Rennie accordingly suggested that a pier be built on the south side of 
19 
the entrance to the river, presumably envisaging that the projecting 
point to the north would complement it. 
Rennie estimated the works as costing L519,320, an expenditure much 
in excess of anything previously considered and 20 times the gross revenue 
derived from the river. By causing the masonry walls at North and South 
Shields to be built at the expense of the riparian owners - the Corporation 
would provide dredged material as backfill -a saving of some L80,000 
could be achieved. In order not to impede navigation, the work should 
be undertaken gradually with the first operations being the formation 
of a uniform channel with the associated removal of projecting obstructions. 
Rennie did not comment on the provision of docks, other than to note 
that they could readily be provided at a later date, neither did he expand 
regarding their possible location although proposals for wet docks had 
already been made; at Mill Dam, South Shields; 
4 
at Coble Dene; and at 
Ouseburn, where William Chapman (1750-1832) had envisaged the terminus 
of his project for a canal from Newcastle to the Irish Channel. 
5 
In spite of the major works recommended by Rennie not having been 
carried out, nevertheless the Common Council did continue to oversee 
the river Tyne, especially so far as the provision of new quays and staiths 
was concerned, the latter reflecting the opening-up of new collieries. 
Early mining had been in the vicinity of Newcastle itself but with the 
introduction of more effective pumping plant, better ventilation and 
improved haulage methods it had become possible to mine coal from greater 
depths, so leading to collieries situated some distance from the riverý 
and to the east of Newcastle, beinq developed, 
6 
and, in some instances, 
re-opened. These developments led to no fewer than 28 applications 
being made to the Corporation between 1815 and 1830 for permission either 
to build or extend existing staiths or spouts; 17 of them were on the 
north bank of the Tyne between Walker and North Shields. * Principally, the 
From the volumes of the Calendar of Common Council Book, Newcastle covering the period the 
following applications have been listed: 
1815: Hebburn. 
1817: Heaton colliery at Wallsend Quay; Brandlings at Wallsend staith. e (continued ov rleaf) 
applications were for outlets at, or near existing staiths or spouts, 
some necessary due to river silting and others the result of shippers 
seeking deeper water to accommodate ships of greater tonnage. 
Several of the applications were for new staiths associated with 
waggonways and although not within the scope of this study, nevertheless 
some will be outlined. Prior to the end of the 18th century the waggonways 
to the north of the river had been limited in number and modest in scale, 
sample figures - they varied as collieries began and ended production 
- were six below the bridge and four above it, the longest some five_- 
miles; south of the river the comparable figures were three and eight, 
the longest eight miles. With the expansion in mining activity came 
the need for additional shipping facilities and in 1818 Benjamin Thompson 
(1779-1867) applied for a staith at Scotswood where a waggonway from Wylam 
terminated; this colliery was later to use the Newcastle and Carlisle 
railway. In 1820 an application was made by the Brandlings for an outlet 
at Bill Quay for their colliery at Heworth but this proposal encountered 
problems regarding the Pelaw Main waggonway, in 1809 planned by Thompson, 
the leading advocate of rope-haulage systems. 
7A further application 
for a new shipping place was from the Grand Allies for the Springwell 
waggonway, opened in 1826; John-Buddle (1773-1843), later to be associated 
with the Marquis of Londonderry and the construction of Seaham Harbour, 
had made a financial appraisal and, the colliery's promoters being satisfied 
as to the scheme's viability, it was proceeded with. 
8 The line ran to-the- 
1817: - Heaton Colliery at Wallsend Quay; Brandlings at Wallsend staith. 
1818: Ellison at Hebburn; Carr and Grace at Walker. 
1819: Ellison at Hebburn; Thompson at Scotswood. 
1820: Percy Main; Elswick; Brandlings at Heworth; Liddell at Willington; Willington 
Colliery extension; Ridley, for ballast quay. 
1821: Russell at Wallsend; Wallsend colliery; Bulman, for ballast quay; West Jesmond 
Colliery; Whitley colliery; Brandlings at Bill Quay. 
1822: Elswick colliery. 
1823: Walker colliery. 
1824: Jarrow colliery; Earsdon colliery at Whitehill Point; Seghill colliery; Cramlington 
Colliery. 
1825: Seghill colliery at Hendon; Bowes; Mount Moor at Jarrow; Elswick. 
1829: Jarrow colliery. 
1830: Brandlings at Wallsend; Heaton colliery. 
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river at Jarrow and was later connected to the Mount Moor colliery, formerly 
shipping coal to the Wear. This line, later to become the Pontop and 
Jarrow Railway, was to have been ll-2 miles in length but only the eastern 
half was constructed initially; steam locomotives, rope haulage and self- 
acting inclines were used. 
9 
Up to 1814 the staiths located on the river's banks were of simple 
construction, platforms with the dual purpose of storing coal and enabling 
it to be easily carted'or barrowed into keels or ships. In that year, 
however, more complicated arrangements were provided by Thompson at Wallsend 
for the Fawdon colliery. Here a covered shed was provided some 24 feet 
above low water, so enabling coal to be stored at the river until such 
time as ships were available; the same design had been used at Pelaw 
Main two year's earlier, the shed there being 600 ft in length. 
10 Further 
developments led to spouts being incorporated into the staiths, or gears, 
and these timber trestle structures were in places built to a length of 
up to 250 ft beyond high water, so enabling bigger ships to load direct; 
the gears were some 30 ft above high water level. In 1830 the owners 
of Burdon Main colliery made application for a coal drop, "this lately 
invented Improvement", whereby a loaded chaldron was lowered to deck 
level by means of a contrabalanced platform. It had been patented by 
Chapman in 1807 12. and adopted only by Thompson at Wallsend in 1815.13 
It was not until after the expiry of Chapman's patent that the use of 
coal drops, designed to reduce the breakage of cQal, -became generalthrougn- 
-out the region. Of the waggonways to the north of the Tyne the most 
ambitious of the pre 1830 lines was the Brunton and Shields railway, almost 
ten miles long, which carried coal from collieries to the north west of 
Newcastle to the point on the Tyne where the Northumberland Dock was to be 
later built, at H aýhole. - The line was built by Thompson and was completed 
in 1826.14 To a larger scale than the waggonway proposals of this period 
was the suggestion made by Chapman in 18ý4 that the line which he had 
surveyed in 1795 for a canal between Newcastle and Carlisle could be easily 
22 
adapted for railway use. 
15 His suggestion was adopted and led to Chapman 
producing a report on the proposed railway, his estimate for it being 
E252,000 as opposed to the L800,000 which the canal would have cost; 
the later surveys were undertaken by Chapman,. and Thompson together. 
Associated with the export of coal was the bringing into the river 
of the ballast used by colliers returning light to the Tyne. To save 
time in port there was a temptation to off-load it in the harbour entrance, 
and in the river itself, and regulations - not easily enforced - strove 
to prevent these dangerous and, for the river's conservators, expensive 
practices. The regulations aimed at ensuring that ships discharged ballast 
only at approved points, the Corporation receiving dues of up to 113 per 
, 16 ton. Some ballast was used as raw material for the river's glass and 
chemical industries but the major part formed the vast ballast heaps on 
the river banks; the Corporation paid contractors for its off-loading 
but continued to extract profit from the operation. Between lBl5 and 
1830 the profit to the Corporation on ballast averaged L6,420 p. a. 
17 
Illegal dumping of ballast in the river exacerbated its silting problems 
and although not recorded some minor dredging -a barge was purchased 
in 1820 - must have been undertaken, the reputed expenditure on the river 
averaging Z1,924 p. a. during this period. Ballast also brought other 
problems and in 1825 a committee reported to the Common Council that Josias 
Jessop (1781-1826), when in the area, had inspected the ballast quay at 
Willington where the superimposed load was forcing the masonry quay wall 
into the river; Jessop judiciously advocated leaving it alone until it 
collapsed as no secondary damage would occur and the longer the heap had 
to settle into the soft underlying strata the better. 
18 It was however, 
recommended that the heap be raised no further and an adjoining site used 
instead. 
The increase in the numbers of staiths, and their improvement, led 
to an increase in the tonnage of coal shipped from the river; between 
23 
IB15 and 1B30 it rose from 1.83m to 2.46m tons. The rise was accompanied 
by a reduction in the numbers of keels emploved on the river, symptomatic 
of additional down-river staiths. Bet-ween 1622 and 1827 the number of 
keelmen in employment below the bridge fell from 300 to 150 while the 
number operating from collieries above the bridge rose from 600 to 700.19 
By this time some two-thirds of the river's shipments were being made 
from below Newcastle. 
By 1827 the number of keels on the Tyne was some 300 but their existence 
could, by then, be seen to be threatened by the improvement in methods 
of shipment. That the keelmen were antaconistic towards the use of staiths 
is borne out by a dispute in 1819 when the keelmen demanded that staiths 
at Whitehill Point be removed as a nuisance was being caused. 
20 One 
of the coalowners, William Russell, was indicted by the keelmen regarding 
staiths at Wallsend, leading to a court case, King vs Russell in 1824.21 
In spite of all protestations, the use of keels was in decline. 
In spite of an increase in coal shipments there was no rise in revenue; 
it was c Z24,000 p. a. in both 1815 and 1830, averaging c E22,000 over 
22 
the period. The sum used on the river's maintenance - there were no 
improvements - amounted to less than &12,000 p. a. leaving the balance to 
be appropriated by the Newcastle Corporation to use as it wished, whether 
for town improvements or for other purposes. It was the despotism of 
Newcastle in relation to the river which resulted in the disputes which 
took place,. principally between Newcastle on the one hand and North and 
South Shields in the other. 
One of the causes of the sporadic disputes was the matter of Customs. 
As the river's principal town, the office was located in Newcastle and 
in 1815 a "Committee of the Shipping Interest"23 from North and South 
Shields agreed to write to the 2nd Duke of Northumberland (1742-1817) 
for his support and also to seek advice as to the powers of the High Court 
of Admiralty, "the 
24 
generall Conservators of all navigable Rivers". 
24 
At this time, of the 800 ships registered in the Tyne, some 75% were owned 
by North and South Shields and as the greater part of the shipping activity 
took place in the lower river it was thought, understandably, that Customs 
facilities should be provided in either of the towns. The case of the 
shipowners was taken up by the Duke, who put to the Treasury his views 
as to "the Propriety (and) almost the absolute necessity of granting the 
25 Shipowners of North and South Shields the Indulgence they desired ." 
The case put by Newcastle to counter the claim was that a considerable 
proportion of the river's collieries were situated above Newcastle "which 
may at present be fairly stated to be the very centre of the coal distri ct 11 
26; 
this view prevailed in the deliberations of the Treasury, the Corporation's 
case - presented by Ridley and Ellison - being based upon the fact that 
there were 28 collieries in Newcastle but only three in North Shields 
27 
and the proportion of coal vended was 1.51m and 135,000 tons respectively. 
Failure in 1815 was followed by another application in 1827, thr. otigh 
the Duke of Northumberland, and, no result having been achieved, the matter 
was revived in 1830' by the shipping interest of Shields. The case was 
similar to that of 1815 but details were given as to the parts of the 
river from which coal was shipped: 324,000 tons by keel; 808,000 tons 
from staiths less than three miles from Shields; 292,000 tons from staiths 
equidistant from Newcastle and Shields; 347,000 tons within four miles 
of Newcastle. 
28 Using these figures, Shields again felt justified in'- 
seeking a separate Customs Office but the cause was again opposed by 
the towns of Newcastle and Gateshead and their Chambers of Commerce. 
The case for Newcastle was that - more than half of the port's shipping 
was registered there while some 80, '0 of the coal was shipped "at the staiths 
of the several collieries on the shores of the river in the intermediate 
space between Newcastle and Shields. , 
29 It was noted that ships of 
up to almost 400 tons register were able to deliver goods' to within two 
or three miles of the town, although this view was disputed by North 
25 
Shields which considered it to be risky for ships to proceed up-river 
to Newcastle. 
Once again, Newcastle's case was espoused by the two Members, propounding 
the view that Newcastle, with Gateshead, now having a population of c 
50,000 saw itself as the river's paramount town and it was contended that 
all the region's coal companies, and its manufacturers, maintained offices 
in Newcastle and in any case, all the principal Shields manufacturers 
lived in Newcastle. The verdict again went against Shields. 
That the Corporation was unwilling to fulfil its obligations so far 
as river management was concerned is confirmed by events in 1824 when 
due to some reluctance on Newcastle's part to remedy a nuisance caused 
by staiths at the Low Lights, North Shields, Chapman wrote to Rennie, 
then engineer to the Admiralty, who wrote to the Admiralty that "the 
conservators of the River Tyne should without delay be requested to adopt 
some general and effectual system of improvement to. prevent encroachment 
upon the tideway , 
30 
which at this time had taken the form of a build-up 
of land at the gears. At the Inquiry held in 1833 as a precursor to 
the formation of a reformed Council it was held by one of the witnesses, 
Robert Plummer, that of the twenty recommendations made by Rennie almost 
20 years earlier, only two - including the removal of the Tyne Main 
shoal - had been implemented. In his opinion the river had not improved 
since 1816; the only factor which had produced some amelibration was 
that by the 1830 s the use of steam greatly assisted the handling of ships. 
31 
At the time of the inquiry the Newcastle Chronicle quoted "Mr. Cobbett 
(in the House of Commons): I will only say that I believe the corruption 
32 
of the corporation of Newcastle to be as great as it possibly can be ." 
Whether corrupt or not, its lethargy in improving the river Tyne is indicated 
by the negligible increase -a crude indicator- - in coal exports over 
the 15 year period and to the fact that the river still possessed its 
shoals, to the great impediment of shipping. 
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By 1830 an engineering industry - not significant so far as the river 
was concerned - had been founded, a chemical industry had come into being, 
shipbuilding was continuing along the river's length and the glass and 
salt industries, if not flourishing, were at least in evidence. It was, 
however, the coal trade which was most in need of river improvements and 
in spite of the complaints made by both coal owners and ship owners the 
hold of the Corporation on the river was such that progress on a public 
scale was impossible; only private capital spending was able to ameliorate 
matters 
3.3 River Wear 
In contrast to the Tyne, in 1815 Jargely' * unimproved, the river 
Wear had been under the control of the River Wear Commission (RWC) since 
1717; as a result it had become the best-maintained port in the region. 
Over the years, the commissioners had experienced problems with the riparian 
owners, largely on account of encroachments being made into the river; 
in this they experienced a "fundamental paradox inherent (in their role 
in that) ... while they sought to improve navigability and thereby foster 
trade in doing so they ran the risk of encouraging the very factors which 
threatened navigability. "' 
Many disputes between the owners and the commissioners resulted, 
at various times Chapman, Jessop and Wooler becoming involved. One case, 
perhaps the most significant, involved the Pemberton family, prominent 
in the town and influential on the RWC. The dispute centred on the problems 
concerning access to the Pembertons I quay and whereas the commissioners 
argued that encroachment reduced the tidal flow and hence caused silting, 
the Pembertons I view was that the construction of quays would reduce the 
channel width, increase the tidal reach and so improve the channel; such 
measures would also reduce the problems due to ice, of concern also on 
the Tyne. The dispute has been chronicled by Miller 
2 but, to su mmarise, 
it led to a defeat for the commissioners' policy by virtue of a vote influenced 
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by the Pembertons - the decision was later reversed - and it caused the 
RWC to take the Pembertons to court, the commissioners losing the case 
and being called upon to pay the Pembertons c E145 in damages and costs. 
It was this decision which in 1818 led the commissioners to seek a new 
Act of Parliament to strengthen their powers. 
3 Through the assistance 
of Lord Lambton the Act was obtained, one of its most important provisions 
being that marker posts be set up to define the Quay Line to be established 
by Rennie. Any encroachment of the river by developers was to be compensated 
for by "a Space ... between high and low Watermark... for so much Tide Water 
as shall be obstructed ... so that the scouring effects of the Tide Water... shall 
not be dimini! Bhed. 
;, 4 Whereas the line established by Rennie on the Tyne 
was not wholly enforceable, that on the Wear was backed by the powers 
of Parliament. 
The other principal points wherein the two rivers differed was, firstly 
in the engineering supervision accorded to them and secondly in the fact 
that the Wear had been the subject of considerable improvement to its 
mouth. From its inception the RWC had employed resident engineers, and 
in 1817 Thomas Milton was so appointed by which time some of, the impetus 
for improvement appears to have been lost; 
5 in contrast, it was not until 
1832 that a resident engineer was employed on the Tyne. Under the succession 
of engineers the river Wear had been improved, dredging undertaken and 
piers provided at the mouth and Sunderland, by 1815, ranked as one of 
the major ports in the U. K. with coal exports totalling some 950,000 tons, 
of which 94% was shipped coast-wise. This traffic - the major trade 
was in coal - was carried in 5747 
6 
carqoes and the improvements to the 
river bar had been such that the minimum depth was 17 ft at high water. 
On the Wear, coal was originally brought to the river by a network 
of waggonways but the system was somewhat different from the Tyne's in 
that, the shipping points were, in the main, much more tightly grouped on 
a two-mile stretch of river between Fatfield and Cox Green; the latter 
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some seven miles from the river's mouth. The waggonways on the north 
bank brought coal from the Washington area with two longer routes, some 
nine miles in length, bringing coal from the Beamish and Pelton Moor areas 
lying to the west of Fatfield. On the south bank, of the river the collieries 
served were those in the Penshaw, Newbottle and Lumley areas, their waggon- 
ways extending for four miles in a generally north-south direction. 
Superimposed on these earlier lines, however, were two of more recent 
construction, the Newbottle waggonway of 1815 - or Lord Durham's railway 
- and the Hetton colliery railway of 1822, both leading to Sunderland itself 
rather than to the up-river shipping points. 
The southern collieries were larger than were the northern and were 
controlled principally by the Vane-Tempest, or Londonderry, and Lambton 
families, with the Hetton Coal Company an aggressive competitor from 1823; 
it, unlike the others, was in part financed from London, Buddle - he was 
employed by the Londonderry concern as salaried Viewer in 1819 - writing 
that it had been enabled to begin operations only by its promoters "prowling 
round the Royal Exchange and the Stock Market... (whereby they) completely 
got Hetton under weight in London. ,7 Buddle's involvement in the coal 
trade of the North East was perhaps the most influential of any. , Himself 
heavily involved in the Tyneside coal trade, he also invested in railways 
and shipping and, in addition, was Secretary of the Tyne Committee, interested 
in the tradels, regulations; from 1819 he also attended meetings of the 
Wear Committee. Two of the Durham coal-owners dominated the Wear's trade 
and in 1814, with a total Wear -vend of. 950,000 tons, the Vane- Tempbst interests 
totalled 250,000 tons and the Lambton 245,000; the Hetton collieries 
were later to rival them. 
The Newbottle railway was built to transport coal into Sunderland 
itself, where spouts or drops were provided for loading direct into colliers. 
At the same time Sir Henry Vane-Tempest had given consideration to providing 
his own railway to Sunderland but in 1819 Buddle suggested to his successor, 
29 
Sir Charles William Stewart, later the third Marquis of Londonderry, that 
an alternative would be to share the railway from Newbottle, so obviating 
the need for horse-drawn transport to the Wear at Penshaw. The suggestion 
was not taken up but, perhaps because of the 1819-20 freeze-up of the 
Wear and the purchase by Lambton of the Newbottle interests in 1822, the 
matter was revived, the plan this time being that Lambton and Londonderry 
share the same line into Sunderland. No agreement was reached and Londonderry 
instead decided to proceed with the construction of his own port at Seaham. 
8 
. 
The second of the later waggonways to the Wear was the Hetton Colliery 
railway to Sunderland where new staiths were built on the south bank of 
the river up-stream of the bridge. The engineer for this line was George 
Stephenson (17B1-1848), perhaps employed through the influence of Nicholas 
Wood. (1795-1865), a partner in the Hetton company. The railway, the 
first designed specifically for steam haulage - at least in part - opened 
in November 1822; on the level stretches of its eight-mile length locomotives 
were employed while winding engines. hauled traffic on the inclines. 
The Hetton colliery, the sinking of which had begun early in December 
1820, was by 1823 shipping 44,000 tons in a six-month period. 
9 At the 
terminus of the railway - or railways -a "very convenient apparatus (was) 
built for discharging into ships, and a huge warehouse"10 established 
adjacent to the river, where apparently three variants of coal drop existed 
by 1826, worked in conjunction with self-acting inclines. 
Before the construction of these later waggonways all coal was loaded 
via, the-se. ver@l qtaiths _.. into keels, from which 
it was trans-shipped into 
colliers at Sunderland. In an effort to reduce transport costs, Buddle 
introduced to the Londonderry concern the principle of tubbing "whereby 
the waggons of coal were lowered by a drop at Penshaw staith into keels 
fitted with tubs which were then transferred by machine from the keels 
into the ships at Sunderland". 
" It would seem that two versions of 
this trans-shipment equipment were used, one shoia-mounted and loading 
30 
coal from a keel moored to the shore with the ship an its river-side 
12 
and the other a floating device, invented by Chapman in 1821.13 Chapman's 
crane lay between ship and keel and with a6H. P. steam engine, 50 tons 
of coal could be transferred in an hour. 
14 By 1828 some 70% of the coal 
not loaded direct into colliers was being transhipped by tubs, the remainder 
by normal handling from keel to ship. 
15 Differences betwen sources make 
it difficult to ascertain the numbers of keels used an the Wear: in the 
1771 flood, it was noted, 200 keels were sunk or badly damaged and, in 
addition, 300 were swept out to sea; 
16 by 1799,520 were reported as 
being in use on the Wear, more than on the Tyne 
17 and Flinn n6tes'45ý'* 
keels on the Wear and 338 on the Tyne as averages for the 1790 -s but records 
a decline by 1828 to 200 and 300 respectively; 
18 by 1862 the use of keels 
had ended. The figures are not incompatible and compared with the numbers 
of keels used on the Tyne reflect.. the greater reliance placed upon them 
c 1820 on the Wear and, in fact, the figures given for that year show 
that no less than 90'/o of the coal was shipped by keel, 
19 
while some 7,000 
colliers, and other ships, cleared the port. 
The RWC was somewhat unwieldy with no fewer than 200 members qualified 
by virtue of an income of L200 p. a. or estate of Z6,000; unbelievably, 
such had been the problems in holding meetings that the quorum was reduced 
in the commissioners 1809 Act 
20 from seven to five. * Day-to-day river 
improvements were controlled by successive resident engineers but, in 
common with many other public bodies, reports were periodically called 
for from more eminent consulting engineers and although Rennie had originally 
been asked to report only upon the 1819 Quay Line his remit was soon 
extended to include the whole river, piers and harbour. He expressed 
doubts as to whether he could undertake this work - the RWC looked to 
Thomas Telford (1757-1834) as an alternative - but discussions were held 
with him concerning the possible replacement of the south pier. A report 
was duly received from Rennie in which he recommended that the piers be 
again extended but set further to the north to combat currents and tides, 
The 1717 Act provided for 65 members; the 1759 Act for 350; and the 1789 Act for 300. 
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to increase the scour and to assist shipping. The commissioners were 
in some doubt as to what procecdure to adopt; the south pier had been% 
damaged and in order to assist them in their deliberations Chapman was 
asked for his opinion. 
21 Repairs to it were put in hand under Milton's 
superintendence and a length of almost 700 ft was rebuilt using masonry 
in place of the earlier timber structure. The blocks, weighing from 
five to seven tons were laid "at such a depth as to guard, as much as 
possible, against any injury which the piers might sustain from the effects 
22 
of scouring" . With this rebuilding the pier was now 1950 ft in length 
and to assist with the better laying of the foundations, a diving bell 
was eventually acquired from Rennie for Z385.23 Problems arose regarding 
the stone used for the pier's construction--; initially it was to have 
been supplied by the Londonderry interests but a dispute involving Buddle, 
since 1819 a commissioner himself, caused the RWC in 1828 to open up its 
own quarry. 
Rennie had died in 1821 and the RWC approached the Admiralty seeking 
his replacement by Giles. Refusal led to George and John Rennie jnr., 
being appointed jointly but the RWC soon asked for simplification as there 
were "technical objections , 
24 to a joint tenure. The eventual appointment 
of the younger Rennie led to the publication of the quay line and to riparian 
owners being asked to remove jetties projecting beyond it. Subsequent 
negotiations with riverside owners were few: in 1816 the RWC had noted 
that a quay owned by the Lambton and Vane-Tempest interests on the south 
bank of the river was defective; the previously-noted dispute with Pemberton 
had arisen; an application was made by the Londonderry collieries to 
form a quarry on land owned by Sir Hedworth Williamson near the bridge, 
this application being granted as Chapman was engineer and the quay line 
was being respected. It is probable that this quay was projected to 
accommodate the coal-tub hoist noted previously. 
Sunderland was one of the earliest ports in Britain to employ mechanical 
32 
dredging, the first there being operated in 1798, using a4H. P. engine; 
not a success it was sold in IB0425 and the RWC presumably resorted to 
hand dredging. A further dredger had been purchased from the Butterley 
Company in 1811, this time with an 8 H. P. engine although, by virtue of 
the fact that it was loaned both to the Newbottle colliery owners and 
to Hartlepool, it can not have been fully utilised 
26 
and the RWC supplemented 
it in 1814 with a vessel to remove the dredged material to sea. In 1817 
Milton was instructed to report on the cost of providing a dredger "with 
a double set of buckets , 
27 but it was not until 1824 that he was asked 
to have built a barge to accommodate the dredging machinery and the following 
year he was "to put up a new engine and a complete set of machinery to 
work on both sides of the dredging bargpý lately constructed. , 
28 The 
RWC sufferdd, as did the Tyne conservators, from problems relating to ballast. 
Regulations were extant forbidding its being dumped in the river but the 
RWC encountered difficulties greater than the Tynels, due to the Wear 
flowing in a more restricted valley, so precluding the formation of ballast 
heaps on the same scale. In 1827 a committee was formed to investigate 
the problem and it reported that further disposal of ballast on land was 
impracticable; it must be deposited at sea and to that end recommended 
that six 100 ton barges be acquired. 
29 
By 1828 coal shipments on the Wear were rising at a rate of almost 
3% p. a. compound, greater than were the Tyne's, but a new development had 
by this time taken place, the formation of' the Stockton and Darlington 
Railway with its export of coal from the river Tees, and it is probable 
that it was this factor, more than any other, which led to the commissioners 
forming a committee to investigate the means which could be best adopted 
to improve the harbour. The membership of the committee included Cuthbert 
Sharp, Capt. Cochrane of the Hetton Coal Company and Wood 
30 
and in July 
1829 it reported both as to provision of better accommodation and as to 
a renewal of Parliamentary powers. 
33 
The committee, noting that it "is universally admitted that the Port 
is too small for its increased trade... (and it therefore) becomes a subject 
of imperious necessity to consider by what* artificial means this deficiency 
Ol 
may be supplied I pointed out that although the river's depth had been 
progressively increased "the want of superficial space is the great and 
serious difficulty", 
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a problem which could be solved only by the provision 
of wet docks. The report noted earlier comments made by Ralph Dodd (1755- 
1822) in 1794 giving his view that a dock could well be formed on the 
north bank of the river, "one of the first docks or basons of any that 
I know of in this kingdom for its convenience, being so near the open 
sea,,. 
33 Dodd foresaw that his proposed dock would contain 237 ships 
of 90 ft length and 27 ft beam, larger than those then frequenting the 
port, and the 13 acre dock, up to 15 ft in depth, could be formed for E28,946. 
Four years later, Jonathan Pickernell (1765-1814) had reported to the 
same effect, envisaging a seven acre dock costing E50,000. In contrast 
William Jessop (1745-1814) had in 1807 reported against the proposal, 
looking instead to an extension of river moorings above the bridge, although 
he admitted that a dock -could be made on the north bank. The last of 
the earlier reports referred to was that of William Bell, made in 1816. 
Noting the, destruction of shipping which had at times taken place he recommended 
that wet docks be built but, discounting the north side, described how 
one could be constructed to the south to hold 300 ships of 250 tons; 
he did not venture to make an estimate of cost. The report concluded 
with the prediction "that when we have a floating dock at Sunderland... 
the collieries upon the Wear will become more extensive ... as the vesels 
will be encouraged to trade to the port... and Sunderland will become the 
,, 34 first sea port in the Kingdom, as far as respects the coal trade... 
Having considered the past plans the committee had met the town's shipowners 
who, however, did not offer any constructive suggestion and its attention 
then turned to the possible location. The northern site provided a suitable 
foundation and an easy access to the sea but it was on private land and 
34 
had the great disadvantage that all the principal collieries were to the 
south of the river. Mainly because of this fact the Committee decided 
in favour of a -dock on the south bank of the river, either at the South 
Battery or at Rector's Gill, above the bridge. A dock at the former 
site would involve the reclamation of land and would necessitate the collieries 
by-passing the town on its south side to enable their coals to reach the 
loading points by rail; only if the dock were provided with staiths or 
spouts could it become remunerative. This site would decrease river 
traffic but the alternative site, Rector's Gill, would tend to increase 
it by providing an up-river dock near the existing staiths. Either scheme 
could cost E150-200,000 and it was considered that the funds of the RWC 
could not be used in the construction of dock works, "leaving the matter 
perfectly open to any body of adventurers. , 
35 The RWC should be responsible 
only for the preservation and improvement of the river and any future 
Act sought should not make provision for dock construction. 
To assist the committee Robert Stevenson (1772-1850) was asked in 
1828 to report on Ithe places where it will be practicable to form wet 
Docks , 36 and the following year he suggested that, due to the importance 
of the river and its coal trade, Telford should be consulted,. a move not 
agreed to by the commissioners. Like the committee, Stevenson stressed 
the inter-dependence of river and coal, railway transport with steam locomotion 
havihg_ cheapened transport. He noted that 800 keels* used the river, 
and with 22 ft beam with a draught of only 2-2 ft., they caused considerable 
nuisance and congestion. To obviate the problem docks should be built 
as the. river's useful area was only 40 acres and even that was impeded 
by sandbanks at low tide. Stevenson investigated four options for the 
forming of docks: cutting off the bend at Southwick to form a floating 
harbour of 36 acres; converting the river into a wet dock of some 46 
acres by forming a cut and tunnel through Monkwearmouth at a cost of L233,300; 
constructing a dock on the Potato Garth - the north dock site of some 
c. fp 31; .I- 
35 
20 to 30 acres; and building docks on the south bank, east of the barracks, 
where 30 acres could be provided. Stevenson discounted the first as 
being inaccessible, the second would prove expensive, and the t -hird was 
unconnected by rail with the coal-field and also subjected to wave effects. 
He therefore recommended that any dock should be to the south of the Wear 
and although considerable expense would be incurred,, the "acquisition 
would be great, but certainly not more than the advancing state of the 
trade of the port seems to require. , 
37 With facilities for connections 
by rail, the proposed dock would cost E193,300 and would hold 300 ships 
of 100 tons. 
Although both Stevenson and the committee had stressed the necessity 
for docks, nevertheless the RWC, in the 1830 application to. Parliament, 
did not seek such powers and the Act principally confirmed the 1819 quay. '**- 
line, gave the commissioners no powers as to docks or railways, and stipulated 
the number of commissioners as 134; all the region's coal-owners were 
included, other than Londonderry, although his viewer, Buddle, remained 
a-member. River improvements had been limited since 1815 but nevertheless 
there had been a growth in trade with 1.385m tons of coal shipped, an 
increase of 4 Gilo 'With the number of Wear collieries in 1829 being stated 
by Buddle as six to the north of the river and twelve to the South. 
38 
The principal change, however, was in the fact that the greater part of 
the coal was now shipped in Sunderland and with the two waggonways completed 
and Hetton colliery in production some 755'o of shipments originated from 
the Londonderry, Lambton and Hetton collieries; 
39 
the last- named was, 
by 1830, perhaps the largest colliery in the U. K. with an output of c 
400,000 tons p. a., significant in the total North-East output of 6.915m tons. 
40 
So far as other industries were concerned the Wear showed both differences 
from and similarities to the Tyne. Whereas chemicals were produced on 
the Tyne, the Wear manufactured little but, like the Tyneý possessed a thriving 
glass and pottery trade. With the presence of establishments such as 
36 
Abbot, Hawks Crawshay, Hawthorn and Stephenson the Tyne had by 1830 az. 
flourishing engineering industry, not nearly so important oh the Wear, 
which conversely had an important limestone exporting trade, shipping 
in 1816 30,000 tons of limestone and c 25,000 tons of lime, figures which 
by 1830 had increased to 40,000 and c 35,000 respectively. 
41, On both 
rivers, shipbuilding was important and the Wear by 1830 had some 30 shipyards, 
many of them small establishments building timber ships; of the yards 
destined to survive, Laing had established ýa yard at Deptford in 1818, 
Austin at Monkwearmouth in 1826 and Thompson at North Sands in 1819. 
In 1830, the Wear produced 15,000 tons of shipping, Newcastle 5,000 tons 
42 
and the U. K. a total of c 60,000 tons. 
3.4 River Tees 
By 1815, the Tees Navigation Company (TNC), by virtue of the powers., 
granted by its IBOB Act, had completed its first improvement to the 
river Tees, the formation of the Mandale Cut, shortening the distance 
from Stockton to the sea by some two miles. What was, perhaps, of even 
greater significance for the area's future was that it was at the dinner 
held to celebrate the opening of the new river channel - it took place 
on 18th September 1810 - that the proposal was made by Leonard Raisbeck 
(1783-1845) that a committee be formed to investigate "the practicability 
of building either a canal or a railway to join Darlington and Stockton 
with Winston, for the more easy and expeditious carriage of coals"' from 
the south-west Durham boalfield to the Tees. The committee did not report 
until 16 montý_s had elapsed, and it was then agreed that Rennie should 
be called upon for his advice. 
His survey was wide-reaching but he concluded that Whitworth's earlier 
line, already noted, could not be bettered; Rennie's estimate, submitted 
in 1813, was higher than those previously made by Whitworth and others. 
The 31 ft wide canal would cost f205,618, of which sum E95,600 was for 
the sections between Darlington and Stockton. It was not until 1B16 
37 
that public consideration was again given to the project and proposals 
were made that only the Stockton to Darlington section should be built 
as a canal, the extension westwards being by means of a railway; without 
branches, the comparable costs would be E179,578 for a canal and L141,460 
for the canal/rail scheme. 
2 Subsequently, it was considered that the 
railway would be better to the north of Winston, so connecting the collieries 
near West Auckland by. a more direct line to Darlington. 
Concurrent with the Stockton and Darlington proposal was another 
projected by Christopher Tennant (d: 1839), "a public spirited inhabitant 
of Stockton, who had come to the conclusion that the Tees might compete 
3 
successfully with either the Tyne or the Wear in the exportation of coals. " 
He employed George Leather (1787-1870) to survey a line from the Tees 
at Portrack, almost directly to Shildon and Evenwood. Leather estimated 
that the canal - an interesting feature was its crossing of the river 
Skerne where the river passed beneath the canal in the form of an inverted 
syphon 
4_ 
avoiding Darlington completely would cost E205,283 and a further 
E35,812 would be involved should it be provided with a branch to Durham. 
His report was in 1818 brought before a public meeting in Stockton, called 
to consider "the practicability of connecting the town of Stockton (by 
means of a canal) with the western Part of this County, which is known 
to be so abundantly stored with treasures, viz. , coal lead , lime, - ironstone 
,, 5 etc... and such was the enthusiasm engendered that it was resolved to 
seek immediate Parliamentary powers for the canal's construction, although 
some dissent had been expressed by Raisbeck, solicitor to the TNC. He 
put forward the view that the canal should begin at Stockton, not downstream 
from it, and should pass through Darlington; if the line were to connect 
only ' the coal-field to the river the scheme "must produce a most serious 
injury to the three principal towns of this port, by withdrawing trade 
from them. ,6 With the improved section of the Tees threatened by the 
possibility of its being by-passed, it is understandable that Raisbeck 
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feared a subsequent diminution in river revenue. He also anticipated 
correctly the intentions of Tennant in that "the wishes of the present 
projector, whose only object appears to be the acquisition of coal, may 
be accommodated by means of a railway at one half the expense. .7 herein 
lay the germ of the proposal to form later the Clarence Railway. 
Both Darlington and Yarm were concerned regarding the proposals to 
route the canal to the north and it was from Yarm that opposition first 
emanated, in the persons of Thomas Meynell, Richard Miles and Jonathan 
Backhouse. Miles, to whom Tomlinson gives the credit of having first 
proselytized for the adoption of a railway, mustered support for the southern 
route on the grounds that the export of coal from Stockton should not 
be emphasised; the greater populations served by the Darlington route 
should ensure success through landsale. By 18189 largely through the 
advocacy of George Overton (d: 1822? ) the decision was taken to form a 
railway, a public meeting in Darlington having considered reports from 
Rennie and Overton regarding canal and railway, respectively. Among 
the speakers in favour of a railway were Edward Pease (1766-1858) and 
Backhouse - they were both on the committee responsible for furthering 
Tennants proposition 
8- the former pointing out that the coal-road to 
Darlington from the collieries was at that time already let at E2,000 
p. a., equivalent to a rate of -, d per ton mile; the projected rate of 
lk'ýd on the railway would, at once, bring in an income of E6,000 p. a., 
sufficient to satisfy Pease as to the railway's profitability. 
9 The 
meeting agreed that a company should be formed and that E124,000 be sought, 
the cost of the railway as estimated by Overton. What was of especial 
importance was the fact 'that an Act was to be obtained. so obviating the 
need for the arranging of the complicated and expensive wayleave agreements 
which had be-devilled earlier lines, and a problem which was to recur 
later. It was this principle, toop which instigated opposition to the 
39 
railway from other colliery interests, fearful that it would bring unfair 
competition into the area. 
The proposal to form the canal avoiding Darlington did not fare well, 
the prospective subscribers evidencing some alarm at the results of tramway 
building in other parts of the country, Overton having shown how their 
construction in Wales had damaged canal traffic. Such were the doubts 
that it was decided to investigate here, too, the possibility of forming 
a railway, Stockton distrusting the Darlington proposals, especially in 
view of the fact that collieries lay within 14 miles of the town; the 
railway line would be much longer, increase transport costs and render 
the port less competitive. Agreement between the promoters of the rival 
lineswas reached in 1819 and it was then resolved that a further application 
- the first Bill, plans for which indicated a canal, 
10 had failed - should 
be made to Parliament. 
11 By this time the railway promoters, doubtful 
as to Overton's ability, had consulted Robert Stevenson, active in tramway 
proposals, for his advice and comments on the line. Stevenson in 1819 
visited lines recently built by Thompson, the Pelaw Main and Fawdon waggonways, 
and it was with his support that the promotýrs obtained the necessary Act 
"for making and maintaining a railway -or tramroad from the river Tees 
12 
at Stockton to Witton Park Colliery" . Royal Assent was granted on 
19 April 1821 and the company's formation was to strengthen the interests 
in the area of the Pease family, already involved in the T. N. C. 
Subsequent to the formation of the Mandale. Cut the TNC had made 
few, if any, further improvements to the river. Perhaps because of this 
it was able to pay dividends at- the rate of 10'/'D. 
13 In common with the 
conservators of both Tyne and Wear, the TNC was forced into regulating 
the deposition of rubbish in the river, to protect its, banks and to consider 
the building of jetties "to confine the river to a proper Channel"; 
14 
powers 
for works of this type, between Stockton and the sea, had been incorporated 
in the Act of 1808. These maintenance works for the years 1817-19 involved 
40 
the expenditure of only L244, E113 and L57 respectively. 
15 
Details concerning the trade of the Tees up to 1825 are somewhat 
scant. The river served an area which was mainly agricultural in character 
and its principal exports were so orientated but nevertheless it is conceivable 
that some coal was exported before 1825. With the combined population 
of Darlington, Stockton and Yarm being some 12,000 in 1821 
16 
and an average 
coal usage of perhaps V2- tons p. a. 
17 it would appear that 18,000 tons 
would have sufficed for the three towns, a figure much less than that 
claimed by the canal promoters as being produced by the western collieries. 
Navigation on the Tees was restricted to ships of 100 tons trading to 
Yarm 18 and of 150 tons to Stockton. 
19 
The trade of the Tees, too, was mainly coastal; in 1811,10,811 
tons of shipping cleared the port for coastal destinations and 1,660 tons 
20 
of shipping entered it from foreign parts. Within two years the figures 
had virtually doubled, undoubtedly the result of the completion of the 
Mandale Cut. Trade increased gradually between 1815 and 1825, revenue 
, rising from' Z1,104 to E1,594,21 figures which do not substantiate any 
significant coal shipments. 
The period of relative* inactivity ended with the opening in 1825 
of the Stockton and Darlington Railway (S & DVYý its formation chronicled 
by Tomlinson and Jeans and it is sufficient to note here the growing domination 
of the Pease family in its affairs and the introduction to railway construction 
of George Stephenson; it was due to him that locomotive traction was 
adopted, this method not having at first been certain. Shipment of coal 
at Stockton began in January 1826, the lines formal opening having been 
celebrated in the previous September when Thomas Me)n. ell (1775-1854), 
now the comapny's chairman, announced that the S& DR was already poised 
to ship 100,000 tons p. a. for five years to one London merchant. 
22 
The improvement in land transport which had been effected by the 
railway reduced very quickly the price of coal in Stockton from 18/- to 
* See Map 7. 
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12/- and later was to cause it to fall to 8/6 per ton. 23 River transport, 
however, was found to be a problem in spite of the improvements which 
had been made. Although the Mandale Cut had removed some two miles from 
the river's length it still remained tortuous and its many sandbanks rendered 
difficult, and hazardous, the navigation to Stockton. The TNC was not 
unaware of the problem and in 1824 two reports were presented by Henry 
Habberly Price as to possible improvements. In his first report Price 
castigated the TNC regarding the complete absence of charts and plans 
of the river, noting that he had been unable to ascertain whether they 
had ever existed. As a result of this deficiency, Price was forced into 
providing a plan of the river and carrying out an investigation of the 
tidal effects upon its channels, at the same time keeping in mind the 
fact "that the present trade of the port, and the funds of the company, 
are inadequate to attempt much more than the improvement of the river 
between Cargo Fleet and Stockton"; 
24 he would report upon the river's 
lower reaches and the harbour, works which he considered should be undertaken 
by means of Government funds, in due course. He concluded his report: 
When I look on the map of this part of the kingdom, at the 
extensive coal-field north and west of your river, and contemplate 
the probability of a trade which may, at a future time, rival 
that of Newcastle and Sunderland; when I think of the vast 
mineral wealth which enriches the bowels of your country, and 
see its surface abounding in fertility; when I see large capitals 
in the course of expenditure, to bring down to your river all 
the produce of the interior; and all these requiring only 
facility of communication. with the sea to bring them advantageously 
into action; I am more than ever impressed with the importance 
of carrying on, with as little delay as possible, every improvement 
that is practicable in your navigation, and consistent with 
your means of expenditure: 25 
In his second report to the company, Price detailed his proposals 
for the improvement of the river. He was somewhat critical of the situtation 
and condition of certain quays in Stockton, noted the problems the formation 
of sandbanks and multiple river channels - caused by the river's excessive 
width and made the suggestion that building pairs of piers or jetties 
would reduce the river's width, increase scour and reduce the propensity 
42 
to silting. He sought to provide a minimum of 6 ft at low water with 
16 ft at high tide; these depthswould permit ships of 250 tons to trade 
to Stockton. Price estimated that the necessary works in the Stockton 
length of the river would cost L4,221 and he gave alternative prices for 
two options which could be adopted downstream, an improvement at Newport 
costing E6,707 or a new river channel at Portrack, costing Z10,923; this 
latter, comprising a channel 180 ft wide and 3*, 600 ft . long, he thought 
preferable as it would enable ships to reach Stockton on a single tide. 
Moving downstream, he noted that 
in the Billingham Reach, which is of great length, the principal 
fault is that it is wider than is necessary to carry off the 
waters of the river and of the space covered. This arises 
from its banks never having been protected and the channel 
never having been confined by jetties or other means into 
a proper width. For the most of it the waters meander along 
a soft and sandy bottom whereas any fortuitous obstruction 
may give them a direction... 26 
and commented that to improve the stretch of the river by meahs of substantial 
jetties would cost L15,591. 
Price summarised his suggestions: if the Portrack channel were to 
be adopted the cost would be E26,073; if a new channel were to be formed 
the cost would be E30,290. One point of great interest was his proposal 
for the reclamation of land resulting from his works, an area which could 
be as great as 115 acres, the sale of which would reduce the capital expended 
by the TNC. Price also noted the possible effect of the railway proposed 
on the north side of the river, in that its formation could lead to removing 
much of the trade of Stockton lower down the river; on the 6ther h6nd, river 
improvements would benefit the town and, if completed, Price "should as 
soon expect the trade of London to be carried on at Gravesend, as that 
27 
of Stockton at Haverton Hill" . In the event of a further Act being 
sought to impose increased duesq he recommended that the views of Telford 
be sought, "certainly the most eminent man of the day in his line. , 
28 
Following the submission of Price's report, dissatisfaction was expressed 
43 
by Raisbeck who suggested that a more worthwhile improvement would be 
"to make a canal across Mr. Hustler's holme to Newport,, 
29 
with another 
from Newport to Cargo Fleet, but although his view was partially upheld 
the plans deposited in 1825 show a single canal from the eastern end of 
the Mandale Cut to Part Cleveland, a distance of 4-'ý. miles; a lock, or 
basin, was to be provided at each end of the canal. 
30 In turn, this 
plan was changed and in 1827 revised drawings were deposited in anticipation 
of an Act of Parliament. The revisions showed, again, a canal from Mandale 
to the lower part of the river but, this time, the canal - perhaps in 
deference to Raisbeck's wishes - was divided into two sections, so enabling 
shipping to use either the canal or the river over the greater length; 
all traffic would use the new cut to reach Stockton. The drawing prepared 
by Price shows a canal only 2--. miles in length, the saving effected 
by omitting the down-river section of canal which had run parallel with 
the river. It terminated at what was. to'.. become Port Darlington. 
31 
To confirm the opinions of their engineers the TNC sought the views 
of Stevenson who, on 22 November 1827, reported critically of the measures 
suggested by Price: 
To, project numerous jetties into the river I regard -as inexpedient being often a dangerous encumbrance to navigation tending 
to distort thd current and to destroy the uhiformity of the 
bottom. I would prefer continuous or parallel dykes on either 
side which have been successfully adopted in deepening the 
Clyde after its navigation had sustained material injury from 
a previous system of jetties. 32 ý 
Subsequent to Stevenson's report the TNC decided to form only the cut 
to shorten the river and omit completely the considerable length of canal 
to the lower river. This decision was perhaps enforced by the S&DR which 
had already, through its engineer , Thomas Storey (1789-1859), deposited 
plans for a railway extension following almost exactly the first proposal 
for a canal. The S&DR envisaged building two docks in the Tees, one 
at Linthorpe and the other at Ormsby, in effect the TNC sites of Port 
Cleveland and Port Darlington. The docks were to be of only Ik acres 
44 
each with entrances of some 30ft in width while the railway was to cross 
the Tees by means of a suspension bridge of* 240 ft span. 
32 The TNC was 
naturally concerned by the move of the S&DR to transfer trade from river 
to railway and a committee was established - Joseph Pease (1799-1872) 
was a member of it - to ask the railway company to suspend its "projected 
extension... till the effect of this improvement of the River be ascertained"; 
34 
Lords Londonderry, Cleveland and He-rewood were to be asked to support 
the TNC Bill which sought additional funding for the works. Outlined 
in the plans deposited, the proposal was simply for a second cut, downstream 
of the Mandale Cut, it being realigned. 
35 
In 1828, Royal Assent was given to three Acts of Parliament for works 
which concerned the riverTees, the first for the extension of the S&DR 
to Port Darlington, the second for the formation 'of the Clarence Railway* 
and the' third for the improvement of the river by the TNC. The object 
of the Cla rence Railway - its principal promoter was Tennant - was to 
Eýhorten the distance between the collieries served by the S&DR and the 
Tees by building a line between the earlier railway at Simpasture and 
the north bank of theTees, in effect the suggestion made by Tennant at 
the time of the formation of the S&DR. Understandably, the railway was 
opposed by the S&DR as "it was a shorter distance to the place of shipment 
and was done at the desire of certain coal-owners , 
36 
who wished to break 
the monopoly of the earlier company and secure the most economical ý means 
of shipping the excellent coking coal from the south-west Durham areas . 
37 
and it is of interest, too, to note that Tennant, remembering the opposition 
accorded the S&DR, realistically suggested that powers be sought in Parliament 
only "when Lambton was out of the Kingdom. , 
38 Ostensibly the proposal was a 
sound one as it reduced the distance of the collieries from the Tees by 
six miles, so providing great anticipated economies even for the most 
remote collieries, distant 25 miles from Stockton; in practice its insuperable 
disadvantage was that it was not able to be independent of the S&DR as 
* See Map 7 45 
all coal was transported by that railway for the first stage of its journey. 
39, 
The first meeting of the new company was held on 8 July 1828 under the 
chairmanship of Henry Vansittart; the engineer was Edmund Steelýo- The proposal 
of the SOR to extend its line to Middlesbrough was the cause of much 
dissent within that company. As the TNC had agreed to put river improvements 
in' hand, certain of the SOR directors were doubtful as to the wisdom 
of, in effect, providing duplicate routes, rail and river. The SOR 
called upon George Stephenson - he was ' inexperienced in river matters 
- to report on the river improvements and, his view being that the Tees 
works would meet all the needs of the SOR, it was suggested that further 
time be - given to the TNC. This suggestion was not agreed and it was 
thereupon resolved to seek powers for the line to Middlesbrough. This 
move led to both Meynell and Raisbeck dissenting as they considered it 
inappropriate both to extend the line only for the export of coal and 
to expend a sum of 05,000. The proposed extension of the SOR to Middlesbrough 
was naturally opposed by' the town of Stockton but nevertheless, the Bill 
was passed by the Commons although meeting severe opposition from the 
Lords, principally from the northern coalowners who - "caught napping in 
1821, were now wide awake to the danger of the Tees competition (and resolved) 
to prevent the continuation of the railway to deep water. ', 
41 
In addition to its involvement in the affairs of the SOR the Pease 
family at this time expanded its industries in the area while at the 
same time continuing its representation in the TNC. In 1828, perhaps 
at the time of the passing of the Act authorising the railway to Middlesbrough, 
negotiations were initiated for the purchase there of the Chilton estate. 
In August 1828 the site was first visited by Joseph Pease when, with 
his partners, he "took a boat and entering the Tees Mouth sailed up - 
to 
Middlesbrol to take a view of the proposed termination of the contemplated 
extension of the Railway, was much pleased with the place altogether.,, 
42 
A contract for the purchase of the estate was drawn up in 1829 and the 
46 
land formally acquired in May 1830 by the partners, Joseph Pease, Edmund 
Pease jnr., Thomas Richardson, Henry Birbeck, Francis Gibson and Simon 
Martin; all Quakers, the three last-named were from the Norwich area. 
A sum of L30,000 was paid for 520 acres of farm land, the plans for the 
town were prepared and laid out by Richard Otley, construction work began 
immediately, sanction was soon sought by the SOR for a branch railway 
"into Thomas Richardson's Land , 43 _ the estate was so described - and the 
first shipment of coal was made on 27 December 1830. 
Subsequent to the report submitted by Stevenson concerning the state 
and the future of the river Tees, a special meeting of the TNC was held 
on 4 January 1828 to discuss it. It was then "ordered unanimously - 
save for Joseph Pease, who remained neutral - that (the work) ... be forthwith 
carried into effect, , 
44 Pease's abstention being the result of his involvement 
in other concerns. In his report Stevenson had estimated that the new 
cutting would cost E21,181 
45 
and sanction was granted by the TNC's 1828 
Act for the raising of a further-L20, OOO capital with borrowings not to 
exceed E30,000; work was to be completed within seven years. 
46 To undertake 
the forming of the new channel, drawn up by Price and approved by Stevenson, 
a contract was, awarded in May 
' 1829 to Ward and Biggs, contractors. 
47 
At first, work proceeded well but, some twelve months later, William Alexander 
Brooks (1800-1877), who was appointed asl assistant engineer at a salary 
of E200 p. a. in 1828, complained that the work was behind programme; 
in his opinion, at least 200 men should be employed to ensure the progress 
necessary to achieve completion by early 1831.48 His threat to terminate 
the contract should progress not improve was heeded and the Portrack Cut 
was opened on 10 February 1831.49 The channel, 3,30Q-ft long, 225 fý 
wide and 15 ft deep, had cost E25,995; of this amount, labour and materials 
totalled E16,307, the remainder being accounted for by compensation, engineering 
services and Parliamentary expenses. 
50 
Although the Clarence Railway was to influence later developments, 
47 
it was between the SOR and the TNC that conflict became first apparent. 
Initially, the dispute concerned only the plans to form the railway to 
Middlesbrough and this move was opposed by the TNC. As a body which 
represented principally the interests of Stockton it was foreseen, correctly, 
that the furtherance of the Darlington interests - through the SOR - 
into the Middlesbrough area would militate against Stockton's pre-eminence 
on the Tees. Some doubt as to whether the SOR proposal to develop Middlesbrough 
did not date from the railway's inception is evidenced by Francis Mewburn 
(1785-1867), solicitor to the company. Writing at the time of the initial 
opening of the railway in 1825 he noted that the south-west Durham coal- 
field, hitherto remote from a shipping place, would be served by the newly- 
built railway and the 
greater the tonnage the cheaper could the Proprietors afford 
to carry goods, minerals etc., and with respect to an export 
trade in coals it was contended that the distance of the coals 
from the river and ýthe difficulties of the river presented 
obstacles too great to be surmounted but that if an export 
trade could be established the Darlington line was superior 
to the others more especially if a canal were made from Stockton 
to Cargo Fleet. 
I did not think when I wrote the above that there would be 
a line to Middlesbrough!. 51 
In spite of the Pease family having been represented in the TNC, the 
SOR was not1sanguine as to the river's capabilitiesp borne out by Mewburn's 
comment. In addition, the railway company had in 1824 acquired from 
Robert Stephenson & Co., a steam tugboat, the Albion, to circumvent navigational 
problems in the river and expedite the passage of ships from Stockton 
to the sea. 
52 Although the two companies had co-existed, if not co- 
operated, from 1825 the Middlesbrough proposal brought immediate conflict. 
In its Act of Parliament for the line the S&DR had obtained sanction 
for a bridge over the river Tees but not for one across the bed of the 
loop by-passed by the Mandale Cut. The TNC was not slow to point out 
this error on the part - of 
the S&DR, which maintained that such powers 
were unnecessary. At first sight the decision of the TNC to maintain 
* The note was added later. 
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navigation in the old bed of the river is curious but it would seem that 
"when the first alteration of the course of the River was in contemplation 
it was suggested by the very Eminent Engineer (Chapman) ... that... it would 
be requisite that the former channel should be kept open , 
53 to enable 
it to be used as a tidal reservoir and so increase the river's tidal 
scour; in addition the TNC wished to retain it as a navigable cut and 
hence was reluctant to its being bridged so as to preclude navigation. 
54 
The TNC obviously considered itself to be threatened by this latest move 
of the SOR and the chairman was authorised to approach the railway company, 
regretting that it 
should have accompanied (its) professions of amity and goodwill 
with a sentiment which seeming to import a threat to the Members 
of the Navigation Company notonly collectively but individually 
and which if meant to be so understood the latter (the TNC) 
cannot but hold to be both presumptious and futile. 55 
The SOR could see only one solution to the dispute, the authorisation 
of a bridge by another Act of Parliament. However, "in a spirit of concil- 
iation , 56 the SOR again approached the TNC offering to widen the arches 
of the proposed bridge. The TNC then demanded greater headroom, whereupon 
the SOR offered to construct a draw-bridge. The TNC agreed to this 
suggestion, the SOR withdrew its Bill and the bridge was erected during 
1830. 
The SOR also encountered problems regarding its suspension bridge 
over the Tees, 
. 
the first time - in effect, it was also the last*- that 
the suspension principle was used for railway traffic although, contempo- 
raneously, Isambard Kingdom Brunel (1806-1859) suggested a similar application 
at Sunderland. On its being tested the bridge proved so flexible that 
damage to it ensued even with a loading less than the 150 tons promised. 
57 
The failure of the bridge led to the 5&DR pursuing the matter of recompense 
58 
with the bridge-Is engineer, Capt. Samuel Brown 5 and it also led to the 
production of a report by Chapman, presumably called upon to deal with 
the problem. He suggested that a pier be provided at the bridge's centre 
*In the U. K. structures of this type were not used again for railways; they were adopted in the 
U. S. A. later, in a stiffened form. 
49 
point with teak arches supporting the existing deck; when in position 
"the Catenary-_ of Suspending Chains (may) be dispensed with; which ought 
or might be disposed of to some other Bridge on Highways. , 
59 Chapman 
perceived correctly that such a design was not compatable with rail traffic. 
Some doubt exists as to the final outcome but the bridge was later noted 
as being supported by four starlings, or supports, the assumption thus 
being that Chapman's plan was not adopted. 
60 
By 1830, the initial steps had been taken on the Tees towards the 
formation of the town of Middlesbrough. The SOR had been largely instrumental 
in opening up the river; it too was to be the force which was to lead 
later to the eclipse - at least partial - of Stockton by Middlesbrough. 
Although the export of coal from the Tees began in 1826, the quantities 
were still comparatively small by 1830; as a result the growing trade 
of the river will be discussed as an entity in the chapter following. 
3.5 River Blyth 
The river Blyth had been first inspected in 1756 by Capt. Grenville 
Collins but it was not until 1814 that Rennie reported upon it, his inspection 
made at the request of -Matthew White Ridley (1776-1836), in effect the 
river's conservator. Rennie noted that the rocks at the entrance were 
dangerous, that southerly winds caused problems, that only small ships 
could use the harbour at neap tides and that the "river is' very small 
and the bottom is hard... so that it is unable to scour 'and maintain a 
deep channel (in addition to which, heavy seas) throw such a quantity 
of stones into the channel that they obstruct the current and occasion 
it to spread... I" so leaving only a foot of water at low tide. Rennie 
suggested that a breakwater be built to replace the North Dyke; a work 
of some magnitude it would be 4,110 ft long and cost E38,015. To form 
a new river chaRnel he suggested building jetties, or groynes, on the 
south shore to protect the land from storms and to channel all tidal water 
into one watercourse and so improve the scouring effect. The groynes 
50 
would cost a further L9,064.5hould his works be undertaken, they would 
"render Blyth one of the best Harbours in the North of England for vessels 
employed in the Coal Trade", 
2 if of less than 15 ft draught. 
Rennie commented also on a more revolutionary idea which had been 
suggested to him, cutting through the rock to the northof the North Dyke 
and so forming a new channel into deeper water, so avoiding the long and 
exposed channel to the sea; a cut of this type was already in existence 
at Hartley and was later to be suggested at Amble. Rennie considered 
that a breakwater was essential, and expensive, and so could not recommend 
this proposal but considered that, if trade at Blyth were to increase, 
"a Wet Dock might be formed in the Slack capable of giving an extension 
3 
which would for many years be adequate for any probable increase of trade. .. " 
With the works estimated at E47,019 Rennie foresaw problems in the financing 
of them as they would inevitably lead to a severe tax on shipping; the 
only cheaper alternative he could think of was to provide a rock mound 
in place of the pier, in effect an enlargement of the North Dyke. His 
suggestions were not put into effect. 
Ridley's involvement in the river's management is a -little uncertain, 
but it would appear that his interest -in it began only with the death 
of his father in 1813; by 1819, however, 'he was indicted - but later 
exonerated - regarding an alleged obstruction in the river's channel. 
Documentary evidence indicated that E956 had been spent over the 'past 
two years, mainly on the North Dyke, and that a further outlay of E500 
was anticipated. Furthermore, he was then thanked by letter for his 
efforts in that he had, at his own expense, employed Rennie, although 
the 'writers - pilots and shipownere - considered that the improvements 
4 
required were such that they could be made only at' public expense. 
Ridley subsequently received a letter from Armorer Donkin, ý his Newcastle 
solicitor and himself a coal owner5 regarding the forthcoming Admiralty 
hearing, informing him that Donkin "could not see what fair objection the 
51 
the Admiralty can have to delegate the conservatorship of the harbour 
to yourself , or... to their appointing a reputable local engineer - Mr. 
Chapman, for instance - (for) any future projected improvement. ..,, 
5 
Prior to this time there were minor developments: a ballast crane 
had been designed by John Rastrick in 1817 and erected on the south quay; 
reflecting the needs of the trade a new ballast quay was built on the 
north shore; Netherton colliery sank its shaft in 1818 and built a waggonway 
through Bedlington to a private staith On the river. 
6 In 1823 Ridley 
became the sole owner of the Cowpen colliery but on his death in 1836 
his successor, again confusingly of the same name, leased it to Messrs. 
Carr and Jobling, who "became tenants of both the colliery and the harbour 
so far as Sir M. W. Ridley was concerned, and for some years the Cowpen 
colliery owners managed the harbour affairs, ,7a situation very similar 
to that which was to occur - at Amble. 
Under Ridley's ownership of the port, few developments had taken 
place although he was aware of what needed to be done. It may be - that 
capital was not readily available; perhaps, he did not wish to cede what 
control he had; perhaps the port was sufficiently profitable in its unimproved 
state: records for this period of Blyth's development are scant. Ridley 
may simply have had interests elsewhere. He was Memberý of Parliament 
for Newcastle from 1812 until 1836 
8 
and with his involvement in both Parliamentary 
af fairs and in the coal trade he had been retained by the Durham and North- 
umberland Coal Owners' Association, formed in 1805, to act on its behalf 
and he had been successful in the fight against duties, won in 1831 when 
dues in coal shipped abroad were reduced by a third. 
9 
3.6 Hartlepool 
Unlike the Tyne and Wear, the trade of Hartlepool was restricted 
only to general merchandise but such was the port's condition that its 
trade and hence its revenue, was minimal. To improve the harbour, principally 
by repairing the pier, a subscription was opened in 1810. 
52 
Among those who subscribed were the Sunderland shipowners, Trinity House, 
London, the Bishops of Durham, Sir Henry Vane-Tempest, Sir Ralph Milbank 
and J. G. Lambton. Despite the support of these shipping and mining 
interests a total of only E2,578 was received, compared with the sum of 
E3,500 sought. 
1 In order to raise funds sufficient to complete the work 
in hand an Act of Parliament was obtained, legislating for the maintenance 
of the pier then in "imminent danger of total destruction.,,. 
2 
For administrative purposes a commission of 25 members was established, 
including Cuthbert Sharp (1781-1849), largely instrumental in seeking 
the Act and then a member of the River Wear Commission. Powers were 
granted to borrow money and to raise revenue by means of a toll of up 
to 2d per ton on shipping together with a rate on houses in the town. 
The first meeting of the commissioners was held in August 1B13 and it 
was there decided that they should be held monthly, a decision which caused 
problems in that, with 25 members and a quorum of only five, it neverthe- 
less proved difficult to make decisions due to poor attendance. Perhaps 
as a result of Sharp's involvement on the Wear, a dredger was borrowed 
and, following the death of Shout in 1817, his successor Milton was called 
upon to undertake work at Hartlepool. 
3 
Between 1817 and 1823 no records of the commissioners' meetings are 
extant but it would seem that in this period Rennie had been called upon 
to report on the harbour , perhaps regarding a- proposal .- not proceeded ; with - 
to ship coal from the Hetton area at Hartlepool. 
4 Details are uncertain. 
In spite of its revenue-raising powers the commission, by 1829, was experiencing 
severe financial problems with only 01.15.0. to its credit 
5 
and to enable 
its finances to be placed on a more secure footing it was agreed to seek 
subscriptions from, amongst others, the Bishop of Durham and the Marquis 
of Londonderry. ' Perhaps exasperated by the lack of a quorum, three of 
the commissioners in 1829 formed themselves into a Committee of Management 
and subsequently made a determined attempt to raise money by means of 
53 
appealing to the Duke of Northumberland, Lord Durham, the Pease family, 
Trinity House, shipowners and others; the results of the appeal are not 
recorded. 
6 
The need for funds was 'vital for the harbour's well-being as due to 
the continuing improvement of the Wear and the forming of the Mandale 
Cut in the Tees, Hartlepool had been starved of trade and although figures 
for shipping have not been located the total revenue for the six-year 
period ending in 1831 amounted only to E400; of this sum E200 was from 
vessels trading to the port and E112 was from fishing boats. 
7 In comparison, 
the revenue of the Tees, then also a non- coal- exporting river, was E1,594 
in 1825 alone. By 1831, however, it had been made known that port developments 
were to take place with the prime object of shipping coal from Hartlepool 
and with the prospect of greater prosperity and involvement in the port's 
affairs the number of commissioners was increased to 36, a further Act 
was sought and the Hartlepool Dock and Railway Company, whose Act was 
passed in June 1832 was asked "for the use of their Engineer to carry 
on the proposed works in the Harbour'! 
8 
3.7 Seaham Harbour 
The establishment of the port of Seaham, five miles south- of the 
Wear, was due to the efforts and co-operation-of three men; the 3rd Marquis 
of Londonderry (1778-1854), John Buddle, his agent, and William Chapman, 
perhaps the most eminent of the engineers living and working in the area. 
In 1819 Londonderry, then Lord Stewart, had by marriage to Frances Anne 
Vane-Tempest come to control the family's collieries at Rainton and Pittington, 
between Durham and Seaham, which despatched coal by waggonway to the Wear 
at Penshaw. In 1819, too, Buddle was appointed as agent by Londonderry 
to revive the flagging fortunes of the mining concern, the largest colliery, 
Rainton, having limited reserves and the prospect that its lease would 
not be renewed. It was, however, the proposed sale of a neighbouring 
estate which brought Chapman into contact with Londonderry and Buddle. 
1 
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The affairs of Londonderry and Buddle, in particular their involvement 
in Seaham, have been investigated both by Sturgess and by Hiskey but, 
nevertheless, it is important to outline the events which led to the establish- 
ment of the harbour. In 1820, the presence of coal beneath the magnesian 
limestone was confirmed by the winning of Hetton colliery, begun in 1810, 
abandoned and then revived in 1818.2 Although it was to be two years 
before production began, the sinking of it was viewed with great interest 
by Sir Ralph Milbanke (Noel), the owner of the Seaham estate, and his 
agent, William Taylor, especially in view of the possibility that the 
same deep seams would underlie Seaham also. What was of greater importance, 
though, was the fact that at Dawdon Ness there was a site suitable for 
a harbour. At Milbanke's instigation, Chapman was asked to report upon 
the possibilities of the site. *. 'He was enthusiastic; the rock was suitable; 
work could proceed as the harbour was brought progressively into use; 
the excavated material could be burnt for lime. The site, with two 
small inlets already formed in the headland, could be made "ready for 
use in two seasons; which is before any colliery can be won and have 
the waggonway laid down to it.,, 
3 Chapman queried whether transport to 
the harbour would be cheaper than to the Wear and speculated as to the 
maintenance of his planned depth of 15 ft at high water. He envisaged 
too, the formation of a town in conjunction with the harbour and, perhaps 
having had his proposals questioned, added in a post-script to his report 
that it was no disadvantage for the harbour to be dry at low' tide; the 
coal exporting ports of Maryport and Whitehaven experienced no ill effects 
from being absolutely dry. 
4 Chapman did not then envisage a 'dock as 
being part of the scheme and the works were to comprise only an outer 
harbour with protecting breakwaters, some 900 and 600 ft long, a small 
southern harbour and the north , 
'or inner harbour, cut into the rock; 
5 
a waggonway would lead from it to the collieries'. intended to supply the 
port. 
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Map 6: Seaham Harbour, 1820-1830 
In spite of Chapman's eulogies regarding its prospects the estate 
was soon offered for sale. Of 3,700 acres it included Seaham Hall and 
eight farms, together with limestone and coal 
so abundent as to give ready means of establishing a vastly 
extensive and profitable trade (while Dawdon) ... presents the 
greatest natural facilities for making, at the least expense, 
a superior port or harbour for the reception of shipping of 
great burthen, and that the district between this and the 
Coal Field (at Hetton) comprises the best line for the carriage 
and shipping of all the coals to be won from any port of the 
adjacent country. 6 
Chapman's proposed haven was shown on the plan which accompanied the notice. 
The initiative to purchase the Seaham estate would seem to have - come 
from Londonderry and the negotiations were undertaken by intermediaries 
to conceal his identity and purpose. 
7 According to Sturgess, Buddle 
was not a party to the actual purchase, duly completed in November 1821fOr 
the sum of E63,000, although in view of his laterenthusiasm and involvement. 
this seems unlikely. 
Londonderry's first task was to seek an independent report on Chapman's 
proposal to construct the harbour and the relevant documents were dispatched 
to George Leather who in January 1822 submitted his views. Chapman's 
scheme was for a harbour with an area of 232, acres, its two protecting 
breakwaters forming an entrance 75 ft wide. The intention was that ships 
would load in the south harbour and lie in the outer one where, howeverp 
there would be a depth of water only of three feet at low tide; this 
depth, Leather thought, was insufficient as ships could not lie on a rock 
bottom without damage. He also commented that, as the north harbour 
was to be formed by excavating the rock headland, investigations as to 
its quality should be undertaken, preferably by someone experienced 
in colliery boring. Chapman's estimates were doubted - his initial costing 
had brought him to a figure of f, 69060 
8- 
especially as Leather did not 
think that the excavated rock would be suitable for construction purposes. 
It would be better to bring stone from Whitby. The report closed with 
a caution: 
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However, I could not feel satisfied in recommending your Lordship 
to commence such a work, upon a venture; not that I doubt 
the practicability of making the harbour: but, that I wish, 
by a full investigation, to enable your Lordship to judge, 
how far the advantages to be derived will be commensurate 
with the outlay. Even from. such an investigation many advantages 
will also result in the future progress and proper arrangement 
of the work; provided it is found advisable to carry it into 
execution. 9 
It was, perhaps, this report which caused Chapman to change his plans 
and following a meeting with Londonderry and Buddle new estimates were 
made, this time for a harbour costing E7,000 with a protective pier being 
provided for an additional E6,000. These smaller-scale works could be 
built as a first stage, assuming that initial through-put would be 75,000 
tons p. a.; extensions could follow. 
10 
After Leather's report soundings and levels were taken on the site 
of the proposed harbour - the idea for it had been claimed by Taylor to 
be his - and the drawings then produced show an inclined plane delivering 
coal to the north harbo6r and a ballast way leading from the south. 
11 
Consideration was given also to the means of transporting the coal from 
colliery to harbour, an exercise undertaken by Buddle. He compared the 
costs of leading coal to the Wear and to Seaham: 'if despatch was to Sunderland 
the cost would be 3/3d per ton and if to Seaham 1/3d. If the vend were 
to, be 132,000 tons p. a. the benefits to the harbour and so a saving 6n 
transport would be E13,073 p. a. 
12 This possible reduction in expenditure 
for a capital outlay of E13,000 for the harbour and L9,835 
13 for the waggonway 
must have made the formation of the harbour a most attractive proposition; 
the estimate for the railway - the change in description is perhaps significant 
was-later-revised upwards'tp"L22,292.14 
Great consideration was given by Londonderry and Buddle to the financing 
of the project. A proposal was put forward that the railway -a route to 
Sunderland was considered, also - should be built by a speculator at his 
own cost, Londonderry then making annual payments to him while guaranteeing 
15 
a minimum tonnage to be transported. The formation of a harbour company 
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was investigated and a prospectus was drafted. Seeking capital of E15,000 
it described Chapman's proposals, the works expected to begin in 1824, 
and noted that Londonderry hoped to pay the subscribers - Sunderland 
shipowners were initially considered - 4d p. ton on a quantity of not 
less than c 50,000 tons p. a. 
16 The possibility of securing a Parliamentary 
loan was also considered, the system introduced in 1817 "for works affording 
employment for the labouring classes of the community by the advance of 
17 Exchequer Bills and money out of the Consolidated Fund". and it was perhaps 
in this connection that Chapman, as an example, forwarded to Buddle the 
application made in respect of Scarborough, together with a further report. 
Chapman's new proposal was for an enlarged harbour, still at Dalden 
Ness, which would provide the best southerly aspect of any harbour on 
the north-east coast and compared with his earlier scheme it would have 
twice the internal space. He proposed that six berths be provided in 
the harbour with a further three at the south breakwater. Noting realistically 
that estimating costs was difficult until work had been begun and site 
conditions revealed, Chapman gave estimates of E6,637 for the north harbour 
and ballast quay, E6,132 for the north breakwater and east pier, and E8,972 
for the south breakwater, a total of E21,743.18 This breakwater was 
now to run parallel with the shore and Chapman envisaged forming first 
the north harbour, excavated from the headland. Its completion would 
enable the shipment of c 50,000 tons p. a. 
Some impetus was given to the plan for the harbour's construction 
by the fact that Thomas Braddyll, owner of an estate at Haswell was with 
Arthur Mowbray contemplating the building of a harbour at nearby Hawthorn, 
Dene; 19 this threat lent urgency to Londonderry's proposals and the views 
of Telford and Rennie were sought. Telford, then advisor to the Exchequer- 
Loan Bill Commissioners, reported in November 1823 that he had visited 
the site with Buddle and subsequently discussed the matter with Chapman 
and Rennie in Newcastle. He agreed that a shipping place was necessary 
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and as Londonderry's coal interests were substantial they appeared "to 
justify a work of considerable magnitude and if accomplished there can 
be no doubt but that the produce of other coal properties would also be 
shipped at the new port. , 
20 Telford foresaw that Londonderry could ship 
132,000 tons p. a. and other owners 26,000. providing a saving -a notional 
revenue - of L15,000 p. a. to be offset against the construction costs 
of 00,000, including the railway. Rennie's reply was similar in content; 
the site was good and the harbour would be able to contain 30 ships drawing 
from nine to 13 ft. His estimate for the harbour alone was E42,000,21 
with a further L22,000 for the railway. Not differing greatly, the estimates 
were much higher than had been Chapman's, principally on account of the 
more elaborate pier works which were considered essential to protect the 
harbour. 
Chapman reported the findings of Rennie and Telford to Londonderry, 
putting to him their opinion that the harbour should be built complete 
in the first instance and later he suggested means by which the costs 
could be reduced to f. 25,840.22 Correspondence between Buddle and Telford 
followed, Buddle pointing out that Londonderry possessed 6,000 acres and 
the whole area would be served by the railway. He also informed Telford 
of the present transport arrangements: coal was carried five miles to 
the Wear by waggonway, then seven miles by keel; to ship at Seaham would 
involve six miles of railway. The correspondence also included, the financing 
of the works in that Buddle envisaged Londonderry funding the project 
to the sum of E45,000 with Exchequer Loan Bills totalling E20,000. Telford, 
however, thought- that a loan of Z40,000 could be obtained, with ample 
time for repayment. 
23 The 1823 discussions appeared to end as a result 
of a letter to Telford: "Certain collateral circumstances, tending to 
enhance the importance of the harbour, have come under discussion, which 
11 24 will probably suspend, for a while, further progress being made... 
at Seaham. What were these circumstances? There are two possibilities. 
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The most likely was, indirectly, the bringing into operation of the Hetton 
colliery. Its success caused Buddle to advise Londonderry to take up 
the lease of Pittington and it is possible that it was the prospect of 
a greater coal tonnage passing through the port and hence needing increased 
facilities which caused the delay, it being perhaps thought, too, that 
improved methods of transporting coal on the Wear -I tubbing I had been 
introduced . by Budddle in 1821 25 _ would so cheapen transport costs as 
to make the Seaham project less economical. The second reason could 
be that Braddyll had abandoned the scheme for a harbour at Hawthorn Dene, 
so rendering less urgent the building of a harbour at Seaham. 
Other than Chapman having produced a further report on the harbour 
in 1824, to the effect that extensions to his projected plan could be 
made, the matter seems to have been dropped for a while and it was not 
until 1826 that the harbour proposal was resuscitated, this time through 
the involvement of Alexander Robertson, a somewhat shadowy figure who, 
having agreed to undertake construction and operation of both harbour 
and railway, backed down the following year. Robertson's involvement, 
and for a while that of Braddyll, resulted in Londonderry seeking, and 
being granted, an Act of Parliament in 1828. It recited an agreement 
of 1822 whereby E4,000 p. a. was to be made available for the purchase 
of estates situated in England and Wales' and noted that consent had then 
been given for the leasing of any property, other than the family residence 
at Wynyard; the new Act sought to extend the earlier and insufficient 
provisions. It noted Londonderry's desire to grant a lease 
for the Purpose of erecting, excavating, constructing, and 
making thereon any Basins, Docks, or other Shipping Places 
for Coals or other Commodities, or any Quays, Wharfs, Staiths, 
Piers, Jetties, Erections, or Buildings for the Shipment of 
Coals or other Commodities, and of making any Railways or 
Tramways, or other Ways, Roads, or Passages -thereto, or any 
other Conveniences for the Transport or Shipment of Coals 
or other Commodities... 26 
and put forward the view that such an arrangement would enhance the value 
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of the collieries on the estate. The Act authorised the leasing of lands 
totalling 1,683 acres. 
The granting of the Act led to a 99 year lease being arranged between 
Londonderry and Braddyll. - reluctant to begin construction without it- 
but before work On the harbour and railway had commenced, Londonderry 
unexpectedly and inexplicably, informed Buddle that he had "entirely made 
up his mind to commence the harbour himself and had written to Col. Braddyll 
to break off negotiations with him. , 
27 Work on the harbour's construction 
thereupon began immediately. 
The building of the railway was undertaken by Shakespeare Reed, not- without 
financial problems having been encountered. During the later months 
of 1822 a proposal was made by Benjamin Thompson to construct a railway 
and to transport coal to Dalden Ness by contract. This proposal was 
accepted and early in 1823 Thompson wrote to the effect that construction 
could be accomplished within 15 or 16 months. 
28 Buddle, however, still 
favoured using the old waggonway from Newbottle to Sunderland - at least 
initially - but looked forward to the time when the two lines together 
would provide Londonderry with great benefits. Like the harbour, so 
the construction of the railway lapsed until 1828 when, a month after 
construction of the harbour began, Buddle was approached by William 
Harrison, later a promoter of the Stanhope and Tyne Railway, with a proposal 
both to build and operate the railway by contract. Seeing the suggestion 
as one which would release capital for the main project it was agreed 
to but then Harrison's financial backer, Shakespeare Reed, attempted to 
withdraw. Eventually it was Harrison who withdrew and the railway was 
built by Reed and Thompson, Reed providing the finance and Thompson the 
expertise. 
29 In 1828 a contract was drawn up between Reed and Londonderry 
whereby the latter was to be completely free from capital involvement 
but would guarantee payments on quantities up to 132,500 tons p. a. - if 
greater, the rate would fall - while Reed undertook to have the railway 
operational by I January 1831.30 Work began in July 1829 and was completed 
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by the summer of 1831. 
In 1823 Telford had propounded the view that the harbour should be 
built to adequate standards "and, unless made so, it had better be delayed 
or abandoned , 
31 
and in the year of its commencement Buddle, adressing 
Londonderry, proposed that work should be undertaken in a concerted manner. 
As it is a Political Effect which we aim at in the first instance, 
our object is, I think, more likely to be gained by advancing 
with a heavy column at once, in this manner, than by sending 
small detatchments, and dribbling on, day after day. . We 
ought boldly to take the ground and at once hoist our flag. 
We might certainly be getting something upon the ground through 
the course of the week.. 32' 
Buddle's view was the correct one; Chapman, perhaps surprised, produced 
hurried plans; . 
Londonderry, responding to Buddle's call to arms, produced 
the necessary finance; construction began. 
The harbour was built by direct labour, Chapman stating at the inauguration 
ceremony in November 182B that due to Buddle's skills "there has been 
no occasion for applying to'any great contractor for public works; therefore 
the large profits they generally require as a recompense for their capital 
and risk, will be saved. , 
33 No mention was made of the abortive negotiations 
with Robertson. The revival of the project had brought John Dobson (1787- 
1865), Newcastle architect, into the affair as Londonderry, foreseeing 
that the construction of the harbour would induce the building of a town, 
sought to achieve high standards of design. Londonderry's brief to Dobson 
however, Was realistic. "Large and expensive foundations and overgrown 
buildings will not inspire confidence in the completion of the work, but 
the reverse - small, neat, compact buildings suitable for the concerns 
of trade are all that we should endeavour , 
34 to provide. Once construction 
had begung Buddle ensured that it progressed quickly as he foresaw its 
prospects and, in fact, regretted that the harbour had not been built 
immediately following the purchase of the estate; "such a move would 
have deterred the Stockton and Darlington Railway promoters and perhaps 
at the same time have made possible some financial backing from Edward 
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Backhouse's bank which now, however, was committed to the Stockton railway, , 
35 
Dobson's appointment: -in factq little of his project was executed 
- led to the appointment of a clerk of works, Thomas Nicolson; Telford 
was again consulted; Rennie-. wrote that Seaham would never serve "any 
national or general purpose,, 
36 
and would always remain a local coal-exporting 
port; and a report was submitted on the project by David Logan, engineer 
under Rennie for the construction of Donaghadee harbour. 
37 With work 
having begun Logan suggested the use of a cofferdam to facilitate forming 
the inner harbour and extended the idea to deepening it to five to ten 
feet below low water, so allowing ships to remain afloat at all times. 
The idea was transmitted to Chapman who responded by letter to Londonderry: "In 
this I entirely agree in opinion with Buddle and would recommend even 
to go a little further, that is to deepen the inner basin to 12 or 14 
,, 38 feet below low water mark . With regard to costs, however, Logan disagreed 
with Chapman's estimate of E25,000, putting a figure of E34,269 an the 
work. 
39 
Once begun, - construction continued with some expedition. Stone 
was obtained from Penshaw, excavation of the inner harbour proceeded and 
lime kilns were built. By the autumn of 1830 the quays and spouts along 
the south side of the inner harbour were almost complete, the 
falling gate at the entrance was under construction and the north pier 
was proceeding, albeit- with problems caused by storms. Chapman reported 
that the 2-2 acre outer harbour provided an exit to sea 100 ft wide while 
that to the inner harbour was 30 ft in width, giving 12 feet of water; 
the falling gate, raised on the ebb tide, would retain seven feet of water. 
The south harbour was now to be 12 acres in extent and was "capable of 
being enlarged to any extent that may be requisite for the vend of the 
adjacent collieries with every convenience for their separate shipments 
of coal... , 
40 
Chapman's remarks regarding other collieries was significant. The 
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harbour was initially envisaged as serving only Londonderry's interests 
but the opening of the South Hetton colliery had brought Braddyll into 
an agreement - later rescinded - with Londonderry. As work progressed 
Braddyll saw Seaham as an outlet for his coal from South Hetton and negotiations 
began concerning his possible -financial involvement. ,A loan of L20,000 
was first considered but, later, the capital injected into the project 
was E17,000, in return Londonderry agreeing to ship Braddyll's coal and 
repay the loan at 5'eo from the harbour's dues. 
41 The involvement of Braddyll 
necessitated a further railway into the town and a drawing produced jointly 
by Chapman and Dobson, shows a rather grandiose crescent of buildings 
overlooking the harbour and flanked by the two railways. It also shows 
a site for a possible future basin north west of the inner harbour to 
be formed "when the Limestone is wrought away. , 
42 
On 25 July IB31 the inner harbour was opened to traffic. Coal 
was brought down the railway and by ýbans of the completed gears loaded 
into a waiting ship - the Lord Seaham, owned by B uddle - holding 300 tons. 
By this time the north pier was almost complete, the southern. under construction 
although far short of its planned length, designed to.. enclose 12 acres; 
in Chapman's view this extension to the south was the most important element 
in the scheme. Chapman was justifiably proud of his achievement and 
although the harbour was still far less . in extent than he had planned, 
nevertheless, he envisaged it as becoming the port for the import- and export 
trade of the city of Durham. He compared Seaham favourably with Hartlepool 
and Sunderland, noting that the former was not so well placed for -use 
by sailing ships as was Seaham while the proposed docks at Sunderland 
were likely to suffer due to , the Wear's restrictions. Seaham, although 
eventually to accommodate 200 to 300 ships could at present contain only 
26 but this shortcoming was compensated for by the facilities provided 
for rapid loading and turn-around. Chapman was certainly justified in 
claiming that there was "no instance of a private Harbour being constructed 
with such rapidity and to such extent as the present Harbour has been... (not 
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least) by the affluence and adventurous spirit of the Marquis of Londonderry, 
,, 43 and his advisors. 
The harbour had not been built cheaply. Chapman's estimate for 
the work had been E25,000, Logan's L34,000, Rennie's E42,000. As the 
work proceeded, expenditure was much greater, the pay bills alone for 
the first four years amounting to E3,295, E18,813, E27,256 and E29,083.44 
Including materials supplied, the total cost up to the opening of the 
harbour would seem , to have been 05 9 000 - 100 9 000; the railway perhaps 
cost a further E20,000 25,000, but having been built as a speculation 
by Shakespeare Reed its exact costs are not known. Seaham was the last 
work of Chapman, involved for so long in the coal industry and its engineering 
needs. The success had been due to his involvement with Buddle, but 
neither could have done anything without Londonderry who, "single-handed, 
had sponsored and brought into being a harbour and a town, leaving an 
ineradicable imprint upon the geography of the north-east coal-field and 
its coast-line. " 
45 
3.8. Summary 
The period 1815-1830 began with a vision on the part of the merchants 
of Newcastle that the defeat of Napoleon would again open continental 
ports and so stimulate trade and it ended with their influence having 
led to a reduction, in 1831, in the duties imposed upon coal, so providing 
the opportunity for the North-East, as a whole, to compete more easily 
in European trade. 
After 1815 the region's coal output and shipments had increased although 
not so rapidly as national output. The increase had been due to three 
principal factors: increasing demand, both domestic and industrial; 
improvements in mining techniques and transport; and the steps taken 
by the region's river conservators, the Tyne excluded, to undertake river 
improvement works. Concomitant with these developments were two of even 
greater potential importance, the winning of the Hetton colliery and the 
completion of the S&DR; together they were to change the old established 
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pattern of the North-ý-East's coal industry. 
Increased demand for coal was due to industrial growth and the continuing 
development and spread of the use of steam power. Improvements in mining 
techniques inClUded better haulage systems, more effective mine ventilation 
and the introduction of safety lamps, but perhaps the most important development 
was in the use of bolted cast-iron tubbing, the lining of the mine shaft 
to exclude water and soft strata. This development, in part, led to 
the successful sinking of the shaft at Hetton, completed in 1822, so proving 
the existence of coal beneath the east Durham magnesian limestone. 
2 
The winning of this colliery was the initial step in the development of 
the Durham coalfield and led, later, to the establishment of the ports 
of Seaham and Hartlepool and to dock developments on the Wear. 
Not only was the physical winning of Hetton significant; so was the 
establishment of the company. It was principally composed of men who 
were not landowners, financed in part from London, and was described by 
Londonderry as "a pack of madmen ... with swords in their hands ... ruthless 
of (the) consequences ,3 of freeing coal prices. The company was not 
a member of the Durham and Northumberland Coal Owners Association, established 
in 1805 to control output and maintain prices. Buddle-was the Association's 
Secretary from 1B06 and it had operated in a difficult period during which 
disputes had taken place between the Lambton and Londonderry interests, 
and suggestions had been made to build both canals and public railways, 
moves which so disturbed the Association, based on the Tyne and Wear, 
that the region's M. P. s. Ridley and Vane-Tempest, were retained by it 
to promote its interests. 
4 
The importance within the region of the formation of the S&DR . can 
not be exaggerated; as the first of the region's public Parliamentary 
lines it was the object of opposition by the longer -established colliery 
interests on the Tyne, fearful that its formation would enable the Tees 
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to compete unfairly with the northern trade where coal was wholly transported 
on waggonways subjected to the annual way-leave charges made by the owners 
of land over which the tracks- ran. Its successful formation was to be 
one of the principal factors in the future evolution of the region , if 
for no reason other than the change which it made to the pattern of development. 
So far as the region's rivers are concerned, their throughput of coal 
continued to increase with the rise being most rapid bn. the Wear with a compound 
increase of 31% p. a. , compared with an equivalent figure of 2'% for both 
Tyne and Blyth. Continuing a trend of more than a century, the North 
East's share of production fell from 24.2 to 22.8, 'D in 15 years although 
shipments rose by one million tons p. a.; the greatest increase, in percentage 
terms, lay in the coal exported abroad. 
Coal Output and Shipments, 1815-1830 
5 
Coal 000 tons 1815 1830 
U. K. Output 
N. E. Output 
22265 
5395 
30375 
6915 
Of NE/UK 24.2 22. B 
NE Shipments 
NE Exports 
2988 
150 
4000 
340 
Exports 5 8.5 
Within the region the number of ports shipping coal increased to 
Four with the' completion oý the S&DR; as a result coal was shipped from 
the Tees from 1826 at Stockton and from 1830 at Middlesbrough. Tonnages 
from both Blyth and the Tees were insignificant. The greatest rate of 
increase in throughput was achieved on the Wear where by 1830 its share 
had risen from 32 to 34.1a. 
67 
Shipments of Coal from North East Ports, 1815-1830 
6 
1815 1830 
Shipments 
000 tons D/ A 000 tons 
Oý 
Tyne 1833 65 2465 60 
Wear 898 32 13B7 34 
Tees - - 100(est) 2.5 
Blyth 100 3 140(est) 3.5 
Note: The total for 1830 of 4-092m tons differs from that of 4m given by Flinn. The discrepancy 
is not significant. 
The period 1815-1830 witnessed little activity at Blyth and Hartlepool. 
At the former, coal shipments rose slightly; at the latter, trade stagnated. 
Although few physical improvements were made to the rivers Tyne and Wear, 
nevertheless their exp-Vnsion was substantial principally because of 
the efforts of the colliery owneýs and their viewers. On the Tyne, the 
opening up of new collieries - also the re-opening of 61der. ones -- led 
to the building of additional waggonways, three of the most extensive 
being those from Fawdon and Springwelland the line from the Cramlington 
colliery, begun in 1824, and, unusually, conveying coal to the Tyne rather 
than to the Blyth, a nearer river. The effect of these waggonways was 
principally to transfer the loading of coal to points nearer its mouth, 
a process which had the dual effort of reducing the numbers of keels in 
the river and in strengthening the voice of the shipowners of North and 
South Shields for some involvement in the government of the river, entrenched 
firmly in the hands of Newcastle Corporation. 
On the Wear a similar situation had arisen, perhaps more marked. 
Waggonways from Newbottle and from Hetton had been built to carry coal 
from the south side of the river direct into Sunderland, so obviating 
completely the use of keels by the' Lambton and Hetton interests over a 
length of some eight miles of the river. On the Newbottle line a locomotive 
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had been tried and the Hetton line was the first to be designed for locomotive 
use, an improvement over the horse-drawn and rope-haulage systems up till 
then adopted. The success of the Hetton colliery sinking led to the 
development of other deeper mines, for example Monkwearmouth, begun in 
lB26 and sunk to a depth of 1,758 feet by 1834.7 
Improvements were also made in the methods of transferring coal from 
land to water. Foremost among them was the use of the coal drop and 
the introduction on the Wear -of the use of tubs, loaded intP keels. 
These innovations improved the handling of coal on both rivers and led 
to a diminution in traffic. Little was done to improve the rivers themselves 
during this period. Still firmly under the control of Newcastle the 
Tyne remained virtually untouched but such was, its natural flow that, even-so, it 
was able to accept ships of size similar to those using the Wear. In 
spite of Rennie's 1814 report nothing had been done, with the result that 
it had become congested and of such inadequate depth that its navigation 
was difficult, if not dangerous. Whereas the Tyne, with c 11750 ships 
sailing each year and employing 300 keels upon it in- 1828 had a surface 
area, at high water, of c 1,350 acres in its navigable length, the Wear, 
with c 7,500 sailings and 200 keels measured only 80 acres. As a result, 
the Wear, unlike the Tyne, had by 1830 been the subject of much discussion 
regarding the provision of docks, although by that', date, no such works 
had been undertaken. Similar suggestions had been made earlier concerning 
the Tyne but the several projected sites remained undeveloped. 
On the Tyne, dredging was minim. al . 
but under the RWC an extensive 
programme of straightening and deepening had been undertaken to the river's 
benefit; with increased coal production - principally by the Lambton 
and Londonderry collieries - this had led to a rate of increase in coal 
shipments greater than on the Tyne. What had ameliorated the problem 
so far as the Tyne was concerned was the introduction in 1818 of the use 
of steam tug-boats, so enabling shipping to navigate more easily the river 
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as far upstream as Newcastle. On the Tees the same change had been brought 
about by the S&DR in 1824. It can only be supposed that the state of 
the two rivers was such as to force upon shipowners the necessity of adopting 
these measures, although it must be noted that the TNC had in 1828 obtained 
an Act for a further improvement to the river, the forming of the Portrack 
Cut, completed in 1831. 
In the southern part of the region two events9the winning of Hetton 
Colliery and the formation of the S&DRIwere most to affect development. 
The former was to have an immediate effect upon the region, the formation 
of Seaham Harbour and the shipment of coal-from it in 1831 while thelatter, 
having as its immediate effects the birth of Middlesbrough was ultimately 
to , lead to the formation of another port complex at West Hartlepool. 
By 1830 the pattern for the future development of the North East's ports 
had been formed. 
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4. PORTS IN THE YEARS OF THE EARLY RAILWAYS, 1830-1654 
4.1 Introduction 
The development of the north-east ports in the period 1830-1854 
needs to be considered against four significant factors: the removal 
of the Duke of Richmond's Shilling from Tyne shipments, so permitting 
all ports to compete on an equal footing; the prospect of a significant 
expansion of the Durham coalfield, begun by the successful sinking of 
Hetton colliery; the formation of the Stockton and Darlington Railway, 
which both- threatened the northern collieries and presaged the surface 
transport of coal from one port to another; and the Rainhill trials 
of 1829, whereby the future use of steam locomotion became assured, initially 
on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway and later throughout the railway 
system. 
The Duke of Richmond's Shilling was a tax imposed only on coal leaving 
the Tyne; as its name implies a shilling was charged on each chaldron 
(2.65 tons). First imposed in Elizabethan times it was described in 
1830 by Brandling as "a very grievous tax upon the river Tyne, and is 
one of the great grievances complained of by the coalowners and shipowners"' 
of that river, principally because of its discriminatory nature. it 
was ended in March 1831 
2, having by then been a government impost for 
some 30 years and, prior to that, a tax accruing to the Duke of Richmond. 
Its removal gave the Tyne an ability to compete with other rivers; the 
almost simultaneous reduction in export duties, noted earlier, enabled 
foreign shipments to be increased. Two further changes were to take 
place in the period here considered, the end of the Regulation of the 
Vend - the restriction on output agreed by the majority of the Tyne and 
Wear coalowners - in 1845 
3 
and the total repeal of the duty in seaborne 
coal in 1850.4 
The winning of Hetton colliery was to bring significant changes 
to the North East. It both proved reserves and caused the principal 
colliery developments to be located -in the eastern part of the county 
where, although the expense of sinking. was greater, subsequent transport 
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costs to the Durham coast. ' were lower. Its success led directly to the 
founding of Seaham Harbour, the later expansion of Sunderland and the 
establishment of Hartlepool. 
The oplening of the Stockton and Darlington Railway (S&DR) was of 
significance on two counts. It was the first Parliamentary line and, 
as such, reduced its running costs by obviating the sometimes high annual 
wayleave charges imposed by landowners. It was also a railway which 
opened up an area around Bishop Auckland where mines were shallow and 
pithead costs low and was able to carry cheap coal for shipment on the 
river Tees, until then not a coal-exporting river. It was to lead, indirectlyt 
to the formation of the port of West Hartlepool. Promoted largely by 
Darlington Quakersp the S&DR, together with the exploitation by the Pease 
family of the coal and ironstone deposits at its head, was to have a far- 
reaching effect on the pattern of development in the North'East. 
5 
The completion of the SOR in 1825, together with-in the same year- 
a trial of locomotives at Killingworth and Hetton, marked the beginning 
of the region's railway system but the major change did not come for four 
years when, at Rainhill, steam locomotion showed itself to have been perfected 
sufficiently to bring it later into universal use. Waggonways had over 
the years developed from being'totally horse powered to using a combination 
of horse haulage and rope-operated machines. As the use of steam developed 
so stationary steam engines were brought into use followed by early instances 
in the use of locomotives at Newbottle, Killingworth, Wylam and Hetton. 
These composite railways, using combinations of motive power, 'later gave 
way to railways operated solely by steam locomotion. 
The period 1830-1854 witnessed the 'formation and demise of some 20 
railway companies whose operations affected the region's ports. The 
establishment of railways after 1825 was much influenced by George Hudson 
(1800-1871) who foresaw the formation, through amalgamations, of the North 
Eastern Railway - it occurred in 1854 - although by that time his influence 
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in railway affairs had ended. Expansion occurred over a period of only 
some 25 years - the formation of the network of waggonways had taken four 
or five times as long - and even by 1840 there were some twelve railways 
in operation in the region. What is of importance is that whereas the 
waggonway system had been aligned on a generally north/south axis, that 
of the railways ran from west to east, in effect supplementing the rivers 
themselves. In the later part of the period a further re-alignment took 
place when London was linked, perhaps somewhat circuitously, with Gateshead 
in 1844 and with Edinburgh in 1850. 
The impact of the railways an the region's ports was considerable. 
No longer could each one be considered as the single outlet for a particular 
mining area; efficient and cheap transport was able to , carry coal 
to the most suitable shipping place, whether on account of its lower shipping 
charges or a greater water depth. These new conditions brought change. 
Although the Tyne was only marginally improved, as was the Blyth, Amble 
and West Hartlepool were established as coal exporting centres and docks 
were built at each of the ports-Of the Durham coast, where expansion was 
to lead to the establishment of new towns, the prime examples being Middlesbrough 
and West Hartlepool. 
The improvements-, made to region's ports were the , result primarily 
of the numbers of ships using them, especially so far as the Tyne and 
Wear were concerned, but constant efforts were needed to up-date them in 
line with the increasing size of ships, partly a result of the change- 
over from wood to iron construction which began to take place, together 
with the change from sail to steam as a means of propulsion, a change 
which did not immediately affect the colliers. It is difficult to establish 
with certainty the size of ships using the ports but taking figures for 
the import of coal 4 into London alone it would seem that, for 1833, the 
cargoes averaged 312 tons from the Tyne, 281 from the Wear, 220 from the 
Tees and 275 tons from Blyth. 
7 Several references have been noted at 
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this time of ships of 200 tons r6gipter, 3 figure which correlates well with 
the deadweight figures and a size which appears to have been common throughout 
the region. Ship sizes increased markedly during the period 1830-1854, 
not the least of the factors which led to continuous port improvement. 
4.2 River Tyne 
At the 1829 Select Committee hearing into the coal trade, the numbers 
of collieries then working on the Tyne was given as 36 by coal-owner Robert 
William Brandling (1774-1848) and as 41 by John Buddle, 23 to the north 
of the river and 18 to the south, slightly more than double the Wear's 
figures. The Tyne collieries' average output amounted to c 53,000 tons 
p. a. with Percy Main, Burradon and Killingworth producing c 92,000 tons 
p. a.; in contrast,. the largest of the Wear coal-bwners, Lord Durham, produced 
334,000 tons p. a. 
2 
albeit from several ralnec . --- Although the Wear 
collieries had a higher average output than those of the Tyne, the Vend 
had, that year, been regulated in the ratio 3: 2 in favour of the Tyne. 
In spite of deeper collieries having been recently won in the Tyne area, 
production had not risen appreciably and Buddle commented that the same 
collieries could, with the same plant, but perhaps more men, easily double 
the output; in his view, only demand would stimulate production. 
The following year another Select Committee investigated ' the trade 
and, obviously unhappy regarding the Regulation, it commented that the 
trade "had better be left to the control of that competition which appears 
already to have affected it"; 
3 the competition was seen as coming from 
the Tees, Brandling viewing it "entirely as a rival trade, the same as 
Wales". 4 The coal-owners on Tyne and Wear, if rivals, did at least communicate, 
although the opposing concerns went their own ways; only eminent viewers 
like Buddle and Nicholas Wood appear to have straddled the boundary. 
To bring coal from colliery' to river, still the only means for exit 
from the region, a network of waggonways had been built; only a very 
few private lines were to be constructed after 1830, principally those 
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of the new collieries at Seghill and Cramlington 
5 
and the Stanhope and 
Tyne Railway (S&TR) from west Durham to South Shields. On the Tyne there 
had been a tendency to provide waggonway outlets at down-river locations 
on both banks of the river although staiths stretched up-river from the 
sea for a distance of 14 miles. The reasons for the later development 
were three-fold: the unimproved river was easily navigable-only, in its 
lower reaches; the restriction of the bridge at Newcastle was avoided; 
the use of keels, with high transhipment costs, was obviated. As a result 
the numbers of keels in the river was declining and, from a peak of c. 400 
- estimates as high as 1,000 have been noted - the number had fallen to 
300 by 1828.6 The number of sailings from the river at this time was 
c 11,750, causing very serious congestion along certain of the reachesq 
especially where colliers were awaiting their turn to be loaded. During 
the previous 20 years the use of drops had increased markedly, and in 
1828 it was estimat6d by Thomas Elliot Harrison (1808-1888) that some 75%) 
of the region's coal shipments was loaded by this means, perhaps 4m tons. 
7 
By 1830 the rivers had been little improved and the coal-ownersp 
expecting little of the Corporation, were forced into extending their 
staiths to deeper water. -In 1831 Killingworth colliery sought an extension 
of 118 ft at Willington Quay with a drop projecting a. further, 36 ft. 
8 
Similarly, the Cramlington Coal Company sought to lengthen its gears at 
Howdon Pans; other companies with longer staiths were said to be causing 
silting in the river. 
9 Similar instances were numerous. 
Although reluctant to improve the river, neverthelessq the Corporation 
was anxious to secure trade for the Tyne and to approve, where it could, 
facilities sought by the new 'railway companies. In 1831 the council 
agreed to form a committee concerning the building of a railway between 
Monkwearmouth and South Shields "from the coal districts in County Durham". 
'() 
It reported favourably'on this proposal as it would "lend to the increase 
of the coal trade of the River Tyne and consequently of the Revenues of 
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of the Corporation. "" There was no mention that the traffic could be 
reversed - as had happened - and the Corporation was recommended to subscribe 
for 50 E50 shares. A year later the Brandlings sought approval for the 
erection of new drops at the west end of South Shields to secure their 
colliery there and a similar request was made in 1835, this time resulting 
from the passing of an Act of Parliament 
12 for the formation of the Brandling 
Junction Railway (BJR), a line from Gateshead to South Shields and to 
Monkwearmouth; the engineers were George Stephenson and Nicholas Wood. 
13 
Capital was subscribed for by the Corporation. 
At this time the Corporation became involved in other railway matters: 
the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway (N&CR) sought a quay at Skinnerburn, 
which was refused without qualifying reasons, and in an effort to eliminate 
or reduce, competition the Corportion unsuccesfully petitioned against 
the Bill promoted by the Hartlepool Dock and Railway Company in 1832, 
on the grounds that it would give to another port "an undue advantage 
over the River Tyne, long the principal Port for the export of coals. , 
14 
Stephenson's advice was sought by the, promoters of this railway and the 
following year the Corporation investigated the possibility of itself 
promoting a new railway from the Durham collieries, those which were intended 
to feed to Hartlepool. It was suggested that a railway, to become the 
Durham Junction Railway (DJR), be built from the terminus of the Hartlepool 
railway, passing through the Durham coalfield to join the SUR and so 
discharge coals at South Shields. It was noted that Buddle was involved 
in the proposals and negotiations had been opened with the Earl of Durham 
and the Marquis of Londonderry, appointed a Freeman of Newcastle in 1827. 
The line would cost 02,000, would transport c -2m tons p. a. and bring 
a dividend of ll-25'O, in addition to the duties payable to the Corporation 
of Z1,667 p. a. 
15 While the negotiations were proceeding the SUR sought 
approval for a wet dock at South Shields with eight berths and gears 
50 to 60 ft long, with spouts; the Corporation naturally agreed. 
Two years later the SUR again approached the Corporation: the docks had 
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not been built ,a fact regretted by the Corporation and the quay with 
its three berths had proved inadequate. 
16 Two drops were now proposed 
to increase the shipping capability of the railway terminus and a further 
three were applied for in 1838.17 
By 1835, with municipal reform imminent and the Wearmouth dock under 
construction at Sunderland, the question of the Tyne's condition appears 
to have become somewhat more pressing. The Revenue Committee proposed 
that a wet dock should be provided in Newcastle and following a request 
for a quay at Hebburn in accordance with Rennie's 1816 improvement line 
the Council sought the advice of Francis Giles, who had been involved 
with the river in 1815. The Corporation had already considered the provision 
of new river facilities, a new quay in Newcastle and a wet dock, perhaps 
at the mouth of the Ouseburn, 
18 
a mile down-river from the bridge. Six 
months later plans for a new quay were submitted by John Dobson and the 
newly reformed Council found them to be "worthy of... (its) immediate con- 
sideration. The cost of the mason work has been ascertained, and it 
is suggested that the cost of the modern mode of forming quays by iron 
plates should be compared91119 presumably a reference to the Brunswick 
Wharf, designed by Walker and Burgess, on the Thamesýý,. and begun in 1832.20 
In 1832 a book had been written by John Macgregor, a naval surveyor, 
addressed to the coal owners of the district. He noted that improvements 
to the Tyne were not being undertaken, to the benefit of the Wear and 
Tees, and criticised Rennie's report as having been too limited in its 
scope; the Corporation was also castigated regarding its attitude on 
river maintenance. He propounded the view that steam dredging was essential 
and was in fact used on the Thames, at Hull and at'Sunderland; even harrowing 
the sandbanks and then allowing scouring to take place would be an improve- 
ment. Macgregor foresaw that the Tyne would soon be lined with factories 
and so recommended building full-height river walls as a quay and he was 
further critical of Rennie for planning to build only half-tide walls 
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and for envisaging a new quay at: Newcastle, already the narrowest section 
of the river. In short, Rennie's plan was "without system, desultory 
and incongruous (with) ... isolated measures which have no natural dependence 
on each other, and therefore cannot form a consistent whole. ,2lA river 
wall was also proposed between Clifford's Fort and Spanish Battery on 
the north bank - in effect, Dodds proposal of 1769 - and the provision 
of a pier, also suggested by Rennie, to the south. 
Perhaps stimulated by Macgregor the Council, in 1834, commissioned 
a report from Joshua Richardson (1799-1866), following discussions between 
councillors and Newcastle merchants. 
22 Richardson was optimistic that 
the river's navigable depth would be increased and the sandbanks removed; 
in general he approved of Rennie's plan to constrain the river between 
walls as this would obviate one of the principal problems, the collapse 
of the river banks - and, in places, of ballast heaps into the riverv 
so widening it and causing further silting. Richardson thought that 
Rennie had over-estimated the cost of the works but considered that the 
river walls should be built to full height and the land reclaimed. He 
urged the conservators to remove obstructions such as Bill Point and to 
undertake extensive dredging, where possible in association with land 
reclamation. 
A further report was produced by the River Improvement Sub-Committee, 
to which he had reported; it also approved Rennie's river line and suggested 
that a wholesale policy of quay re-alignment should be undertaken, recommending 
that "the several landowners an those parts of the river should have every 
reasonable inducement and facility afforded for undertaking the building 
of such quays themselves , 
23 
and that extensive machine dredging of the 
many shoals and sandbanks should be proceeded with. The matter was also 
reported upon by the River Jury, responsible for investigating all nuisances 
perpe: trated. ' within the river's navigable length. It reported that "the 
channels of the river are now as good as they have been within the memory 
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of any man living , 
24 but nevertheless the river could be greatly improved. 
The Jury further approved of Rennie's line, agreed strongly with the protection 
of the river banks and with the removal of obstructions typified by Bill 
Point; it also agreed that the Newcastle Quay should be extended to the 
Ouseburn but recommended that the Common Council should take the opinion 
of some eminent engineer before proceeding. 
The government of Newcastle was reformed in 1836. One of the 
first decisions made by the new conservators was the formation of a River 
Committee, its remit to improve the river to accommodate 400 ton, rather 
150 ton ships; 
25 
some three months later it was agreed that Rennie's river 
line, proposed twenty years earlier, should be adopted. Whereas in the 
years following Rennie's report little had been done to the river, the 
twenty- year period which now began saw greater activity and in order 
to clarify matters, the river will be treated chronologically under four 
principal headings: negotiations with colliery companies; river improvements; 
railways and docks; and other matters. 
4.2.1 Negotiations with Colliery Owners. 
As earlier, the Corporation's dealings were principally regarding 
the provision of new staiths or the improvement of those already in use. 
Between 1836-50 some 20 applications were made, half of them on the north 
bank of the lower river, where on the site of what was to become the North- 
umberland Dock the number of shipping places increased from two in 1815 
to ll. * 
* Between 1830 and 1850 applications made for the provision or extension of staiths were as follows: - 
1838: Seghill Colliery 
1839: Cramlington Colliery; Seaton Colliery. 
1840: Percy Main Colliery; Whitley Colliery; Heaton Colliery. 
1842: Spital Tongues Colliery at Victoria Tunnel; Elswick Colliery 
Marley Hill Colliery; Gateshead (Oakwellgate). 
1843: ElswickColliery. 
1844: Killingworth, Wallsend, Walbottle Collieries. 
1845: Willington Colliery; Hebburn Colliery. 
1848: Blyth; Wylam Colliery at Scotswood. 
Ref: ProC N. C., 1838-1848. 
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Staith extensions had become necessary on two counts; the need for facilities 
for somewhat bigger ships and the silting taking place as a result of 
illegal ballast dumping and natural river deposition. In some instances, 
for example at Willington in 1842, it was found that the river was as 
shallow as two feet at low water and in 1839 the owners of the Wallsend 
spouts) and others, presented a petition to the Corporation on this account. 
It was followed by a memorial from George Johnson, Wood and Buddle on 
behalf of the owners of the Wallsend, Heaton, Kenton, Burradon and Killingworth 
collieries and led to the Corporation', s eng: ineer William D. Anderson (lB09- 
1842)q appointed in 1838 and a former pupil of Telford, reporting that 
the jetties there were in fact beneficial and it was anticipated that 
they would reduce the river's width from 2,000 to 1,000 feet. 
26 In a 
report which had been submitted by William Cubitt (1785-IB61) - details 
of it follow - the forming of groynes by filling in the bases of the timber 
gearings had been advocated. 
27 This was now, in the 1840-s, being done 
and many of the applications made for staiths were sanctioned on the condition 
that provision would be so made; in certain instances the Corporation 
met partof the costs of so doing, as for, example, at-the Killingworth 
staiths where E750, half of the total, was paid by the Corporation. 
28 
In 1838 the Corporation approved of the plans of the lessees of Spital 
Tongues colliery to construct a tunnel under the town, reaching to the 
Tyne at the Ouseburn. The colliery, a mile north-west of the town, was 
not able to obtain a surface route for its output and was so forced into 
the construction of the tunnel, two miles long; at its lower end, spouts 
were approved in 1842.29 The permission given for a shipping place 
virtually on the town's quayside is understandable in view of the fact 
that the Corporation was the lessor of the colliery. Across the river, 
in Gateshead, the small Oakwellgate colliery, near to the river, sought 
permission to erect spouts in 1842. The numbers of keels on the river 
was still in decline but the construction of the High Level Bridge brought 
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the operators of the 20 keels transporting coal from Wylam colliery into 
conflict with the Corporation. Although the new bridge's spans were 
of 125 ft., the construction of it had reduced the navigable width to 
40 ft, thought insufficient for the 22 ft wide keels. 
30 
4.2.2. River Improvements 
The reformed Council soon agreed to obtain an iron boat with a 10 
H. P. dredger from Fenton Murray & Co., for a total sum of L2,600, to 
encourage riparian owners to build quays and to coerce staithowners into 
boarding the gearing to form groynes where needed. 
31 It was also agreed 
that the Newcastle quay should be extended but first some eminent civil 
engineer should be appointed as consultant; Pubitt was approached, his 
first task being to report upon the quay proposal recently prepared by 
Dobson. It was approved but Cubitt suggested quay walls six feet thick 
with counter-forts at 18 ft' centres, the face to have a curved batter: 
it should be built inside cofferdams in 100 ft lengths. Cubitt also 
advocated the'use of Walker's iron sheet piling, giving a low-water depth 
of six to ten feet: the cost of 4,000 ft of quay would be E60 - 100,000.32 
Cubitt recommended the removal-of Friars Goose Point and Bill Point, where 
work would seem to have begun and, like Rennie, he envisaged the forming 
of groynes and then filling between them with dredged material. ' He' also 
recommended that the river channel should be dredged and suggested' that 
a weekly expenditure of E50 would enable 2,000 tons to be removed, 100,000 
tons p. a. Following Anderson's appointment tenders 'were sought for the 
removal of Bill Point, the spur causing the greatest restriction to the 
river's width in its navigable length. 
The Corporation, however, remained reluctant to embark on major river 
works, in 1839 instructing the River Committee that not more than E4,000 
was to be spent during the year, a decision reached following a memorial 
presented by the town's tradesment concerned at the small proportion of 
the river's revenue being spent on its maintenance. 
33 
They indicated 
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that of the past three years gross revenues of 09,575, only E35,168 
had been used for river purposes, the balance having been appropriated 
for town improvement. In the debate which ensued it was noted that Cubitt 
had proposed an expenditure of E2,500 for dredging, Z2,500 for groynes 
and Z5,000 for the quay and contingencies; it was not disclosed what 
the actual proportion of costs was. It was also stated, perhaps erroneously, 
that Sunderland already spent E30,000 p. a. on improvements; its revenue 
was half that sum. Matters did not quickly change and in 1841 the revenue 
from the river was E24,463 - E5,639 of it from ballast - while expenditure 
totalled Z7,209.34 
For the following year the River Committee estimated that its expenditure 
would be iE6,170; a ballast engine E510; Willington groynes Z520; berths 
E1,240; Walker groynes E400; dredging E500; new dredging plant E2,600.35 
A further dredger was purchased from Fenton Murray & Co. of Leeds for 
L1,500, four hopper craft being ordered separately. The report presented 
by the River Committee for 1841 indicated that a total of . 
84,000 tons 
of ballast etc had been dredged from the river and that the dredger had 
on occasions worked for hire. In addition, almost 100 ft of Bill Point 
had been removed. Due to ill health, Anderson resigned in July 1841 
and a year later was succeded by Brooks, previously engineer to the Tees 
Navigation Company. Before his resignation, Anderson had listed -the 
River Committee's expenditure during its first four years and had, shown 
what had been achieved. New dredging plant had been purchased, the greater 
part of the E5,200 capital expenditure, while revenue expenditure totalled 
E510 before Anderson's appointment and E14,051 afterwards. ' Included 
was some Z3,000 each for dredging, for works at Walker and for, Bill Point 
removal. 
36 
The year before his appointment Brooks had written on the improvement 
of rivers, 
37 
expressing major differences vis A vis Rennie's observations, 
especially as to the value of Jarrow Slake which Brooks considered to be 
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inessential to the river's well-being. The philosophy of improvement 
of the Tyne, as he saw it, was the construction of groynes to restrict 
laterally the main flow so that the "natural power of the stream (should) 
38 do the work of deepening the channel" . Noting that the improvements 
undertaken during Anderson's employment consisted mainly of the establish- 
ment of ballast depots at WillingtDn and Walker, together with the removal 
of 150,000 tons of material from Bill Point, Brooks laid down his first 
proposals, only partly in accordance with Renniels, and foresaw the formation 
of groynes to reclaim land and deepen the channel. The cost of the projected 
works would be c E17,000.39 
By 1843 Brookswas experiencing some antagonism from the Corporation. 
In a dispute between 
- 
it and T. & W. Smith regarding their ship 
yard at Dents Hole, Brooks had suggested a river line to them, a move 
deprecated by the Corporation. As the dispute progressed, Smiths threatened 
to take their business from Newcastle, a move which the Corporation attempted 
to avoid by promising improved facilities and although the matter dragged 
on for some time it was inevitable that Smiths should later migrate down- 
river. Chapman had earlier expressed surprise at Smiths building large 
ships above Bill Point; 
40 the river 330 ft wide at the Low Light was 
reduced to 132 ft at Bill Point. The matter was eventually fully investigated 
and Brooks found himself interrogated by the full Council and although 
he was notcalled upon to resign, nevertheless, his reputation was somewhat 
impugned and he was henceforth viewed with mistrust by Council members, 
to the extent of James Walker (1781-1862) being called in to report on 
the Dents Hole problem, not settled until 1845. Distrust of Brooks also 
caused two inspections of parts of the river, Willington and Friars Goose, 
to be made by John Murray (1804-1882), engineer to the River Wear Commission, 
in 1844 and 1845, although both of his reports were generally supportive 
of Brooks. 
In 1845 Brooks congratulated himself on the work he had accomplished, 
including the formation of the longest groyne, 800 ft, proposed by Rennie 
87 
at Wallsend and forming the deepwater channel in the bight there. His 
views were not, however, reflected by the report of the Commissioners 
for Tidal Harbours which in 1846 commented that the Tyne 
has coasted upwards of two millions of tons of coal per annum 
for the last quarter of a century. Her foreign trade has 
risen to half-a-million tons yearly; and the revenue derived 
from the river, and paid to the City Corporation, by charter, 
as conservators of the port, amounts to Z19,000. a-year; exclusive 
of 60001. annually levied by the Trinity Board fot- primeage, 
buoyage, etc. Where all seems so prosperous, it is an ungrateful 
task to point out that such a state of things may be deceitful'; 
yet so it certainly will prove to be in the Tyne, if the river 
be much longer abandoned to itself, as, generally speaking, 
it has been till within the last few years. The improvements 
proposed by Mr. Rennie, 30 years since, have, with the exception 
of a quay at Newcastle been left unexecuted. The width of 
the river remains extremely irregular, in some places the channel 
being only 60 yards wide; sharp angles increase the difficulty 
of nagivation; upwards of ten acres of sand-bank, dry at low 
water, still disfigure the bed of the stream; Newcastle bridge, 
with its nine narrow arches, heavy piers,, and additional starlings, 
acts almost as a mill-dam; a- loss. of 5 feet range of tide, 
in the distance of about twice as many miles, takes place between 
Tynemouth bar and Newcastle quay; coal staiths are projected 
irregularly into the stream; and no dock accommodation has 
been provided, while Shields harbour, the daily resort of hundreds 
of colliers, is so inconveniently crowded that damage frequently 
occurs. 41 
The Commissioners were not exaggerating the problems of river congestion. 
42 With some 19,000 sailings from the river in a year and with perhaps 
43 100 to 150 keels in daily Use it is understandable that, exceptionally, 
some 1,500 ships could be in'the river at any one time. 
44 
Soon after the above report, the' Council received 'two memorials'' from 
coal-owners, the first seeking improved facilities at Low Lights staitýs, 
the other from those shipping coal from Hay Hole where the' river was 
deteriorating due to silting: formerly at low water there hI ad been 12 
to 14 ft depth; soon the staiths would be blocked. At Hay Hole there 
were now 14 shipping places, loading 900,000 tons of coal p. a. into 3,000 
ships and the principal cause of complaint was the Willington groyne, 
recently completed by Brooks and' now causing "the fatal increase' of sand , 
45 
at the staiths. That the memorialists were justified is borne out by 
levels taken in 1850 when depths of water were shown to range from 7 ft 
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to 1513" at low water; 
46 it was this outcry which was to lead, eventually, 
to the construction of a dock at Hay Hole. 
4.2.3 Railways and Docks 
Docks had earlier been proposed at the Ouseburn, at Coble Dene and 
at South Shields, both at the Mill I 
Dam and also at the terminus of the 
SUR. Nothing further had been done so far as the first two were concerned 
and at Mill Dam it was later claimed that Newcastle Corporation had "filled 
it up with ballast for fear of any improvement to Shields. , 
47 Somewhat 
different, however, was the SUR dock where Harrison proposed to provide 
eight berths but owing to its estimated cost, some E25,000, and the opposition 
of two directors it was not built. 
48 The Corporation regpettEid that this 
had occurred as the dock was to have provided the outlet not only for 
the SUR, but also for the DJR, which the Corporation had promoted 
in conjunction with William Harrison, one of the most influential of the 
SUR directors. 
49 
The first of the railway companies to deal with the new Corporation 
were the N&CR and the Newcastle and North Shields (N&NSR). The former, 
under its 1835 Act, was empowered to extend its line to Redheugh and sought 
to erect staiths there, informing the Corporation that c 250,000 tons 
of coal p. a. could be expected; 
50 the Corporation - as it did with the 
DJR- held shares in the railway company. The latter, the N&NSR, was 
in effect precluded from mineral traffic under the terms of its Act, the 
principal landowner, the Duke of Northumberland, having enforced way-leave 
imposts on coal carried in an effort to protect his own mining interests; 
51 
nevertheless, in IB36 the N&NSR sought riverside-facilities at North Shieldsq 
a quay at the terminus of its branch to the river. 
52 The engineer for 
these works was Robert Nicholson (1808-1855) and he was responsible, too, for 
the abortive Morpeth and North Shields railway which in 1837 sought staiths 
at North Shields. 
53 
In 1637 a pamphlet written by John Richardson drew attention to 
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the need for docks in the Tyne. It advocated a series of them at North 
Shields with a railway at a higher elevation, so permitting the discharge 
of coal to the spouts. It was also suggested that a river wall be built 
from Jarrow to South Shields with two sets of dock gates provided so as 
to lead into Jarrow Slake, 350 acres in extent. Once this had been done, 
a dock could be formed on the land reclaimed. As traffic on the river 
increased so the need for docks became of greater importance as it was 
only by their provision that congestion in the lower reaches of the river 
would be ameliorated. 
54 A year later a prospectus was issued for the 
Tyne Dock Company, 55 having as a member of its provisional committee the 
mayor of Newcastle; the engineer was to be Harrison with Cubitt as consultant. 
The prospectus noted that no better site for a dock existed in the river 
as the SUR already carried 400,000 tons p. a. of coal to South Shields; 
it was expected that a branch line would soon bring a further similar 
quantity from Weardale. In addition, the DM which supported the construction 
of the dock, was almost complete 
56 
and the BJR, with the N&CR, -w-obld , bb'. Well 
placed to transport a further 400,000 tons from the south and west of 
Newcastle, now shipped by keels. Surprisingly, the prospectus was totally 
uncritical of the river and played upon the fact that the benefits would 
accrue ' from simpler handling and the ability of ships to remain afloat. 
The docks, the site of which had been first proposed in 1835,57 would 
have an area of 20 acres, would cost E200,000, and would achieve a profit 
of E25,000 p. a. assuming that lm tons of coal were to be shipped. it 
was reported upon by Anderson who considered that it would be "of great 
advantage to the port and navigation of the Tyne , 
58 
especially if the 
requirements of the dock ýompany and the B J. R could be concerted, the 
latter seeking drops at the same site; their construction would impede 
access to the dock. The Corporation duly gave consideration to investing 
in the Dock Company, the Finance Committee having suggested a sum of L19000. 
An Act 59 for the dock's construction was duly obtained - the authorised 
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Map 8: River Tyne; Jarrow (or Tyne) Dock, 1837-1859 
capital was reduced to E120,000 and the works were to be completed within 
seven years - and in September 1839 tenders were sought for its construction. 
Work did not proceed due to financial difficulties then being experienced 
by the SUR, many of whose shareholders had invested in the dock, and the 
BJR subsequently erected further spouts adjacent to the site proposed. 
In 1844 the Corporation decided to sell its holding in the DJR, the 
shares of which had fallen in value to E93. In a report made the following 
year it was pointed out that the Corporation held E5,000 of the company's 
Z80,000 capital and the line, unprofitable to operate, had been purchased 
by the Newcastle and Darlington Junction Railway (N&DJR) in 1843 for L88,500, 
virtually at the cost price, 
60 
and the comment was made in debate that 
the Corporation would have been better advised to have retained its investment 
in the N&DJR. 61 The Corporation had also been involved in the plans 
of Hudson to complete the main line between London and Edinburgh. A 
direct link between London and Gateshead was established in 1844 and in 
1849 the High Level Bridge was completed; initially, the completion of 
the north/south railway proved of grp-ater benefit to passengers than to 
the mineral traffic, economics dictating that the coastal sea trade remained 
predominant. As an adjunct to the railway mania of 1845 proposals were 
again made for docks on the river and plans having been made for enclosures 
at Jarrow, Low Lights and Coble Dene, the River Committee reported upon 
them. Jarrow had already been discussed in Council, the promoters of 
the Low Lights did not intend to seek Parliamentary powers immediately 
and it was, therefore, the Coble Dene dock - it had been first proposed 
in 1796 - which received most attention. 
62 The new dock company was 
to have a share capital of E100,000 and had as its chairman, Hudson, with 
Robert Stephenson (1803-1859) and Nicholson engineers and amongst its 
directors were several directors of the region's -railways. 
63 The prospectus 
began with the comment that it "has long been a Matter of Surprise that 
the Port of Newcastle _ should have no Dock of any description for the 
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accommodation of Shipping" 
64 
and it was therefore planned to build a dock* 
of some 20 acres with rail connections and port facilities such as to 
enable a higher class of ship to trade in the Tyne and to provide an outlet 
from the collieries to the north, Seghill, Cramlington and Seaton Delaval, 
some without shipping points. The prospectus also noted that "the System 
which has hitherto prevailed of constructing the Railway, and Shipping 
Places, Staiths and Drops, by individual Enterprise and Capital, must 
give way to the greater facilities afforded by the proposed Dock... , 
65 
which, it was hoped, would immediately ship the 600,000 tons p. a. presently 
loaded at Whitehill Point, adjacent; the prospectus claimed that total 
shipments from the river amounted to 2.725m tons of coal but no forecast 
of profit from it was made. The River Committee, in general agreement, 
suggested that an additional entrance be provided at the docks west end 
and also that 270 ft of Whitehill Port be removed to meet Rennie's proposals. 
To this latter matter the dock company could not agree and the Corporation 
withdrew the requirement. No work ensued, due to the factthat Hudson 
found it impossible to proceed with forming a feeder network of railways 
to the dock; they remained in private hands. 
66 
The -Newcastle Corporation at this time discussed the advantages of 
rival lines seeking access to the Tyne via the valley of the river Teamq 
the York and Newcastle Railway (Y&NR) and the Leeds and Thirsk Railway 
(L&TR), the latter-in the general enthusiasm for expansion at that time- 
seeking to extend ''its influence to Newcastle. The debate in Council 
became somewhat acrimonious with the opinion being voiced that Hartlepool 
would become the outlet for Yorkshire trade if Newcastle did not favour 
the L&TR. Lockey Harle expressed a lack of faith - Phillipson was described 
67with Hudson already established and as his "paid agent"- while Brandling, 
controlling the SUR staiths, but not yet Jarrow dock,, thought that 
competiticn could do nothing but good. The Corporation decided, eventually 
and narrowly, -to petition in favour of the LUR, principally on the grounds 
that. a railway monopoly would adversely affect the trade of the district; 
*See Map 19 92 
on the other hand, it was pointed out, if the High Level Bridge had not 
been built by Hudson, the town would have had to wait another century; 
his presence should be encouraged. 
Independent of Hudson, a proposal was made in the depressed year 
of 1848 that a dock should be built on the north bank of the river, at 
Low Lights. Again a symptom of the enthusiasm for dock and railway projects 
at the time, a dock had been projected here by Brooks in 1845 
68 
when a 
wet dock some 2,500 ft in length with three spur quays had been pla6ned-. 
immediately down-river of Cliffords Fort, a feature being that its excavation 
would provide materials for the formation of a north pier, some 2,000 
feetin length. Brooks claimed that he had been the first to have envisaged 
the construction of the pier - but that credit for it had subsequently been 
taken from him. 69 The suggestion for a dock now came from the owners 
of the Cowpen, Blythp Bedlington and Netherton steam coal collieries and 
they memorialised the Corporation to the effect that whereas their coals 
had previously b&en shipped "in the river of Blyth, at considerable cost 
and sacrifice , 
70 they now sought a place of shipment on the Tyne where 
bigger and more economical ships could be used. The promoters sought 
"to erect a sheet pile dam or open dock , 
71 
and, with only some 5k miles 
of railway to be built, the scheme should prove economical. In 1849 
Brooks stated that the dock was to have had its entrance to the north 
of Cliffords Fort but he had, with the assent of James Simpson (1799-1869)t 
presumably acting for the coal-owners, redesigned the dock to provide 
an entrance from the west. 
72 Brooks also stated a preference for the 
Low Lights vis A vis Coble Dene dock - Hudson's Northumberland Dock - 
commenting that he had in 1848 produced plans for docks on both sides 
of the river. 
73 The north dock was a redesigned version - it had a locked 
entrance - of the 1845 proposal and had, again, an area of 30 acres. 
Opposite to it he had planned a 38 acre dock which was to incorporate 
staiths for the SUR but he noted, realistically, that it would not be 
93 
required should the Jarrow dock proceed. 
In 1851, after the formation of the Tyne Improvement Commission, 
a dock, again at Low Lights, was proposed in conjunction with a railway 
from Cowpen, Bedlington and Netherton,, so enabling steam coal to be 
shipped on the Tyne. The plans, 
74 
prepared by Joseph Locke (1805-1860), 
indicated that the dock was to be of seven acres and it was noted that 
3-',,, miles of railway would enable a connection to be made to the existing 
rail network, so permitting 300,000 tons p. a. to be shipped in the new 
dock. It would seem that this proposal was influenced by developments 
on the Wear: 
The great argument, we understand in favour of docks on the 
Tyne and one which has had considerable weight with the Projectors 
of the present undertaking, is the success which has attended 
the splendid docks at Sunderland. At that place it is said 
that many Parties although possessed of private shipping places 
on the Wear, and branch railways leading to them, have abandoned 
both, and now ship their coal exclusively in the Dock, owing 
to the superior facilities which are offered. 75 
The promoters of the scheme claimed that "if dock accommodation was 
not forthwith provided, first-class ships would cease to frequent the 
river, and exclusively visit those ports on the East coast which were 
provided with such accommodation"; 
76 
such facilities had earlier been 
provided at Seaham, Hartlepool and the Tees. Three years later the 
same site was again considered for a 30 acre enclosed dock with a seven 
acre tidal basin; 
77 the same site had been suggested by Brooks in 1845. 
He had amended the design so that no part of the dock was within the 
line of fire from Cliffords Fort while the eastern sea wall would form 
both a line of defence and a shelter for the ships lying in the dock. 
The Blyth and Tyne Railway (B&TR) shareholders approved the scheme, 
noting that the lack of docks on the Tyne was resulting in ships seeking 
cargoes elsewhere. 
78 
Perhaps contemporaneously, a further proposal for docks was promulgated 
seemingly independent of railways. It too was made by Brooks and was 
a scheme for three independent docks, of 52,31 and 42 acres respectively, 
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situated on the coast between Tynemouth and Cullercoats, all with gates, 
and for the construction of a tidal harbour forming an extension of the 
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old harbour of Cullercoats. A feature of this complex was a cut from 
the south dock to the river, joining it immediately up-river from Cliffords 
Fort, its advantage, in Brooks's eyes, being the provision of an entrance 
to the river other than by the bar which would not be kept clear by the 
inadequate piers proposed by Walker. 
Of the foregoing proposals, only the docks at Coble Dene and Jarrow* 
came to be built. 
4.2.4 Other Matters. 
The 1833 Enquiry into the affairs of the Newcastle Corporation revealed 
that not only was the method "of choosing this select body... very complicated; 
but it is, in effect, self elected". 
so The sums appropriated for use 
by the Corporation from the income it received for the river were variously 
given, one estimate maintaining that in eleven years, E217,000 had been 
"81 shared amongst the members of "this close and self-elected body. 
After reform, the Corporation continued to use much of the river's income 
on town improvements, especially on the construction of an extensive new 
quay in Newcastle. Originally designed by Dobson the drawings of it 
were sent to Cubitt for his approval and tenders were received in 1B37, 
82 the lowest being that of ElB, 128 from William Brown. On Cubitt's advice 
the design was changed from a piled structure to a solid masonry one, 
founded at 12 ft below low water, and a revised price of L19,120 was accepted 
for the 1,000 ft length; it was not until 1838 that work should begin. 
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In the construction of the quay the Corporation had originally sought 
facilities for ships of 16 ft draught at all times in an effort to attract 
the East India and China traders but this requirement, thought to be too 
costly with ten miles of the river to improve, was temporarily abandoned 
and the reduced depth adopted. The new quay was to extend from the Broad 
Chare to the Swirle with the possibility of an extension when circumstances 
so demanded. 
* See map 10 
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Although the new section of quay in Newcastle was to be built some 
20 ft in front of the old one, 
84 
when Gateshead came to apply for a new 
quay, in conjunction with the BJR, the Corporation had no inhibitions 
in opposing the application on the grounds that the contraction of the 
river was unacceptable because of its 30 ft projection. 
85 A report by 
Anderson, however, proved favourable to the Gateshead proposal whereupon 
the decision was reversed. Disputes in Newcastle Council had delayed 
the execution of the quay contract and Anderson again reported to it his 
revised proposals, namely that the quay should be in only ten feet of 
water as many of the ships using it would draw between nine and twelve 
feet; it would be cheaper to build on a solid base rather than to pile. 
In debate two views were expressed: first, that it was ill-advised to 
provide only 10ft of water when 12 ft would cost only E2,000 more; second, 
why provide as much as ten when the channel depth in places was only half 
that figure? Realism prevailed, the greater depth was initially adopted 
- it was later reduced - work began, the contractor was soon in financial 
difficulties and the Council sanctioned a masonry quay built on piles 
whichq due to the fact that a cofferdam would not be needed, would be 
cheaper. 
86 At the same time the length of the masonry quay was reduced 
from 1,000 to 400 ft. The official opening by the mayor took place 
an 25 August 1840, the directors of the several railway companies having 
been especially invited; almost two acres of land had been reclaimed. 
In 1844 the Corporation, prompted by its Trade Committee, sought 
a railway to the quayside, estimating that some 20,000 tons of goods were 
normally transferred from river to rail, and plans for it were prepared 
by Nicholson. Later, William George Armstrong (1810-1900), as part of 
his scheme for providing hydraulic cranes on the quay, stressed the need 
for a. link with the York Newcastle and BEFrwick Railway (YN&BR ). Ih 1849 the 
railway company sought to reverse its 1845 decision to build its line 
but the Corporation petitioned against I the company's Bill then in Parliament: 
87 
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the petition was unssuccessful and it was not until 1870 that the link 
to the Quayside was formed. 
In 1854,3.696m tons of coal were shipped from the river Tyne, some 
lm tons from the Hay Hole staiths and -4m tons from above bridge, slightly 
more from the north bank than the south. Since 1830 the coastal coal 
traffic had risen only from 2.168-to 2.185m tons but the increase in overseas 
trade had been dramatic; from 197,000 tons it had risen to 1.511m tons. 
In the same period the number of sailings had increased from c 14,000 
to c 20,000 with, at the earlier date 89'% of them being co-ast-wise and 
at the later 5950. To ship the ýgrowing tonnage of coal new railways had 
been built - the Corporation had invested in - those which were potentially 
of the greatest benefit to it - and the several companies had successsively 
amalgamated in an effort to reduce, both competition and costs. With 
the colliery companies they had, built staiths at their own expense whereas, 
except for relatively minor items of work, the river's conservators had 
done little'to improve the Tyne. 
Municipal reform had brought some changes to the Corporation's attitude 
towards the river and whereas between 1815 and 1835 the average sum spent 
on it had been E2,381 p. a., after, 1835 it had risen to E4,125 p. a.,, although 
it would seem that these figures were for maintenance. only. After 1835 
river improvements were undertaken in an effort to maintain navigation, 
still limited to ships of c 400 tons, and figures presented to the 1850 
Inquiry indicate that, over the 12-year period beginning in 1835, ' Z53,336 
had been so spent. 
88 At the same time it was stated that in the years 
prior to 1835 the river's improvement had cost only E2,943 in total. 
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The statement of the Corporation is not, perhaps to be fully trusted in 
relation to its capital spending , as it , may have - been inflated in defence 
of its conservatorship. Whet6r the figures are accurate or not is immaterial. 
Newcastle had abused its powers relating to the river and the allegation 
that between 1815 and 1850 it had misappropriated, or at best not used 
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to the river's advantage, some Z500,000 was never challenged. 
The attitude of the Corporation towards the Tyne was somewhat ambivalent. 
On the one hand it looked to it as a source of revenue by virtue of its 
coal exporting capabilities, at the same time seeing it simply as a canal 
leading to Newcastle where the' river's principal quay was located, and 
on the other the Corporation was unwilling to undertake any improvement 
work, to the extent of denying itself adequate water depth at the Newcastle 
quay; to have made provision at the quay would have involved the Corporation 
in unacceptable expense in relation to the river's channel. 
Superimposed upon the 'river's principal function as ýa, main artery 
for the shipment of coal was the industry which, during this period, became 
more significant. By 1854 'industrial developments were considerable, 
principally chemical manufacture, engineering and ship-building. None 
of them was new; ship-building in wood was of long standing, the engineering 
industry dated from the early years of the century and the chemical trade 
since the late 18th century. 
What took place between 1830 and 1854 was a rapid expansion in each 
industry. From its effective beginning at Walker the manufacture of 
alkali) the Tyne's principal manufactured chemical,, 'increased and the 
south bank of the Tyne from Gateshead to Jarrow witnessed the establishment 
of major manufacturing works, all dependent upon the river, especially 
for the importation of raw materials, normally brought into the Tyne as 
ballast. Similarly, the engineering industry expanded too. From the 
early works of Crowley it had seen, by 1800, the formation 'of the 
concerns of Abbot and of Hawks Crawshay and by 1854 the factories of 
Hawthorn, Stephenson and Armstrong had been established., Their founding 
had been due to the inception of steam power, in the case of -the first 
two - Hawthorns were concerned initially in the manufacturing of stationary 
and marine engines while Stephensons specialised in locomotives - and 
the rediscovery of the concept of hydraulic power in the case of Armstrong. 
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Shipbuilding on the Tyne was of long standing but the introduction 
of steam motive power and the change to _iýoiri 
hulls initiated a great 
expansion in this industry. Although ships which traded from the river 
reached, in general, some 400 tons, those built on the Tyne were of a 
greater size, Smiths at St. Peter's having built Indiamen at their up- 
river yard. By 1840 an iron ship of 800 tons was first seen in the river 
and the same year the Archimedes, the first screw steamer, made an appearance; 
in IB46 a ship of 1,300 tons was launched and in 1848 one of 1,500 tons. 
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It was, however, the John Bowe. s,. a ship of 600 tons built by , 
Charles 
Mark Palmer (1822-1907) in 1852, which was to have the greatest influence 
on the coal trade of the Tyne, and indeed of the North East. The ship 
was an iron-hulled steam-powered screw collier and although these principles 
had all beenadopted by Brunel for his Great Britain of 1843 
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1a much 
bigger ship 7 the combination of them in collier construction led to 
a ship of such speed, capacity and reliability that sailing colliers were 
rendered uneconomic, if not obsolete. It was to accommodate such 'ships 
that rende. red so vital the river's improvement. 
4.3 River Wear 
In IB30 the s, hipments of coal from the river Wear totalled 1.387m 
tons, of which c 7'% was exported. This tonnage was carried in some 7,000 
ships, the average cargo less. than the comparable figure for the Tyne. 
Despite rising shipments the river Wear was under threat. Five years 
earlier the SOR had begun the shipment, of coal from the Tees, in 1828 
an Act of Parliament had been obtained for the construction of, the Clarence 
Railway and in 1829 the Marquis of Londonderry had begun the construction 
of his private port of Seaham Harbour, together with the railway leading 
coal to it. All projects were likely to compete with the Wear for the 
shipment of coal from the expanding Durham coalfield. 
It was against this_ background that the River Wear Commission (RWC) 
decided to ask Sir John Rennie to report upon the harbour as an entity. 
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He recommended that the north pier be extended, parallel to the south, 
and also advocated that deeper foundations, as already provided by -Milton, 
be adopted to obviate the undermining of the piers by the scouring effect 
which would result from lengthening them. 
1 Nevertheless, the greatest 
shortcoming was the lack of docks, necessary because of the river's limited 
area and the numbers of ships using it. With an average width of only 
350 ft and an area of some 80 acres it was noted that into the river had 
"been crowded, besides coal keels and steam-tugs, between 600 and 700 
vessels, many of them coal laden. ,2 In spit'e-of having earlier decided that 
the construction of docks should be by'bodies other than'the RWC, ' nevertheless 
in 1831 a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Cuthbert Sharp 
to reconsider this matter and within two months, after discussion with 
shipowners and merchants, it w- as resolved that "the increasing trade and 
commerce ... require more accommodation than the river can afford 
(leading 
to the necessity)... of having docks to communicate' with the River so 
as to increase and facilitate .3 its-growing'business. 
The reversal of the RWC policy had perhaps been influenced by a prospectus 
issued by John Hartforth in January 1831 which sought to Promote the 
construction of a dock to the' south of the pier. It foresaw that without 
one, trade could not increase' although' "the undertaking, indeed, is a 
gigantic one for an individual; but for a body of public" spirited men 
it will be light and easy (and) ... when completed, will ' cause Sunderland 
to rise in commercial adventure and prosperity in a greater yearly proportion 
than has ever yet been witnessed" .4 That docks were' a 
'requisite for 
the Wear was confirmed in September 1831 when a notice pointed 'out that 
powers for a railway between Tyne and Wear - it was supported by Newcastle 
Corporation - were about to be sought, "so that even the produce' of the 
Monkwearmouth colliery which is now forming within a stonesthrow of' your 
5 
Bridge and your River may actually be shipped in the Tyne. "" Under the 
pressure of competition from other ports, the actual location of docks 
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on the Wear became a matter of controversy, Miller, in a detailed study, 
noting that opposition to the south dock proposal had become evident at 
least from October 1831 6 when Sir Hedworth Williamson (1779-1861), the 
owner of most of the north bank of the lower river, received a report 
from Brunel regarding a dock at the base of the north pier with a railway 
from it, crossing the river in the vicinity of the Hetton staiths. Brunel's 
dock was to have its principal , entrance adjacent toý the pier and a lock 
at its upstream end connecting to a tidal basin; 
7 the bridge crossing 
the Wear would seem to have been-, somewhat innovatively, of a two deck 
suspension form of construction. 
8 Construction would necessitate 'the 
removal of partýof the north pier. 
At this time also the RWC received drawings from Francis Giles showing 
his proposals for a dock on the south shore, providing accommodation for 
300-400 ships. 
9 The promoters had received estimates from Giles of Z150,000 
and looked to receipts - of some L15,000 from dues levied by the RWC for 
that purpose; the capital sum would be borrowed "on security of the, proposed 
rates by Commissioners to be named in the Act"'() and the RWC had , themselves 
agreed than an imposition of 2d -per ch. should be made on coal ia figure 
agreed with all exporters other than 'the Hetton colliery, 
11 
which already 
having shipment facilities in the river considered any dock to be irrelevant 
to its needs. Proposals for both north and south schemes were submitted 
to Parliament and the merits of the, opposing designs vigorously publicised 
by their respective proponents. 
The advantages of a south dock were stated as being ýthat the site 
was publicly owned, some SO'% of the river's coal originated there and 
approximately 75', 'o of the Wear's shipping was owned by Sunderland, the 
principal centre of population. The principal advantage of the north 
dock, as seen by its supporters, was that it was the site favoured by 
Rennie, 12 his view being that it was betterý placed for ships putting to 
sea and that its construction costs would be much less than on the south bank, 
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mainly'': -on account of less expensive excavation operations; conversely, 
the sea wall of the South Dock would be too exposed and. ships entering 
the river would be endangered. Consideration of dock facilities became 
entwined with a proposal to build a railway between Monkwearmouth and 
South Shields, now considered as the possible terminus of the N&CR; the 
two railways would have the effect of stimulating the growth of South 
Shields at the expense of the Wear. The opponents of the railway held 
that its main object was to detach "the coal trade from the port of Sunderland" 
13 
and it was to counteract this possibility that Williamson promoted the 
dock and opposed the railway, a view confirmed by a pamphlet comparing 
north and - south proposals which commented that "the North Dock may' be 
desirable to prevent (Wear coal) being carried to the Tyne. , 
14 
In the 1832 Parliamentary Session, Bills were introduced for 'the 
three schemes noted above, the South Shields to Monkwearmouth ýrailway, 
the south dock and the north dock; none passed through Parliament. 
The railway Bill was defeated, -' principally by the several landowners-ý 
headed by Bryan Abbs, whose property would be affected. 
15 Abbs had been 
instrumental in promoting the north dock, later involving Williamson, 
and his firm later became salictors to the north dock company., The , RWC 
had given no views on the railway, only expressing concern regarding those 
clauses seen as likely to, affect its authority. , 
16 The Bill for Ahe 
south dock was defeated in committee, opposition to it having been made 
by Sir William Russell and Williamson, both M. P. 's for the county. Mis- 
management was also a factor, the Bill having been altered four times, 
and Giles was criticised for having misjudged the quality of stone to 
be excavated, assuming that it would be suitable for building. 
17 The 
south dock Bill was also opposed by - the - Hetton Coal Company, which had 
recently improved its river staiths, 
18 
although it was supported by the 
Newcastle Member , John, Hodgson9, i6 preference to the north which was likely to 
affect the Tyne to a greater extent. 
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In July 1832 Parliament heard evidence regarding the proposal to 
build the north dock. Several witnesses advocated such provision, principally 
on account of the volume of shipping using the river and its inadequate 
state; the depth of water on the bar was 15 ft maximum, some 300-400 ships 
could leave the river together, 100 per tide , and the river's depth 
was, in places, inadequate, forcing shipping to lie aground; ships could 
only moor five or six abreast. Fears were also expressed concerning 
the loss of trade to other rivers. Most ships using the river were of 
c 200 tons but, although vessels of 350 tons could berth in the Wear, 
they could not be fully loaded or unloaded there due to lack of water 
at the loading berths forcing the ships to ground; they must use the 
Tyne. Engineering evidence was presented by Brunel who, admitting that 
he had no dock experience, stated that he had been in communication with 
Chapman. The dock which he proposed was to be 12 acres in extent - he 
had proposed plans for 26,18 and 12 acre docks - would hold c 150 ships, 
give a depth to 21 ft and would cost L66,000, of which L21,000 was for 
excavation. The suspension bridge and its connecting railway would cost 
E27,000 and Brunel, in spite of the problems recently experienced with 
the S&DR Is suspension bridge at Middlebrough, foresaw no problems in trans- 
porting 3m tons p. a. across the Wear. In spite of his advocacy the Bill 
was rejected, much to the satisfaction of the south dock promoters who, 
after rejection of their own Bill, had fought a rear-guard* action to 
thwart developments on the north bank and had pressed the RWC to 11con. sioer, 
the early Constructiion of Wet Docks on the South Side of the River as 
essential to the future Prosperity of the Port. " 
19 Opposition to the 
north dock Bill had come from both Hodgson and from the Marquis of Londonderry; 
he and the Newcastle Corporation had been described as the "sworn foes 
of Sunderland"' 
20 but in fact Londonderry, far from being so, had pledged 
himself to support a south dock. From press comments it would seem that 
the north dock promoters had initiated it partly on the basis of its being 
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for asylum purposes, a concept expressed in Committee, but its opponents 
noted, rightly, that if the bridge were to be built the dock would soon 
need to serve "the whole trade of the Port; for, be it remembered, no 
shipowner will even think of loading or unloading his ship in the river, 
. after a place 
is made for his accommodation... 11 
21 
In March 1832 John Murray was appointed engineer to the RWC in succession 
to Milton and within six months, following the rejection of both dock 
schemes, he produced a report suggesting that the river itself be converted 
into a wet dock, a concept earlier proposed by Stevenson; Murray' s scheme 
was much restricted in scale in that, whereas the earlier floating harbour 
was to be virtually bisected by the bridge, the later scheme was to be 
entirely down-river of it and the 'dock would -be by-passed by a channel 
rather than by Stevenson's tunnel. The total area to be enclosed would 
be 24 acres, including two tide basins - two acres downstream and three 
acres upstream - with a lock - separating basin from dock. Murray -envisaged 
the dock as coalý-handling and planned 'the colliery railways to pass between 
the barracks and fort and thence to the quays. He also suggested that 
the harbour would be improved by the new straight channel increasing the 
river Is velocity' and hence its scouring power; dredging would not need 
to be so extensive. The total cost of the works would be Z200,000.22 
At the request of the commissioners, a report was submitted by James 
Walker regarding docks on both north and south banks. He suggested that 
they be initially of six and eight' acres respectively ýbut that land be 
purchased and provision made for their extension to 13 and 20 acres; 
the entrances and half-tide basins would serve both sizes of dock, the 
locks of which would be 32 ft wide and the entrances 50 ft. Walker rec- 
ommended docks on each side of the river so as to facilitate egress. from 
the river with varying "winds and realistically he noted that if the town 
indulged 
in bickering as to the 'advantages and disadvantages of the 
north and south sides and the exact manner in which shipping 
or property is to be rated, while your enterprising neighbours 
at Seaham and Hartlepool are in full activity... (then) it 
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requires no power of divination to foresee the consequences. 
(He concluded by commenting that the poor state of the river 
and the lack of' docks contributed) a serious drawback on the 
local advantages of the port in reference to the coal fields... yet.. 
Sunderland has become one of the principal sea ports in the 
Kingdom, because there was no port or communication with a 
port from which the same coal could so conveniently be shipped. 
But is this state of things likely to continue if Sunderland 
be not improved Seaham, Hartlepool, the railways of the 
Tees and those projected to Shields on the one side and to 
Hartlepool on the other, answer the question; and if the 
answer does not create a spurt of activity as well as unanimity 
among those concerned in the trade of the Wear, they must 
view their interest very differently from what I do. 23 
Walker estimated that his docks would initially cost E185,000 and a further 
E164,000 would be needed to extend them; it would take E332,000 to build 
the larger size immediately. George Rennie (1791-1866), in general approving 
of Walker's scheme, disagreed with his estimates without publishing his 
24 
own. 
The RWC decided to seek Parliamentary powers but the proposal was 
soon dropped, largely on account of an injunction obtained by the Hetton 
Coal Company and others, concerned that the RWC, not legally empowered 
to do so, should use its funds for dock purposes. As this move was 
probably supported by the Monkwearmouth and Lambton colliery interests 
it is understandable that the RWC should have retracted, especially 
as it could not expect unanimous support from its members. So the 
south dock scheme foundered in spite of a somewhat desultory move by 
25 
a group of shipowners to form a joint-stock company. Opposition 
to the south dock proposal had not come from Londonderry although he 
had been urged to oppose it by the Hetton Coal Company, the latter suggesting 
that they would both be affected "in consequence of the large outlay 
of capital at Seaham Harbour which has relieved Sunderland from so great 
a redundancy of shipping and which obviates the necessity of a dock 
,,, 26 or docks at all. It was also suggested that the North Docks promoters 
did not intend openly to oppose the Bill as they felt that the traders 
were not taxed unduly. Londonderry responded by informing Buddle that 
he wished to remain aloof from the dispute, considering that the traders 
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should be taxed, rather than the coal-owners. As he hoped to ship the 
major part of his coal from Seaham, he therefore thought that it "behoves 
Lord Durham and the Hetton Company to look to (theriver duty) unless 
they are speculating on Hartlepool which, by the by, the Dock Bill may 
much impede. , 
27 It is perhaps ironic that the South Dock was opposed 
by, amongst others, the coal-owners whose royalties lay to the south 
of the river. 
In 1833 two proposals were made 'for a north dock, the first envisaging 
the construction of a 14 acre enclosure, capable of holding 200 ships, 
with an upstream entrance and a down-stream exit - the plan produced 
by Brunel - and capable of shipping both coal and general goods; it 
would give a depth of water two feet greater than was then available 
and would cost 00,000. The prospectus noted that the river was now 
crowded, that berths for loaded ships were insufficient, that the SUR 
was proposing to bring coal from the southern parts of Durham to the 
north bank of the Wear via the BJR and that the new Monkwearmouth colliery 
was- being opened up within a mile of the dock. The immediate revenue 
was estimated at E9,000 p. a. but "the prospect that it ultimately affords, 
is incalculable.,, 28 The second prospectus was for a dock of nine acres 
but with provision for its future enlargement. For its building E30,000 
capital would be required and the dock was expected to generate a revenue 
of E4,500 p. a.; a. contract with., the landowner was already arranged. 
29 
In April 1834 a Deed of Covenant ... was completed listing the directors, 
among them Williamson, and in July 1834 a Royal Charter was obtained 
and the Wearmouth Dock Company established. The dock,, - was constructed 
with a water area of six acres and a tidal basin of A acres, 
30 Williamson, 
with his brother, raising the initial, E60,000. It was opened in November 
1837 and had reputedly cost Z120,000,31 perhaps because of problems en- 
countered during construction, among them a collapsed wall; 
32 it was 
was-built without the railway and bridge which had formed a vital element 
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in the original schemeq the result of opposition which considered that 
Sunderland was likely to lose trade to the Tyne should it be built. 
The RWC made it a condition that all drawings were to be approved by 
Rennie and in 1835, in accordance with his recommendations, the RWC 
33 
agreed to a wider entrance being provided. The cutting through of 
the north pier became necessary to form it and the dock company was 
instructed to rebuild in accordance with Rennie's specification; it 
was not allowed to provide for sluicing the dock, presumably as this 
operation would be lik I ely to cause silting at the river's mouth. 
34 
As the forming of the north dock began, yet another proposal was 
made, in pamphlet form, byý William Bell. After referring to earlier 
suggestions he put forward, again, a scheme for docks to both north and 
south of the river, of 20 and' 35 acres respectively, with a diagonal 
loading berth in each to increase jetty length with respect to dock 
ar, ea., then in the North-East a novel concept. Bell considered the 
Tyne, especially through the SUR, and Hartlepool to be the Wear's competitors 
and prophesied that Hartlepool would founder if Sunderland built adequate 
docks. Seaham was thought to be inconsiderable and -would collapse 
if Sunderland did. 35 
In the years leading up to the next bout of dock activity the RWC 
was involved in two principal, inter- connected, activities, namely the 
maintenance of the river - and negotiations with the railway companies 
which served it. The principal traffic in the river was confined 
to the lower two miles, to the Hetton and Durham s-taithsq and in the 
ten years following 1834 extensive dredging and the removal of rock 
from the river's bed was undertaken, the latter involving the use of 
diving bell and caisson; from -, 100,000 to 150,000 tons of material 
was removed annually. 
36 Problems were encountered at the mouth of 
the river regarding the swell experienced at certain times, complaints 
being received from both the Wearmouth Dock Company and the Durham and 
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and Sunderland Railway (D&SR) which had staiths at the river mouth. 
The dispute with the dock company - from 1842 Harrison undertook its 
engineering work - was settled only by an arbitration when three engineers, 
Rendel, MyIne and Leather adjudged that the dock had caused sand and 
shingle to collect in the river, so impeding navigation. 
37 The problem 
of swell in the harbour was 'resolved in 1846 when the inner section 
of the south pier was removed and rebuilt in such a fashion as to form 
an enlargement, or wave trap, in the river, immediately opposite the 
Potato Garth, itself a natural feature with the same effects on wave 
action. Earlier, however, between 1832 and IB43 the north pier had 
been rebuilt by Murray to Rennie's design. The new structure was much 
more substantial, with' a piled curved and battered masonry inner face 
and a pitched outer slope. 
38 It was on this' pier that Murray adopted 
the unusual procedure of moving bodily the' masonry , 
lighthouse first 
built in 1802; 60 ft in height to its cornice, the complete structure 
weighing some 340 tons was moved a distance of 475 ft in c 13ý2, hours 
39 
over a period of two months. 
The development of Sunderland was influenced by four railways* 
The SUR at first seen' as a potential danger . was formed in 1832 
to transport coal and limestone from upper Weardale for shipment; originally 
a dock was to be provided on the Tyne"and a branch was to run to Monkwearmouthq 
40 
a plan which was dropped, perhaps because of the high wayleave rentals 
sought by landowners. The SUR was not built under Act- of -Parliamentg 
hence the Sunderland interests had no means whereby the branch to Monk- 
wearmouth could be enforced; only when the BJR was formed - again, it 
was begun without Parliamentary powers - did a branch to'the Wear become 
possible, perhaps an expected outcome in view of Ahe, fact that Williamson 
had been chairman of the provisional committee-in 1835.41 Having originally 
planned the railway to run from Gateshead to South Shields and to Monk- 
wearmouth, the promoters John and Robert William Brandlingý found 
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the eastern end of their line paralleled by the Gateshead, South Shields 
and Monkwearmouth Railway, 
42 formed under the auspices of the SUR, but 
in 1835 an arrangement was made whereby the BJR built its line to the 
Wear and used the tracks of the SUR to South Shields; begun in 1836 
the railway was constructed under the supervision of Nicholas Wood, criticised 
for his conflicting interests, and coal was first brought to the Wear- 
mouth Dock in August 1839, a self-acting incline provided by the dock 
company carrying the waggons to the staiths. 
The railway seen as posing the greatest . 
threat to the Wear was the 
DJR. The threat was real but nevertheless, although the RWC in- 1834 
petitioned against its formation. at the instigation of the town of Sunderland, 
it was presumably by means of its Victoria bridge over the Wear that London- 
derry coal was later brought from Penshaw to the Wearmouth Dock for shipment. 
The dock had not been as successful as its promoters had hoped although 
in 1839 it shipped c 40,000 tons, mainly via the SUR, rising in 1842 
to 58,000 tons, in 1843 to 83,000 tons and in 1845 to 95,000 tons. 
43 
In 1843,76,000 tons of the coal exptafted was carried by both the SUR 
and the BJR and the latter company shipped in that year 110,000 tons at 
South Shields compared with 81,000 tons at Wearmouth, 
44 later described 
by Sir John Rennie as 11 inconveniently situated for the coal trade. , 
45 
The dock was improved in 1847 by the installation,. by the MR, of two 
46 "cast iron lever drops" 
On the south bank of the river the first Major development, was the 
formation iný 1834 of the D&SR, some 13 miles in length. , Its construction 
began on a wayleave basis but, as with the SUR, - costs proved high and, 
in spite of problems in raising capital, an Act of Parliament was obtained. 
It ran from the coal mining area, of Hetton and Haswell northwards, via 
Ryhope, to Sunderland ending at the river where drops, the subject of 
some dispute with the RWC, were provided. 
47 With William Bell, Edward 
Backhouse and some of the RWC members among its directors the railway 
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was completed in July 1636 and brought into full use in October: a feature 
of it was that all haulage was by stationary engine. 
48 In the company's 
early life negotiations took place with the Hetton Coal Company, amenable 
to disposing of its railway. It was suggested that the D&SR purchase 
this line, with staiths, and abandon its own proposals but the matter 
was later dropped. 
In spite of the construction of the north dock and the two railways 
feeding into Sunderland, the shipment of coal in 1845 was almost identical 
with the figure for 1830,1.39m tons p. a, principally due to the rpoid increases 
which had occurred on the Tees, at Hartlepool and at Seaham, all depriving 
the Wear of trade and all now equal at 600,000 tons p. a.; should their 
rates of increase continue Sunderland, it was thought, would soon be 
eclipsed. In these circumstances Murray in 1842 submitted a report 
to the RWC outlining his plan "for connecting the whole of Sunderland 
Harbour into a floating Dock. , 
49 He noted the improvements made to the 
river in the p@st 30 years as having enabled the size of the largest 
ships to increase from 250 tons to 350 tons, the latter drawing 14 ft 
of water; in spite of improvement the river had a low-water depth of 
only four feet. He noted also that railways had come into general use, 
the use of keels had almost been eliminated and the RWC, with the Durham 
and Hetton interests, had recently-expended some Z13,200 in widening the river 
above Rectors Gill. Murray had little to say about the north dock and 
considered that south docks would prove expensive, both from a construction 
aspect and due to the coal companies being forced to re-locate their staiths. 
Instead of building docks Murray again propounded his, view - it differed 
in certain aspects - that the river should be converted into a single 
floating harbour of 100 acres, the key - to his plan being the construction 
of a barrier, with two 80 ft wide gates included, at Thornhill's Quay. 
Where this plan differed from his earlier proposals and from Stevenson's 
was that now he did not seek to form a new channel, as. 
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it would be very expensive to make any cut for the passage 
of the waters of the river, in the event of converting the 
present channel into a dock, either according to the plan 
of Mr. Stevenson of Edinburgh, or that of my own in 1832, 
where the cut proposed by me, though much shorter than the 
other, and not through such high ground, is yet covered with 
streets and buildings. A better acquaintance with the locality 
than I had in 1832, causes me to form an opinion that some 
other plan must be adopted than the formation of any cut through 
the town of Monkwearmouth. 50 
The river itself should be the dock, at least seven feet additional depth 
being provided by the barrage. Murray did not intend to build locks 
but planned to form a tidal basin to facilitate traffic movements. The 
works were expected to cost E60,000, compared with the E200,000 of his 
earlier proposal, and they were duly approved by the commissioners. 
The resultant local opposition to Murray's plans was based on fears 
as to the river's scouring powers being diminished, that traffic problems 
would result from the limited access and that costs would be prohibitive, 
in fact as high as the earlier E200,000.51 Opposition came from the local 
newspapers but some, especially as to cost, emanated from Walker, called 
upon to report as Admiralty engineer in spite of the fact that the RWC 
did not wish him to do so. 
Through want of capital, . and still more, I believe, through 
want of unanimity among the local interests, combined it was 
stated with political feelings, (no schemes) with the exception 
of the Monkwearmouth Dock have been executed... It is ingenious 
and for a river or harbour of less magnitude, less trade and 
less exposed t6 land floods and to ice, might be applicable, 
but for the river Wear at Sunderland I think the difficulties 
and dangers have not been sufficiently estimated, and that 
when fairly viewed they are such as to render the experiment 
- for such it may be called - inadvisable and dangerous. 52 
On behalf of the RWC and perhaps to counter Walker's criticism, both William 
Chadwell Mylne (1781-1863) and James MeadowsRendel (. 1799-1856), reported 
upon Murray's dock, the former attempt I ing to all ay fears regarding "a 
scheme upon so large a scale, which has never before been executed in 
this country, although works corresponding in their object... are in perfect 
53 
operation on the ýContinent, under far less favourable circumstances . 11 
Murray's project, or something similar, was essential if the Wear were 
ill 
to compete with other ports. Rendel, in his report, 
54 
referred to the 
comments made by Walker and, to counter some of the scheme's shortcomings 
- in Walker's view - proposed ame-ndments, namely that the harbour be 
enlarged to twice the existing area, reforming the south pier and excavating 
in the Potato Garth; the 'float' should be extended downstream to the 
Wearmouth Dock; and the dam retaining the river in the floating harbour 
should be relocated downstream. Although the commissioners had earlier 
agreed to back Murray's proposals with Parliamentary powers their decision 
was reversed in May. 1843,, presumably due to Walker's strictures and Rendel's 
doubts. 
In 1845 George Hudson was elected as M. P. for Sunderland iw the hope 
that he would revive the fortunes of both the north dock,, not the success 
which had been hoped for, partly because of its poor access 
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and the 
D&SR, never profitable due to difficulties in working. He achieved both 
objectives in the same year, purchasing -the former for Z85,000 - it had 
never paid a dividend and had supposedly cost F. 120,000 - and finalising 
an agreement with the latter, transferring it to the Newcastle and Darlington 
Junction Railway (N&DJR), on behalf of which company he also subscribed 
E75,000 in the newly, formed Sunderland Dock Company (SDC). 
56 The promoters 
of the dock company sought capital of L225,000 for a 33 acre dock with 
a capacity of 350 ships, an important element in the project being a south 
outlet opening directly to the. sea. As had been the case elsewhere 
in the region the dock was promoted, on its utility as a coal dock and, 
with the ýsouth Wear collieries already shipping 1.5m tons, the total "will 
be very greatly augmented on the formation of a dock, by collieries now 
existing and afterwards to be opened out, the owneiýof which will doubtless 
avail themselves of such improved accommodation , 
57 
giving a depth of water 
at the dock's entrance greater than at any other North-East port. Resulting 
from the involvement of the N&DJR, two of its directors - one of them was 
Wood - were included in the provisional committee, as were several commissioners; 
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the engineers were Robert Stephenson and Murray, who had recently resigned 
from his full time post as engineer to the RWC. He was, however, retained 
as consultant and Thomas Meik (1812-1896) was appointed in his place. 
When the SDC made application for its Act in 1846 the RWC made no 
objection but as the Bill passed through Parliament, some disquiet was 
expressed there on account of the protection given to the RWC due to the 
docks having been designated as part of the river; substitute clauses 
were drafted and agreed. What concerned the RWC more was the proposed 
Tidal HarbouisBill which would reduce the powers of the RWC as coal owners 
and shipowners would be excluded from it, - The RWC petitioned against 
this Bill on account of its longstanding jurisdiction; the scale of revenue, 
now Z12-M6,000 p. a.; its history of continuous improvements; and the 
dock now authorised. If passed, the Act would vest control of the river 
in London and destroy the power of the local authorities and whereas these 
bodies may have been neglectful at other ports, they certainly had not 
5B 
neglected the Wear. Other ports were canvassed as to their views but 
in the event the Bill was dropped. 
The commissioners had taken great exception to the report on the 
harbour made by the Tidal Harbours Commission in 1B46. The Tyne had 
been the subject of a very severe indictment but the RWC, correctly considering 
that it had improved the Wear to a much greater extent than had Newcastle 
the Tyne, felt agrieved at the conclusions: 
Sunderland is indebted less to nature and more to art than 
the neighbouring port of Newcastle; here extensive stone 
piers project into the sea, by the aid of which several feet 
of water over the bar have been obtained, and the enterprise 
of the coal-owner and ship-builder, and the skill of the engineer, 
have been rewarded by a revenue of 16, OOOL a-year, derived 
from an extensive home-trade in coals, and a rapidly increasing 
foreign traffic. This port, however, is capable of much 
improvement; the quays are private property, and much out 
of order; the moorings were so indifferent, that owing to 
the pressure of the ice, in the winter of 1841, the whole 
of the shipping in the harbour broke adrift, and the damage 
done was estimated at 30, OOOL; the foundation of a part of 
the south pier is so insecure that the scouring of the sea 
has undermined its foot; the entrance of the north docks 
is far from being well placed;. so heavy a swell ranges along 
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the piers, and into the harbour, that the engineer has been 
obliged to take down a large portion of the middle of the 
south pier in order to make a beaching ýIace. for the swell 
to expend itself upon; and a general complaint is made of 
the want of dock accommodation, affording an easy outlet to 
the southward in north-easterly winds. 59 
In reply to this statement the RWC noted that vast improvements had been 
undertaken from 1717 to such effect that ships carrying up to 350 tons 
and drawing 14 ft of water could now use the port and they hoped that 
their defence would "vindicate them from all charges of mismanagement of 
the funds entrusted to their charge, ' having by their exertions raised 
Sunderland from a small Fishing and Coal port to the rank of the fourth 
as respects the aggregate amount of tonnage of its ships, and it is decidedly 
now the principal Port for shipbuilding in the Kingdom. , 
60 The commissioners 
could only assume that as Murray had been absent from Sunderland, the 
inspectors had not appraised themselves sufficiently of the ports advantages 
and virtues. H2ving receivpd approval from Rendel, who had recommended the 
inclusion of a half-tide basin and the temporary abandonment of the South 
Outletq the SDC began construction work in July 1847 and within two years 
a 20 acre dock had been constructed, together with a 21-2 acre half-tide 
basin an8 a 2-32, acre tidal basin; expenditure had totalled E182,000.61 
Initial work had not included the south outlet and in 1850, with the dock 
virtually complete, Murray produced an estimate for a further E60,000 
for its construction. By this time expenditure totalled c Z220,000 and, 
in a move which would generate immediate revenue, the SDC agreed with 
the YN&BR that the coal drops of the former D&SR be re-located in the 
new dock. 
62 In order to obtain further facilities for bringing coal 
to the dock the SDC viewed with great expectation the proposals of the 
YNOR to build a line from Penshaw, along the river's south bank, and 
its scheme to extend. -, . westwards by means of its Bishop Auckland 
branch; 
with these branches - they were completed in 1852 and 1856 respectively 
- the dock's prospects appeared good. 
The con'struction of the dockq completed in 1850, 
had reclaimed, by 
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means of groynes, some 20 acres from the sea and the sill of the entrance 
was two feet lbwer than. the river's bar which depth "could not be increased 
without a large expense in prolonging the piers into the deep water of 
the bar. , 63 The means for shipping coal was discussed by Wood, Murray 
and Harrison, and they agreed to provide 13 drops, additional to those 
of the D&SR. 
64 The question of shipping coal in the south dock was also 
discussed with the Londonderry interests in 1850, exports From Seaham 
having reached what was to prove a peak by, this time, some 700,000 tons 
p. a., no doubt due to the inability of the port to increase throughput 
without a large expenditure. 
65 It was, perhaps, with the knowledge that 
Londonderry coal would reach the dock -a junction between the Seaham 
Railway and the D&SR was made in 1852 to permit this to take place - 
that the decision was made in August, 1850 to extend the dock southwards 
and to form the south outlet, part of the work deferred until trade had 
developed. 66 Admiralty, approval was obtained, the port was reported 
upon by James Leslie (1801-1889), work began in mid 1851 and was substantially 
67 
completed by the beginning of 1856. The exteo6ion had added 13 acres 
to the dock, enlarging it to 32 acres and the new outlet, wi6 ' conduits 
for scouring incorporated, provided much deeper water for loaded ships 
passing to sea, "a superiority of depth over the bar.. of . at least six 
feet; " 68 the forming of the extension had reclaimed a further 40 acres 
of land from the sea and, as a whole, the dock served to 'protect the town 
from erosion, in 1832 stated by George Rennie as being, "at least 100 ft 
over a period of 13 years. iv69 
In its first year of oppration, the dock's revenue totalled c L9,700 
and 374,000 tons of coal were exported through the drops located on its 
west side where advantage was taken of the natural high ground and where 
Murray, in a move to obtain additionRl berthage in the dock, adopted 
gearing at right angles to the quay, an adaptation of'Bell's earlier diagonal 
quay. 
70 In 1B51 the SDC formed a committee to promote the advantage 
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of the dock to both the YN&BR. and to the Leeds Northern Railway and Hudson 
took it upon himself to meet the Earl of Durham and the owners of the Hetton 
Coal Company to persuade them to ship ýat the dock, 
71 it was also resolved 
to publicise to all relevant coalowners the opening of the Penshaw branch 
railway. These moves proved successful: an agreement was made with the 
Hetton company and Londonderry in 1854, following the completion of his 
Londonderry Railway, sought to transport up to 450,000 tons p. a. to the 
dock. Immediately the dock opened it began to ship all the coal of the 
YN&BR, initially thought to be c 357,000 tons, and with capacity of c 
Im tons at its 15 drops felt well able to meet any challenge. In 1854, 
633,000 tons of coal we're eýported in 3,389 ships but, nevertheless, the 
directors were somewhat 'disappointed by the coal revenue, E22,600, which, 
due to the still incomplete south outlet, had not risen so quickly as had 
been hoped. Some 20 collieries were now using the dock and the rail 
dues had been "so regulated as to place (Sunderland) on the same footing 
as Newcastle, Hartlepool and other ports on the East Coast; , 
72 the capital 
expended to date had been E470,000. 
In 1851 the SDC had decided to provide a graving dock in its complex 
as ships using the dock were larger than the existing Wear dock could 
accommodate. The dock agreed was to be 300 ft long and so would induce 
ships "from other Ports to come to Sunderland to be repaired and subsequently 
73 
to load coals in the Dock, thus- augmenting the revenue of the Companyp" 
it was not until 1854 that the SDC decided to seek an Act to undertake 
that work. In 1853 ship building and repairing were referred to by Meik 
who noted that the Wear, through the commissioners, should be'ek' to ýttraat 
iton. shipbuilding and that "unless immediate 
facilities are given to 
this new trade of ship building on an extensive scale, Sunderland must 
lose her pre-eminence as the first ship building port in the world. , 
74 
He also indicated that rapid improvements to docks and their entrances 
had been made at Grimsby and Hartlepool while new docks were planned at 
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Stockton and on the Tyne, of 31 and 50 acres respectively. Meik's ; report 
was investigated by consulting engineers D. & -T. Stevenson* who agreed 
with its suggestion that Rennie's 1819 river line should be amended; 
they also commented on the lower harbour where the swell caused problems 
to both dock entrances and noted that they knew of no other harbour entrance 
with masonry piers exposed to the sea which, while producing a scouring 
effect on the bar, aggravated the swell. 
75 
Since the formation of the SDC the RWC had been -somewhat inactive, 
except for undertaking repairs to the piers and carrying out dredging. 
After a decline, coal exports began to revive from 1840 and whereas the 
completion of the Wearmouth Dock had little effect, the building of the 
south dock stimulated trade to the extent that by 1854 coal, exports reached 
1.891m tons, from 1.387m tons in 1830. In the same period the number 
of ships clearing the river rose from c 7,500 to 9,440 and shipbuilding 
too expanded from 99 ships (25,000 tons) in 1834 to 151 ships (67,000 
tons) in 1854.76 Between 1830 and 1854 the pattern of the Wear's coal 
shipments had altered dramatically: in 1830, all coal was shipped in 
the river, much of it from keels; in 1854, although 625'o was still shipped 
in the river, 30,00 passed through the South Dock and 8% through the Wearmouth 
Dock. In the same period foreign shipments rose from T'O to 23% of the 
total. - In a period of fluctuating fortunes the formation of' the Sunderland 
Dock Company had succeeded in attragiting further trade to the river. 
4.4 River Tees 
Subsequent to the completion of the SOR in 1825 three Acts of Parliament 
had been passed in 1828, all relating to the river Tees. of these the 
works authorised for the SOR to extend its operations to Middlesbrough 
were completed in 1830, those relating to the formation of the Clarence 
Railway were begun in 1829 but not completed until 183.3, and ti-ase of 
the Tees Navigation Company (TNC) the formation of the Portrack Cut 
David Stevenson (1815-1866) and Thomas Stevenson (1818-1887) 
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- were terminated in 1831. Delays on the Clarence Railway had been due 
to doubts as to whether the best line had been chosen; when giving evidence 
on the SOR Bill, Thomas Storey had pointed out that Samphire Batts, 
to become Port Clarence, would provide a better shipping place than 
would Haverton Hill, the terminus chosen. 
1 The Clarence Railway asked 
George Leather to report upon 'its proposals and his findings led to a 
further Act, amending 'its line and providing for a branch to Durham city; 
2 
only then did construction work begin under the engineer Edward Steel 
and his superintendent, James Stephenson. 
3 
As noted, the SOR began the shipment of coal at Stockton in January 
1826; 4 by the end of its accounting year, June, 35,600 tons had been 
transported for landsale and 7,290 tons - for shipment. By June 1830 the 
comparable figures were 68,000 and 79,000 tons, the first time shipments 
exceeded landsales. The coal traffic for the year brought to the SOR 
a revenue of JE20,951, in addition to income of E797 from limestone, Z1,227 
for merchandise and L413fromcoach traffic; 
5 
virtually 90% of the company's 
income was due to coal traffic and the figure of 80,000 tons p. a. estimated 
by Pease as being the railways potential revenue earner had-been exceeded 
in the second year of its operation. 
6 As noted by Barton, 
7 
problems 
exist in the correlation of -coal export statistics relating to the Tees. 
Partly the result of -varying year-ends the figures from 1828-30 may be 
summarised as follows: 
SOR TNC Barton 
Year (ref 5) (ref B) (rpf 7. pl3O) 
182B 54290 35444 66051 
1829 46216 43738 39351 
1830 79434 44589 120130 
It is possible, if not probable, that the figures recorded by the TNC 
8 
relate to register tonnage rather than to deadweight, the tonnage actually 
carried I and the years 1B28 and 1830 would appear to confirm this fact; 
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for 1829, however, there is no agreement; neither is there enlightenment 
from the TNC revenue statistics, E1,943,2,061 and 2,967 respectively. 
9 
The income derived by the TNC since 1812 7 the first full year after the 
completion of the Mandale Cut, had virtually dou. bled. 
The use of the river by the SOR brought the TNC to undertake further 
improvements to it, although already the two cuts had shortened the channel 
by 2-ý miles and I, mile respectively. In 1828 the TNC purchased a dredging 
machine - it was sold in 1837 - then in use at Cork and two barges for 
it were ordered to be built at Stockton. 
10 In spite of its improvements 
the TNC, concluding that trade on the river was suffering as a result 
of inefficient moorings and insufficient berthing and depth of water, 
called for a report from Brooks, resident engineer under Price. 
Reporting in 1831 Brooks noted that the new cut had a depth of five 
feet at low water but it could be increased to eight by dredging and he 
pointed out that the river's current had proved effective in scouring 
its own channel through the new cut - Chapman had suggested that the first 
cut be so formed - and a bed-of peat, ' up to three feet thick, had "been 
completely broken up, floated away, and lodged in the eddies or unnavigable 
part of the River; and this without- any detriment to the side slopes 
or banks of th e New Channel. ". 
11 Brooks also reported that the two jetties 
which had "been recently constructed in Newport Bight have already' been 
the means of drivi. ng'away the shoals which previously were serious impediments 
12 in that part of the sailing course of the River Tees". . Only Billing'ham'Reach 
now required improving but, even so, ships could leave Stockton at spring 
tides when drawing 13 ft. 
A summary of the monies expended on the 'New Channel Account' was 
enclosed. It showed that the total for the new channel amounted to E18,316, 
exclusive of dredging, but including the piling for protecting the slopes 
and for facing them. Dredging had cost a furtherL2,750 and had 
been undertaken mainly in the old' channel; this comment, together with 
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a note concerning a dam across the 1810 cut, would seem to confirm that 
the old cutting had been, partially at least, realigned - it was so shown 
on the deposited plans - and deepened. Jetties, had been built for improving 
the coal staiths at Stockton, in Stockton Reach, at Newport, at the Blue 
House, and at Billingham while a tantalisingly short note refers to a 
'floating breakwater: The total cost of the new cut was L26,053. 
The TNC was not without its critics and in 1828 under the pseudonym 
'Examiner' the Durham Chronicle complained of excessive port dues, showing 
that the Tees was much more expensive than was the Tyne; ships loading 
in the Tees were subjected ý to dues of 1/- per ton register while on the 
Tyne the figure was 2d per chaldron, c ld per ton. The- complaint was 
also made that all ships were forced to pay for the river improvementsq 
whether or not they entered the cut and the TNC was contrasted unfavourably 
with the SOR which did not and could not' charge for goods not carried 
by it. The writer claimed, correctly, that an increase in revenue had 
resulted from the railway and criticised Stockton "for the supposition 
that (it would) profit by the trade of the port being confined- to the 
present wharfs... it would be just as reasonable for ... Durham (to impose) 
a duty on all vessels entering the Wear, to make and improve the navigation 
- , 13 to Durham . The TNC was also criticised for' executing the POrtrack 
Cut, a later engineer, Joseph Taylor, noting that the - shortening of the 
river was immaterial especially as "steam tugs were... generally employed 
in towing the vesels between Stockton and the sea. , 
14 ý 16 addition, a 
good reach of the river was destroyed, the old channel became a 'swamp, 
silted up and so deprived the river of its reservoir of tidal water, bonsidered 
by Chapman as being vital to its well being. 
Soon after the completion of the Portrack Cut the TNC put in hand 
further improvements to the river, the construction of jetties at right 
angles to the banks to narrow the channel, increase scour and so deepen 
the river. Built by Brooks, under the direction of Price, between 1831 
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and 1848 24 jetties were formed on the north side of the river and 29 
on the south, their lengths ranging from 26ft to 2,170ft. 
15 Their construction 
was later criticised in that when the first of them had been built near 
Stockton the effect had been to increase the river's velocity, only to 
have it reduced downstream where silt was deposited and sandbanks formed. 
Progressively, further groynes were built downstream. The groynes also 
caused the silting up, in 1835, of the staiths of the S&DR, built in 1830 
at Middlesbrough, resulting in a report by Storey, acting for the S&DR, 
but when it was presented to the TNC the reply was "that he proposed such 
a departure from the general principles hitherto acted upon, that his 
plans could not be listened to.,, 
16 Later a scheme acceptable to both 
parties was proposed by Price; its cost of E5,000 was partly covered 
by Pease offering E2,000 at 5% and the TNC seeking the. balance in loans 
from colliery owners using the Tees. 
17 
. Although groynes , both her e 
and on other rivers were much criticised, Taylor later noted that they 
had partly achieved their purpose in advancing the foreshore to their 
extremities but had had the -effe6t of reducing the tidal storage and hence 
reducing the scouring action. 
The completion of the S&DR staitils at Middlesbrough led to a doubling 
of the quantity of coal shipped, from 79,434 - the S&DR figure - to 151,262 
tons; subsequently a figure of 558,117 tons was recorded in 1840, with 
checks only in 1834 and 1837.18 The staiths at Middlesbroughp described 
in 1835 by Head, 19 were designed by Timothy Hackworth (1786-1850), locomotive 
superintendent to the SOR and were of a much more sophisticated and complicated 
design than were those at Stockton, where side-opening waggons had simply 
discharged onto a canted platform. It was an argument concerning the 
opening doors of the waggons which led to a disagreement between George 
Stephenson and Hackworth and later resulted in the SOR dispensing with 
Stephenson's services'. 
20 
The works of the Clarence Railway were sufficiently completed 
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by 1833 for staiths to be built at Stockton and the following year at 
Haverton Hill. The railway's committee of management included Christopher 
Tennant, to become involved at Hartlepool, and Ralph Ward Jackson (1806- 
1830), later to initiate the formation of West Hartlepool. 
21 In an effort 
to reach deeper water, the Clarence Railway in 1833 sought powers to extend 
its lines to Port Clarence, where initially a single coal drop, designed 
by Leather, lowered waggons vertically to the waiting ship. 
22 The early 
years of the railway were difficult, due partly to an apparent conflict 
between engineers and management and partly to the scale of its indebtedness 
to the Public Works Loan Commissioners, in 1832 owed E100,000.23 Financial 
problems led to the company holding its meetings in both London and Stockton, 
Steel attending both places. 
Initially Price had been appointed consulting engineer but he was 
superceded by Thomas King in 1833 and Thomas Rhodes (1789-1868) in 1834, 
by which time the company was firmly in the hands of the London committee, 
in July 1834 it having been proposed 
that in the present state of affairs of Clarence Railway it' 
is not in the power of the Company to bring the undertaking 
to a sucessful issue... (and) under these circumstances it 
is the deliberate opinion of the proprietors... that the Com- 
missioners for the Issue of Exchequer Bills should be applied 
to take control. 24. 
The Commissioners agreed to this proposal and a new London committee was 
elected. 
The completion of the railway was not accompanied by profitability, 
the Commissioners being informed that "so far coal pits (have) hitherto 
been opened which no doubt has been occasioned by the depressed state 
, 25 of the trade. I Nevertheless, by 1835, a second coal drop had been 
erected at Port Clarence and Rhodes then reported that ships of 300-400 
tons could be accommodated there; the ballast crane at Haverton Hill 
had ben moved down-river. 
26 
Initially, the Clarence Railway was undecided as to railway traction, 
horse or locomotive. In IB35, however, negotiations with Hackworth led 
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to his demonstrating a locomotive at Simpasture, the junction with the 
S&DR, to such effect that it was purchased for use on the line 
27 
and proved 
so successful that others followed. In an effort to attract further 
trade, Tennant, in the same year, urged the company to extend its lines 
into the Auckland area and its reluctance to do so led him to inform the 
company that he himself "should endeavour to form a company to connect 
the Auckland Valley by a railway to the Chilton branch, , 
28 
a proposal 
not greeted with enthusiasm by the company. 
The fact that Clarence Railway traffic was forced to use the line 
of the SOR led to problems as the latter charged dues at landsale rates, 
so rendering much more expensive the coal shipped on the north bank of 
the Tees. 29 In contrast with the SOR - its first year's revenue was 
E7,984 from coal alone - the initial year's receipts totalled only Z2,206 
although coal exports from the Clarence staiths increased rapidly, the 
figures being 43,600,57,000,117,000 and 180,000 tons p. a. between 1834 
and 1837.30 For 1835 and 1836, revenue was E3,504 and L5,622* and the 
committee, in the latter year, commented that the company's prospects 
were good; from the collieries served by the railway an output of chm 
tons could be expected, increasing revenue to c E25,000 p. a.: four staiths 
were in operation at Port Clarence. 
31 
The Clarence Railway had brought the SOR to defend its positiong 
against both it and the northern collieries. In 1826, perhaps under 
pressure from the S&DR, the TNC had agreed to charge shipping dues at 
only half the maximum rate and in 1833 the matter was again raised by 
the SOR "to enable the Coalowners on the Tees to maintain the present 
competition with those on the Tyne and Wear. , 
32 The TNC was unwilling 
to make any reduction, but on being prevailed upon further, it agreed, 
subject to Joseph Pease guaranteeing any loss. 
33 By 1834 both the Clarence 
Railway and the SOR were shipping coal from their own staiths, the former 
on the north bank at Port Clarence and the latter on the south at Port 
In 1840, the figures were recorded as E1,141 and E4,571. 
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Darlington; neither company was satisfied with the arrangement, principally 
due to the problems experienced in the river's navigation. 
In 1832 Brooks had advocated the construction of a harbour at Redcar, 
connected to Middlesbrough by means of a canal, so enabling shipping to 
avoid the shoals ' in the lower parts of the river. 
34 The harbour was 
to be 435 acres in extent at high water and be located immediately seawards 
of the town, behind which was a reservoir for the water used to sluice 
the harbour and the entrance of the canal to Middlesbrough. In 1835 
this proposal was reported upon by Cubitt, with some admiration for several 
of the points which Brooks had made: the location of the 'harbour; its 
rubble masonry protecting piers founded on two outcrops of rock a mile 
or more in length; and the careful levelling which had been undertaken. 
As an asylum harbour it would be well placed, especially as it had adjoining 
beaches and Cubitt likened it to Kingstown harbour, of the same form, 
which had cost c Z. -12m. He estimated that Brooks's Port William would 
cost- not more than E300,000, although he was not confident about its 
usefulness; nevertheless "there is no doubt that the trade which would 
arise in the neighbourhood immediately on the construction of a harbour, 
would simply pay its current 
'expenses'. ' 35 He envisaged the harbour as 
being built from public funds so' enabling it to become "a free harbourp 
rendering comparatively safe to navigate, by night or day, a part of the 
of the coast which is at present the dread of mariners. , 
36 
The preparation of the Redcar scheme caused some ill-feeling between 
Brooks and the TNC, which in April 1832 had informed him that he must 
devote himself full- time to the company's affairs 
37 
and at the end of 
the following year he was dismissed, apparently without excessive acrimony 
as he continued to act as "6 consultant, 
38 
at the same time promoting his 
Redcar scheme to the extent of personally seeking financial support in 
London, where in 1834 the decision was made- to seek public funding as 
it would prove impossible to finance the harbour privately. 
39 Brooks's scheme 
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was revived in 1838 as an asylum harbour together with a naval station 
40 
- harbours of 510 and 914 acres were indicated - but it was soon dropped. 
As its development would have reduced the need to main'tain the Tees and 
would so 'have led to the demise of Stockton it is not surprising that 
Brooks was asked to leave the company. 
Further shipping facilities, including the provision of docks, were 
also considered by both railway companies and, for clarity, they will 
be dealt with in turn. After 1838 the affairs of the Clarence Railway 
became much involved with the development of Hartlepool, at the expense 
of the Tees , where the Hartlepool Dock and Railway (HD&R) had been promoted 
by Tennant; by 1835 the railway had been completed and coal was being 
shipped from the new staiths. Jackson had become involved, with Tennant, 
in the Clarence Railway and 
he at once saw that an improved shipping place was desirable. 
It had been found that the shipment of coals in the tideway 
of a rapid river was exposed to great inconveniences and that 
it was essential to obtain the security of dock accommodation... 
(and instead) of suggesting a dock at Port Clarence, with 
an entrance from the Tees... (he) proposed that... a railway... should 
be made into the bay at Hartlepool ... 41 
To further this object the Stockton and Hartlepool Union Railway (S&HR) 
was promoted in 1838, the Bill noting that because of "the difficulties 
in the navigation of the river Tees it is necessary to afford the collieries 
(of south-west Durham) ... further means of export than they now possess. , 
42 
The projected measures were considered by the TNC to be "wholly unnecessary 
"43 
and ... not calculated to produce any essential benefit to the public 
but in spite of this opposition the railway was built under the supervision 
of George Leather and John Fowler (1817-1898); it was formed without 
an Act of'Parliament. 
44 
The new railway had not gone unnoticed by the Clarence company, still 
suffering financial problems. In 1838 it experienced difficulty in persuading 
shareholders to meet a call on capital and in London - 15 of the 18 directors 
Lý 
lived there 
5 
it was noted that "several of the most influential gentle- 
125 
men and coal proprietors have made an overture to your committee to join 
with them in a plan for uniting the Clarence Railway with the harbour 
. 
46 
of Hartlepool, which port can be entered by vessels in almost any weather", 
conversely, in Stockton, the London committee was criticised on account 
of its remoteness and "the utter impossibility of a party of gentlemen 
living in London ever directing with advantage the management of a railway 
240 miles from them. , 
47 
By lB40 the fortunes of the Clarence Railway had improved, revenue 
rising from E1,141 in 1835 to E4,571, E10,048, L15,429, L20,211 and finally 
to E22,418 in 1840.48 Suggestions had been made earlier that the company 
should amalgamate with the S&DR, a move not adopted. The completion 
of the S&HR was viewed as a threat to the Clarence Railway and "the unfavourable 
position in which... (it) is now placed... (makes it) highly expedient that 
active measures be adopted to render the management of the affairs more 
economical and efficient... , 
49 
and, to that end, it was suggested , that 
all management should be based in Stockton, ýa move which led to a bitter 
dispute between the two factions. By this time the total capital of 
the Clarence Railway was L564,145 of which only L235,000 was in paid-up 
shares; the Loan Commissioners, involved in the company virtually from 
its inception, were owed E111,000 and by 1843 this sum was noted as being 
L144,054; 50 by then revenue had increased to E27,600 and the company had 
been able to pay dividends of E1,981, seemingly its first. In 1842-the 
Loan Commissioners sought to sell the 'railway in an effort to recoup the 
monies owed, 
51 
a move which was countered by loans raised privatelyp so 
enabling the company to repay L65,000 to the Loan , Commissioners and so 
prevent its sequestration. The Clarence Railway still owed the Commissioners 
E70,243 and the matter was finally resolved by an Act of Parliamentp passed 
in 1843, whereby capital was authorised to repay the loan, a special class 
of "Government Loan Shares , 
52 being created. 
Developments on the south bank of the river were in the hands of 
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the Darlington Quaker interests$ described as being "the soul of every 
great undertaking. , 
53 The SOR noted with some sadness in 1834 the antagonism 
of the northern coalowners and the injurious completion of the Clarence 
Railway: 
Your Committee have no occasion to conceal the fact that hopes 
were entertained that by obstinate perserverance in a line 
of policy so at variance with sound principles and even so 
injurious to themselves the Coal Proprietors of the North 
would prove successful in crushing the energies of your Company 
and the Coal-owners connected with your Undertaking - for 
otherwise has been the result - it has served to convince 
the most sceptical that the confidence ever entertained by 
your Committee is based upon the best foundation... The inter- 
ference of a rival Company in the landsale department has 
also tended to reduce your revenue... 54 
That the SOR was in some dispute with the TNC was evidenced in 1836, 
-when 
the railway company noted that the TNC had undertaken work to remedy - 
the lack of water at the staiths and downstream of them, though the management 
committee "regret to add that in their arrangements with that Company 
the cooperation of an expensive character became necessary on your part; 
they rely, however, upon receiving benefits of the utmost value and return. , 
55 
The river's shortcomings led to the two companies meeting jointly and 
to a report from Storey, on behalf of the S&DR, in which he was at pains 
to note that the suggested works "will not... be injurious to the shipping 
place at Port Clarence, this subject having been referred to at the con- 
ference... " 
56 In view of his comments the TNC agreed that any proposal 
should be approved by Leather, acting for the Clarence company; with 
Brooks having left the TNC, the works were executed under John Murray, 
of Sunderland. 
In 1836 a prospectus had been issued by Tennant for the formation 
of the S&HR, its object ostensibly being "to give the collieries using 
the Clarence and Stockton and Darlington Railways, and shipping in the 
River Tees, the opportunity of using Hartlepool as an auxiliary port, , 
57 
especially in the winter months. In addition, it had been noted that 
Middlesbrough was now virtually dry at low water and the Clarence staiths 
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could suffer the same fate. The formation of the railway should lead to 
Hartlepool benefitting by Z5,625 and the Clarence Railway by E6,875 p. a. t 
"a reciprocity of advantage to both sides. , 
58 Tennant's proposal did not 
escape "the observation of the watchful andpstute men who guided'the affairs , 
59 
of the SOR and in the following year the shareholders were informed that 
tenders were about to be sought for the construction of a dock at Middlesbrough. 
The expediency, if not necessity, of giving greater facilities 
for the shipment of coals at Middlesbrough has obtained the 
continued serious attention of your Committee. The proposition 
to construct docks has already been brought before you and 
the opinion of your Committee strongly expressed that the 
greatest possible. advantages would result to your undertaking 
from their formation. 60 
Plans for the work had been prepared by Cubitt but in 1838 an arrangement 
was made between the SOR and Thomas Richardson that the Middlesbrough 
owners would finance the dock construction if the SOR would relinquish 
to them all coals shipped beyond Stockton. The offer was accepted on 
the understanding that the . 
dock would be later transferred to the SOR 
and by 1840 work was in progress -a branch railway to the.. S&DR was included 
61 
- and the railway shareholders were informed that as 
the Middlesbrough Dock proprietors have received all the assis- 
tance from your Company which they will require, the undertaking 
promises to be of essential use, especially in counteracting 
any present or future attempts to draw your export trade into 
other channels; nothing hitherto devised for that object- 
has succeeded... 62 
The dock was of 9 acres in extent, approached by a channel of 1,200 ft 
long 9 to be kept open by sluicing from the lock gates and adjacent culverts. 
The entrance was 30 ft in width and a depth of 19 ft was'provided at high 
water; 15 acres of siding provided accommodation forl, 200 loaded wq9ons. 
The total costý including ten coal drops based-, on designs used by the 
Clarence Railwayq was E122,000.63 The dock at Middlesbrough was opened 
to traffic in May 1842, the SOR shareholders having been informed, as 
it reached completiong that 
the Middlesbrough Company have proceeded vigorously with the 
construction of the Docks, which it is confidently expected 
will be opened before the end of the present year. That 
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the great bulk of the coal coming down your line will be event- 
ually shipped in the basin in preference to the ships being 
allowed to beat about in a tidal river seems obvious. 64 
Two years later it was reported - justifiably - that the new facilities 
were unrivalled and that the costs of shipment had been considerably reduced, 
a claim virtually impossible to substantiate. 
The SOR directors were correct in anticipating that the greater 
part of the coal shipped would be through the dock. In the four twelve- 
month periods which ended in June 1845 it amounted to 392,0002 370,0009 
317,000 and 505,000 tons respectively; the total SOR traffic in the 
first three of these years has not been ascertained but in 1845 ý it was 
563,000 tons, 65 indicating that 90'/'G passed through the dock. The figure 
for coal shipments given by the TNC for the same year was 481,000 tons, 
presumably a register tonnage and so indicating c 675,000 tons shipped. 
66 
Although it has been stated that the dock at Middlesbrough was financed 
by the S&DR 67 this was not, at first, strictly true as in 1842 it was 
reported that the SOR had agreed to pay off the dock construction on 
a rental basis and in 1844 the sum paid was E5,760.68 
In 1842 the SOR reported that it had not been greatly affected by 
the completion of the S&HR but nevertheless revenue from coal traffic 
fell almost continuously until 1846 when it totalled only E62,974 compared 
with E88,277 in 1841.69 In 1845, however, coal traffic totalled 908,000 
tons, an increase of almost 501,10 on the previous year. That year also 
saw two events which affected the port: an end came to the limitation 
of the vend of coal and the S&DR arranged with the TNC to lease its coal 
dues whereby "a very wibe: . step 
has been taken and the trade of the River 
has been placed on vantage ground. , 
70 The arrangement was that the 
railway company, through Joseph Pease, Thomas Meynell and John Hopkins, 
would lease the river dues, Paying to the TNC an annual sum of E6,900 
p. a. to the general funoand F. 1,300 for lights. 
71 As a result it was 
envisaged that the Teeq, almost completely dependent upon the coal trade, 
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would become free of dues - and hence attract shipping. From 9,692 ships 
using the river in 1844 the totals for the succeeding three years rose 
to 12,190,10,898 and 11,974 before falling to 8,176 by 1850.72 The 
Clarence Railway was not a party to the leasing arrangement and it was 
later explained that "why the parties on the Clarence side of the river 
were not'free' was solely because they had declined to come in on equal 
terms, as they were entitled to do under the, lease", 
73 
perhaps due to 
the fact that Port Clarence shipped only a quarter of the river's total. 
The Clarence Railway's reluctance-- to tie itself to the Tees is under- 
standable. The MAR had obtained an Act regularising its position 
in 1842 and in that year it was decided that a separate dock be built 
at Hartlepool 
74 
where relations with the H&DR were strained and the working 
agreement between the two parties was not operatin, g satisfactorily. 
Through the incorporation of a separate company, the Act for the dock 
was passed in 1844 at which time the S&HR finalised the leasing of the 
Clarence Railway, a proposal:, having been so made by the latter company. 
75 
In 1842 the revenue of the S&HR was given as E9,275 
76 but, surprisingly, 
more than half of this- sum originated from passenger traffic. By 1844 
revenue had fallen slightly but then increased dramatically in 1845 to 
no less than 02,156 for coal alone; 
77 the corresponding revenue for the Clarence 
Railway was 03,279.78 The opening of the first of the docks at West 
Hartlepool in 1847 signalled an effective end to the use of the Tees by 
the Clarence Railway. 
Since the . completion of 
the Portrack Cut the works undertaken by 
the TNC- had been not inconsiderable-, 53 jetties or groynes involving a 
total length of 3.85 miles having been built; additionally, spurious 
channels opened up by the river's flow had been closed. The works of 
the TNC had not included the embanking of the river but in 1840 Pease 
asked the company for its approval to the Middlesbrough Owners protecting 
their property by this means, 
79 
stating that they had, at some expense 
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carried out work considered to be the responsibility of the TNC. The 
owners now sought a definite river line to which they could work and so avoid 
needless expense. It was finally agreed that a line delineated by Leather 
and Price should be worked to, Brooks and George Turnbull (1809-1889), 
engineer. to the dock owners, being responsible for adherence to it. 
80 
The subsequent reclamation of land was to be carried out by depositing 
ballast provided by the TNC. In all, the TNC expended L69,009 on river 
improvements between 1829 and 1850, in addition to the E25,996 spent on 
the Portrack Cut. The source of the funds was "the surplus balances 
of the Company's annual income after paying their shareholders 10 per 
cent. "81 
By 1845 the situation of the interested parties on the Tees had polarised. 
The Clarence Railway had been extended, through its leasing by the S&HR 
in 1844ý to Hartlepool where the new dock at West Hartlepool, promoted 
by Jacksong was under construction. On the other hand, the S&DR had 
consolidated its position by leasing the Tees dues, so freeing the port 
and, in addition, was leasing the Middlesbrough Dock from its owners, 
the S&DR so having been freed from capital spending. The TNC had exceeded 
its authorised capital and, due to maintaining its first charge 100*0 dividend, 
had not been able to spend revenue on river improvements. 
In 1846 Brooks again reported on the river Tees. He had been asked 
by the TNC to recommend improvements to the river's estuary and, recounting 
its history, noted, that the river had been at its worst in the 1830 s; 
since then the channel had improved. Again, to direct the flow, Brooks 
proposed the use of groynes, sheet piling and piles-protected by a-deposi -t 
of chalk rubbish - presumably imported ballast - beaten into a trench 
on each side of the groyne. These structures, to a level of five feet 
above low water, would cause silting, following which wharfs would be 
formed at their ends and then gradually extended to form a continuous 
longitudinal embankment. Brooks considered forming a breakwater on the 
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north side of the estuary but considered it somewhat premature to proceed 
with such and expensive item, although potentially beneficial. Referning 
to the works already completed he commented that 
the confidence which Your committee have obtained by experience, 
that by a right direction of the current the most important 
changes may be effected at a small expense, give me the assurance 
that the plan now placed before them for the general improvement 
of the estuary, will be considered in its proper light, viz., 
as of works which, great in themselves, were they to be executed 
by manual labour alone, are nevertheless of easy accomplishment 
when a powerful stream is brought into action to assist the 
hand of man. 
That small causes may in some cases produce great results 
is nowhere more evident than in the mutations which have taken 
place in the estuary of the Tees within the last century; 
and as it' is my desire to recover for the trade of the port 
the advantages which a former condition of the estuary produced, 
I shall proceed to show what has been the nature and extent 
of those changes. 82 
They were sentiments expressed forty years earlier by Chapman. 
The state of the river was not considered so satisfactory by the 
Tidal Harbours Commission, which heard evidence concerning the Tees in 
Stockton and was there made aware of its actual state, principally as 
to its lack of depth and it. P bar, problems caused principally by narrowing 
the upper reaches but neglecting the estuary. The section of the report 
concerning the river Tees read: 
Stockton-on-Tees, including Middlesbrough, is one of the most 
thriving of our coal ports. The channel of the - river has 
been contracted and deepened; the approaches are admirably 
lighted; a floating dock of nine acres has recently been 
opened at Middlesbrough; the traffic and revenue of the port 
have doubled within these few years and in 1845 the Darlington 
Railway Company leased the whole of the harbour dues and declared 
it a free port. All is bustle and activity, and all seems 
to prosper. Yet even here, on a closer inspection, the want 
of some control is manifest - the quays are nearly all private, 
and are falling into the river; the piers of the bridge are 
only supported by the loads of stone thrown down at their 
foot; rocks of whinstone impede the upper navigation, and 
cause damage to the barges; the entrance of the dock at Mid- 
dlesbrough, completed but five years since is only thirty 
feet wide; 
. 
while about 2000 acres of the estuary have been 
enclosed and the corresponding tidal water excluded... Great 
complaints also are made of the want of a harbour of refuge 
in the neighbourhood, and of a beacon on Redcar Rock, upon 
which vessels are annually wrecked. 83 
Although Brooks had been criticised and was to be criticised later, the 
lack of the harbour of refuge could not be blamed on his lack of enthusiasm. 
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The leasing of the port dues by the S&DR did not bring the prosperity 
expected, principally due to the formation of docks at West Hartlepool. 
By 1841, the S&DR had carried a total of 4.5m tons of coal compared 
with the 1.25m tons on the Clarence Railway; in that year the proportion 
was 460,000: 190,000 tons. 
84 Of the latter total a quantity was taken 
to Hartlepool and the S&DR later admitted that its lease of the Tees 
coal dues "worked well until the Coals shipped at Port Clarence, were 
85 
abstracted to Hartlepool", so causing the S&DR to attempt to relinquish 
its lease which by 1850 brought in receipts of only E30 and E23 in successive 
quarters. 
86 The Tees was also affected by the expansion of the region's 
rail network; no longer were railways to supply ' only individual ports. 
By 1849 some 25% of the coal -carried by the S&DR was transferred to 
the YN&BR at Darlington, and hence lost to the Tees. 
87 
Having subsumed some of the responsibilities of the TNC, the S&DR, 
in 1846, sought some voice in the operation of the port and suggested 
that a Central Board be set up to take over the river's management: 
the TNC could not assent to this suggestion. 
88 To strengthen its position 
further the S&DR in 1849 took over the Middlesbrough, dock entirely - 
it involved , the transfer of 62 acres of land 
89 
- although the railway 
company itself was not then financially sound, having leased two lines 
at rates which absorbed more than its revenue. As a result, Edward 
Pease, then 82, noted that SOR shares "once deemed worth L360 have 
been sold at E30.1190 and blamed the fall on a "malicious attack on the 
safety, soundness and solvency"91 of the company. 
In addition to its having been affected by the formation of the 
YNOR, the Tees also became the subject of an approach from the L&TR, 
extending its line northwards. In spite of its revenue from the S&HR, 
nevertheless the Clarence Railway had resolved in 1846 that the L&TR 
"take the Clarence Railway at a sum of E450,000 of which E214,000 to 
be paid in money, within a reasonable 
133 
time from the passing of an amalgamation Ac t,, 
92 
- duly sought, but lost 
- and in the following year the shareholders of the S&HR were informed 
that their railway, too, might become part of the L&TR, 
93 
another move 
which did not materialise. The capital of the S&HR was given as E240,000 
but the stated revenue had fallen dramatically; landsale coal Z120, shipments 
E2,73B: for the Clarence Railway the figures were E3,970 and E20,368 respectively. 
94 
Coal traffic amounted to 232,000 tons. The breakdown of negotiations 
did not deter the L&TR and in 1847 it asked the TNC to sanction the con- 
struction of its bridge at Yarm as -a two-span structure, not the single 
span authorised by Parliament, a request which was agreed. " Two years 
later, with the railway approaching completion, the TNC queried the "intended 
traffic on the line coming to the Tees (and offered) ... every facility 
in the power of (the TNC) ... towards accomplishing that objec t,, 
95 
and offered 
to meet a deputation from the railway to discuss the development of port 
facilities. 
By 1850 the export of coal from the Tees was in decline, a matter 
of concern to TNC, SOR and Clarence Railway alike, the two first-named 
on account of the dues arrangement and the latter because of a loss of 
revenue 
to the 'extent of L2,756.17.9. which the Committee much regret 
because the greatest part of the deficiency is to be attributed 
to the diversion of nearly the whole of the coal traffic from 
off the Clarence line at Billingham with the Stockton and 
Hartlepool line leading to the west docks at West- Hartlepool 
by which the Clarence Company not only lose the revenue on 
A4 miles of distance from Billingham to Port Clarence but, 
likewise that arising from shipping dues and other sources. 96 
The quantity of coal lost to West Hartlepool amounted to 525 597 tons 
in 18509 
97 
while SOR shipments had fbllen from 558,000 tons in 1840 
98 
to 3559000 tons in 1849,99 a decrease due to rail competition. 
What was not in decline, however, were the towns of Teesside. Between 
1821 and 1851 both Stockton and Darlington doubled in size, the former 
to 10,172 and the latter to 11,582. Yarm's populationhad not changed 
but Middlesbrough, with a population of 154 recorded in 1831 had already 
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reached - 7,631; 
100 
within ten years it was to exceed both Darlington and 
Stockton, a factor which was to pay a large part in the future development 
of the river, intimately tied to the discovery - rediscovery is perhaps 
more accurate - of ironstone deposits in the immediate vicinity. 
The existence of ironstone in the Cleveland district had been recognised 
almost from the beginning of the 19th century and trials involving its 
use had several times been made. Whitby are had been brought to the 
Tyne in 1810 for use at Lemmington and in 1830 it was used by the Birtley 
Iron Company, having been transported by sea to the Tyne and then by the 
Pelaw Main waggonway. It was not until the main seam of ironstone was 
exploited that the character of the Tees trade was to uhdergo a change 
in direction, Fordyce noting in 1860 that 
nothing has been discovered within the last twenty years, 
having so direct an influence on the landed, railway, and 
mineral wealth in the north of England, on the South Durham 
Coal field, and on the iron trade generally, as the discovery 
and application of the large Ironstone deposit of the district. 101 
It is not within the scope of this study to detail the developments which 
subsequently ensued other than to note that the river Tees, unlike the 
other rivers of the North-East, came to lose its role of a major exporter 
of coalp although shipments did continue to be made. 
4.5 River Blyth 
Documentary evidence relating to the trade and development of the 
river Blyth is lacking for the period here considered, perhaps largely 
due to the fact that the river was, in ef fect, in the private ownership 
of the Ridley family. Trade figures, too, are complicated by the inclusion 
of Hartley or Seaton Sluice, but for 1826 the tonnage of coal shipped 
was given as 140,000 tons, 
Ia figure which includes Hartley; perhaps 
120,000 tons was from the Blyth alone. Between 1830 and 1854 new collieries 
were opened at Bebside and Horton, both near Blyth; at Bedlington, Netherton 
and Bomarsund.; and at Ashington. 
2 The natural outlet for their produce 
was Blyth and to that end a new waggonway was built in 1832, running east- 
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wards from the Netherton collieries to Bedlington and hence to the north 
bank of the river Blyth. 
3 From a quay built by the Bedlington ironworks 
coal from Bedlington was shipped into keels which carried it for trans- 
shipment either at Blyth or, in favourable weather, on the Tyne. In 
spite of the railway being later extended down-river, the situation 
was still unsatisfactory and the Bedlington Coal Company in 1841, built 
the Bedlington, a steamship of iron construction which was able to carry 
40 chaldron waggons containing c 110 tons, of coal, the waggons being 
lifted by steam derrick. 
4 Built in South Shields the ship was one of only 
16 iron vessels registered at that time and one of the eight steam powered. 
The quantity of coal which it transferred to the Tyne increased to 11,000 
tons in 1844 but subsequently the Bedlington owners were enabled to 
bridge the river Blyth and so gain a rail link with the Tyne in 1850. 
To overcome the problems caused by inadequate shipping facilities 
at Blyth, Messrs Jobling and Partners commissioned Robert, Nicholson 
to report on the shipment of coal from their Cowpen and Hartley collieries. 
Although committed under the terms of their lease to shipping some 50,000 
tons p. a at Blyth 
5 the lessees sought other outlets and Nicholson suggested 
that coal from these collieries, together with the output of Netherton 
and Bedlingtong be shipped at the Low Lights, at North Shields. This 
scheme did not materialise in full; whereas the railway had been intended 
to run the full distance it was curtailed and built only to link with 
the line from Seghill to the Tyne, opened in 1840. Completed in 1847 
the new railway extended the northern steam coal area to the Hay Hole 
staiths on the Tyne. 
6 Formed as the Blyth and Tyne Junction Railway 
the company took over part of the Cowpen colliery line into Blyth and 
in 1849 built new staiths on the quay. Running parallel with the river, 
a feature not much in evidence in the northern part of the coalfield 
at that time, the staiths were some 20 ft in height and provided seven 
berths, each with a spout-or drop. 
7 
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To appreciate fully the situation in' which the river Blyth users 
found themselves, and the factors which led to the changes in the river's 
conservatorship, it is necessary to proceed further with the railway develop- 
ments in the area between Tyne and Blyth. The Tyne was attracting much 
trade to the Hay Hole and Whitehill Point areas and it was here that the 
Blyth and Tyne Railway (B&TR) - it was incorporated as such in 1852 - 
discharged coal. At its incorporation, however, it was threatened by 
another projected company, seeking a line from Morpeth to North Shields 
with a dock at Low Lights, a revival of the earlier plan. The battle 
between the two factions brought victory to the BUR, by then supported-* 
by land owners and by the Tyne Improvement Commission, recently formed 
and seeking powers to build its own dock at Hay Hole, the Northumberland 
Dock. 8 
In addition to the colliery waggonways and the BUR, another threat, 
or potential threat, to Blyth developed in 1847 with the completion of 
the Newcastle and Berwick Railway (N&BR), soon to merge with the York 
and Newcastle Railway. The completion of the High Level Bridge in 1849 
created the opportunity for coal from Blyth to be shipped on either the 
9 Tyne or the Wear and by 1851 a link, shown on a contemporary plan, had 
been established between the collieries north of the river Blyth and the 
recently formed YNOR at Netherton. A line from Bedlington to Blyth 
was also shown, connecting with the BUR. 
Despite the threats, the river Blyth was able to ship 177,000 tons 
in 18529 a substantial increase on its 1830 throughput but a figure seemingly 
below that for 1847,10 1 presumably due to competition from the Tyne. 
Between 1847 and 1852 the number of ships clearing the river fell from 
1,417 to 1,148 and assuming all left carrying coal the average cargoes 
were 162 and 154 tons respectively, significantly less than those of the 
Tyne and Wear. In addition to the export of coal, shipbuilding was carried 
out on. the river, five ships averaging 400 tons being built in 1853; 
137 
as on the Tyne and Wear the ships built in the river were of a tonnage 
greater than those shipping coal from it. 
The changing pattern of coal production and transport had not brought 
about any significant change in the river and, indeed, the colliery interests 
would seem to have avoided using it whenever possible. No improvements 
are recorded as having been made and the depth at the bar varied at high 
tide between eight and sixteen feet, 
11 
no different from the water depth 
available in 1788.12 It was against this background that the Blyth Harbour 
and Dock Company was formed in 1854. 
4.6 The Hartlepools 
Hartlepool had been suggested as an outlet for coals from the Hetton 
and Haswell area as early as 1823, when it was proposed that a railway 
be formed to it from the Durham coalfield. Drops were to be provided 
near to the Old Pier and a timber viaduct built across the Slake, or tidal 
inlet. With only 12 ft of water at spring tides and six at n-Baps and 
with the harbour in a state of disrepair, the scheme would 'have proved 
impracticable and so was abandoned. 
' Perhaps inspired by it, another 
proposal, in form similar, was made in 1831* by Christopher Tennant, in 
1817 responsible for commissioning a survey by George Leather for a canal 
from the Tees to the Durham coalfield, Tennant being then of the opinion 
that the Tees could well become a competitor to the Tyne and Wear in the 
export of coal ;2 he was responsible also for the formation in 1828 of 
the Clarence Railway. A native of Yarm, Tennant had settled in Hartlepool 
and in 1831 he published a prospectus- for the formation of a company 
to construct both railway and dock. Capital of L200,000 was sought for 
the initial works and the engineers were to be Sir John Rennie and Thomas 
Milton for the harbour and George Stephenson for the railway, 
3 
which would 
carry coal from collieries. at Moorsley2 Elemore -, 
Haswell and Castle Eden. 
At Hartlepool two docks Would hold, in all, 350 ships and a tidal harbour 
would be provided. The inner dock was to be formed on the site of the 
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1831 proposal, orange 
1832 procosal, green 
1833 project, blue, as built. 
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old harbour and the division wall between it and the outer dock , 
to accommodate 280 ships , was to follow the line of the town wall. 
The docks would have on aggregate area of some 40 acres and the tidal 
harbour would cover a further 25.4 The proposal had two interesting 
features; first, a cut to the sea which was in effect a version - of the 
older one at Seaton Sluice and which was claimed to provide advantages 
when winds were from the south and, second, the Slake was to be partially 
impounded and used for scouring the dock. Financial problems led to 
the abandonment of the cut and to a reduction to 12 acres of' the docks 
themselves; additionally, part of the railway was contracted to single 
line. 5 of Z50,000 were envisaged as a result and by its Act 
- it was opposed in the House of Lords only by the Newcastle Corporation 
- the Hartlepool Dock and Railway Company (HD&R) was authorised to seek 
capital to E209,000 and loans to a total of E70,000,6 to build its dock 
and to construct 23 miles of railway. 
The construction of the docks required modifications to the harbour, 
the responsibility of the Hartlepool Port and Harbour Commissioners (HP&HC) 
and the latter, after many moribund years, rose to the challenge of the 
r. ailway company and with the assistance of that company's engineer sought 
powers for a new Act of Parliament, the works of the commissioners being 
principplly. - the building of a new breakwater to the south of the harbour. 
The HP&HC, however, was in no position financially to undertake this work; 
in seven years its total revenue had been E434 and the dock company was 
thereupon forcedinto making a subvention both for obtaining the requisite 
Act and for finan. cihg. the repairs necessary to the pier. 
7 The company 
also purchased for E6,000 the dredger used to improve the harbour mouth. 
8 
The first meeting of the the HD&R was held in June 1832 with Rowland 
Burdon (1800-1875) in the chair and although Tennant had not become a 
director he was appointed Superintendent of Works with a salary of E400 
p. a. 
9 James Milne, of Edinburgh was appointed as engineer for the harbour 
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works and although detailed plans of them were subsequently produced, 
disagreement regarding both the dock - he suggested two smaller wet docks 
in place of the larger one built - and the method of construction led to 
his dismissal as the HD&R- did not consider it "prudent to require him 
to execute works contrary to his own judgement. 1110 He was replaced by 
James Brown who, however, was to act under Rennie, again consulting engineer. 
There were problems, too, concerning the railway. When the scope of 
the Act had been initially contracted, Stephenson had felt himself unable 
to continue as engineer and his resignation had been followed by the appoint- 
ment, in 1833, of Stephen Robinson (1794-lBB1) 
11 
To enable work to proceed the HD&R had sought the approval of the 
HP&HC to place a cofferdam in the harbour, a work entailing no little 
expense. Once in place the company considered it prudent to build to 
a bigger scale, but not to its original proposals, and so proceeded to 
construct a 16 acre dock with a 25 acre tidal basin. Unfortunatelyq 
financial problems ensued and, somewhat ironically, the company found 
that. its shares, having been at a 20% premium, were now at a 20'/'0 discount; 
on the other hand, whereas it had not been possible to fill the subscription 
list when the Act was sought - hence its reduction in scope - it had since 
been filled. 12 As work continued, successive calls were made upon share- 
holders. The shares were paid-up by October 1834 and having failed to 
obtain loans privately, the HD&R was forced to seek the necessary additional 
funding from the Exchequer Loan Commissioners but "although the scheme 
was reported favourably of by their engineer, the obstacles they 
threw in the way of an advance, were only at last removed by private security 
being given... to complete the works, if their loan of E30,000 should 
prove insufficient. , 
13 The HD&R had applied for 02,000 for the dock 
and E10,000 for the railway. 
14 
Construction of the dock proved difficult, maýnly on account of ground 
conditions. After construction of the cofferdam, woTk Ion the dock-itself 
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began but soon it was found that foundation level coincided with a bed 
of peat, resulting in piling being resorted to; in turn, this was found 
not to 
The 
the appropriate solution and a masonry foundation was adopted. 
In the eastern part of the dock, fissured limestone was encountered and 
the siting of the dock itself was amended so as to avoid it. 
15 It was 
at this critical period that Rennie was called in to report and differences 
between him and Milne, principally because the latter wished to use rubble 
walling as opposed to ashlar, led to the latter's dismissal. Problems 
were also experienced with the ingress of water, mainly through the limestone. 
In 1835 work was suspended due to flooding of the harbour having dislodged 
the dock gates and, whereas in the previous year 800 men had been employed, 
the site had been deserted; the dock was approaching completion, a set 
of staiths, two drops and the three pairs of sluice gates for scouring 
the harbour having been installed. 16 
Despite the problems, construction of the tidal harbour was completed 
by the end of 1835, the Hetton Coal Company then being informed that the, 
harbour with a depth of 23 ft at high water could receive ships "of the 
largest burthen employed in the coal trade" 
ý7 Unfortunately the Commissioners 
- the HD&R later purchased a dredger for their use had not yet been 
able to deepen the channel leading to the harbour with the result that 
only ships of less than 400 tons capacity were able to use the port. 
18 
The proposal to complete the outer harbour first had been made by Rennie 
so that the company could benefit from its revenue while continuing con- 
struction of the dock, a consideration of some importance in view of the 
financiai problems. Rennie considered that the sluices were vital to 
the scheme and concluded his report by commenting that "there is every 
prospect of making an excellent Port, at a comparatively modest expenseq 
and in a short period of time. "19 
By the end of 1835 the port was handling coal from South Hetton colliery 
at the rate of 120,000 tons p. a., a rate estimated to generate income 
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of E7,000 p. a. but what was perhaps of greater satisfaction to the shareholders 
was the fact that a company , the South Durham Railway, had been recently 
formed "to connect the extensive Coal, Lead and Lime Districts of the 
south west parts of the county with Hartlepool. , 
20 Amongst its promoters 
were several Durham coalowners and also George Hudson, the former seeking 
an outlet for their coals and the latter attempting to secure shipping 
facilities. 21 The Bill for 'the railway encountered severe opposition 
from the colliery interests on the Tyne and Wear, their output subject 
to regulation. Their objecti. ons were due to the fact that the Durham 
railways the SOR, the Clarence and the HD&R had been built under 
Acts of Parliament rather than by wayleave agreements and the view held 
by the northern interests, , 
including the Marquis of Londonderry, was that 
this created an unfair advantage in that, for example, the South Durham 
Railway would obtain the necessary land by purchase for some E11,000, 
or by interest charges L5-600 p. a., whereas if wayleaves had been enforced 
the costs would have totalled c E3,000 p. a. It was on this basis that 
the coal-owners petitioned against the railways to the Tees as"they considered 
it then, and now consider it, ' an interference with Private Property to 
allow, Coals to pass at a reduced expense for transit. , 
22 The Bill was 
defeated. 
During 1836 the new harbour shipped 175,000 tons of coal and received 
an income of E12,600; railway construction had cost E174,500 and the 
harbour, to date, E1159400. Following the de, eat of the 5outh Durham 
railway, another line connecting with Hartlepool was proposed which, 
joinýng with the Clarence Railway, would open to Hartlepool the coalfield 
now exporting principally to the Tees; "avoiding the Hartlepool Railway 
altogether ... (it was) characterised by an absolute disregard for the safety 
of the Harbour... ", 
23 
now claimed as one of the best on the coast. Two 
plans for a railway, the Clarence and Hartlepool Union railwayq were deposited 
during 1836, both indicating a railway from the south terminating at the 
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Map 13: The Hartlepools, 1830-1854 
tidal harbour. 24 This line was again originated by Tennant and, later 
to change its name to the Stockton and Hartlepool Railway (S&HR), it was 
built under way-leave agreements to circumvent opposition and was completed 
in 1840 under the superintendence of George Leather with John Fowler as 
his assistant. 
25 
The genesis of this railway was not simple, especially where it 
was in contact with the port of Hartlepool. The 1836 drawings Show the 
line as terminating at the newly-built harbour after skirting the Slake 
on its seaward side. By 1838, however, it had been proposed that a separate 
dock should be built by the S&HR to the south of the Slake. Two entrances 
were proposed, one alongside a suggested new pier immediately opposite 
the Old Pier and the other opening, via a channel, into the mouth of the 
tidal harbour; it was presumably this proposal which was adversely commented 
upon - justifiably - by the HD&R. 
26 The following year the dock proposal 
was abandoned and the railway directed towards the harbours upper end 
27 
while in the next year the line was planned to skirt the harbour and approach 
the dock itself, by then completed. 
28 
The change in plan had' been caused by the uneasy relationships which 
developed following the S&HR's first proposal. In 1837, the year in 
which the HP&HC was first informed of the interests of the S&HR, the commission 
was again in financial difficulties and unable to deepen the harbour to 
as great an extent as was necessary. 
29 In addition a new pier was needed 
as the tide did not run as before and, to enable it to be built and to 
improve its finances, a new Act was sought whereby dues totalling only 
E305 in 1B36 I could be increased. By it, the Admiralty became 
empowered to appoint five of its nominees as commissioners. 
30 At this 
time the Clarence Railway was not prospering and it was in an effort to counter- 
act this situation that Tennant had suggested the eight mile railway to 
Hartlepool although his proposal to form a dock there had met with opposition 
from the HD&R which thereupon purchased the Middleton estate so as to 
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pre-empt dock construction by the S&HR. 
31 
A contemporary pamphlet claimed that the HD&R works were built to 
a much higher standard than had earlier been thought possible and the 
dock, originally to have been seven acres, was now ten with 25 acres of 
tidal harbour; the dock would at all times have 22 to 25 ft of water 
and its cost was anticipated as being E160,000. As a result of its up- 
grading, harbour dues had become inadequate although those on the railway 
had been increased, a situation noticed by Tennant who sought, by forming 
his own railway, to use the cheap harbour. At that time the HD&R carried 
c-', m tons of coal p. a. and with greater tonnages expected the HD&RIs harbour 
would not be able to handle any additional traffic generated by the S&HR. 
To prevent itself from being faced with a loss in revenue due to competition, 
the HD&R, "in a position in which no reasonable man would wish tosee a 
, 32 public company placed' had made an arrangement hoped to , be acceptable 
to both parties: the S&HR would not build its own dock and the HD&R would 
ship coal transported by any other railway, on the condition that it became 
responsible for the raising of the coal from quay level to the drops, 
some 14 ft higher. The HD&R which in 1831 had complained of objections 
to its Bill being "opposed to Competition, the grand reformer of abuses" 
33 
found itself threatened by that same competition, causing it to complete 
its dock, the building of which had been suspended. In 1838- the engineer 
was instructed to have all work, including the lock, completed within 
12 months, 
34 the arrangement with the S&HR was ratified in 1839, the 
contractors were encouraged by financial rewards to expedite work, four 
additional coal drops were ordered and the dock the Victoria Dock 
was opened in Decembeý 1840 by which time six drops were in use and a 
further eight were envisaged. During that year total shipments of coal 
totalled 461,000 tons. 
The HD&R did not expect the S&HR to oppose the Bill to make legal 
the arrangement and it was somewhat surprised when opposition , 'to 
delay 
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work for three months was experienced. The HD&R did not obtain the 
revenue expected from its agreement with the S&HR, opened in 1841, and 
the following year it was reported that in fact there had been no benefit 
during the half-year, * although shipments of coal had grossed 669,000 
tons for the year, a marked increase. 
35 By 1843 the traffic in coal 
along the S&HR had been reduced to 25,000 tons for the year and the total 
shipments had risen only very slightly; these factors and the refusal 
of the S&HR to renew its three year agreement - it had not maintained 
the traffic promised - led the HD&R to oppose a Bill promoted in 1843 for the 
construction of docks at what was to become West Hartlepool, a measure 
put forward by the S&HR and its promoter and one-time solicitor, Ralph 
Ward Jackson. 
In an atmosphere of rivalry, the Quaker interests had in 1842 opened 
their docks at Middlesbrough and, with the prospect of attracting trade 
both from it and from the HD&R, Jackson now proposed a dock at West Hartlepool. 
He had been associated with the S&HR from 1836 when, rather than build 
a dock on the Tees at Port Clarence he had in effect, carried the Clarence 
Railway to Hartlepool. 
36 In his earlier dealings regarding the S&HR 
Jackson had antagonised both the port commissioners and the HD&R and as 
a promoter of and Solicitor to the new company - Henry Vansittýrf. was 
its chairman - Jackson now sought again to build anindependent dock at 
Hartlepool; some five acres in extent and, with an earth mound for wagon 
standage, it would be provided with a locked entrance to the tidal harbour 
of the HD&R, 
37 by this time 17k acres in area and with eight coal drops 
and a ballast crane. 
38 
After the failure of the initial Bill the Hartlepool West Harbour 
and Dock Company (HWH&D) an offshoot of the S&HR sought anotherg this 
time projecting a dock on the Stranton estate, south of its earlier site. 
*For the half-year, shipments of coal from the several collieries served were as follows: - 
Thornley, 86,500 tons; South Hetton, 20,000; East Hetton, 65,000; Cassop Main, 7,000; 
Cassop, 35,000; Crow Trees, 22,000; West Hetton, 11,000; Bowburn, 3,500; Wingate, 61,000; 
Haswell, 6,500; S&HR, 33,000; a total of 351,000 tons. 
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Designed by James Simpson and John Fowler it was to be of seven acres 
opening directly to the sea and, to protect its entrance, a tidal harbour 
with curved breakwaters was envisaged, an approach channel formed through 
it. 39 The HP&HC had earlier been concerned as to the effect on the scouring 
of the harbour which the dock might have' but now in 1843 it resolved 
"to oppose by every means (within its power) ... the adverse interests 
(of those) ... who have not given the slightest notices to the Board of 
,, 40 their intentions... Naturally the HD&R, which perhaps had some influence 
on the HP&HC, also petitioned against the Bill, as it had done against 
the earlier one, on the grounds that as it opened into the tidal harbour, 
danger and congestion were likely due to the already heavy shipping traffic 
there. 41 The concern of the HD&R is evidenced by the attempts to secure 
leading engineers to act for it in the disputes with the Jackson interest, 
at times attempting to secure Brunel, Cubitt and McNeil. 
In 1844, John Murray, engineer to the River Wear Commission, reported 
that the HD&R was suffering financial problems in spite of its trade and 
this fact was later commented upon by Jackson when as Clerk to the S&HR 
he noted that the HD&RIs main problem was due to "the circuitous and complicated 
mode, which they themselves planned and adopted without any consultation 
with the Company to lead and ship the coal from the 'railway, (having) 
been so expensive as not to allow (that company)... a sufficient remuneration. , 
42 
So far as the dock itself was concerned, Murray 'stated that the sluices 
appeared to have proved effective but he expressed grave doubts as to 
whether the Slake could provide adequate water for scouring both the HD&R 
and the HWHO docks. 
43 
In 1844 the press commented upon the fact that HD&R shares were now 
at an 80'/'0 premium and the company, a prosperous monopoly, was maintaining 
the dues at too high a level in the depressed state of the coal trade; 
new outlets for coal shipment were heeded 
ý4 To reinforce further its 
finances the HDR in 1845 opened negotiations with the Leeds and Thirsk 
146 
Railway (L&TR) regarding its proposed extensicn towards Hartlepool 
45 but 
the matter did not reach a conclusion and the HD&R later petitioned against 
the LOR's Bill to extend its line northwards. The following year talks 
took place with the N&DJR with a view to its leasing the dock and in 1848 
the necessary Act was obtained for the leasing of the HD&R to what had 
become the YN&BR, under the auspices of Hudson. * 
When the HP&HC had been re-constituted in 1837 powers had been granted 
to the Admiralty to make nominations to it. In 1B45, three of the com- 
missioners so appointed, directors of the HWHO - one of them was Jackson 
- applied to Parliament for a further Act with the object of increasing 
the dues which the commission could impose and altering again its constitution, 
"the chief reason alleged for incurring this expense (being) the preponderating 
influence of the old dock company in the trust"; 
46 independent members 
were to be preferred. What was unusual, if typical of Jackson, was that 
he had not consulted, or even informed, the HP&HC as to his intentions 
47 
and naturally, it presented a petition against his Bill. , Nevertheless, 
the Act was passed and the old and new dock companies were enabled to 
nominate four mem ýbers each to the 22 strong commission. 
48 Since 1837 
the commission's income had risen from E560 to L2,680 and now with its 
borrowing power raised to E50,000 it was considered that harbour improvements 
could be undertaken. Subsequently Sir John McNeil (1793-1880) reported 
that the purincipal requirement was a light house on the Heugh headland; 
49 
agreement was reached regarding its joint funding;, W. O. Mossman was appointed 
as engineer; its construction began in 1846 and was completed the following 
year. 
In 1845 the Tidal HarbouisCommission heard evidence relating to Hartlepool, 
principally from Thomas Wood, secretary to the HDR and Jackson, both 
of them commissioners. Jackson evidenced some bitterness that the commission, 
* In 1857 the HD&R became part of the North Eastern Railway. 
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with an income of c E2,000p. a. should have spent E900 in opposing the 
Bill of the HWH&D but this was defended by Wood on the grounds that the 
new dock would have adversely affected the harbour. Jackson displayed 
some inconsistency in his evidence in that, although it had been hewho 
had agitated for a revision of the constitution of the HP&HC, he now complained 
of the fact that the disinterested members he had sought lived up to 40 
miles away and so were unable to mediate between the two antagonistic 
parties. The sense of antipathy between the two dock companies was reflected 
in the Report: 
Hartlepool owes its rapid rise chiefly to its southern 
outlet, the want of which is so much felt at Sunderland. 
This fortunate position has been in some measure seconded 
by the Dock and Railway Company, who have now a floating dock 
of 20 acres, where they can load 5000 tons of coal a-day; 
while the entrance is allowed to be one of the most easily 
accessible of any tidal harbours along this coast. The 
success of this port has induced the formation of a Hartlepool 
West Harbour Dock, about half a mile to the westward, the 
works of which are in an advanced state. But as it is hardly 
to be expected that two rival companies in the same port should 
agree upon any general plan for improvement, some independent 
control, free from local bias, seems to be absolutely essential. 
Complaints are made of ballast and stone being thrown over 
the cliff and washed into the harbour; that the bight of 
the bay is filling up with mud and silt, caused by sluicing out of 
the Slake, and the fishermen with one voice declare their 
fishing ground has been thereby destroyed. 50 
The Commission was correct in its conclusions. 
The first meeting of the HWH&D was held in July 1844 and Jackson 
subsequently confirmed the purchase of theStranton estate -for E15,000.51 
It was-soon announced that the company was working in close liaison with 
the S&HR and the HD&R was referred to as "the great, though unsuccessful 
opponent , 
52 
of the new company which already had the support of 23 collieries. 
The S&HR had already leased the Clarence Railway and these lines were 
anticipated as bringing satisfactory profits to the company; with only 
14 collieries served by it the HD&R had managed to ship 600,000 tons in 
1844. 
The Act 53 for-the incorporAion of the 'HWH&D-had legislated for the con- 
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struction of a dock and while the Bill was in Parliament Jackson was 
authorised 
to arrange with Mr. John Stephenson of Derby for his guaranteeing 
in Parliament the formation of the Hartlepool West Harbour 
and Dock at his estimate of E48,700 according to his Schedule 
of Prices - on the understanding that if the work ultimately 
go on, they shall be first offered to him for execution without 
public competition. 54 
It was later reported, however, that this figure had been increased to 
aL 
Z52,400 and that Stephenson had esti eo that the work could be completed 
within 18 months 
55 but for no recorded reason, the contract was later 
awarded to Thomas Hutchinson* of Ferryhill at a price of E45,170.56 
Some changes were made to the plans for the dock: the entrance was increased 
to a width of 42 ft and it was decided to build two of the dock walls 
in masonry rather than as an embankment, a change leading to an increase 
in area but at a greater cost, some E7,000. 
Negotiations with the MR, which sought an extension to Hartlepool 
so that the products of the West Riding could be shipped there, proceeded 
well. The intention of the L&TR had been to circle the town to the 
west before terminRting on the east side df the'HD&RIs Vib'%oria. D, 3cW, 
7 
and 
this arrangement is confirmed by a drawing dated 1B46 which shows, however, 
a differing form of dock extension. The drawing notes that the port, 
after extension, would be able to accommodate 250 ships of 500 tons register; 
it was' noted, too, that a 740 ton ship (500 tons register) would incur 
port charges of E28 at'Newcastle, E23 at Hartlepool and E19 at West Hartlepol. 
58 
The first of the HWH&DIs docks, the Coal Dock, was opened in June 
1847 by which time a further Act 
59 
had authorised the provision of a 
second docký the Jackson Dock of 14 acres. The first had proved a success: 
in 15 months 1,243 ships had cleared from it and 166,273 tons of coal 
had been shipped; from the old harbour- the comparable figures had been, 
according to the directors, 880 and 155,628 when it first began operating. 
60 
The HP&HC recorded that in 1848 the number of ships clearing the port 
* Hutchinson also constructed the S&HR. 
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from the old docks was 50889carrying perhaps Im tons of coal. 
61 The 
62 dock authorised by the 1847 Act it was completed in June 1852 --had not 
been begun before a third Act was sought this one to improve the 
harbour and its protective breakwaters by means of building a new south 
pier to allow for the expansion of waves and the consequent reduction 
in their height to take place within the harbour. 
63 These additions 
too were completed in 1852 and, designed initially by Simpson, the piers 
were later to be remodelled by Thomas Casebourne (1797-1864) y engineer 
at the west docks, certainly from 1849, and the methods adopted by him, 
and perhaps by Jackson, in the somewhat arbitrary but effective design 
of the piers was outlined at the time of Jackson's death. The problems 
encountered had been 
due to the variable currents, winds, and storms, on the east 
coast of England, and in the Tees bay in particular. Though 
the new harbour was within the port of Hartlepool, it was carried 
into a much more exposed part of the bay, on account of the 
works of the old company; two simple north and south piers 
of Mr. Simpson had to be remodelled; and it was inevitable 
that success could only be attained by experience and experiment 
of a costly description. In all these matters Mr. Jackson, 
under the advice of the late Mr. Thomas Casebourne, M. Inst. 
C. E. ', was ceaseless in his industry and indomitable in his 
energy. In the end, the harbour was enabled to be kept clear 
of sand with scarcely any dredging; and by a series of 'inner 
piers, designed by Mr. Jackson, which formed a unique system 
of "wave traps" in the outer harbour, the sea was so broken 
that the lock gates, though only about 400 yards in a direct 
line from the pier head, were enabled to be worked with ease 
and safety at all times. The ultimate expense was greatly 
reduced by all the piers being, in the first instance, made 
of timber. These were, with little cost, altered as experience 
proved necessary; and, finally, were filled in and encased 
with permanent masonry. 64 
To improve the harbour with respect to the difficulties noted above the 
commissioners in 1851 obtained a further Act, th'is time to build a very 
much more substantial pier or breakwater at the Heugh, a structure which 
would give much greater protection to the harbour and, in fact, play 
a great part in the suggestion made in later years for the provision 
65 
of a vast harbOUr of refuge in the bay. 
The last of the moves made within the period considered was the 
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amalgamation of Jackson's interests into one. Since the formation of 
the HWH&D, the docks had prospered in that in lB49 coal exports were 331,000 
tons; in 1850,533,000 tons; in 1851,579,000 tons; and 1852,630,000 
tons: by 1852, the capital expended totalled Z432,000 and revenue was 
some E15-16,000 p. a. What was a foretaste of the future was that in 
that last year some 1,600 tons of iron was exported and some 600 tons 
66 imported. To effect the change an Act , was obtained in 1852 to unite 
the HWH&D and the S&HR with the provision to lease or purchase the Clarence 
Railway, the new company being entitled the West Hartlepool Harbour and 
Railway (WHH&R). Before the change in title became effective the new 
Jackson Dock was opened, togetherwith the extended harbour of 44 acres 
and a graving dock 320 ft long, the first public. ly owned repair dock 
in the North-East. Some 25,000 people attended the ceremonies which 
celebrated also the fact that the Leeds Northern Railway (LNR), formerly 
the L&TR, had completed its line to Hartlepool and immediately afterwards 
the wind "brought up to the bay of Hartlepool several hundreds of vessels 
that had been detained (in East Anglian ports and) ... no less than 200 
vessels entered the docks where they found ample accommodation) for loading 
and unloading their cargoes. , 
67 The two major railways 'of the North- 
East, the LNR and the YNOR , had both achieved a foothold in Hartlepool 
although the former had failed in its major objective, to reach Newcastle. 
In 20 years much had been achieved at the Hartlepools. Two rival 
undertakings had been formed, each with its own docks and railways and 
by 1854 coal exports had risen to 1.631m tons, 935,000 from the docks 
of the HD&R and 696,000 tons for the WHH&R. By 1851 capital had been 
68 
expended to a total of L615,000 by the HD&R, E346,000 on the docksý 
while the Jackson enterprises had reached a much higher figure: the 
capital of the Clarence Railway had reached some E600,000 
69 
_ it had 
offered itself to the L&TR for L450,000- although a substantial sum was 
still owed to the Loan Commissioners; the capital of the S&HR, was E205 '000-70 
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and the total expended on the HWH&D had risen to 046,000.71 After 
the amalgamation, the new company was capitalised at U. 994m 
72 
although 
in 1854 it was recorded that only U. 563m had been raised. 
73 In view 
of what was to follow it is of interest to note Jackson's diversification, 
following the amalgamationjinto the winning of coal: 
Having taken into consideration Mr. N. Wood's proposition 
for opening out the Merrinton coalfield, Resolved: that this 
Company agrees to advance the sum of L5,000 towards opening 
out and winning the above coalfield. The amount to be repaid 
by annual instalments of E500 each... the coals to be confined 
to the Clarence and Stockton and Hartlepool railways for 
exportation. 74 
This entry would seem to be the only one relating to the monopoly which 
Jackson sought to achieve. 
What was perhaps the most significant aspect of the development of 
West Hartlepool was the fact that Tennant's initial proposal, and Jackson's 
development of it, was the first in the region to intercept successfully 
coal from one outlet and transfer it to another for shipment; only the 
Durham Junction and the Brandling Junction railways had been similar in 
concept although not so effective as was the WHH&R. 
4.7 Seaham. -Hatbour 
Seaham Harbour was little affected by the early public railways. 
For almost a quarter of a century from the opening of the harbour to traffic 
the only lines serving it were the Marquis of Londonderry's own railway 
from Rainton and Pittington and the South Hetton colliery railway, brought 
into operation in 1833. In spite of the apparent lack of railways in 
the vicinity of Seaham, Londonderry was active in his opposition to those 
which he saw as a threat and he opposed the formation of the Clarenceo 
the Great North of England and the South Durham railways, the latter, 
as noted, on the grounds that as a parliamentary line it would not be 
subjected to high wayleave expenses and hence would compete unfairly with 
others. 
Although both harbour and railway had been brought into operation 
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in July 1831 the construction of' the harbour had not been completed. 
In that year its current St'ate and its intended extensions were described 
by Chapman: 
The Inner Harbour, by Means of a Gate falling Inwards with 
the rising Tide, will not, at low Water, have less than seven 
Feet Depth; so that laden Vessels will be so far Water-borne; 
exclusive of which, its Bottom is either a hard Clay, or strong 
Harle, on which the general Run of Coal Vessels might have 
laid with Safety, as they do in many Coal Ports. Its Extent 
is not nearly what it is designed to be by its Noble Proprietor, 
the Marquis of Londonderry, and its Englargement will be pro- 
gressively dependent on the Consumption of the Excavation that 
will be necessary to supply the very extensive Limekilns North 
of the Inner Harbour, and the internal Filling of the Piers, 
Tongues and Breakwaters, inclosing and forming the Harbours. 
The Breakwater, inclosing the Northernmost of those Harbours, 
is now in Progress of Construction, and each Face of the Tongues 
and of the North and South Quays, will not contain less than 
8 Coal Shipping Places: the Intervals, whenever found expedient, 
may each of them be inclosed by an East Wall, with Gates, to 
form them into Half Tide Basins. The Gates, similar to that 
of the Inner Harbour, will contain Sluices, and be closed when 
the Tide falls to the required Level. 
The Height of the Breakwaters will be 6 Feet above ordinary 
Spring Tides, and each of their transverse Lines will have 
two Cross Walls, at 40 Feet asunder, to admit of an Opening 
being made through it, whenever an additional Harbour to the 
South may be formed, which may extend as far as the Ridge of 
Rocks run parallel to the Shore, or beyond that Limit, whenever 
expedient * The Progression of these extensive Works will, evidently, 
depend on the Quantity of Coals, from more or less adjacent 
Collieries, that may be brought to this Harbour; which, inclusive 
of Blythq has a better Outlet to the South than any Harbour 
on th-- Coast; and in a good Offing to clear the Yorkshire 
Coast, in the long prevalent Winds from the E. and N. E. 1 
Chapman envisaged the south harbour being built in stages with the falling 
gates subdividing it into Ithree partsý extensions 
taking place as trade 
developed; the piers or 
, 
tongues projecting from the land side of the 
dock were to provide more extensive berthing. 
Ten ships loaded coals at Seaham in July 1831 and 101 in October; in 
all, 388 ships cleared the port in six months, the largest of them 271 
tons register. By the following year the plans for the harbour's extension 
were again changed by Chapman proposing to form a harbour for light ships 
- it formed the north end of the earlier south harbour - to contain within 
it a smaller wet dock. With this extension there would be eight loading 
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berths which would, be capable, extrapolating the tonnages already shipped, 
of dealing with up to 875,000 tons p. a., three quarters of the Wear exports. 
2 
Completion should adhere to this plan. 
In 1832 a statement of the capital expended on the harbour showed 
that labour had amounted to L87,579, materials E7, BBI and materials supplied 
by the collieries Z22,963, including E12,457 for stone from Penshaw, a 
total of E118,424.3 To complete the works a further Z31,172 would be 
4 
required. . 
On its first-stage completion the harbour was able to accommodate 
only 26 ships but nevertheless in the twelve-month period which ended 
in August 1832,213,000 tons of coal were shipped, all presumably from 
Londonderry's mines and to the detriment of Sunderland where coal shipments 
from his collieries began to decline, so having the effect of reducing 
total coal shipments there from 1.256m tons in 1831 to 1.089m tons in 
lB35. Expenditure on the harbour had fallen; from Z29,083 ) only for 
5 labour it had dropped to Z10,223 in 1832 and to E2,392 and. without 
further finance becoming available completion was likely to. be many years 
away. I 
ýThe necessity forenlarging the harbour was brought about principally 
by the developments which resulted from the successful sinking of the 
South Hetton colliery, some four miles south west of Seaham, by Braddyll, 
earlier i'nt&'rested in Seaham. In August 1833 the colliery, with its link 
to Seahamv was opened and in 1835 the railway was extended to a further 
colliery at Haswell. 
6 The need --for extended facilities at Seaham had 
been foreseen by Buddle, who at the end of 1832 had made enquiries as 
to the possibility of an Exchequer Loan. Telford was asked by the Loan 
Commission to report upon the' harbour 
7 
although viewed with some suspicion 
by Londonderry who., consideringthat private finance was preferable, nevertheless 
admitted that Telford's assistance "may produce some if not the best relief. " 
8 
Perhaps to ease relations between Londonderry and the Exchequer Loan Com- 
missioners, Telford was informed that Londonderry wished to avail himself 
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of his "superior judgement and experience (and to appoint Telford) ... 
as his consulting engineer in the further prosecution of the works, 119 
by this time the death of Chapman having resulted in Buddle's assuming 
full engineering control through the resident engineer, Thomas Nicholson. 
Buddle, doubtful as to the outcome of expansion at Seaham, sought 
Telford's views on the possibility of bridging the river Wear so as to 
link the Durham collieries to the Tyne at South Shields. Telford sought 
further information from Buddle and was informed that expansion was vital 
as the harbour could at present ship only 240,000 tons p. a., a quantity 
barely sufficient for Londonderry's own output. As it was to be called 
upon to handle a further 410,000 tons from Braddyll's colliery at South 
Hetton a loan would provide the means of achieving its expansion. 
10 
In reply Telford anticipated that he would need to obtain still further 
information from Buddle but had "such confidence in (his) judgement, ex- 
perience and integrity, that it is more than probable, that from the infor- 
mation you will furnish and my knowledge of the localities, I shall be 
11 
enabled to make a report" to the Commissioners without undertaking a 
visit to Seaham; the sooner the application was made, the better. Telford 
estimated that a sum of E44,849 should be borrowed but in 1833 a loan 
of only Z35,000 
12 
was granted, so enabling work to proceed; in fact a 
further sum of E42,414 was expended up to 1835.13 . 
In that year Nicholson reported upon the harbour, then approaching 
completion. In the four years which had elapsed since it, was brought 
into service construction had continued at a slower pace. After Chapman's 
death in 1832 Telford had been appointed as consultant but he had died 
in 1833 leaving the engineering work to Buddle. In spite of these set- 
backs the harbour had been completed to the reduced plan proposed by Chapman. 
The north harbour, although in use, was still incomplete in that drops 
were provided only on its south side; the north side remained to be excavated 
from the limestone headland. The wet dock, with three loading berths, 
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had been brought into use in July 1835 although it too was not yet complete. 
Appreciation of the necessity of enabling ships to lie afloat at all times 
was exhibited in the fact that' a greater depth of water had been provided 
in the dock than in the outer harbour and Nicholson noted that if it were 
to be deepened to "the level of the bottom of the Dock (it) ... will give 
the same depth of water as at Sunderland. , 
14 The major part of the piers 
had been completed but the parapets to the breakwaters-had not been added. 
The plan accompanying the report would seem to indicate that coals could 
be shipped at each dock by both Londonderry and Braddyll, on the south 
side of the north dock and the west side of the south dock. The plan 
shows also the part of the work which had fallen short of expectations; 
the construction of the town. Originally planned by Dobson, elaborate 
schemes had been involved, , among them public buildings and offices above 
a tunnel through which the railway approached the docks. At least two 
variants of a grand crescent overlooking the harbour had also been proposed 
but Nicholson's plan of 1834 shows none of these features, only a simple 
layout with the railway running between two terraces of houses. 
Although no public railways were to be connected with Seaham Harbour, 
nevertheless Londonderry felt his interests threatened both in 1832 and 
1834 when Acts of Parliament were passed for the Hartlepool railway, the 
HD&R and that between Durham and Sunderland, the D&SR. ' The g]7eater threat 
was that posed by the HD&R in that its formation included for both a dock 
and a railway, the latter terminating in the vicinity of the Hetton collieries. 
On the other hand the D&SR, although having at its head the same areat 
did not feed directly to a dock system but only to the town of Sunderland, 
albeit with staiths on the river. What could pose a bigger threat was 
the Durham Junction Railway (DJR) with its bridge across the Wear enabling 
coal to be carried from the Durham collieries, either to the Vlearmouth 
dock on the river's north bahý or to the Tyne. The HD&R opened in 1835, 
the D&SR in 1836 and the DJR in 1838; through them, the source of Seaham's 
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potential trade was open to Tyne, Wear and Hartlepool. 
Between 1831 and 1835 the total quantities of coal shipped were 93,000, 
234,000,275,000,273,000 and 286,000 tons. 
15 The opening of the South 
Hetton colliery brought 16,000 tons of its coal to Seaham in 1833,75,000 
in 1834 and 98,000 in 1835, figures apparently indicating that Londonderry 
shipments fell at Seaham but wer. e presumably maintained on the Wear; 
in that year, too, 26,000 tons of coal was shipped from Haswell. The 
opening of the HD&R brought a change in that although total shipments 
at Seaham increased to 342,000 and 374,000 tons in 1836 and 1837, the 
quantities from South Hetton fell to 66,000 and 53,000 tons respectively 
16 
a direct result of that colliery shipping from Hartlepool. This situation, 
too, did not pass unnoticed by Buddle who in 1836 pointed out to Londonderry 
that "it would seem (his) ... best policy to open his harbour to the public 
to compete with and participate in the benefit to be derived from the 
shipment of the coals from the coal-field in question with the ports of 
Sunderland and Hartlepool. , 
17 Buddle considered that Seaham would benefit 
due to the shorter haulage possible, the collieries best placed to profit 
being South Hetton, Haswell, North Hetton, Belmont and Whittle Grange, 
the two last-named then intending to ship at Sunderland. They could 
perhaps be persuaded, through cheap wayleave agreements, to ship at Seaham. 
Buddle saw the problem principally as one concerning the colliery lessees; 
one of the shareholders in the D&SR, Gregsonjwas also Londonderry's solicitor. 
Londonderry replied realistically to Buddle's suggestion: 
There is no use in a good harbour, unless it is made as profitable 
as possible. The more trade that is brought to Seaham the 
more the Estate and Town will receive and the larger the income 
that is obtained by shipment of the coals of others the more 
chance there will be that the very large expenditure on Seaham 
Harbour will be rapidly repaid. 18 
Londonderry approved Buddle's suggestion that Gregson should be persuaded 
to ship at Seaham - he was not sanguine as to the outcome - and he extended 
Buddle's suggestion by proposing that efforts should be made to attract 
coal from the Bishop Auckland area; by so doing "it would give the go- 
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by to Hartlepool and the Clarence. 1119 Perhaps without realising the 
diminution which was taking place- in the South Hetton shipments, Londonderry 
suggested also that work should proceed with the building of an extension 
to the south harbour, part of Chapman's plan. 
To permit completion of the harbour to be undertaken a second Exchequer 
Loan of Z10,000 was received in 1836 for the purpose "of building two 
jetty piers to give further protection in easterly gales to the southern 
part of the South Harbour where light vessels lay before entering the 
dock , 20 and, on this work being completed, construction gave way to maintenance. 
By 1840 the cost of the harbour had totalled E158,178 for labour alone, 
the capital expended on it annually for the years 1834-9 having been E17,138, 
E11,156,0,984, E6,022, E4,217 and E2,821; 
21 
revenue had amounted to 
E62,574.22 By this time, too, Braddyll's loan had been repaid, as had 
the bulk of the Exchequer Loans, and it had also been possible, by exercising 
the option incorporated into the original agreement, to purchase from 
Shakespeare Reed the railway from Rainton and Pittington. In 1840 the 
line was valued at E13,950 for the railway works* and Z8,771 for the buildings; 
the agreement made with Reed brought the railway under Londonderry's control. 
The substantial completion of the harbour brought several changes: 
the harbour suffered in the 1840-1843 commercial depression - coal shipments 
fell to 209,000 tons in 1842 23 _ which was exacerbated by involvement 
in Regulation matters; Londonderry's hands were severely tied by the 
Trustees appointed to manage his estates in 1834; in 1843 John Buddle 
died and was succeeded by Neville Hindhaugh. At Buddle's death the harbour's 
capital cost stood at E180,000 and an annual rate of return of 2-2'10 had 
been achieved. Revenue had been used to pay off all but E21,000 of debt 
and the growing trade through the port - imports were virtually limited 
to timber - had caused the profits to average 0,471 between 1830 and 
1844; between 1845 and 1852 they were to average E7,910.24 Both the 
* The valuation, 6y John Blackmore, included c E3,300 for winding engines. 
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involvement of Trustees and the events which led to the collapse of the 
Regulation inI844 have been describea by Burgess and need not be investigated 
again. What should be stated, however, is that between 1845 and 1854 
the throughput of coal at Seaham amounted to 6-700,000 tons p. a., by 1854 
standing at 735,000 tons, the figures corresponding with the profits gener- 
ated in the comparable period. ' The harbour extensions and the facilities 
provided - the north dock was enlarged and further coal drops provided 
in 1845 - would seem to have imposed a limit of some -. M tons p. a., on 
the quantity of coal which could be shipped at Seaham and it was this 
constraint which between 1850 and 1854 caused Londonderry, perhaps now 
influenced by George Elliott (1815-1894) from 1851 successor to Hindhaugh 
as Agent, to consider the options open to him. 
The output of the collieries both of Londonderry and of the South 
Hetton company had been increased since Seaham Harbour was first used. 
Londonderry had opened new collieries at Broomside, 1835i Seaton, 1845, 
and Seaham, 1852 while the South Hetton concern had opened Haswell in 
1835 and Murton in 1843.25 To ship these coals three ports were available: 
Sunderland, where the South Dock had been op-ened by Hudson in 1850; Seaham, 
where extensions would be necessary; and Hartlepool, at which place an 
agreement would perhaps have been difficult in the light of past relationships. 
It is possible that the engineer's estimates in relation to Seaham deterred 
Londonderry from putting its extensions in hand, preferring to lay a cheaper 
railway - the cost would also be more predictable - to an established 
dock some six miles distant, a dock which had obviated the problems previously 
experienced when shipping from the Wear. It is possible, but not so 
recorded, that he entertained fears as to rival railway comp6nies extending 
their lines to Seaham, so serving its mineral traffic, reducing its revenue 
and rendering worthless any improvement made to the harbour. It is under- 
standable that the railway to Sunderland was the favoured course of action. 
Work began in 1853 and the railway was brought into operation in August 
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1854, permitting coal to be carried to the docks at Sunderland without 
the necessity of using the line of the D&SR, which had been utilised for 
the same purpose since 1852; the new railway cost c E50,000.26 
Londonderry died in March 1854, before the railway between Seaham 
and Sunderland was opened. His involvement in the affairs of the North 
East coal trade was considerable both one personal level and, perhaps 
more significantly, through the involvement of Buddle, his Agent from 
1819. The two men together, in addition to their many other financial 
interests, had, almost single-handed, created the port -of 'Seaham with 
two railways each six miles in length, opened quarries and kilns for lime 
production, operated eleven pits and built the town of Seaham. After 
the death of Chapman, ubiquitous in the North-East, much of the engineering 
work had devolved upon Buddle who, with perhaps some assistance from Telford 
for a short period, saw to it that construction progressed., By the time 
of Buddlels' death in 1843 the ports throughput was c--, m tons p. a. ; by 
Londonderry's death it had risen to c3-, m tons. The rise in the tonnage 
of coal passing through Seaham was spectacular as it was at both Hartlepool 
and on the Tees. Like these ports Seaham too was affected by the growth 
in coal shipments which occurred at Sunderland following the construction 
of the South Dock there although a part of the Sunderland Dock Company's 
success must be attributed to Londonderry's decision to ship his coal 
there, rather than at Seaham. 
4.8 Warkworth Harbour, Amble. 
Amble, at the mouth of the river Coquet, lies some 24 miles to the 
north of the Tyne, at the northern point of the coalfield. In the late 
18th century the harbour had been used for the shipment of materials to 
and from a foundry at Acklington but by 1836 it was virtually disused. 
1 
Coal from Togston had been shipped on a 'small scale in the unimproved 
river from 1826 - it could have been very much earlier from other collieries 
- and in the same year, further developments took place at Hauxley and 
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Radcliffe, 2 within two miles of Amble. Remote from any developed shipping 
point, colliery output remained low and it was not until 1832 that the 
harbour was reported upon by Hamilton Fulton, an engineer presumably 
acting for the owner or lessee of Togston colliery. 
Fulton stated that at little expense provision could be made for 
exporting coal in ships with a draught not greater than nine or ten feet 
and suggested that a wharf be formed at Gibbon's staith, confirming shipments 
before this date. He recommended, however, the forming of a tidal harbour 
,, 3 "immediately to the southward of the mouth of the Coquet... at Pan Haven, 
one of the advantages of providing facilities on the coast being that 
a greater tidal range would be experienced; the range on the coast was 
14 ft and at Gibbon's staith 8 ft. Fulton further envisaged that the 
harbour would be sheltered partlyby a rock outcrop and partly by Coquet 
island, a mile distant from the shore. Piers should be built to protect 
the harbour's mouth. Fulton also noted that at Togston, the coal reserves 
were such that there should be afforded an ample profit on the capital 
invested, a sum which he estimated as being E15,000 for the harbour and 
E2,000 for the railway. 
In 1835 the Radcliffe leases were taken over by Robert Kingscote and 
ThomasBrowne who opened a new colliery and provided some impetus to the 
development of the area's mining and to the provision of a harbour. 
4 
A prospectus was issued putting forward the case for "the opening out 
of this valuable Coal-field... (and) the construction of a Harbour of Refuge 
for all vessels passing this dangerous coast., 
5 Capital of E25,000 was 
sought and the harbour's net revenue was anticipated as being L6,500 p. a.; 
it was stated that the river had again been reported upon, this time by 
Robert Nicholson. 
By June 1837 an Act of Parliament had been obtained for the establishment 
of the harbour but, rather than forming a company, it legislated for the 
formation of a commission, among its members being the Earl of Newbrough, 
two Radcliffe colliery lessees, Kingscote, Col. John Grey, Hugh 
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Taylor, agent to the Duke of Northumberland, and Richard Spoor of Sunderland. 
6 
The works were to be completed within a period of five years and protection 
was afforded to the fishing interests of the Duke of Northumberland (1785- 
1847), a requirement which was to have serious consequences. The Act 
laid down the maximum dues which could be levied - coal was to be 4d per 
ton - but stipulated that no tolls could be exacted until E3,500 had been 
expended on the harbour; borrowing was limited to L100,000, a sum very 
different from the capital originally envisaged. 
The first meeting of the Warkworth Harbour Commissioners (WHC), was 
held in August 1B37 when Fulton's report was read, as was that of Nicholson. 
He proposed that a new channel be formed to the south of Pan rocks where 
a small haven would be protected by breakwaters founded on the rock outcrop, 
a scheme very similar to that suggested earlier at Blyth. The new shipping 
channel could be as narrow as 60 ft, but if funds permittted it would 
be better with a width of 120 ft. Nicholson envisaged the harbour as 
being of paramount ' importance as "without a means of shipment the coal 
must remain valueless and shut up for centuries to come, as there is no 
other port within 20 miles to which it can be taken. His two schemes 
would cost E12,310 or Z23,356. 
John Murray was asked to give his opinion on the suggestion of Fulton 
and Nicholson; he was not encouraging. Murray thought- that Nichol'son's 
proposal to form a new channel would involve too great an expense as much 
of the - excavation, in rock, must be undertaken below low water. If the 
channel were ever to be widened another considerable expense would be 
involved and these circumstances "compel me to give an unfavourable opinion 
to a project which appears theoretically to be good but in practice difficult 
to be attained. "B Murray suggested' that a jetty be formed to permit 
the river to scour a channel, following which a permanent staith could 
be built in deep water; this, together with a pier built of timber carcassing, 
would cost c Z18,000 and if trade were to increase a further improvement 
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could be made by building a more permanent pier of rocks. Before work 
could proceed he suggested that the WHC "call in the eminent abilities 
of Sir John Rennie who has had more experience on harbouisthan any enclineer 
of the present day. "9 
Before Rennie could report, James Leslie did, presumably called upon 
to give his views on the reports already received. He was critical of 
Murray's plan, especially as it took the river to the north whereas it 
was in the south that it should be deepest, it being there that trade 
would develop. Leslie put forward two schemes, in concept similar but 
in scale different. Each had ashorter south pier with a much longer 
one built to the north of the river to protect its mouth; the bigger 
scheme with the north breakwater 2,300ft long would cost E23,410 and the 
smaller, having the north breakwater 1,200 ft long, would cost E12,185. 
He did not approve, either, of Nicholson's idea of a 'river entrance at 
Pan Haven although a harbour there independent of the river would be acceptable 
The last of the pre-construction reports was submitted by Sir John 
Rennie in 1838. In the course of a very exhaustive investigation he 
had tested the tidal range throughout the river's lower reaches, had taken 
trial borings and had investigated past storms and their attendant toll 
upon shipping, as well as reading the reports already submitted. Rennie 
thought that Nicholson's plan was impracticable in that considerable expense 
would provide only a small harbour; Fulton's plan, on the other hand, 
attracted him initially although he expressed grave doubts as to its silting 
up and thought that wharfage must be insufficient. Rennie considered 
Murray's plan to be good although some modification to it would be required 
but Leslie's proposals, a modified version of Murray's, were not thought 
appropriate as, having been excavated through rock, the river would not 
then be capable of deepening itself by its own scouring properties. 
After his rather severe strictures regarding Leslie's proposals, Rennie 
nevertheless adopted his pier suggestions but, instead of using the southern 
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line of channel, proposed one to the north, removed from the staiths; 
the final form adopted was a compromise solution. 
The WHC also wrote to Capt. Beaufort, Admiralty Hydrographer, showing 
what was intended and stating that whereas the river was now capable of 
accommodating ships only of 80 tons, it was hoped to provide facilities 
for 200 ton vessels *. the present 10 ft of water would be increased to 
21 ft. Browne, as solicitor and promoter, invited the Duke of Northumberland 
to join the project and visited London, there obtaining agreement that 
E44,000 could be borrowed provided an agreed contractor be employed; 
tenders were subsequently sought from Gibb, Barry and Logan. 
13 
Having decided to proceed with the scheme for the larger harbour. 
the WHC in May 1838 let the contract for its construction to Kingscote 
and Browne, 
14 the colliery lessees, in the sum of E46,200. They, in turn, 
subcontracted with John and James Welch for the 7 actual work. Problems 
were encountered on two counts, first, unanticipated problems which were 
estimated in 1838 as likely to cost a further Z22,000 
15 
and, second, a 
dispute with the Duke of Northumberland, involving the WHC in depositing 
E10,000 with Hoares Bank, London, as security upon any claim by the Duke, 
the WHC receiving such income as was due until a claim should be made. 
These two matters caused the WHC to seek an extension of time for its 
works and a further Act was duly passed in 1842, defining the fishing 
agreement and extending completion by five years. If damages to the 
fishing exceeded E1,000 within the first three years, it should be deemed 
a total loss, the E10,000 trust fund should be liquidated and settlement 
made with the Duke. 
16 
The WHC experienced problems regarding finance in 1841. Application 
was made to the Exchequer Loan Commissioners for E36,000 and, perhaps 
-o receive favourable consideration, it offered "security of the hoping 4. 
tolls and of the works being constructed under the direction of Sir John 
Rennie. , 
17 It was pointed out that the lessees had already expended E50 - 
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60,000 in developing Radcliffe colliery and expected ultimately to produce 
from it c-,, m tons p. a.; other collieries were being exploited in the vicinity. 
With shipments of 200,000 tons p. a. revenue should be c E10,000. The 
Loan Commissioners insisted that the harbour be inspected by James Walker, 
who duly reported that whereas ships of up to 600 tons could use the 
Tyne, Warkworth would be able to accept only small vessels and in spite 
of the high figure given, he suggested that only 50,000 tons P. 2. wgýjld 
be shipped in the first two years. His view was that 
Warkworth Harbour, when finished as proposed, will not be 
entitled to the high character which the word 'National' seems 
to convey; but that, nevertheless in connection with the 
roadstead, it will, when completed, be useful to the public. 
The harbour, of which the entrance is dry at low water, and 
of which the capacity is only what is due to the very small 
river upon a coast where the average lift of the tide is only 
12 feet, must be a very imperfect harbour refuge; but it 
is also to be remembered that the estuary of the Forth is 
60 miles distant to the Northward, the Humber 150 miles to 
the Southward; and the importance of harbours upon the North- 
East coast of England is well known .... Warkworth can scarcely be called a harbour at present, but its break-water piers 
when finished will give it a claim to the name and on the 
principle of 'any port in a storm' I think the harbour when 
completed will occasionally be useful, particularly for small 
vessels running into it, when the 'tide is in ... My opinion is that Warkworth... is deserving of the notice of the Commissioners 
for the Loan of Exchequer Bills; supposing always a security 
for the repayment Of any advances, to be good, independently 
of the harbour; for I do not consider that dependence for 
repayment can be placed on the returns from the harbour. 18 
The Loan Commissioners declined to advance the capital necessary. 
By the time of this report only E10,000 had been raised by the colliery 
lessees, financing the works through the WHC. Construction had been 
subcontracted to, the Welchs. for E41,500 and it had been on the suggestion 
of Lord Howick, owner of Broomhill Colliery, that the loan had been sought. 
Its refusal led to an offer by Robert Ladbroke from 1841 the lessee 
of Radcliffe collieryg, to advance all monies necessary for work to 
be completed 
19 
and on this basis construction continued. In 1840, 
without mention in the WHC records, plans were made to provide wet docks 
at Amble, and drawi-ngs were preFoared., perhaps prior to an Act being sought. 
The drawings show a tidal basin of 3 acres with two 8 acre docks opening 
20 from it, all situated an the south side of the river. By this time 
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the forming of the north breakwater, 2,300 ft long, was proceeding, a works 
railway leading from the quarry at Pan Haven and crossing the river to 
the north shore. Under the supervision of Rennie and Murray the pier 
was of masonry with slopes of 1 in 2 on the outer face and 1 in V2, on 
the inner; it was to be raised only to a height of two feet above high 
water. 
In their deliberations the Loan Commissioners had asked for a report 
on the colliery. It was duly inspected by John Buddle although his findings 
were not made known to the WHC until after the loan's refusal. He noted 
that the coal was of a quality similar to that at Blyth and although when 
shipped it would be 1/- p. ton cheaper than on the Tyne there should 
be no problems as only smaller ships could use Amble. Harbour and colliery, 
he thought, were "mutually indispensible. , 
22 
The unusual nature of the contract was almost certain to lead to 
problems: two of the colliery's former lessees - one of them its solicitor 
- were acting as contractors, under Rennie and Murray, for, the construction 
of a harbour built, in effect, at the present lessees expense through 
a harbour commission; in turn, the construction work had been let to a 
sub-contractor with the major part of the materials, stone, being supplied 
to him by the main contractor! It is not surprising that Welch abandoned 
his contract in 1842, when others were sought to complete the work. 
The ensuing dispute involved all parties and in June Edward Western, solicitor 
to Ladbrokep wrote to Rennie regarding contractual matters, noting that 
the work was to have been executed under Rennie's supervision and be completed 
by 1 June 1842. Welch's, men had not worked for some weeks; were they 
guilty of delay? Had all work been to Rennie's satisfaction? Would Rennie 
recommend that Kingscote and Browne seek the services of another contractor.? 
23 
Rennie's reply was judicious, if not evasive: 
As I am situated in the Contract being Umpire between the Con- 
tractors & you I think you will see the impropriety of my answering 
your questions until some arrangements be made as to the present 
disputes with the Contractors upon which I wrote to you yesterday. 
I shall be glad to explain this more fully when you call. 24 
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The outcome would seem to have been that a lawsuit ensued, much of the 
evidence relating to the site supervision provided under Rennie, at first 
by Robert Gibney and then by George Remington. The piers had been both 
re-aligned and re-specified but on their part, the contractors had not 
expeditiously proceeded with their contract. 
25 The result is not clear 
but it was not until 1849 that Rennie certified the works as complete. 
The north pier had cost E101,239 and the south E15,746; of these sums 
Z78,785 was for extras. 
26 
In May 1844, with problems continuing regarding the design and construction 
of the piers, the WHC agreed to the formation of a Warkworth Harbour Joint 
Stock Company with a capital of L100,000 and borrowing powers of Z509000; 
already debentures totalling E60,000 had been issued. The prospectus 
pointed out that adjoining the harbour there was "a most extensive virgin 
Coal Field amounting to more than 100 square miles and by making docks 
and other improvements it is calculated that the whole, when opened out, 
will be shipped from this port. , 
27 If Hartlepool were taken as an examPleg 
the return on capital would be large. It was noted that Radcliffe, a 
mile distant, was connected to Amble by rail and was able to ship 150,000 
tons p-a- Plans for a dock - it was not proceeded with - triangular 
in shape and 750 ft by 350 ft were prepared by Rennie; 
28 it was to be 
sited on the south side of the river, virtually at its mouth. In form 
simpler than Murray's 1840 proposal it acknowledged the fact that the 
river would remain in its southern channel and not as he had earlier 
suggested. An added spur to expansion was provided in 1846 wherf 'the 
Newcastle and Berwick Railway (N&BR) informed the WHC that a branch to 
Amble was planned. Understandably, the commissioners resolved to petition 
in favour of the forthcoming Bill, "a measure so fraught with benefit 
29 to the revenue of the harbour" . 
In 1844, 
- 
5,700 tons of coal were shipped; in 1845,32,800 tons: 
revenues were E90 and E488.30 Although shipments had not nearly approached 
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Walker's projection of 1841 and as the proposals to form a company had 
foundered, the WHC decided in 1846'to seek a further Act of Parliament, 
principally to increase its capital and to extend the time of completion 
of its works. Remmington prepared estimates showing that although almost 
E1009000 had been spent on the harbour, a further Z44,500 would be needed 
to complete piers, jetties and wharfs, the extra costs having arisen prin- 
cipally because of the soft stone which had been used and because the 
foundations of the north pier had spread, involving much greater quantities 
of stone being required. 
The 1847 Act 31 embraced two new general Acts, the Harbour, Docks 
and Piers Clauses Act, 1847 and the Commissioners Clauses Act, 1847 and 
it amended slightly the constitutionof the commission in that three nominees 
of the Duke of Northumberland were included, as were Felix Ladbroke, Edmond 
Calvert and representatives of the Broomhill colliery owned by the Grey 
family. It was to serve this undertaking that the NOR had formed its 
railway to Amble. 
32 The works were to be completed within five years 
and powers were given for raising capital and loans totalling E200,000. 
After 1847 problems regarding depth of water in the harbour become 
apparent, also some disillusion regarding Rennie. Three years earlier 
he had been instructed to present quarterly statements of work done and 
in 1848 when a new jetty Was being considered in relation to the Radcliffe 
staiths it was decided to seek advice from 1eslie, involved earlier. 
Rennie and Leslie at once disagreed on the measures necessary and Rennie 
again propounded his view that a dock was needed to accommodate "the increased 
traffic which will, I trust, be shortly developed, , 
34 two sites being 
envisaged, one at the river Is mouth and the other further upstream. Some 
damage to the piers was occasioned at this time and to effect repairs 
and improve the harbour Rennie and Leslie agreed that the north pier 
be extended by 200 ft while they were both of the opinion that a dock 
should be constructed "in the space enclosed near the present staith and 
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that the cost of making the dock with a half entrance and a single pair 
of gates will amount to the sum of 02,500. , 
35 Rennie later changed his 
opinion as to the site of the dock, envisaging it on the site of the quarry 
opened to build the pier where excavation was h alf completed and where 
a three acre dock could be built for E30,000. 
Due to the financial problems experienced by the colliery lessees 
in building the harbour and winning the colliery it was proposed by Ladbroke 
that a company be formed to build and operate the dock. The WHC resolved 
to give every support to the project and the prospectus, recording that 
L150,000 had already been spent on the harbour, sought a further Z100,000 
for the dock but noted that only two collieries were in production, shipping 
c 80,000 tons p. a.; this figure could rise to 400,000 tons and bring 
to subscribers an income of almost L9,000 p. a. With the Hartlepool and 
Sunderland docks in operation "it cannot be doubted that in a new coal 
district like that adjoining the Warkworth Harbour seeing how much the 
consumption of steam coal increased the foregoing estimates must be more 
than realised in a very short time. , 
36 Rennie and Leslie were to be Joint 
engineers and plans were prepared by Remmington for a two acre dock near 
37 38 the river mouth. An ACL Was obtained but capital was not forthcoming 
and a proposal was made to amalgamate the dock company with the WHCf a 
move opposed by the latter, leading to its seeking to withdraw, at least 
temporarily, from the arrangement. Nevertheless it agreed that the contractors 
should be allowed to proceed, a contract for the work having been awarded 
by the dock company to Messrs. Rigby. 
39 
The WHC was at this juncture informed by Western, Ladbroke's solicitor, 
that the latter - he had financed the whole of the project - was unableg 
or unwilling, to continue his outlay and had contracted to sell his debentures 
to the dock company. This crisis raised a query from the Duke of North- 
umberland (1792 -1865) regarding the amalgamation, which was about to 
become inoperative due to the shares Pot having been subscribed for within 
the requisite time. A further Deed of Amalgamation was submitted for 
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his approval and, although he agreed, the dock did not proceed. 
40 
By 1B54 the harbour had been completed and the output of the Radcliffe 
and Broomhill collieries was being shipped at the rate of 78,000 tons 
p. a.; serving only two collieries the port was completely dependent 
upon them and was not to increase the throughput of coal for some years. 
The capital expended on the harbour itself had been E125,000 and in IB41 
it was estimated that Radcliffe coll. iery winning- 2,000 acres were originally 
leased for 42 years in 1839 - had cost c E60,000.41 A railway from Radcliffe 
to the south of the harbour had been built and riverside staiths provided 
while the NOR , by 1854 the NER I branch line five miles long brought 
coal from Broomhill; staiths had been provided by the WHC at a cost of 
E3,000 42 and had been leased t 
possible that a small quantity 
staiths as in 1843 the owner. 
may soon be shipping a greater 
had not proved profitable; as 
o Broomhill colliery at E200 p. a. It is 
of coal was being shipped from the older 
of Old Togston colliery intimated that he 
tonnage at Amble. 
43 The harbour by 1854 
the coal shipments had not been as great 
as expected 
I 
revenue in that year was only L1,262 
44 
and the capital expenditure 
then given was E. 183,800, almost E60,000 above the initial construction 
expenditure. The involvement of the Duke of Northumberland in the WHC 
had proved difficult, Compensation for his fishery loss was not easily 
afforded and he had caused a delay at the beginning of the project by 
taking out an injunction against the WHC, so causing a stoppage in work: 
on the other hand, although there were three of his nominees on the commission 
he had not interfered in its management. - It was not until 1847 that 
Walker was instructed by the Duke to report upon the feasibility of providing 
breakwaters to link Coquet Island with the mainland, so to form a harbour 
of refuge but, even so, no request was made regarding the harbour itself. 
45 
The formation of the harbour at Warkworth had proved both difficult 
and expensive, in part due to the contorted construction procedures and 
to the conflicting engineering opinions. In addition, geological problems 
had limited the output of Broomhill colliery and, perhaps, of Radcliffe 
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also; it was only a change of ownership in 1854 when it was taken over 
by Joseph and John Harrison , which improved its working, so resulting 
in a better quality of coal being produced. 
46 The change in ownership 
led also to the earlier preponderance of coastal. shipments being reversed, 
and between 1854 and 1859 the percentage shipped abroad was to rise from 
1 75'o to9 25o . 
4.9 Summary 
The quickening industrialisation of the country, especially developments 
in the North -East brought with it an increasing demand for coal and 
whereas before 1830 the national coal output had risen at a compound rate 
of 2% p. a., after that date it increased at a rate of 35a p. a. What was 
of greater importance for the region was that its output of coal had increased 
from a rate of 1.6% p. a. before 1830 to 3.25% p. a. afterwards, leading 
to the North - East again achieving the 24% share of national production 
which it had possessed in 1815. A significant change, however, was in 
exports 5 increased eight-fold in 25 years , where a compound increase 
of 91/'0 P. a. had been brought about by, amongst other things, the reduction 
of duties, so enabling U. K. coal to compete much more effectively in con- 
tinental markets. 
Coal Output and Shipments. 1830-lB55 
1830 
(000 T) 
1855 
(OOOT) 
1830-55 
% P. a. 
UK Output 
NE Output 
30,375 
6,915 
64,448 
15,431 
3 
3.25 
ot NE/UK ýo 22.8 24 
NE Shipments 
NE -Ex'ports 
4,092 
340 
8,271 
2,839 
2.7 
9 
Exports 8.5 34 - 
I 
In the North -East, demand for coal was met by the opening of two. -. 
mining areas: in the north, collieries near Seghill developed outlets 
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on the Tyne for shipping their steam coal while in the Durham coalfield 
the main emphasis was on the exploitation of the deeper deposits in the 
eastern part of the county, a development which led to high-output collieries 
and the formation not only of improved shipping facilities but the building 
of new ports. This transformation had not taken place solely at the 
behest of the port authorities; much of it had been due to colliery interests 
and much was' the result of railway development, in turn stimulated by 
mining. 
Improved shipping facilities were most apparent in Durham where the 
two main factors were the mining of deeper seams and the aftermath of, 
first, the growing use Of Parliamentary powers for the construction of 
public railways and, second, the introduction prior to 1830 of steam traction 
and later its development and universal use. The first of the composite 
railways, using locomotive traction in part, had been those carrying coal 
into Sunderland while the S&DR was the first of the railways proper although 
initially a composite line. It was the building of this railway which 
resulted in coal being shipped from the Tees; similarly, Londonderry's 
harbour at Seaham was dependent upon its railway and the port and railway 
at Hartlepool were conceived as a single entity. Significantly, it was 
the formation and, in effect, extension of the Clarence Railway which 
led to the establishment of West Hartlepool. 
Shipments of coal from the North East Ports, 1830-1855 
Shipments 1830 1B55 
000 Tons ot to 000 tons 
of 
4 
Tyne 2465 60 3663 43 
Wear 1387 34 1891 22 
Tees 100(est) 2.5 29B 4 
Blyth 140(est) 3.5 196 2 
Hartlepool - 1612 19 
Seaham 735 9 
Amble 59 1 
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The development of the new ports affected dramatically the pattern 
of coal shipments. Within 25 years the share of the trade taken by 
Tyne and Wear had fallen from 945'a to 655'o, although each had increased 
its throughput; of the new outlets the most prominent was Hartlepool, 
where the total shipment of the two ports had grown so as to command 
19% of the region's trade. 
Change had not affected the Tyne and the Wear alike. To some extent 
isolated from the Durham coalfield , although still with its network 
of waggonways and colliery railways on the south bank of the river', 
the Tyne maintained a near-constant rate of increase over the period, 
albeit assisted by the shipment of coal from the Blyth area. To the 
southq the formation of Seaham Harbour had the effect of inducing a decline 
in the Wear's shipments, a trend which was not arrested for some six 
years; it was only the building of dock facilities at Sunderland which 
enabled the Wear to achieve new growth and again compete with the Tyne. ' 
The initial rates of growth of the Durham ports were dramatic) a figure 
of almost 101% p. a. 'being reached at Hartlepool; it was not to continue 
and although the Tees and Hartlepool both maintained their importance 
in the economy their peaks, so far. as the shipment of coal was concerned, 
occurred in c 1840 and c 1860 respectively. 
Coal Statistics: annual percentage increase (compound); 1830-1855 
Dates % 
Tyne 1830 - 1855 1.6 
Wear 1830 - 1844 -2) 1.25 SO 
1844 - 1855 5.5) 
Tees 1830 - 1840 
Blyth 1830 - 1855 1.3 
Hartlepool 1640 - 1855 9.5 
Seaham Harbour 1832 - 1855 5.5 
Amble 1845 - 1855 6 
III 
The Wear suffered from the competition of Seaham Harbour and Hartlepool; 
both Londonderry and the HD&R drew coal from areas which the Wear would 
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formerly have exploited. More doubtful are the areas served by West 
Hartlepool and the Tees, perhaps too distant to have affected the Wear's 
growth. In 1845, each of the three ports shipped some 600,000 tons 
of coal, half of which would formerly have accrued to the Wear. 
As railways developed in the region , to a large extent complementing 
the older waggonways , so the transport of minerals from one area to 
another became possible, an example being the shipment of Northumberland 
coal at Sunderland. In the period the influence of indi'VaduaLs on. the. 
early railway system became apparent: the Carrs, responsible for the 
BUR; the Harrisons, involved in the SUR; and, later, Londonderry, 
Tennant and Jackson who were able to undertake developments on a larger 
scale. It was, however, the advent of Hudson which was to produce the 
greatest impact on the region. His development of the YN&BR had a unifying 
effect upon the region's system and its completion, with links to the 
Midlands and to London, provided the North-East with a further outlet 
for its products. From the 1840-s onwards it became possible for coal 
destined for London to leave the region by rail as well as by sea. 
The North- East ports were saved by the economics of transport. 
Although rail transport had ousted road, the carriage of coal by sea 
remained economical in comparison with rail and as a result the railways 
continued to act as feeders to the ports in spite of forming an outlet 
in themselves. Even the formation of the North Eastern Railway in 1854 
was not to change matters and it, like its predecessors, engaged in the 
building and management of dock and harbour facilities. The region Is 
three principal rivers remained under the control of Corporation, commission 
and company. On the Tyne, the Corporation of Newcastle had undertaken 
little improvement, although greater efforts had been made subsequent 
to the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835. The Corporation, however, 
was not averse to others providing the' facilities needed and its approval 
was given to several proposals put before it for dock construction, whether 
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by company formed for the purpose or by railway interests. None, however, 
was built before 1854, not even that proposed by Hudson. Failure would 
seem to - have been due principally to lack of available capital, in part, 
a result of continuing railway development. There was perhaps the fear 
that dock facilities would not be complemented by river improvements 
and in spite of the many proposals made, the Tyne was forced to rely 
on private colliery facilities for its trade, the Corporation itself 
having, in spite of the changes brought about, settled down to "a regime 
of parsimony, inaction, laissez faire and great complacency. "3 
The Wear, in contrast, fared better. The several suggestions made 
for docks eventually resulted in the construction of the private venture 
of Sir Hedworth Williamson on the north bank and the dock of the Sunderland 
Dock Company, backed by Hudson, on the south; his intervention later 
brought under his control the Wearmouth dock and the D&SR. The need 
for dock facilities on the Wear was vital; not only was its waterway 
inferior to the Tyne but its trade had suffered especially as a result 
of Seaham Harbour. Hudson, and the dock company, transformed the port 
and from a decline of 2/'G p. a. a 5.5% p. a. increase was achieved between 
1844 and 1855. Over the period 1830-1854 as a whole it had lagged behind 
the Tyne. On neither river had the conservators seen themselves as 
responsible for dock construction, perceiving their role only as that 
of river improvement. This view was taken also by the TNC,, responsible 
for navigation on the Tees. 
The conditions governing the development of both Tyne- and Jees -were 
similar; each had its principal town, where was based th-- river governmentt 
a considerable distance upstream and each saw its role as 'one of main- 
taiining a navigable channel only to that town. Relatively, the Tees 
was more progressive than was the Tyne in- that it made itself responsible 
for two major projects of river improvement but, again, it left the con- 
struction of a dock - it was the only one built - to the Pease interests, 
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to be later taken into the SOR. The Tees suffered, too, from the conflicting 
interests of its towns - to be detailed later - but nevertheless it was 
enabled to become a major river in the region, ironically at the expense 
of Stockton, formerly the principal town. From 1850 the n3-ture of the 
trade of the Tees began to change due to the discovery and working of 
nearby ironstone deposits and, although this trade prospered, coal exports 
fell from this time, principally due to the marked increase in the use 
of coal in the burgeoning iron industry. 
The three remaining ports on the Durham coast, Seaham, Hartlepool 
and West Hartlepool, were with Amble different in character; in effect, 
each was the outlet for a single railway carrying coal for shipment. 
As such, they were subjected to no outside constraints other than 
the raising of capital, their sole purpose being to meet the need of 
the trade. Under the influence of Londonderry, Tennant and Jackson 
they prospered with the combined Hartlepools achieving a growth rate 
of 9.5% p. a. over a 15 year period; the comparable figures were 5.5 for 
Seaham Harbour and 6 for Amble, all significantly higher than those for 
the established ports. 
The construction of docks at the Durham ports marks clearly the 
improvements made at the behest of the region's colliery interests. 
What is somewhat nebulous, however, is the magnitude of the changes made 
in the rivers themselves. The construction of piers and quays is self- 
evident but conditions in the rivers' channels are less clear due to 
the increasing use of steamboats for towing colliers up-river and to 
sea. Joseph Price, credited with being the first to use steam power 
for this purpose, claimed that whereas ships exceeding 240 tons register 
had been unable to reach Newcastle, "after the introduction of the towing 
system, vessels of 400 tons register were brought up... 11 
4 
and as a result 
the potential usefulness of a ship had been raised substantially. Dredging 
was undertaken on all rivers, spurs projecting into the rivers were removed 
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and loading facilities improved, the latter at private expense. In 
1833, cargoes from the region to London averaged some 300 tons but the 
end of the period, after the introduction of iron ships, saw steamships 
carry c 9,500 tons to London in 17 cargoes, an average of 558 tons. 
Emphasising the disparity between cargoes to London and other ports, 
by 1855 the average cargo leaving the Tyne - assuming that 90% were 
of coal - was 225 tons, and from the Wear 215 tons but other evidence 
relating to ship sizes is inconclusive and in some cases subjective 
and biased. Ship sizes had increased but nevertheless the river works 
undertaken had provided accommodation for them; between 1812 and 1842 
the maximum tonnage of ships able to use the Wear had risen from 250 
to 350 tons. At Seaham Harbour, in the early years, the biggest ship 
to use it was of 271 tons. On the Tees in 1847,11,974 ships took 
from the river 317,000 tons of coal; again using a 905'Q load factor 
the average cargo amounted to 294 tons. The only conclusion must be 
that ship sizes were generally similar throughout the region. It is 
probable that shipowners extolled the virtues of particular ports; 
it is possible that ships' dimensions could influence the choice of 
port, the relationship between draught and beam governing especially 
the utilisation of dock entrances; and it is certain that port dues 
related to ship configuration, so rendering difficult the comparison 
of port charges. 
Personalities were significant in the development of the North- 
East. The most prominent have been noted and it was through them that 
the Durham ports were founded and the railway system built up, before 
being subjected to leasings and amalgamations. By 1854 the system 
had polarised into the North Eastern Railway - its formation will later 
be detailed - and four smaller ones, the S&DR, the BUR, the N&CR and 
the H&DR. The railways' impact had been profound and of the engineers 
involved, Thompson, Wood and Buddle made notable contributions to railway 
construction while little need be said of the two Stephensons through 
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whom the locomotive had been brought into universal use. In -the field 
of river engineering, most prominent were the Rennies and locally, Brooks 
and Murray, employed on the Tyne and Wear respectively but undertaking 
consultancy work also. In spite of their efforts, development and 
improvement had been sporadic - except perhaps on the Wear - but the 
responsibility for this must be attributed to the governing authorities, 
although by 1850 great changes were beginning to take place. 
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5. CHANGES IN RIVER GOVERNMENT, 1850-1859. 
5.1 Introduction. 
Before 1850 the development of the North-East had been concentrated 
on the winning of coal and its transport by ' rail to the region's ports 
where improvements had been, with certain exceptions, relatively small 
in scale and privately financed; the only public authorities were the 
River Wear Commission and the Newcastle Corporation, the latter having 
done little. After 1B50 the nature of the ports changed, a transformation 
brought about by the creation of river commissions on the Tyne and the 
Tees, the rationalisation of interests on the Wear and the establishment 
of a company at Blyth. These events were not directly connected but 
nevertheless they were inter-related. 
Change came first to the river Tyne, a result of the long-standing 
rivalry between the towns of Shields and Newcastle, the former seeking 
a measure of control in the river's affairs and also its improvement. 
Perhaps intensified by the growing shipment of coal from the Durham ports, 
pressures resulted in the formation of the Tyne Improvement Commission, 
later to undertake improvements of a magnitude not until then experienced. 
Somewhat analogous were the developments which occurred on the Tees 
where Stockton, earlier dominant, in the 1850s became threatened by Middlesbrough 
in terms of population and overshadowed by it in terms of trade. . it 
was the rivalry between Stockton, embodied in the Tees Navigation Company, 
and Middlesbrough, as the Stockton and Darlington Railway and the -. "Pease 
family, which was to lead to the formation of the Tees Conservancy Commission. 
On the Tyne, change was political; on the Tees it was demographic. 
On the Wear, however, events were the result of economics, brought" about 
by the uneasy relationship existing between the long-standing commission 
and the Sunderland Dock Company, which sought links with both the Commission 
and the NER. Until 1854 the river Blyth'had been, in effect, the property 
of the Ridley family. As new mining areas began production, it became 
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obvious that the river was inadequate and the colliery interests went 
to some lengths to ship coal on the Tyne, rather than at Blyth where in- 
adequacies were emphasised following the formation of the Tyne Improvement 
Commission, it then becoming apparent that substantial river improvements 
there would be to the detriment of Blyth. In an effort to inject additional 
capital into the port the Blyth Harbour and Dock Company was formed. 
No less important was the formation of the NER in 1854, to be a major 
factor in the future of the region, not only because of the facility it 
offered for the movement of minerals but also because it was independent 
of the coal producers, many of whom had originally been instrumental in 
promoting and constructing railways to secure their own needs. These 
major reorganisations were to change the scale of the improvements made 
to the region's ports. 
5.2 River Tyne 
The dispute between Newcastle and the down-river towns of North and 
South Shields was of long standing. As early as 1655 Ralph Gardiner 
(or Gardner) had published a book registering his complaints as to the 
iniquities endured at the hands 'of Newcastle Corporation by the merchants 
of North Shields, of which group he was a member. His principal complaint 
was that ships should not, be, forced to travel to Newcastle only to unload 
ballast when their intention was to load cargoes at! Shields; the ports 
should be severed and "the trust -of the river of Tyne be put into faithful 
commissioners hands; the mayor and aldermen and commissioners of Newcastle 
having betrayed the trust reposed in them for conservan . cy thereof. "' 
Contemporaneously, Gardiner petitioned Cromwell 
2 
as to the state of the 
river bUt7 again, he achieved nothing; neither did the shipowners of Shields, 
when in 1800 they unsuccessfully attempted to form a commission to administer 
the river. By 1832 competition from other ports had become evident. 
Change was necessary but to achieve it "petty jealousy of sister towns 
must be laid aside, and their just influence in the confederation heartily 
acknowledged.,, 
3 Only by so doing, it was said, ' could the two towns of 
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Shields flourish and Newcastle retain its pre-eminence as a provincial 
capital. The principal catalyst was the passing of the Reform Act of 
1832 by which Parliamentary representation for Northumberland and Durham 
was increased from 10 to 18. Newcastle retained its two representatives 
and new constituences were created in Sunderland, Gateshead, South Shields 
and Tynemouth. Newcastle lost its supremacy and its electorate increased 
from some 3,000 freemen to c 5,000.4 In 1835 the passing of the Municipal 
Corporations Act, with the opportunity for new Council members to be elected 
in place of the long-standing oligarchy, provided a further stimulus for 
change in river government, control of the river becoming the responsibility 
of a River Committee. * 
In relation to this later Act, an Inquiry had been held in 1833 regarding 
the operations of the Corporation. It showed that of some 1,000 ships 
owned on the Tyne, one third each was owned in, North and South Shields, 
the Tyne being the second port in, the U. K. so far as tonnage was concerned. 
It also revealed that the river was still largely unimproved with only, 
two of the 20 items suggested by Rennie completed. It confirmed, too, 
the river's reliance on the coal trade; of 11,726 ships leaving the Tyne, 
10,322 - 881% - carried coal, 9,740 of them coast-wise. 
5 As the Inquiry 
proceeded representations were, made for the ballast dues received by Newcastle 
to be distributed to the towns of Shields, as Newcastle's trade was "now 
infinitely multiplied by the inhabitants of South and North Shields.. ."6 
The Inquiry showed that in a period of ten years the income received by 
Newcastle from the river had been E137,319, of which only L5,133# had 
7 been spent on improving its bed. 
The resulting municipal reform did improve the attitude of the Corporation 
towards its river. Expenditure increased, groynes were built, the Newcastle 
quay was improved and a start was made to the removal of Bill Point. 
What was referred to as work of "a fitful and partial character" 
B in reality 
* At first comprising 26 members it was later reduced to 20. 
# The earlier quoted figure included maintenance and salaries, as well as capital expenditure. 
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referred to lack of effective dredging; little of the work undertaken 
by Anderson and Brooks was later modified. The attitude of Newcastle 
Corporation did not change towards the towns of Shields and Gateshead 
where it opposed almost any improvement suggested by them. Objections 
had been made to Gateshead's proposal for quay improvements in 1838; 
at South Shields, Mill Dam had been 'filled; and when North Shields in 
1840 sought to build a quay the Newcastle Corporation declined to commit 
itself in any way. 
9 North Shields became incorporated in 1847 and South 
Shields the following year. 
Shipping had so increased by 1844 that the Trade and Commerce Committee 
recommended that attempts should be made to increase the standing of the 
river by seeking its classification as a first-class port, as it was now, 
in terms of registered tonnage, second only to the Thames and its revenue 
was nearly equal to that of Glasgow, already a' first-class port. The 
Treasury did not agree to the reclassification but six months later the 
Corporation was informed that an Act was being sought, its object to form 
a Commission to provide both a river police force and im proved mooring 
facilities. Initiated by Shields shipowners, as had been the 1833 rep- 
resentations, the resulting Newcastle upon Tyne Port Act, 1845 was funded 
by dues on all ships using the port. The promoters had contended that 
the Corporation should defray the costs from its own receipts but "true 
to its ancient character, (it) refused, and the shipowners, rather than 
- 1110 - lose (the advantages gained) ... agreed to the imposition. After acrimonious 
discussion with the Corporation it was finally agreed that the Committee 
should comprise 12 Newcastle councillors with four North and four South 
Shields shipowners. 
11 
Newcastle and Shields again came into conflict in 1846 when the down- 
river shipowners complained of the state of the river's bar, maintaining 
that it had perhaps worsened since the time of Rennie's report;, later 
figures showed that whereas in 1841 a depth of 91 -211 'was available, by 
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1847 it had decreased to 61 _ ,,. 
12 In 1848 the ports of Newcastle and 
Shields - from a Customs point of view were severed, a move initiated 
by the two towns of Shields which, independently, had memorialised the 
Treasury to the effect- that 100,000 tons of shipping was registered in 
North Shields and 99,000 in South Shields, the latter shipping 11im tons 
of coal p. a. from 16 staiths. Newcastle responded by itself memorialising 
the Treasury as to its predominance on the river and, pointing out that 
similar applications which had been made in 1816 and 1830 had been rejected, 
13 
admitted that facilities could be provided at Shields without dismembering 
the port. There was also the view of Newcastle merchants that the granting 
of a Custom House to Shields could mean the withdrawal of facilities from 
Newcastle. 14 With proposals having been already made for docks at Coble 
Dene and at Jarrow, both sites within what was to be the Port of Shields, 
it is understandable that this view should have been taken. In spite 
of the Corporation entreating, Earl Grey to intervene on its behalf the 
decision was made that a Custom House be established in North Shields, 
the division between the two ports running between Jarrow Quay and Whitehill 
Point. 
The North Shields merchants, however, were still not satisfied and 
in July 1848, while congratulating themselves on the fact that the custom 
house had collected duties at a rate similar to Sunderland's 07,000 p. a., 
they drew attention to the , 
inconvenience of the boundary line and to "the 
unprecedented regulations by which the political influence of the town 
of Newcastle has for the present been enabled to fetter the independent 
action of the port of Shields. , 
15 Six months later, a meeting was held 
in North Shields "to take into consideration measures for the Conservancy 
of the Tyne, , 
16 the first item discussed being the financial state of 
Newcastle Corporation; river expenditure had totalled L10,824 while the 
sum appropriated for town improvements amounted to E17,172. The next 
day a similar meeting was held in South Shields but its main thrust Was 
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directed towards the unsatisfactory and dangerous condition of the river. 
Within a month a Conservancy Bill had been prepared and an Admiralty pre- 
liminary inquiry was under way in North Shields. 
17 
The Bill was debated in the Newcastle Council, its main opponent 
being Lockey Harle who after commenting on "certain mysterious advertisements 
18 
which had recently appeared, shielding the Bill's promoters, attacked 
the towns of Shields firstly for having mistakenly obtained their separate 
custom house and secondly for criticising Newcastle for its inadequate 
conservatorship. Harle asked whether "so much had been done on any given 
water as' on the Tyne'119 without an increase in taxation, and pointed to 
the construction of almost 15,000 feet of new quays, * some 6,500 ft of 
protective river walls and some 3,500 ft of groynes. Harle also commented 
that Newcastle had promoted the well-being of South Shields by supporting 
the dock# there and stated 'that the principal problems were the jealousies 
of the two towns of Shields; what was dbne to further one would antagonise 
the other. His attack ended with a plea that all the river's boroughs 
should oppose the Bill, "erroneous- in principle, unjust in detail. , 
20 
His proposal was agreed to, unanimously, with -the exception of William 
Henry Brockett (1804-1667), proprietor of the Gateshead Observer, who 
tabled an amendment to the effect that as Shields and Gateshead were now 
of relatively greater importance, some form of Conservancy should be adopted 
following negotiations with all interests. 
The Preliminary Inquiry was conducted by Captain John Washington 
R. N. (1801-1663) and the promoters represented by their barristerg Thomas 
Leitchq and the opposition, Newcastle Corporation, -by its Town Clerk, 
John Clayton (1792-1890). Much of the evidence concerned the navigation 
of the river and the problems associated with the handling of ballast. 
It was maintained that the river had actually deteriorated- over the years, 
principally due to a lack of dredging, although steps had been taken to 
remove certain of the more serious obstructions. Ballast caused problems 
* Predominantly, they had been financed privately. 
# In fact, a dock at Shields would render it less necessary for Newcastle to improve the river. 
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on three counts: if cast at 'sea it rendered difficult and' dangerous the 
bringing of ships into port; when off-loaded in the river its handling 
was the subject of many abuses related to careless or wilful casting overboard; 
the dues payable in respect of ballast were, on the Tyne, exorbitant, 
several times the cost imposed on the Tees. The Tyne was also 'compared 
unfavourably with the Wear and with most, other ports, and one witness, 
George Straker, often in dispute with the Newcastle Council when a member 
of it, rightly claimed that it was now declining in importance. 
For the Corporation, Clayton- listed the improvements which had been 
made to the river, noting that nothing at all had taken place until 1787 
when John Fryer had suggested the removal of stones from the river bed. 
Since 1816, however, improvements had taken place at an increasing pace 
and Clayton cited the several surveys made as an indication of the Corporation's 
desire for improvement. He also propounded the view that shipowners 
should not be appointed as commissioners - they could remove their trade 
to other ports - but coalowners were much more suitable; his view, though, 
was that the Corporation of Newcastle, with its 56 members, was much better 
suited than the proposed commission with its six members from Newcastle 
and Gateshead balanced by the three each from North and South Shields. 
From an engineering aspect, evidence was given by Nicholson, Simpson 
and Brooks. Nicholson's main criticisms concerned the deposition of 
ballast in the river and its entrance and the river banks themselvesv 
where slippage was in evidence -and loose material was being washed into 
the river, as it was from the ballast heaps. Simpson advocated the provision 
of free tidal movement in the river, best achieved by removing Newcastle 
bridge, and the provision of additional dredging, noting that only two 
machines* were in use whereas on the Clyde five were employed when necessary. 
The Corporation's engineer, Brooks, was probingly questioned by Washington 
as to his past employment and his work on the Tyne. Formerly engineer 
to the Tees Navigation Company, Brooks stated that he had spent Z60,000 
One dredger had been borrowed from Hartlepool. 
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on river improvement within a period of five years and his system of groynes 
there had substantially improved that river but he admitted that the Corporation 
had done little to improve the Tyne east of Jarrow. In making a case 
for the promoters, Leitch deplored the lack of river improvement, compared 
it unfavourably with the Wear and noted that it "is manifest that the 
Corporation have shown the grossest partiality towards Newcastle, not 
to speak of the circumstance of 63, OOOL ... having been expended on the 
extension of Newcastle Quay, whilst not a shilling had been spent on similar 
works at Gateshead, and... at North and South Shields. , 
21 He found it 
impossible to ascertain how the river revenues had been mis-appropriated 
but emphasised that c Lkm had been lost to the river since 1809. it 
was now imperative that a Commission be established. 
Washington's reportý published in May 1B49, was a scathing indictment 
of the Newcastle Corporation on all counts, financial, operational and 
engineering. Favourable comment concerned only the Newcastle quay and 
its cranes, the Bill Reach improvements, graving docks at North Shields 
and the use of steam tug-boats and it concluded that it 
must be manifest that the several duties usually attached 
to the conservancy of a harbour have not been attended to 
on the Tyne; that the most ordinary duties of river engineering, 
such as regulating and deepening the channel, cutting off 
projecting points, dredging away or otherwise removing the 
shoals, so as to produce a uniform bed of the river, have 
all but been entirely omitted; that sufficient quay accommodation 
for the traffic has not been provided; that no attempt has 
been made to improve the bar, or to get rid of the obstruction 
to the tide by the piers and starlings of Tyne Bridge; that 
the casting of ballast close to the entrance, and to a large 
extent in Shields harbour, had not been prevented... 22 
The subsequent Parliamentary Committee recommended that the Bill be amended 
so as to give additional representation to Newcastle and Gateshead and, 
with that provision, it was brought to both Commons and Lords, only to 
be withdrawn through lack of available time. 
As the Bill was to suffer some' 'amendments it is apposite to list 
the membership of the Commission which resulted from the several proposals. 
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Conservancy H of C Conservaancy Navigation Tyne 
Bill) Committee Bill, 1850 Bill, 1850 Improvement 
February June 1849 ActMay 1850 
1849 
Newcastle 
upon Tyne 4 6 3 9 6 
Gateshead 2 2 1 2 2 
North Shields 3 2 3 2 3 
South Shields 3 2 3 2 3 
Admiralty - 5 5 - 4* Trinity House - - 2 - 
With the prospect of impending defeat, the Newcastle Corporation, critical 
of Washington's "unfair and partial report, , 
23 delegated its River - Committee 
to suggest means of improving the river. Its deliberations led to Cubitt 
and Rendel preparing plans for piers at Shields which together with the 
removal of the several river projections, were estimated as costing E100,000, 
a figure which certain members of the Council found it hard to accept, 
thinking that some Vkm, the estimate made by Rennie in 1816, Would be 
needed. 
24 Nevertheless it was decided that the Corporation should promote 
its own Tyne Navigation Bill, suggesting that Newcastle should have nine 
representatives with, in addition, two nominees from Trinity House, responsible 
for navigational matters. As the Tyne Conservancy Bill was to be re- 
introduced, the Corporation again petitioned against it on the grounds 
that it was "desirous of further improvement of the river, and of putting 
25ý 
an end to the disputes which have arisen... and with both Bills in 
Parliament a further Admiralty Inquiry was held, conducted by Edward Lawes 
and James Abernethy (1814-1896). 
As before, evidence was somewhat inconclusive. Due to the use of 
steam tugs on the river, it was stated, vessels of 400 tons capacity could 
now load at Heaton spouts whereas formerly they had to be loaded from 
keels, as few as 100 keels remaining in use. Clayton was reminded that 
* Two Admiralty nominees would not subsequently be replaced. 
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although he had earlier stated that the removal of Bill Point "would destroy 
one of the finest natural docks in the world and would do incalculable 
mischief to the trade of Newcastle , 
26 this had not been so and ships could 
now travel to Newcastle within the day, a considerable improvement. it 
was noted that Sunderland dock was almost complete, that Wearmouth dock 
was not well used and that the Netherton colliery, now shipping at Blyth, 
was planning to ship its coals at Sunderland, rather Ahan on the Tyne. 
Ralph Park Phillipson (1799-1879), a Newcastle councillor with colliery 
interests on both Tyne and Wear, stated that although the Tyne was cheaper, 
the two rivers were physically comparable but the River Wear Commissioners 
were more active in river improvement than were the Tyne's conservators. 
Engineering evidence was conflicting. Speaking' on behalf of the 
promoters of the Navigation Bill, Brooks was critical of Rennie's plans 
and claimed that his own proposals were such as to render wet docks unnecessary, 
the Tyne now being "superior to any port in the kingdom, or in any country; 
large fleets may even now leave 'at half an hours notice, provided they 
have steam-boats to take them away.,, 
27 He also explained that Rendel and he 
proposed further river works above Newcastle so as to open up a large 
expanse of land for industry. Further support was given by ýendells assistant, 
Alexander Comrie who had designed the proposed piers. In his opinion 
the river had been improved, a view disputed by Edward Kinlick Calver 
(1813-1892) who commented that he had "never seen the banks of a 'river 
in such a state as they are here. , 
2B Nicholson, * also in opposition, 
considered that not nearly enough had been done to fulfil Rennie's plan 
but recommended the partial enclosure of Jarrow Slake, combined with extensive 
dredging. He also disagreed with 'Brooks concerning his estimates; the 
works above bridge would cost E117,500 While those below would cost E313,420, 
A new development in the Inquiry was the evidence given by Joseph Cowon 
Nicholson stated that most of the river staiths, up to 300 ft long, had been built between 1826 
and 1840. 
# Brooks had given figures of E9,266 and E133,984. 
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(1800-1873) who asked that the towns up-river of Newcastle be represented 
on any commission. Industrialists with up-river interests had concluded 
that the Tyne Navigation Bill would benefit them most and they intended 
to support it. He listed the several industries involved - chemicals, 
coal, iron and glass - and stated that some 150 craft were at present 
employed on the upper reaches of the Tyne. Further opposition was also 
expressed by Leitch, proponent of the Conservancy Bill, who congratulated 
Newcastle on having, 34 years previously, asked Rennie to report an the 
river. He had produced an invaluable report, whereas the Corporation 
now had only "an ill-digested scheme of, river works (designed by Brooks 
29 
with) ... the object of making the river a better ship canal to Newcastle . 
Little mention was made of shipbuilding, although reference was made to 
the fact that whereas Smiths built ships of up to 1,500 tons, once in 
use they were unable to return to the Tyne; if the river had been improved 
in 1640 it could have had a share in the India trade. 
Lawes and Abernethy duly reported their findings. The river should 
be governed by an -independent board; the membership should be divided 
equally between Newcastleý and Gateshead- vis 6 vis Shields; there should 
be Admiralty representation in view of the river's importance as the principal 
coal-port in the country; separate representation for the area above 
Newcastle was not appropriate; and the question of river improvements 
should be postponed until the new Commission had been formed. The most 
important clause, so far as Newcastle was concerned, was that regarding 
membership, "inasmuch as of the 17 members lof whom 
the proposed Board 
would consist, 13 represent that part of the river in the immediate locality 
of... Newcastle; nine being members of the Town Council... 1130ý Ih general 
Lawes and Abernethy, favoured Rennie's proposals and were saddened by 
their remaining unfulfilled. They were also sceptical concerning the 
effectiveness of the newly-proposed river works, due largely to the imperfect 
state of the deposited plans, and the absence of the necessary data, perhaps 
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leading to excessive costs. 
In its subsequent report to Parliament the Admiralty relied heavily 
on that of the inspectors and similarly it declined to recommend representation; 
nevertheless, a separate Commission was considered essential. The Admiralty 
concurred that the river had deteriorated over the'years, in that improvements 
"have not been carried out to the extent and efficiency which the interests 
of so great a shipping port so powerfully demand,, 
31 
and the report led 
to the proving of the Bill's preamble and with both Bills in this state, 
agreement of the rival parties was sought. Failure to agree on represent- 
ation led to its being decided by the House of Commons, each party in 
the dispute choosing two life commissioners; on this basis thelyne Navigation 
Bill became the Tyne Improvement Act, 1850. Meanwhile agreement had 
been reached between the two parties concerning the Act's financial aspects 
and whereas the North Shields group wished Newcastle to give up all rights 
to its coal dues, the Corporation would consent to relinquishing only 
one quarter. Agreement was reached on the basis of the Corporation giving 
up 3/8 of these dues and the new'- Tyne Improvement Commission (TIC) took 
over the E67,000 debt of the Corporation, incurred on its quay extensions. 
"The 'year which registered' the meridian of the nineteenth century marked 
the turning point in the Tyne's career.,, 
32 
5.3 River Wear. 
Somewhat different were the events which led to the amalgamation 
in 18,59 of the Sunderland Dock Company (SDC) with the River Wear Commission 
(RWC) - Here changes were initiated by the SDC's financial problemsq 
by friction between the two bodies and by the relationships between the 
SDC and the railways serving its dock. Before detailing the amalgamation's 
preliminaries it is, however, necessary to outline the progression of 
the SDC. 
The first phase of dock construction ended in mid 1856 with the opening 
of the South Outlet and the dock extension, bringing the total water area 
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to 32 acres. Not only did the new outlet provide six feet of water more 
than the river, it also extended from four to ten hours per tide the period 
during which the gates were open. 
1 By this time a grain warehouse had 
been built, hydraulic power was in use throughout the, dock system, railways 
served both sides of the docks and 18 coal drops and three spouts were 
in operation; 
2 the total capital cost had been 002,000,1.158m tons 
of coal passed through the dock in 1858 and revenue totalled E43,000. 
The half-yearly meetings of the SDC were invariably under the chairmanship 
of George Hudson and the directors included men with colliery and shipping 
interests, some of them commissioners. When the dock had been extended 
southwards the SDC had been led to expect that by the end of 1854 the 
Londonderry collieries would ship at Sunderland an additional 200,000 
tons p. a., carried by the recently completed coastal railway. This quantity 
did not materialise, possibly due to, the shipment of coal from the South 
Hetton area at Hartlepool, so enabling additional Londonderry, coal to 
be shipped through Seaham Harbour. The SDC provided the necessary drops 
but Lady Londonderry (1800-1865)* did not approve them and, threatening 
to involve the SDC in a court action, was awarded damages of E20,000. 
The drops were found to be excessive for the comparatively small quantity 
of coal shipped and instead of the Seaham collieries having exclusive 
use of them, some were cross-connected to the NER system. 
3 During the 
dispute Hudson had accused Lady Londonderry of wishing to monopolise the 
Sunderland dock 4 but she disputed this view, stating that the SDC was 
"becoming comp, ýised by the influence of a rival interes t,, 
5 
and it was 
Oryý 
to combat this threat of monopoly by the NER that the railway had been 
built. She also pointed out that she shipped 124,000 tons via four drops 
while the NER shipped 329,000 tons via 13 drops, a lower rate. There 
is little doubt that the dispute proved expensive to the SDC, deprived of 
anticipated revenue and forced to provide the settlement of E20,000. - 
As early as 1851 the SDC had experienced financial problems. The 
The third Marquis of Londonderry died in 1854. 
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York Newcastle and Berwick Railway (YN&BR) held 3,000 L25 shares, 
6 Hudson 
a further 2,345; * calls on capital were in arrears; money was borrowed 
on mortgage; construction costs had exceeded estimates and * income had 
not developed as had been hoped. In 1851 Hudson had asked that 1,000 
of the 2,345 shares held for him but not yet paid for be made available 
in partly paid up form at L2 each; the remaining 1,345 would be held 
by the Company as security. Two years later, the shares had not been 
paid for and it was feared that the company would be called upon to pay 
for discounting them as Hudson was financially embarrassed. Parliamentary 
powers granted in 1849,1853 and 1855 had enabled the SDC to issue capital 
totalling E600,000 with permitted borrowings of L150,000 but the SDC still 
experienced problems, in 1856 seeking to ýpostpone re-payment of a bank 
loan of E45,000. , 
Further, loans were sought to repay it and a year later 
the SDC mortgaged 6,200 preference shares of E124 each to raise E50,000, 
at the same time proposing to seek an Act which would enable the RWC to 
contribute funds towards the SDC's cost of providing the South Outlet 
and for the NER to subscribe to the SDC. 
7 
Due to the fact that the YNOR had a financial involvement in the 
SDC, three railway directors had been appointed to the board in 1853.8 
When discussions had taken place regarding the raising of further capital. 
George Leeman (1809-1882), to become chairman of the NER, objected to 
the plan of action proposed by the SDC directors and, perhaps uniquely 
in its history, the SDC minutes record the votes cast, including those 
of proxies. Leeman's move had been defeated by 5,749 votes to 3,227 
9 
but it had been an obvious attack upon the SDC management and had led 
to the appointment of the railway directors, a move publicly stated as 
being to promote a closer union. 
10 In 1858 the NER requested that the 
next vacancy on the SDC board be filled by a further railway director. 
11 
The most serious threat to the SDC came in 1854, although then perhaps 
not fully appreciated; in that year the YN&BR revived the project for 
Purchased on behalf of the YN&BR without authority the shares had become Hudson's 
responsibility in 1850. 
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building docks on the Tyne at Jarrow, so providing an outlet for Durham 
coals. Rightly perceiving this - move as a threat to the SDC, Hudson, 
at the half-yearly meetingg referred to the YN&BRIs proposal but "wished 
they had waited a little till they saw... completbd"12 the dock at Sunderland. 
Differences again surfaced in 1857 when the SDC attempted to encourage 
the NER to accept higher charges and in 1859 Hudson himself stated that 
the SDC had erred in not charging higher rates in its early days. 
13 
Although Hudson had been favourably disposed towards the Londonderry interests 
when the railway link to Sunderland was first made, his views changed * 
over the years and it was perhaps his antipathy towards Lady Londonderry 
which encouraged him to remark in 1857 that relations between the SDC 
and the NER were good, a statement not altogether borne out by the facts. 
He did, however, note ruefully that the NER had not perceived-the advantages 
of the Sunderland dock 
14 
and the fact that the dock had been built without 
being associated with a railway company was noted at a public meeting 
held to discuss the SDC's proposed Bill. It was remarked that Sunderland 
itself had rejected Hudson's proposals and one speaker, Joseph Watson, 
commented: "In his better days, Mr. Hudson said 'We will make you a dock I; 
but 'no' it was answered, 'we want a local management, ,, 
15 
a view which 
had led to an independent dock company being formed; if the YN&BR had 
consulted its shareholders, he continued, Sunderland would have benefited 
rather than the Tyne. 
It is difficult to see why the NER did not, purchase the dock at Sunderland 
rather than build at Jarrow. There was little to choose between the 
two locations - Jarrow perhaps had more space for standage - and both 
had adequate rail links. The lack of desire to rescue the dock companyt 
over-extended financially and unable to pay a, dividend, may have been 
simply because of the fact that Hudson was its chairman. In the period 
which followed his downfall in 1849, the shareholders and directors of 
the YNOR had little cause for gratitude in view of the fact that their 
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dividends had rapidly fallen from 9'% to nil and in fact "actions were 
brought against Hudson to recover from him the profits he had pealised 
on certain of his transactions in railway share s"16 he paid out 'more than 
E200,000. Following the formation of the NER, which brought to its board 
members of the former Leeds Northern Railway (LNR), there can have been 
little sympathy for Hudson's business interests from his former rivals, 
the LNR having several times sought an entry to the North-East only to 
be defeated by Hudson. There was also friction between Hudson and Leeman', 
Tomlinson noting that Leeman, coming "to the front in the troubled period 
of 1849 ... had assisted in the deposition of the Railway King (and later) ... his 
influence made itself felt at every crisis in the history of the Company. 
17 
Can it be that it was only Hudson's history* and personality which led 
to the virtual abandonment of the Wear by the NER? Or was it the antipathy 
between the NER and Lady Londonderry? 
The SDC first came into serious conflict with the RWC in 1855 at 
which time the dock company, with the new south outlet about to be brought 
into use, sought a new Act which would exempt dock users from RWC dues, 
thought logical in view of the fact that ships would be able to use the 
dock without entering the river. This move was naturally -opposed by 
the RWC which formed a committee under Hedworth Williamson to confer with 
the dock company and attempt to safeguard the commission's interests. 
18 
The SDC sought exemption from RWC dues , but at the same time it wished 
to avert any hostility as company and Commission had "only one common 
object, the improvement of the trade and port of Sunderland. "19 
The discussions which then took place between the two bodies centred 
on the wish of the SDC to have ships using only the dock exempt from river 
dues; the desire of the RWC to maintain its income; the aversion of the 
SDC to provide a rising income, based on increasing coal exports, to the 
RWC. Agreement proved impossible and, as would be expected, the dispute 
became the subject of press comment, the Sunderland Times noting that 
* He owed the NER E123,000 in 1859. ' 
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having failed to reach agreement by so close a margin, L220, this could 
prove to be "the most suicidal act the parties could commit.,, 
20 A public 
meeting was held to discuss the matter and whereas one side congratulated 
the SDC on having again brought Londonderry coal to Sunderland, the other 
upheld the RWC. Doubts were also expressed concerning the constitution 
of the RWC, its members now "representing only the interests of landed 
proprietors, , 
21 but the opposite view was 'also voiced, namely that the 
RWC should not be deprived of revenue, otherwise "the river will dwindle 
to its natural proportions, and Sunderland will be in the hands of the 
Dock proprietors. , 
22 Opposed by shipowners and by ýthe RWC the Bill went 
to Parliament where it received the Royal Assent in July 1855. 
The final dispute between the SDC and the RWC began in 1857 when 
the SDC, in financial difficulties, sought to obtain further revenue from 
the commissioners, its argument being - understandably - that as the dock 
had attracted trade to the Wear the company should receive some benefitv 
perhaps half the increased revenue. 
23 
The SDC resolved to accept not 
less than E2,500 p. a. from the RWC and, later, when the RWC offered E2,000 
it was refused. 
24 The company then decided to obtain an Act to authorise 
additional capital, to exempt ships using the south outlet from RWC duest 
to arrange dues with the RWC regarding ships using the dock and to enable 
the NER to subscribe to the SDC. 
25 
Agreement was later reached whereby 
the RWC would pay E2,000 p. a. if the SDC maintained a depth of seven feet 
at the outlet and, should shipments exceed 2.4 m tons p. a., additional 
payments would be made, to an upper limit of E3,000. Conversely, if 
shipments were less than 1.6 m tons, payments would cease. 
26 Agreement 
with the NER was reached, the SDC anticipating borrowing E50ý000 from 
it. The Bill went into Committee when the only 
ýbjection 
came from Lady 
Londonderry, not only to those clauses affecting her interests "but also 
those Clauses by which it was proposed to' carry out the arrangement" 
27 
between commission and company; the Committee, too, did not approve of 
the arrangements and the Bill was withdrawn. 
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Following this failure the RWC suggested that the two bodies should 
merge and both sides discussed the matter, apparently amicably. During 
negotiations, a deputation from the town of Sunderland sought to be a 
party to any agreement but both the SDC and RWC agreed that any enlarge- 
ment "would be likely to prejudice... the negotiations now in progress, , 
28 
the local press noting that such exclusion would "effectively preserve 
the management of the River from the obnoxious and officious interference 
of the Corporation of Sunderland. , 
29 Discussion led to agreement and 
the Act which brought together the SDC and the RWC was passed in August 
1859 by which time the capital expended by the two bodies was E724,000 
and F. 231,000 respectively. 
30 The reconstructed commission, was very different 
from those of the Tyne and Tees. They were formed almost exclusively 
of representatives of the towns bordering the rivers; in contrast the 
new RWC was dominated by the coalowners, holding 21 of the 52 seats. 
The town's shipowners elected 15 members, the landowners nine, the traders 
three; one commissioner was appointed by the Admiralty, one was the Collector 
of Customs, one was elected by the owners of the Wearmouth Dock and only 
one was elected by Sunderland borough, 
31 
perhaps indicative of the dichotomy 
between port and town. 
5.4 River Tees 
The second phase of the development of the river Tees had principally 
been due to the 'Stockton and Darlington Railway (S&DR) seeking an outlet 
for coal from the south-west Durham coal-field, first at Stockton and 
then' at Middlesbrough. By 1850 the town was expanding rapidly and it 
had been provided with dock facilities, by this time in possession of 
the SOR. Due to the format-ion of the Stockton and Hartlepool Railway 
(S&HR), * a proportion of the river's trade had been diverted from the 
Tees to Hartlepool and, later, to West Hartlepool. To ship its coals 
more cheaply the SOR had in 1845 leased the Tees port dues from the Tees 
Navigation Company (TNC), only to find that the revenue expected from 
* It was in effect an extension of the Clarence Railway. 
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the Clarence Railway was not forthcoming. Superimposed upon this situation 
was, from 1850, the exploitation of the nearby ironstone deposits9 initiated 
by Henry Boltkow (1806-1678) and John Vaughan (1799-IB6B), the first to 
establish ironworks at Middlesbrough. 
In 1840, the quantity of coal shipped from the Tees by the SOR had 
totalled 558,000 tons 1 but the figure had subsequently fallen and by 1849 
it amounted only to 355,000 tons. 
2 The reduction in coal traffic in 
1848 led Edward and Joseph Pease to confer with the Marquis of Londonderry 
with the object of inducing "the Marquis to enter into some regulations 
to avert the ruinous consequences of the coal trade. '.. (an) 
, 
effort not 
crowned with success. ,3 To increase shipments, the SOR later approached 
its supplierý and offered to ship any coal in quantity greater than the 
previous years figure at kd per ton, provided that the colliery owners 
paid, as a guarantee, the previous years dues; the result was an increase 
to 491,000 tons. 4 
For some time, relations between the SOR and the TNC had been somewhat 
strained, the former company wishing to exert some pressure on the TNC 
to improve the river, still showing signs of inadequate capital spending. 
In 1850 the TNC became aware of two developments, both of which could 
act to its detriment 
5 
and it was agreed to oppose both measures, one of 
which would "dissolve the Tees Navigation Company. ,6 Two Bills were 
projected, the Victoria (Redcar) Harbour and Docks and the Tees River 
ConserýLancyq both promoted by the S&DR, a fact not confirmed until later. 
The proposal for the harbour at Redcar was another version of the earlier 
schemes of 1832 and 1838 with two docks, * of A and eight acres, located 
within a 510 acre refuge harbour, 
7a 
railway connecting with the Middlesbrough 
and Redcar Railway, completed in 1846. The second Bill was to form 
a body better suited to the river's conservatorship than was the TNC; 
as before, its limits were to be only from Stockton bridge to the sea 
8 
* See Map 11 
206 
and its powers were to be similar. * 
The Admiralty commissioned a report from David Stevenson (1815-1886) 
and an inquiry was subsequently held in Stockton. Great interest in 
both Bills was shown by the Gateshead Observer which in February and March 
devoted much space to the disputei principally that concerning the conservancy. 
The paper was generally antagonistic towards the SOR, noting that it 
was not "the state of the river that pinches the railway directors: - it 
is the withdrawal of coals from the Clarence staiths on the Tees to the 
West (Hartlepool) Docks, by which their lease of the Tees is not so good 
a bargain by, E3,000 or E4,000 per annum'19 and it pointed out that there 
was then a greater depth of water in the , river than ever before. . The 
paper was critical, of the SOR regarding its attempt to wrest the river's 
control from the TNC, but nevertheless commented: 
There can be no question that wiih the Tees, as with the Tyne 
- or indeed with an), other navigable river - it is most desirable 
that the management and improvement... ought to be entrusted 
to such a body of persons as shall most fairly, and fullyq 
and competently represent those interests whose protection 
and promotion depend upon the conservation and improvement 
of the whole navigable stream. 10 Ii 
It went on to note that relations between Stockton and the SOR left much 
to be desired and, perhaps forgetting that Stockton had taken over the 
role of Yarm on the Tees, continued by stating that the Redcar harbour 
project-orsq establishing a railway terminus "cannot be supposed to -feel 
any interest in... the improvement of the more inland stream of the Teesq 
which they - would never use, and which ... would be a competitor... with 
their own railway-"" 
The Redcar proposal brought into the discussions the Leeds and Thirsk 
Railway (L&TR) , approached the previous, year by the TNC. So important 
was the scheme thought to be that the L&TR called a special meeting to, 
discuss it, the Secretary then stating that "the formation of a deep water 
harbourý and accessible to ships of the largest burden in all states of 
,, 12 ' the tide, renders the project important. Itsaw the scheme as providing 
Perhaps conincidently, moves were madeat Hartlepool to improve the harbour there, resulting in 
the 1851 Act. 
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the only capacious low-water harbour on the east coast and that, coupled 
with the area's mineral wealth, the easy route to Leeds and the accessibility 
of the manufacturing districts to the west, led A to recommend that 
the harbour proposal be supported. The L&TR directors proposed that 
interest payments, should be guaranteed to a sum not exceeding E2,000 p. a. 
on the understanding that "the requisite capital is to be advanced by 
Government at a low rate , of interest , 
13 
and this suggestion was carried. 
Jackson, attending the meeting, rejected the proposal outright as "it 
would not be worth one shilling ... without an inner Harbour and Docks" 
#14 
and it would prove of much greater value to shipping and trade to provide 
a harbour of refuge at Hartlepool. With a dock there already,, a sum 
of one-tenth of the envisaged Redcar expenditure would prove adequate. 
The Leeds Northern Railway (LNR)* withdrew its support from the Redcar 
project - perhaps at Jackson's instigation - and at a meeting of the Hartlepool 
West Harbour and Dock Company (HWH&D) it was noted that the LNR was extending 
its lines to West Hartlepool, arrangements having been made "for the dccomm- 
odation of their passenger, merchandise and general traffic, which will 
succeed the opening ... of the remainder of their direct line from Leeds 
to West Hartlepool. , 15 
The Admiralty Inquiry into the Tees Conservancy Bill began in Middlesbrough 
on 10 March 1851 under WilliamlBald. The TNC was represented by -Scurfield 
Grey, the Middlesbrough Owners by Lockey Harle of Newcastle and the S&DR 
by its barrister, Edmund Plumer Price. Discussion centred on two ý main 
points: had the TNC served the river's users well and was the representation 
of the suggested commission satisfactory? The TNC was depicted by the promoters 
as being without money - as was the S&DR by the opposition - and without 
a resident engineer. ** That the river's depth had not been materially 
increased since the formation of the TNC was evidenced by James Johnston 
(d 1854), superintendent of works, who stated that recent soundings had 
#A dock was, in fact, included. 
Formerly the Leeds and Thirsk Railway; the name was changed in 1851. 
Brooks acted as consultant. 
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indicated only 2--2ft and A ins low-water depths in the north and South 
channels respectively; however Joseph Laing, active in the TNC, pointed 
out that the size of ship trading between London and the Tees had increased 
from 127 to 160 tons within a period of some 30' years and the real reason 
for the decline in trade was the recent opening of docks at West Hartlepool, 
not the state of the Tees; in fact steamboats were provided free of charge 
to tow colliers from the Tees to that port. 
It was recorded that ships of 100 tons were now trading in agricultural 
produce to Yarm and, considering only coal, the number of vessels using 
the river had risen between-1812 and 1850 from 452 to 3,550, the tonnage 
from 49,900 to 452,200 and the average tonnage from 95 to 128. The recent 
growth of Middlesbrough was referred to by William Fallows; * already 
there was' there an ironworks, 'a patent fuel manufactory, a chain-making 
works, three shipyards and a locomotive maker. He explained also that 
the SOR carried 75% of the coal shipped an the Tees a'nd pointed out "that why 
the parties on the Clarence side of the river were not 'free' was solely 
because they declined to come in on equal terms, as they were entitled 
to do, under the lease. , 
16 
The SOR's case was summed up by Price, pointing out that of the 
0 tons of coal shipped -from the river, 90, ' passed through Middlesbrough 
its population now some 10,000. The SOR "appeared in no spirit of hostility 
to the Tees Navigation Company a body of gentlemen who, however willing 
to perform their duties as conservators - were utterly unable to discharge 
them with justice to the town of Stockton; , 
17 
neither was it antagonistic 
towards the other Teesside towns. In his view the new commission proposed 
by the SOR would be much better fitted to undertake the task. In opposition, 
Grey suggested that the SOR was not likely to be at all interested in 
the upper river and its sole purpose in promoting the Bill was that "as 
much as E4,000 per year had been received by (the S&DR) ... but the trade 
had left ýort Clarence and it was to destroy and get rid of the lease 
* SOR shipping agent at Middlesbrough. 
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that the promoters of the Bill had brought them all to Middlesbrough that 
day. 11 
The most interested of the local newspapers was the Gateshead Observer 
which, noting that a preponderence of SOR members was suggested, quoted 
the recently-formed Tyne Improvement Commission as a satisfactorily con- 
stituted body. The paper did not regret the anticipated demise of the 
TNC; "they have done good service in their day ... but another and a different 
day has dawned, and demands another and a different form of government" 
19 
and it suggested that, as the Tyne had been taken from the hands of the 
Newcastle Corporationg so should the Tees be taken from the TNC. In 
an editorial, it noted that the Tyne, with coal shipments eight times 
as great as those of the Tees, nevertheless had no direct coal or rail 
interests among its members; they were all elected by the river's towns. 
In the views expressed, the editor, James Clephan (1804-1888) showed 
great knowledge and insight, writing later that the inclusion of coalowners 
or railway proprietors 
will find no favour with the Crown. The coal owners may pass 
away tomorrow; their mines may be exhausted, or their produce 
may be shipped elsewhere; we have seen such a revolution on 
the Tees within the space of the last four years; but, . -in 
all human probability, the towns that exist upon the banks 
of the navigable river will endure for centuries; and in the 
hands of their inhabitants the conservancy of the stream should 
be vested. 20. 
The paper's editor, . or perhaps 
its owner, Brockett, was blessed with the 
power of prophecy. With the coal trade declining and the ironstone deposits 
so recently discovered it is difficult to believe that his vision for 
Middlesbrough was otherwise: 
The town occupies an admirable situation for commerce; and 
the river... is naturally superior to the Clyde. All that 
the Tees requires is men - men like to those of Glasgow, who 
in little more than half a century have swelled an annual revenue 
of E170 into one of 00,000.... The people of Stockton and Middles- 
brough have only to will it, and it shall be done. They have 
before them one of the most improvable rivers in the world. 21 
The men attracted to Middlesbrough, the ironmasters, were to have a dramatic 
effect upon the town's development. 
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With West Hartlepool and the almost-completed L&TR viewed as a threat 
to the Tees a public meeting in Stockton resolved to join with the TNC 
in opposing the Conservancy Bill, at the same time ensuring 
, 
that Stockton 
would be fairly represented. 
22 As a result, the SOR agreed to amend 
the commission's constitution to include Stockton shipowners, the Clarence 
Railway, the S&DR, the TNC and the two towns. 
Bald reported his findings to the Admiralty. The TNC "had been 
animated with a true spirit to improve the river Tees Navigation" 
23 
and 
although it had at first taken sound professional advice, nevertheless 
it had not been as successful in improving the lower river as it had the 
upper. A total of E14,995 had been expended between 1808 and 1828 and 
E95,005 between 1828 and 1851 but the higher rate of expenditure had resulted 
only in the forming of groýnes, injurious to navigation. It-was 'now -ýIlari 'admitted 
Aphorism that all public navigable Rivers"'hould be placed Linder the 
jurisdiction of commissioners and he recommended that the Tees should 
be so treated. The quays at Stockton should be improved, a floating 
basin should be provided there, some 7,500 acres should be reclaimed from 
the sea and an asylum harbour of some 50 acres in area should be formed, 
paid for by government funds. He suggested, too, that the debt of E29,500 
which carried interest at 105a should be redeemed and 4/la stock substituted. 
Bald considered that the river was capable of improvement. A channel 
could be formed 15 to 1B ft deep at low water immediately up-river of 
the barl, 12 ft deep to Cargo Fleet and ten feet to Stockton but straight 
channels should be avoided, the aim being "to hold fast to that which 
exists in being good and useful, and to assist Nature by Works of Art. , 
25 
Bald thought the S&DR's interest in the lower river to be natural as it 
had 
. recently spent 
E160,000* on a wet dock. Paying the lease of the 
coal dues, the S&DR had earlier received Z4,716 p. a. from the Clarence 
Railway - their shipments then were similar - but its proportion of the 
dues had now been completely eliminated. The report included statistics 
In addition, coal waggons were capitalised at E90,000. 
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produced by witnesses, Fallows having stated that coal exports in 1850 
had totalled 318,000 tons coastwise and 60,000 tons foreign; goods exported 
amounted 'only to 68,000 tons. 
# It was also shown that there were ten 
staiths or drops in use in the Middlesbrough dock, six at Port Clarence, 
five at Stockton owned by the SOR and two there operated by the Clarence 
Railway; of, the total shipping using the river, 8050 traded to and from 
Middlesbrough. 
So comprehensive was Bald's report that the Admiralty recommended 
that it be laid before Parliament in its entirety, expressing the view 
that the down-river problems were due to the groynes built from 1831 onwards. 
They had "created more Mischief than Good, by impeding the Influx and 
Reflux of the Tide, and causing Eddies; so that longitudinal Guide Walls, 
as in the Clyde... have 'been found to be much preferable. , 
26 The Tees 
was seen to be in a backward and defective state, it was recommended that 
alterations be made to the river's management, the 'jurisdiction of any 
commission should extend to Yarm and the fact that the Bill's promoters 
had not sought finance for river improvements was deplored. Investigated 
by a House of Commons Committee, presumably greatly influenced. by Bald's 
comprehensive report, the Bill's preamble was found not proved but nevertheless 
the committee considered that a Bill was "absolutely required , 
27 for the 
conservancy of the river Tees and in 1851 Parliament confirmed this view. 
The Bill for the Victoria harbour had been withdrawn as its promoters 
did "not appear-to have subscribed, or proposed to subscribe any portion" 
28 
of the required capital. It had been criticised, too, as ostensibly 
being promoted as a harbour 'of refuge but in reality being for the export 
of coal, the first a public measure an-d the second private; the two uses 
were seen as incompatible. It was also suggested that if the Admiralty 
were minded to defer the project, the bay and estuary of the Tees should 
be surveyed; could not "the improvement of an entrance to the Tees ... be 
adopted at a less expense', ' and prove as advantageous as the proposed plan. "29 
# All register tonnage. 
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With some 89000 acres available the river itself could form an equally 
good refuge. Other than the S&DR, all parties shunned the Redcar proposal; 
had it been adopted, both Stockton and Middlesbrough might have suffered. 
When conducting the Inquiry into the S&DR proposals Bald had agreed, 
perhaps unprofessionally, to inspect and report upon works undertaken 
by the TNC downstream of, Cargo Fleet, where groynes had been formed under 
the direction of Brooks. Bald recommended their removal and suggested 
that, instead, longitudinal banks should be built parallel to the river. 
The groynes had decreased the depth of water available and he strongly 
criticised the TNC for expecting such devices to work satisfactorily where 
the river was so wide; . at 3,300 ft it was 
three times wider than the 
Thames at Waterloo Bridge. 
30 Armed with a report from Bald and with 
Parliamentary encouragement I 
the TNC 
-decided 
in June 1851 to promote its 
own Bill in the forthcoming Session. 
31 The Bill sought approval for 
the river's improvement, a basin at Stockton and river dredging and re- 
alignment for easier access to both Stockton and Middlesbrough. -dock. 
Additionallyý and the converse, of the proposal for a harbour of refuge, 
it was intended "to embank in 7 or 8 thousand acres from the Sea , 
32 
and 
to reclaim the land. 
The deposited plans were prepared by Bald and showed a 20 acre dock* 
formed at Stockton by - cutting off 
the sharp bend in the river by means 
of a new channel, itself with wharfs. With a locked entrance at its 
lower end it would contain the existing quays at Stockton and -the I 
S&DR 
staiths. 
33 A breakwater, one mile in l, ength was proppsed at_ the North 
Gare, the river's mouth. The TNC's Bill favoured Stockton more than 
had done the S&DRIs proposals: . 
the river was to be rendered more easily 
navigable; Stockton was to be provided with a dock at public, expense; 
its representation on the commission was to be greatly enhanced. 
In January 1852, a public meeting in Stockton was reminded that Bald 
had suggested that, like the Tyne, the full tidal length of the river should 
Brooks had suggested a dock at Stockton in 1805 (NYCRO: QDP 51) 
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be within the jurisdiction of the commission and those attending were 
informed that the Bill's clauses concerning representation were likely 
to be disputed as they provided for five Stockton members, with three 
from Middlesbrough and two from Yarm. What was unusual was the fact 
that the Stockton dock was to be the responsibility of only the Stockton 
members. Bald, attending the meeting, envisaged a prosperous future 
34 for the river, but only if it 'could be improved. At a similar meeting 
in Middlesbrough the proposals were not so well regarded. Boldcow - 
in the chair - was unhappy that Yarm would be so well represented and 
he thought that Middlesbrough should at least have "perfect equality with 
,, 35 Stockton; the dock should be the responsibility of the whole commission. 
Naturally, Yarm favoured the plan. 
Although a Commons Committee had recommended that the Tees be the 
subject of a conservancy, the passage of the Bill through Parliament was 
not uneventful and it was in May 1852 brought before a Select Committee 
of the House of Commons. Petitions against it had been presented by 
the SOR, the colliery owners and lessees, Middlesbrough Improvement Commissioners, 
the merchants of Middlesbrough, the S&HR, the Clarence Railway and the 
merchants of Stockton. Much of the evidence was similar to that submitted 
the previous year but Joseph Laing commented that the Tees traffic had 
declined since the previous hearing and whereas Port Clarence had formerly 
contributed half the river dues levied under the lease, this income had 
ended as some 40/`0 of thecoal trade had been transferred to West Hartlepool; * 
there was now taking place an increase in trade "in consequence of the 
iron ore largely found in the Yorkshire hills and being imported extensively'. 
' 36 
Differences in the trading patterns of Stockton and Middlesbrough were 
revealed. In 1851 Stockton, had dealt with 94,186 tons of shipping, inwards 
and outwards, while for Middlesbrough the figure was 334,670 tons; in 
terms of value, however, cargoes handled in Stockton totalled El m and 
in Middlesbrough E245,000. Stockton imports amounted to E660,000 while 
The, Durham Advertizer, 3 October 1851, noted that coal shipments from West Hartlepool had risen 
over the past four years from 133,000 to 579,000 tons p. a, greater than the coal exports from the 
river Tees. 214 
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the Middlesbrough figure was a mere 03,000. 
Following the Select Committee hearing the Admiralty requested that 
provision be made for a breakwater at the river's mouthý should it be 
considered necessary. Changes were also made regarding finance and with 
these amendements the, Act was granted Royal Assent in June. 
37 It defined 
the constitution of the commission, with Stockton and Middlesbrough electing 
five members each, compared with two from Yarm; the Admiralty was to 
nominate three members. In tabular form the several proposals made for 
the membership of the commission are as follows: 
I 
S&DR (1) SOR (2) TNC (1) TNC (2) 
(MIbro) 
TCC 
Act 
Stockton 7 4 (+4) 5 4 5 
Middlesbrough 7 4 3 4 5 
Yarm - - 2 1 2 
Admiralty 4 2 3 3 3 
SOR 10 4 - 
TNC - 4 
Clarence R - 2 
28 24 15 12 15 
Noting that the TNC had exceeded its borrowing powers, the Act sanctioned 
the issue of stock to recompense the TNC shareholders and further authorised 
the borrowing by mortgage of L207,000 for the Tees Conservancy Fund and 
E80,000 for the Stockton Dock. Soon after the Act had been passed, however, 
Stockton became dissatisfied with the provisions regarding the dock. 
It was agreed to mortgage its prospective dues and also a 1/- in the pound 
rate on town property for the sum of 00,000, so bringing its control into 
38 
the town's hands . but a Parliamentary Bill to sanction this arrangement 
was rejected by a committee of the House of Commons, in spite of the TCC 
having petitioned in favour of it. The jurisdiction of the Tees Conservancy 
Commission (TCC) was to extend over the tidal reach of the river, to some 
three miles upstream of Yarm. 
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5.5 River Blyth 
The opening of new collieries in the vicinity of Blyth brought to 
the town the promise of an increased prosperity; conversely, the recently 
formed Tyne Improvement Commission, with the certainty of its ýmaking marked 
improvements to that river, posed a threat to the port of Blyth, in effect 
in private hands. On the Tyne, proposals had been made from IB45 onwards 
for the construction of docks to serve the steam coal, area between Tyne 
and Blyth and in 1848 the owners of collieries at Cowpen, Blyth, Bedlington 
and Netherton had asked for shipping facilities on the Tyne as Blyth was 
used by them only at considerable expense and inconvenience. 
' So real 
was the threat of trade, being diverted to the Tyne that a meeting of those 
interested in the commerce of the port was held in April 1852 when a resolution 
was passed in favour of forming a company to build a dock on the river. 
2 
At a later meeting, in December 1853, it was stated that the town would 
benefit should the harbour be improved and a provisional committee was 
formed to oversee the establishment of a company; the chairman was Matthew 
White Ridley (1778-1864). 
The provisional committee included several local coal-owners of whom 
five were directors of the Blyth and Tyne Railway (B&TR), then recently 
incorporated. The engineer for the proposed company was James Abernethy 
and his. views on the suitability of' the port made up aýsignificant part 
of the prospectus. Abernethy saw the harbour as having"great natural 
advantages over others in the 'North-East, largely on accou I nt of its being 
sheltered on the east side by the rock outcrop and the North Dyke. He 
estimated that his proposals for a seven acre half-tide basin and a 19 
acre dock, * together with breakwaters and jetties, would cost Z150,000 
and enable ships of up to 1,500 tons burthen to use the harbour, 22 ft 
deep at high tide. 
3 
The prospectus noted that vessels trading from the port were of only 
moderate size and such was 'the state of the harbour that it was often 
See Map 5 
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necessary to load by keels; as a result, coal mined in the Blyth area 
was often transported to the Tyne for shipment, involving higher rail 
transport costs for the additional ten miles. The prospectus anticipated, 
optimistically, that -. m tons of coal would be shippe'd through the port, 
so bringing to the shareholders a return of E12,421, or 8%. The involvement 
of Ridley in the company was to be not inconsiderable; he, as the area's 
principal landowner, was to give "absolutely to the Company the land required 
for the docks... agreeing to grant all reasonable facilities for the undertaking 
as circumstances arise... (and) support it to the extent of Z10,000... "4 
The anticipated profits were calculated -on coal alone but there would 
be other revenue from general shipping dues and from ship building and 
repairing. 
5 Parliamentary powers were duly sought and plans for the works depositedg 
delineating two docks with a graving dock opening from the half-tide basin. 
The dock complex, with its' associated rail link, was to be located to 
the south of the town, its entrance close to the sea, and partially on 
the area over which Rennie had proposed the building of groynes. The 
river's mouth was to be protected by a new eastern breakwater and a half- 
tide western breakwater. The projected , railways included a line to the 
harbour at Hartley and one from Cramlington to Blyth, 'but problems arose 
regarding their provision in that agreement could not be reached with 
Lord Hastings, owner of Hartley; their provision was abandoned. The 
press commented that the proposals would prove of great benefit to the 
town, now with a population of c 7,000, and the fact that a new refuge 
for shipping was to be provided was applauded; ' there was a notable lack 
of such facilities on the north-east coast although planned works on the 
Tyne and at Warkworth would improve the situation considerably. 
6 So 
uncontroversial were the powers sought by the new company that a local 
inquiry was considered unnecessary and seemingly without the Bill having 
been discussed by Parliamentary &ommittee7 it was accorded the Royal Assent 
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in July 1854. The Act named only Ridley as a director but he was enabled 
to nominate a further director and) unlike the others, his office was 
not conditional upon his holding shares . The Act 
B 
obtained by the Blyth 
Harbour and the Dock Company authorised the raising of L150,000 and a 
time of completion of five years. * Powers for a, railway to the dock 
were not sanctioned but the new company was granted jurisdiction of the 
river Blyth upstream to Bucks Hill Mill, the tidal limit. 
5.6 Summary 
Between 1831 and 1851 the population of Durham County had risen at 
an annual compound rate of 2.49% p. a., twice that of Northumberland. 
Of the region's several ports, those on the Durham coastline were expanding 
much faster, the extreme being the c 20% p. a. reached by Seaham Harbour; 
in adjoining Yorkshire Middlesbrough achieved the same increase. With 
Sunderland, the Northumberland ports showed a rate of increase higher 
than that of the county' as a whole but nevertheless they were seriously 
outpaced in population,, as they were in trade, by those on the Durham 
coast. 
The differences between the old-established northern ports and those 
further south had been brought about by the expansion of Durham coal output, the, 
abilities of men such as Tennant, Londonderry, Jackson and the Pease family 
and the introduction of the public Parliamentary railway. Success had 
principally been due to the enterprise of the Durham coal industry, as 
opposed to the inactive oligarchy controlling the Tyne, the cumbersome 
commission of the Wear and the shortage of capital at Blyth. 
It was the success of the Durham ports and especially the incorporation 
of the Sunderland Dock Company which spurred the towns of North and South 
Shields to seek the establishment of a controlling body to improve the 
Tyne and , so attract trade. Changes in shipbuilding technology, although 
only on a small scale, had brought about the use of iron for ships' hulls 
and the adoption of steam power for propulsion; shipbuilding was seen 
* The Bill had sought a seven year period. 
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as, a trade which would require improved river facilities as, already, 
ships built in the region were generally of a tonnage greater than those 
trading from it. The move for 
_a, 
Tyne commission was also stimulated 
to a great extent by the financial- mis-management of the river by the 
Newcastle Corporation and it is not surprising that Washington's report 
of 1849 was critical of Newcastle. The eventual representation of the 
commission was fair: the membership suggested by the Shields Conservancy 
Bill was weighted unfairly against Newcastle, the premier town; the Navigation 
Bill's suggestions sought extremely unequal representation, to Newcastle's 
benefit. The compromise arrangement acknowledged the supremacy of Newcastle 
but deprived it of an overall majority. 
Like the Tyne, the government of the river Tees came to change, its 
inter-community struggle in the guise of a dispute between the TNC and 
the S&DR, exacerbated by the diversion of trade to West Hartlepool. 
For some years relations between the TNC and SOR had been um, @sy, the 
railway company responsible for the removal down-river of its coaling 
staiths, and the establishment of the town of Middlesbrough itself. Within 
months of the formation of the TIC the SOR promoted two Billsý one 
to reform the conservancy of the Tees and the other to provide even further 
down-river, at Redcar, extensive shipping facilities and docks, Due to 
competition from Hartlepool the trade of the Tees was beginning to decline 
and the measures put forward by the SOR were seen as providing alternative 
methods for its stimulation: one Bill would improve the river; the other 
would by-pass it. The Redcar Bill was abandoned and the Conservancy 
Bill defeated. In 'rejecting it Parliament stressed the necessity for 
such a body and to avoid the risk of further battle, the TNC - as Newcastle 
had done earlier - sought its own conservancy Bill, perhaps the outcome 
hoped for by the S&DR. The TCC was established in 1852 with jurisdiction 
over the river's tidal length. The constitution of the TCC like that 
of the TIC, had been the subject of much discussion but the final outcome 
j 
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North East Ports: Population 1811-1851* 
1811 1831 1851 Increase 1831-51 
0, /o p. a. (compound) 
Amble 155 247 1040 2.45 
Blyth 2861 4125 6976 2.66 
Newcastle 33723 54991 89156 2.44 
Gateshead 8782 15177 24805 2.48 
North Shields 19042 22778 30524 1.47 
South Shields 20068 24427 35790 1.93 
Others 10847 17547 23795 1.53 
Tyne total 92462 134920 204070 2.09 
Sunderland 27346 42664 70576 2.54 
Seaham and 
Seaham Harbour 121 1152 4267 19 
Hartlepool 1047 1330 9503 10.3 
West Hartlepool 350 381 4008 12.5 
Hartlepools total 1397 1711 13511 10.9 
Stockton 4229 7763 10172 1.4 
Yarm 1431 1636 1647 - Middlesbrough 35 154 7631 22 
Tees total 5695 9553 19450 3.6 
Northumberland IB3269 236959 303568 1.25 
Durham County 165293 239256 390997 2.49 
* See Census of Population, 1851 
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was realistic. As on the Tyne, Admiralty nominations were included although 
a major difference between the two bodies was the legislation for a dock 
at Stockton, its operation envisaged as being the responsibility of only 
the Stockton members; fortunately its provision was abandoned as it was 
a situation which could have led to continuing internal unrest. 
The next of the region's ports to undergo change was Blyth, concerned 
that the newly-formed TIC would adversely. affect its trade. To enable 
capital to be raised, a new company was formed under the aegis of Ridley. 
Seeking capital of E150,000 its enabling Act, passed in 1854, provided 
for the improvement of the river to enable ships of 1,500 tons to use 
it, the building of breakwaters and the forming of a dock. The granting 
of the Act brought about no conflict. 
The provision of docks had been the subject of much discussion in 
the North-East. At Seaham, the Hartlepools and at Middlesbrough, as 
at Sunderland, they had been financed privately. The Tyne's earlier 
conservators had never sought powers for such work and the RWC considered 
that, its responsibilities were restricted solely to river improvements. 
By 1859, however, two docks had been built on the Tyne, one was planned 
at Blyth, 'extensions had been considered at Seaham Harbour and additional 
dock space had been provided at the Hartlepools. To compete with other 
ports the SDC- would seem to have maintained its charges at too low a level, 
and by 1859 was financially strained, ironical in that it was the SDC 
which had revived the Wear coal trade. The dock company sought an arrangement 
with the RWC on the basis that the dock, with its own outlet to the sea, 
provided a better exit than did the river and hence recompense should 
be made to the SDC. Opposed by Lady Londonderry, the three-cornered 
dispute led to the RWC itself promoting a Bill for the amalgamation of 
the two bodies, a surprising volte-face from its previously held view. 
The Act which resulted gave to the RWC the complete control of the river. 
By 1860 the transformation of the pattern of government of the rivers 
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of the North-East was complete and was to survive almost unchanged* up 
to, and beyond, 1914. Change had also been brought to the region's railways, 
the process of continuous amalgamation culminating in IB54 with the formation 
of the NER. The final amalgamation involving the YNOR, the LNR and 
the York and North Midland Railway had been brought about by the invasion 
of the North-East by the LNR which sought port facilities, first at Redcar 
and then at West Hartlepool. The threat of LNR co-operation, first, 
with the SOR and then with Jackson brought the YNOR to seek amalgamation 
with it. At first not possessing monopolistic powers the NER competed, 
in part, with the SOR and with the WHH&R but by 1865 both of these railways 
were to fall into its hands, so forming a monopoly not enjoyed by any 
other railway company in Britain. With the reformed ports it was to 
be a major force in the economy of the North-East. 
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6. PORT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
THE NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY, 1854-1885. 
6.1 Introduction. 
The four factors which most influenced the further development of 
the region's ports during the 30-year period which began in 1854 were 
the reorganisation of river government - already noted - the formation 
of the North Eastern Railway (NER) the exploitation of the Cleveland 
iron ore deposits and the changes 'brought to shipping by the adoption 
of iron for hull construct'-ion and of steam for propulsion. 
Within a ten-year period the Tyne, Wear and Tees, in 1855 their combined 
throughput of coal amounting to 691,10 of the region's shipments, came to 
be governed by commissions representing riparian and trading interests; 
Blyth and the Hartlepools were in the hands of companies; and Amble and 
Seaham, together accounting for 105'0 of the shipments were, in effect, 
privately owned. Such were the advantages of unified control which accrued 
to the commissions that their share of coal shipments rose from 69 to 
B40%) by 1885, mainly'at the, expense of Seaham and the Hartlepools. Ostensibly, 
the reason was simple. Unified control, however internally convoluted, 
enabled greater expenditure on improvements to take place, in turn generatinq 
higher revenue resulting from the improved facilities provided. 
This simple view was however, complicated by the 
_. 
development of the 
region's railways. Under the influence of George Hudson, 'railways had 
been promoted and, from 1844, amalgamated but it was not until 1854 that 
the principal change was made, the formation of the NER, its constituent 
members being the York, Newcastle and Berwick, the Leeds Northern 
(LNR) 
and the York and North Midland companies. Of the two last- named, only 
the LNR had earlier sought a foothold in the region, seeking to reach 
Newcastle but being able to establish itself only as far north as Hartlepool. 
The formation of the NER had not been without acrimony in the North-East, 
not least at Stockton which had hoped to become the principal port of 
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the LNR but now envisaged that role falling to Hartlepool. The fact 
that the NER served Hull was also to be the cause of much dissent, especially 
in Newcastle, anxious lest its natural trade would be diverted to the 
Humber. 
In its establishment, the NER was given a dominant position in its 
area but not a territorial monopoly 
I in that the Stockton and Darlington 
Railway (S&DR), the West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway (WHH&R) and the 
Blyth and Tyne Railway (B&TR) remained independent although not all were 
competing directly with it. Nevertheless the NER was able to transport 
coal to all ports of the region, excluding Seaham and the Tees, a corollary 
of this being the fact that it became possible for it to adjust its rates 
so as to encourage the use of specific outlets, the principal 'one being 
the Tyne Dock at Jarrowq the first major work of the new company. The 
increasing use of this dock was. to distort somewhat the pattern of coal 
shipments from the region. After 1854 attempts were made by other companies 
to break into the region but by its later amalgamations the NER was to 
become, by 1866, "the most complete monopoly in the United Kingdom', 
2 
and 
by 1870 it extended to 1278 route miles; in 1854 the comparable figure 
had been 720.3 The NER did not abuse its monopolistic powers although 
"the only type of competition which (it) not only permitted but actually 
fostered at every opportunity was that between its cities, ports and other 
,, 4 industrial centres and it is perhaps a measure of its success that most 
ports came to criticise the NER for favouring others. 
Interlinked with port development and with the NER was the iron industry 
of the Tees with its working of the Cleveland ores, a phenomenon which 
led to a rapid increase there in railway construction, not only to facilitate 
local transportation but also the trans-Pennine carriage of ores and fUels. 
It was this upsurge in the sourthern part of the region which led the 
NER to absorb both the SOR and WHH&R, and similarly, to prevent the incursion 
of outside companies, for example the Newcastle and Carlisle Railway. 
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The iron trade transformed the nature of the Tees from a coal-exporting 
river to a centre drawing to it, principally by rail, the raw materials 
necessary for the manufacture of iron and as a result the shipment of 
coal from the Tees and the Hartlepools was to fall in absolute terms, 
the only ports where this was to, occur. 
The iron industry on Teesside, which by 1885 was producing more than 
2m tons of pig iron per annum led also to an expansion in the engineering 
and ship-building industries, able to use locally-made materials. Ship- 
building in iron led to ships of greater tonnage being built on the region's 
rivers, their use of steam propulsion expanding the area's engine works. 
The technology available was such that the ships built in the region were 
of a significantly greater tonnage than were those trading to the North- 
East, a phenomenon due initially to the restricted facilities of the ports 
into which the'coastal colliers traded, rather than a measure of the capabilities 
of the rivers of the North-East. * 
; The increasing size of the ships using the north-east ports led to 
constant improvements becoming necessary, principally the deepening and 
straightening of the rivers' channels to enable shipping to reach up-river 
towns and staiths and for newly-built ships to gain the sea. To a certain 
extent, the contemporary view of river improvement was confused with dock 
construction. 
In December 1853 the imports of coal into London from the north-east ports were as follows: 
Port of Departure Tons No: UfShips T/Ship 
Tyne 137,000 428 320 
Wear 65,000 213 305 
Seaham Harbour 21,000 95 221 
Hartlepools 64,000 235 272 
Tees 13,000 54 240 
Blyth 4,000 19 210 
Ref; Coal Market: Monthly Importation of Coal, Coke and Cinders, December 1853 (OCRo: D/Lo/B331) 
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Prior to the advent of iron screw colliers the need for dock accommod--tion 
was vital, first to enlarge the area of water available for loading and 
mooring, second to protect the comparatively small vessels and third, 
to permit them to load without grounding, liable to cause damage. As 
ship dimensions increased, protection became less necessary and the maintenance 
of constant water levels in docks less vital. Increasing size led to 
fewer vessels and to less congestion while improvements in coal-handling 
facilities brought about the 'more rapid turn-around of shipping, again 
reducing the numbers of vessels in port. To deal with ships of greater 
tonnage three solutions presented themselves: the deepening of the docks 
in use, with expensive alterations to their entrances; the 'construction 
of new docks able to accept bigger ships; and the provision of hig'. -I-C2paCity 
loading equipment at deep-water river berths. All three options came 
to be adopted, although on the north-east coast the necessity for providing 
dock accommodation was marginal, even in 1850. With a mean tidal range 
of only some 12 to 15 ft - in South'Wales the range was doubled 
5_ 
problems 
regarding the loading of ships were not -insuperab I le; the greatest benefits 
came from the increased water surface made available. 
The principal need was for dredging in the rivers and it was the 
development and perfection of efficient dredging plant which made possible 
the vast improvement which ensued. On the Tyne, dredging was on an enormous 
scale, on the other rivers less so, but it was the increase, by dredging, 
of the rivers, ' tidal capacities which was both to deepen the channels 
and to remove the bars from the entrances, themselves greatly improvedy 
especially those of the rivers Tyne and Tees, by the construction of protecting 
piers, expensive but of great value both in affording protection and in 
reducing wave action. 
In spite of the move towards port management by bigger authorities 
the role of the individual remained important. The Londonderry and Ridley 
families exercised their powers at Seaham and Blyth, the Dukes of Northumber- 
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land an the Tyne. On Tyne, Tees and Wear, prominent industrialists brought 
their influence, partisan at times, to bear in the deliberations of the 
commissions while the NER, on a broader basis, was served by men who represented 
all of the region's industries and areas. Of the engineers involved, 
all ports continued to seek the services of prominent consultants while 
the Tyne and Wear commissioners employed full-time engineers of calibre, 
the other ports, men of perhaps lesser ability. Pre-eminent in the area 
was the engineer of the NER, Thomas Elliot Harrison, his opinions respected 
and his advice widely sought. Employers and engineers alike were to 
undertake in this period the greatest of the region's port improvementsq 
changes which were to re-establish the supremacy of the Tyne and, in conjunction 
with the new iron trade, establish the Tees as a major river. In no 
small measure it was N. ER' poýlicy which was to bring c. hange. 
6.2 River Tyne. 
The Tyne Improvement Commission (TIC) had been established in 1B50, 
its membership comprising representatives of the four principal towns 
on the river with, in addition, four life commissioners, two representing 
the interests of each of the two factions which had fought so bitterly 
in the Parliamentary contest. The enabling Act 
1 had provided the towns 
of North and South Shields with a voice in the management of the river 
while, at the Same time, giving Newcastle "an important if restricted 
,, 2 authority over the river it had so long controlled It legislated, 
too, for the collection of dues, stipulated that the TIC was to be responsible 
for dredging and ballast disposal and provided protection to the Duke 
of Northumberland, Trinity House and the Dean and Chapter of Durham, all 
previously involved in the river's management. Wisely, it did not authorise 
any river works or improvements; they were to be left to the commissioners 
appointed. 
In its first year of office the TIC would seem to have faced problems 
similar to those of the Newcastle Corporation, principally encroachments 
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and complaints by the owners of staiths as to the river's condition. 
It was also hampered by a lack of funds. 'At its formation the TIC appointed 
as its Clerk John Clayton, Town Clerk to Newcastle, and as its Engineer 
William Alexander Brooks, formerly employed by the Corporation. To give 
an opinion on the river the TIC sought the services of James Meadows Rendel 
and he and Brooks each, in 1851, submitted reports. 
3 In principle similar, 
they differed in detail, mainly in Brooks's advocacy of the use of trans- 
verse jetties, used by him earlier on the Tees. 
Rendel 's report began by drawing the attention of the commissioners 
to 
the development of the railway system, and its tendency to 
encroach on that important branch of the shipping interest 
engaged in the coasting trade. Further, that the competition 
thus commenced is giving rise to a struggle amongst the several 
ports in your neighbourhood, not only to meet the new and 
common rival, but also with each other for supremacy. 
Many who have directed their attention to these questions, 
hold that the result will be a great increase in the size 
of vessels used in the coasting trade, and its concentration 
in those ports which can be made to offer the greatest facilities 
for the largest class of such vessels. I so far adopt these 
views myself, that I should not be prepared to recommend any 
large expenditure on the Tyne, if I did not consider its natural 
advantages such as, with suitable works, would insure its 
superiority over all the neighbouring ports, in regard to 
depth of water, ease of access, extent of harbour room, and 
length of inland navigation. 4 
To attain his objectives Rendel sought a minimum depth of water on the 
bar of ten feet with a channel seven feet deep to the principal shipping 
places at Hayhole, navigation being improved by the removal of all promontaries 
projecting into the river. The river itself should be restrained by 
training walls, its channel deepened and its mouth protected by piers. 
Rendel recommended that the bridge at Newcastle be replaced by a swing 
bridge, with two 45 ft wide openings, so making feasible the improvement 
-ortuous to of the river above Newcastle, where the river's 'course was t 
the extent of being analagous to the Tees prior to its earlier improvement. 
Like Rendel, Brooks advocated the removal of the Newcastle bridge 
but envisaged its replacement as a fixed structure with spans similar 
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to those of the railway bridge but he differed in wishing to retain the 
projecting points; without them the river's depth would be reduced. 
5 
The reports* brought Rendel and Brooks into immediate conflict, Brooks 
informing the commissioners that the idea of a dock at Hayhole had been 
originated by him although in 1845 he had concluded that the Low Lights 
would be a better site. # Rendel took issue with Brooks in the latters's 
temerity in proposing to amend his plans, writing that "it would be incon- 
sistent with the economy of the river to adopt any of the alterations 
he propose s,, 
6. He was critical of Brooks's pier proposals as being too 
ambitious for the commission's funds and, similarly , criticised his complicated 
entrance to Hayhole dock. The involvement of Rendel in the matter of 
the dock had been brought about as a result of a deputation of shippers, 
and the Duke of Northumberland (1792-1865), meeting the commissioners 
regarding improvements to coaling facilities. The TIC was not willing 
to provide staiths - these the Duke could build "as his own adventure ,7 
- but it was willing to form a dock and it was on this basis that it was 
agreed to seek Parliamentary powers for its construction. The decision 
to form the dock was, in effect, forced upon the TIC by the groynes built 
into the river by Brooks; one of them, 330 ft long, had caused silting 
atý the Hayhole staiths and the owners pressed the TIC to extend the staiths 
into deeper water at a cost of E64,000. The TIC, as the inheritor of 
the Corporation's liabilities, found its only escape 'in the formation 
of a dock, financed by borrowing and likely to bring future income' to 
The proposals of Rendel and Brooks may be summarised as follows: 
Rendel: - Brooks: - 
Use training walls, remove all projecting Use groynes to train river. 
points in river. Maintain projecting points. 
Inner piers 1,400 and 1,200 ft Piers 2,244 and 4,290 ft long 
Outer piers 2,450 and 1,320 ft. Total cost E213,000, including 
Half-tide dock at Hayhole, IS ft water E169,000 for piers. 
Total cost E570,000, including E359,000 Hayhole Dock to be full-tide with 
for Hayhole dock. basin and lock. 
# Brooks's earlier report was dated 9 October 1845. 
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the commission 
8, for the TIC a satisfactory outcome. 
The commissioners agreed in 1851 to include the formation of protective 
piers in the Bill presented to Parliament and to seek Government funding 
for their building, looking upon- the formation of a harbour of refuge 
as a national responsibility. The views of Brooks were accepted by the 
commissioners in respect of the piers, the deposited plans showing two 
straight piers at the river's mouth, some 2,000 and 4,000 ft, long respectively; 
9 
the Hayhole dock, now officially the Northumberland Dock, was , shown with 
entrance lock and basin at its eastern end. As passed, the Act 
10 
provided 
for both dock and piers to be completed within seven years, the former 
without impeding the use of the coal staiths, and stipulated that no works 
were to project into the river beyond Rennie's line of, 1813. Funds totalling 
E150,000 were granted for the dock and L180,000 for the piers; the Act 
provided also for river channel improvements. For the sake of clarity, 
each of these three major items will be discussed in turn, prior to a 
return to general matters. 
*** 
6.2.1 River Channel Improvements. 
The need for improvements to the river's navigable channel was acute. 
In his report of 1848 Washington had noted that up to 300 ships had arrived 
in or cleared the river on a single tide while the harbour at Shields, 
146 acres at low tide, had in 1847 held no fewer than 778 ships, 
11 
perhaps 
half the total in the river. Under its 1850 Act responsible for dredging 
and ballast disposal, the TIC in 1852 became responsible also for river 
moorings. Such was the congestion in the river that ships were forced 
to lie in the tideway in tiers of perhaps six or eight and more safely 
to effect their mooring the commissioners agreed to install screw moorings. * 
Soon after the formation of the TIC9 friction became apparent between 
certain of the commissioners and Brooks, censured for allowing the staiths 
of the John Bowes partnership at Jarrow to be built without consent. 
*Patented in 1833 by Alexander Mitchell (1780-1868) 
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Since the passing of the 1852 Act the TIC had split into two factions, " 
the Newcastle representatives favouring the proposals of Brooks and the 
Shields members supporting Rendel. 
12 In 1854, however, six of the commissioners 
wrote to the Admiralty, ostensibly to prevent the passing of the NER's 
. Bill 
for a dock at Jarrow, but in reality to criticise severely the operations 
of the TIC: the river had been narrowed without being deepened; encroachments 
had been permitted; the depth had deteriorated; dredging had cost three 
times as much as at Sunderland; and ballast continued to be deposited 
in the river. The dissident commissioners, all Shields representatives, 
deplored "the unsound and ruinous system of engineering which has been 
practised" 
13 
and drew the attention of the Admiralty to the disastrous 
effect which would result from the construction of the NER dock, depriving 
the river of a considerable storage capacity and henceforth reducing its 
scouring capabilities. Not only, they maintained, had the river, been 
neglected, it had been ruined by injudicious systems of improvement. - 
These allegations were refuted in a letter to the Admiralty from 
Joseph Cowen, since 1853 chairman of the TIC, who ascribed 'the motives 
of the dissidents asbeing simply the prevention of the dock's construction 
and he pointed out that the dock, now sanctioned, would, "in the opinion 
of the most eminent engineers ... benefit the navigation of the river". 
14 
Cowe, n's statements were, in turn, refuted by the minority party of the 
TIC which memorialised the Admiralty in an effort to rectify matters; 
15 "the importance of the crisis demands the fullest inquiry" . A' Royal 
Commission ensued with Brunel one of its five members. 
As had happened earlier, evidence was conflicting and contradictory. 
In its report the Commission was ambivalentýascribing some of the apparent 
improvements to steam navigation but nevertheless it was concluded "that 
very little change has upon the whole taken place during the period of 
upwards of 40 years in the actual navigable capabilities of the river. , 
16 
The principle of the piers was approved, as was the formation of full- 
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tide river walls, virtually as proposed by Rennie in' IB13; the use of 
groynes was not recommended; the removal of the several natural projections 
into the river should be undertaken in conjunction with training walls. 
The report concluded with the hope 
that the, differences and disputes which have hitherto prevailed 
in the Tyne Improvement Commission, and so much interfered 
with its usefulness, may from henceforth cease to exist; that 
all its members may be induced to believe that the interests 
and prosperity of Newcastle and Shields are identical and inseparable, 
and to bury in oblivion those local jealousies and animosities 
which can only prejudice the community to which they belong-17 
Guthrie, writing in 1880, recorded that after 1855 "a determination to 
effect some real and practical improvement of the river began unmistakably 
to display itself"18 but he expressed regret that Brooks did not command 
universal repect amongst the commissioners, this animosity having in part 
led toJames Walker and John Plews having been appointed as engineers for 
the pier and dock works respectively. In 1856 Brooks was again censured 
by the commissioners, who stipulated that his employment was to be full- 
time, and in 1858 matters came to a head, Brooks then having complained 
to the members that if their resources were "to be devoted nearly altogether 
to Shields Harbour and Northumberland Dock the trade to Newcastle must 
submit to the present inconvenience". 
19 Stung by his comments -a riposte 
was made that his groynes were to the"amusement of scientific -men who 
,, 20 21 saw them the commissioners unanimously dispensed with his services . 
No' reasons were officially expressed but Brooks subsequently wrote to 
the TIC on its decision, "injurious to me as a professional man". 
22 
He was replaced by John Francis Ure (1820-lB80) of Glasgow who, had given 
evidence to the Royal Commission of'1855. 
Within a year of his appointment Ure produced a report on the improvement 
of the river's channel. He propounded the view that dredging "on a very 
extensive scale ... is the only means by which the improvements ... can be 
attained , 
23 
and, rightly, he proposed to dredge initially only to the entrance 
of the two recently-completed docksq providing a channel with a depth 
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of some 15 ft at low water. He suggested that the work be undertaken 
by a new machine which, with the necessary hoppers, would involve expenditure 
of E40,000, would cost L8,000 p. a. to operate and would work at a rate 
of Im tons p. a. The commissioners reduced the scale of the plant suggested 
by Ure - the dredger was to have two rows of buckets instead of four 
24 
- and the vessel was ordered in 1860 by which time another report had 
been prepared on the more general improvement of the river. 
Ure began his report by noting that coal shipments had increased 
three-fold since 1800 and no river, other than the Thames and Mersey, carried 
a greater tonnage than did the, Tyne. Aware of the TIC's plans to improve 
the river above Newcastle, Ure commented on the fact that c Im tons 
of goods passed under the bridge, compared with the 4m tons, of coal shipped 
from the river. He divided the river into sections, from sea to-docks, 
from docks to Newcastle and above Newcastle. He proposed river depths 
from these lengths of 29,26 and 23 ft respectively, at spring tidest the 
corresponding low-water depths being 15,12 and 10 ft. He recommended 
the removal of the projecting natural points and, having analysed the 
dimensions of the ships using the river, reiterated his views on the importance 
of dredging, "a greatly improved navigation can be accomplished and maintained 
by no other means. , 
25 Ure's analysis of ships arriving at ýNewcastle 
showed, surprisingly, that their average draught had changed little over 
a period of 12 years, proof to him that the river's improvement had been 
minimal. The bridge at Newcastle was found by Ure to be a severe problem 
and he recommended that- it be replaced by a high-level suspension bridge; 
if this were not possible, an opening two-span low-level bridge should 
be provided, together with a similar structure replacing the timber railway 
bridge at Scotswood. The costs of undertaking the improvements of the 
three sections were put at E120,000, E369,000 and E384,000 respectively 
but, nevertheless, trade and commerce would so increase that revenue must 
greatly outweigh expenditure. 
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Ure's proposals were accepted by the commissioners, their adoption moved 
by James Cochrane Stevenson (1825-1905), one of the earlier dissident 
members, but opposed by the representatives of South Shields, wishing 
to restrict development only as far up-river as the docks. 
26 Stevenson's 
views prevailed, Parliamentary powers were sought, including for a dock 
at Low Lights, and opposition was at least temporarily assuaged. The 
27 Act legislated for the river's improvement, the dock and the removal 
of the Newcastle bridge and its replacement, on the same site, by a swinging 
structure, the mechanism to be the responsibility of the TIC and the bridge 
deck and approaches of the Newcastle Corporation. 
28 In 1862 the commissioners 
purchased two further dredgers, a move perhaps made in response to the 
up-river interests which had earlier memorialised the TIC on the hindrance 
to navigation caused by the bridge. From this time dredging proceeded 
apace. 
During these years some improvements were undertaken to the river 
quays, both privately and at public expense. Privately, quay frontages were 
formed both by manufacturers, such as Allhusen and Cowen, and by shipbuilders 
while, of the publicly financed projects powers for quays were sought 
by the corporations of North Shields in 1851, Gateshead in 1855* and Newcastle 
in the same year. To all three proposals the TIC objected in a somewhat 
desultory manner and at North Shields little improvement resulted. At 
Gateshead, construction work did proceed and, although to a lesser extent 
than had been first hoped for, the quay, under the powers of a second 
Act of 18599 was connected to the NER by a rope-hauled incline in 1862.29 
In Newcastle, quay works were projected to a larger scale. An Act authorised 
an extension downstream to the Ouseburn 
30 but it was not until 1862 that 
the Chamber of Commerce approached the Corporation with a plan for the 
provision of a rail link to the quay. 
31 The NER was prevailed upon to 
build the line needed - it was opened in 1870 - so spurring the Corporation 
into building a new quay, beginning in 1866 under the direction of the 
A quay there was first suggested by A11husen. 
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Borough Engineer, John Lamb. Initially the new quay was to provide 12 
ft of water at, low tide but the decision of the TIC to deepen the approach to 
Newcastle led to this depth being increased to 20 ft. Problems. encountered 
during construction, including collapse, led to Abernethy and Harrison 
32 
being consulted and it was not until 1879 that completion was achieved. 
The cost of the 3357 ft long quay had amounted to E239,323.33 
Beginning in 1B60, the TIC became much involved in three of the bridges 
crossing the Tyne, the bridge of the Newcastle and Carlisle 
Railway (N&CR) at Scotswood, the*. Tyne biidge in-Newcastle and the Redheugh bridge, 
a new project. The Bill for the amalgamation of the N&CR with the NER 
included for the replacement of the timber bridge built in 1837. * it 
had been reported upon by Ure who noted its decrepit state, its ability 
to accommodate only single-line traffic and the possibility that it could 
easily take fire. 
34 The NER was well aware of its condition and it was, 
in fact, destroyed by fire in 1860 when actually being tested to assess 
its load-bearing capacity. 
35 A temporary bridge was built within two 
months on the original, mis-aligned, 
36 
piers and it was not until 1868 
that the NER sought TIC approval for a new bridge. The commissioners 
insisted that the bridge must be capable of being swung open to permit 
ships to pass, that its foundations must be deep enough to permit dredging 
and it should have as few piers as possible. 
27 
Not willing to concede to the 
first demand the NER erected a fixed multi-span hog-backed, wrought iron 
girder bridge in 1870.38 
The next bridge to be discussed was that at Redheugh, projected by 
a company formed in 1866 and having amongst its shareholders the water 
and gas companies, both seeking river crossings for their main pipes. 
39 
Initially the bridge was to be of a stayed-girder design with a central 
span of 345 ft and end spans of 217 ft 
40 but it was subsequently amended 
to comprise two spans of 252 ft and two of 170 ft; its designer, Thomas 
Bouch, when re-submitting his design, was requested to carry its foundations 
* The bridge had later been strengthened by means of a laminated timber arch. 
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to a 10 ft greater depth so as to permit future dredging. 
41 Providing 
headroom for shipping of 85 ft the bridge was opened in June 1871. 
The last of the three bridge works was the building of the Swing 
Bridge, a replacement for the multi-arch masonry structure, a hindrance 
to navigation and the subject of discussion regarding its renewal. A 
bridge of this type had first been suggested by Rendel and a swing bridgeo 
mechanically operated, was proposed by Thomas Bryson (1805-1867), Borough 
Engineer, in 1864,42 when the TIC, under the powers of its 1861 Act, began 
acquiring the necessary properties and lands. A temporary bridge was 
first built so as to enable the new structure to occupy the old alignment. 
Richard Cail (1812-IB93), later a commissioner, at this juncture suggested 
to the TIC that it would be better to build the new bridge slightly to 
43 
the west, so enabling the old one to be maintained during construction. 
His proposal was rejected and the commissioners in 1866 completed the 
temporary timber bridge and demolished the'' old. In June 1868 the tender 
submitted by Sir W. G. Armstrong for a hydraulically-operated opening bridge 
was accepted and an immediate start was made to the sinking of iron cylinders 
as foundations for the masonry island and abutments. Designs were not 
finally agreed until 1873 and Armstrong then undertook to supply the bridge 
44 
structure within two years at a cost of Z100,825. Delays ensued and 
it was June 1876 before it was brought into use, its two -opening spans 
being 110 ft wide. 
As the construction of bridges and quays continued, ' Ure pursued 'hi: Ei 
task of improving the river's channel, more than 5m tons of material 
being removed in the peak year. * Concomitant with this programme of 
dredging was the removal of other hazards, such as Bill Point which obstructed 
both visibility and navigation; its removal involved c2m tons of material 
of which 380,000 tons was rock, blasted under water and dumped at sea. 
By 1885 the average size of ship using the river was 305' tons, double 
the size of 1850, but what was of greater significance was the fact- that 
*In 1861, dredging totalled ckm tons, in 1863,2.47 m tons, in 1864,4.18 m tons, in 1866, 
5.25 m tons, in 1872, c4m tons and in 1885 c 2.5 m tons. 
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the improvements had opened up the river to such an extent that it had 
become possible to build ships of up to c 10,000 tons and feasible to 
ship coal economically, without trans-shipment into keels, from the upper 
reaches of the river, even in 1872 its depth there increased from 3 to 
13 ft. 45 
6.2.2 Piers: design and construction. 
The construction of piers at the river's mouth was authorised by 
the 1852 Act but discussions and proposals were of long standing. A 
pier on the south shore had been first proposed by Rennie in 1813 and, 
later, by Rendel, Brooks, Washington, Vetch, Calver, Turner, Taylor, Murray 
and William Purdo, to become one of the life commissioners. 
46 - In 1853 
the TIC sought the requisite Admiralty approval for the construction of 
the piers, only to experience the latter's rejection on the grounds that 
they "could not be safely reckoned upon as adequate to fulfil the object 
proposed". 
47 On behalf of the commissioners, Clayton wrote to the effect 
that no better design could be produced and in reply to this letter, the 
Admiralty mentioned that its powers were limited only to the approval 
or rejection of plans submitted by the TIC. To break the deadlock Clayton 
suggested that the plans be viewed by James Walker, the Admiralty's inspector 
prior to official submission, a move accepted with some alacrity by the 
Admiralty which had "long felt the necessity of placing the entire responsibility 
of the plans for the works at the entrance'of the Tyne with an eminent 
engineer, in whom (all parties) ... might place confidence. , 
48 
, Walker 
was empowered to assess the plans submitted and "to select or modify any 
proposed plan, or to originate any other one... (deemed proper for) so 
grave a question. , 
49 In June 1853 the TIC was 'informed that Walker was 
to review the evidence previously taken by Washington, , Calver and Vetch 
and the commissioners then formally assented to the Admiralty's request. 
Walker heard evidence in London, Tynemouth and Newcastle and, referring 
to the several proposals made, noted that each had its merits. He was 
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concerned by the river's bar and recommended its immediate removal by 
dredging, at the same time setting out the philosophy of his pier design: 
to allow waves to spread and so' reduce in height; to maintain beaching 
facilities; to protect ships from the dangers of a lee shore; to shelter 
ships clearing the river until deeper water prevailed; and to enable 
steam tug-boats to assist ships more easily. He proposed to, provide 
an entrance 1,100 fer-twide between the two piers, the north 2,100 ft long 
and the south 4,200 ft, their lines similar to those projected by Brooks 
and, at the same time, gave credit to him, and to Rendel, for the designs 
50 
which each had evolved. 
Walker's plans were duly submitted to the Admiralty- Hydrographer, 
-ributed the comment that "if an Admiral Beaufort, to whom was later att 
angel from heaven were to suggest better piers, he might, but that he 
51 
himself as Hydrographer could not suggest anything superior to Mr. Walker' S. " 
The Admiraltyq howeverp sought further details, working drawings-and estimates 
and requested that borings be taken to ascertain ground - conditions. 
Differences in opinion between Walker and Brooks became apparent -in 1854', 
and in January 1855' the Admiralty complained to-'. the 'commissioners that 
drawings submitted had not been in accordance with Walker's plans. ' Walker 
had originally produced outlines of the two piers and the Admiralty had 
sanctioned construction of the north pier masonry and the south pier 
hearting. Now, however, the Admiralty noted that the plan of the north 
pier, left at the Admiralty for assent, presu mably by Brooks, was "not 
in conformity with the profile of Mr. Walker, and that the cross sections 
of the South Pier do not show merely the core of that breakwater, but 
a finished section of the work. ..,,. 
52 The Admiralty expressed extreme 
displeasure and the commissioners, in effect censuring Brooksq recorded 
that he and Walker must work in unison. At the same time Clayton pointed 
out to the Admiralty that Walker's duties were legally confined to the 
approval of plans but, regardless, the TIC would be pleased to avail itself 
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of his services, a move agreed by the Admiralty, and in May 1855 Walker 
was formally appointed consulting engineer for the construction of the 
piers with Brooks supervising work and preparing the necessary drawings. 
53 
In the hope that the piers would be built at Government expense by convict 
labour, the TIC began work on the north pier in October 1855 and on the 
south in March the following year, the tender of Benjamin Lawton having 
been accepted. Involved already in the winning of stone for the piers' 
construction and for the building of a railway from quarry to south pier, 
Lawton submitted prices of E117,300 and L479700 for the north - masonry 
- and south - rubble - structures respectively#, their lengths of 1,400 
and 2,800 ft having been reduced at the Admiralty's request in an effort 
to diminish expenditure. 
54 
The transfer of responsibility for the pier works brought , in place 
of Brooks, Phillip John Messent (lB30-1897) to the Tyne as resident engineer 
under Walker* and it was under his day-to-day superintendence that work 
was carried out. The actual building of the piers has been well described 
by Porter 55. and it is here necessary only to summarise the events which 
occurred over the 30 Years which followed. As designed the north pier' 
was of two separate masonry walls connected at 25 ft intervals by cross 
walls, the whole" founded upon a mound of rubble stone and filled with 
loose quarry debris. Formed to a height of 20 ft above high water with 
upper and lower surfaces 10-', and l3h ft wide respectivdlythe pier's masonry 
foundations were one foot beiow low water. The south pier took the form 
of a rubble embankment faced with masonry three feet thick forming a walkway 
27 feet wide at 10 ft above high water. 
Initially it had been the commissioners' intention to provide 15 
ft of water at the pier's entrance but it soon became obvious that a greater 
depth was necessary and Walker accordingly prepared schemes' for terminating 
the piers in depths of 25,30 and 36 feet , plans for the second scheme 
# The highest tender was Z463,000 
- Messent had earlier worked under Walker in London. 
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1 56 being presented to the Admiralty- in 1859; the piers were delineated 
57 
as being of sinuous form and to a greater length. A further Act of 
Parliament was sought by the TIC and, successful in its application, it 
was granted powers to extend the time of completion for the piers by ten 
years and to borrow additional funds. The Act noted that the TIC had 
been promised L-'4m by the Commission on Harbours and Refuge on the understanding 
that the commissioners raised a similar sum. 
58 
By this time Lawton -was experiencing financial problems and progress 
would seem to have been somewhat retarded as a consequence. To expedite 
matters, the TIC sought to supply suitable materials, finding a certain 
amount of ironworks slag available, a material much used on the Tees. 
With the original contract approaching completion, the Commissioners took 
over Lawton's plant in 1863, an arbitration* determining its value as 
c E13,300. . 
Rather than employ another contractor, the TIC resolved to pro- 
ceed with construction work using direct labour under Messent but to simplify 
matters a labour-only contract was arranged with Oldroyd and Marshall. 
59 
Walker died in 1862 but his partners continued as engineers) in 1863 
submitting the drawings for the new pier extension, in character more 
substantial than the old. In place of masonry facing, concrete blocks 
of much greater weight were to be used and mass concrete replaced the 
less strong material used for heartingbut what was of even greater importance 
was the fact that foundations were taken down to a maximum of 23-2 ft below 
low water. North and south piers were now to be 2,900 and 5,400 ft long 
respectively. Although some storm damage had been incurred in 1861 it 
was not until 1867 that major damage was sustained, undermining of the, 
foundations of the north pier causing some 280 ft of the sea wall to fail. 
Similar damage occurred to the south pier, where 370 ft of the later vertical 
walling collapsed. At this time some 475 men were employed on the work 
but the delay enforced by the damage led to the TIC terminating the labour- 
* The arbitrators were George Parker Bidder and -James Leslie. 
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only contract and taking all aspects of the work into the hands of Messent. 
60 
Repair of the damaged sections involved the rebuilding of the foundations 
at a greater depth and led to a delay in progress of seven years, it 
being considered inadvisable to continue seawards and so risk further 
damage. 
In 1876 Cail, earlier a substantial civil engineering contractor, 
was appointed chairman of the Piers Committee, soon followed by a letter 
from him on account of "the slow progress made in building the piers by 
the present process and according to the plans made by Messrs. Walker 
and Burgess near a quarter of a, century ago"; 
61 
as staging was' expensive 
and vulnerable would it not be better to work from hoppers? He was asked 
to submit details and did so, by report, in January 1877. Cail did not 
claim to be the originator of his proposals, the placing of concrete in 
bags having ! been adopted elsewhereý but where he did claim originality was 
in the "tipping cradle , 
62 
which would lower the concrete- filled jute bag6 
to the required depth and Cail offered his patent on the device to the 
TIC. He also suggested modifications to the south pier, to make it safer 
to use, and 'concluded by asking that his report be read by Messent and, 
if thought advisable, by other engineers. Caills views were commented upon 
in two reports by Ure and Messent in March. After reviewing the history 
of the construction of the piers, they saw no reason to alter 'procedures 
either by using the barges suggested by Cail or by using an overhanging 
crane, another suggestion which had been made; "the plan of works recommended 
in our report of 1868 ... has hitherto proved so successful. " 
63 In view 
of the fact - that virtually no progress had been made for ten years and 
that it had been minuted that work- should "for the present be contracted 
within the smallest limits consistent with safety to the works , 
64 Caills 
apprehension is understandable. Cail disagreed, in a further report, 
65 
with 
their comments, so resulting in a meeting which involved Sir John Coode 
(1816-1892), James Guthrie (1827-1880)*, Cail and Messent. Coode, reporting 
Guthrie had been appointed as Secretary to the TIC in 1861. 
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soon afterwards, admitted some merit in Cail's proposals but nevertheless 
sided firmly with Messent, especially in his preference for construction 
by blockwork, able to be cast in adverse weather conditions9 rather than 
by concrete in bags. Coode was unable to recommend Caills design for 
the piers' foundations - they must be 15 to 18 ft below low water - but 
nevertheless, "in a position fully to appreciate Mr. Caills desire to 
aid in accomplishing these important objects (he) should... have been pleased 
to have concurred with him in his proposals had (he) found substantial 
ground for doing so.,, 
66 
Pier construction was subsequently resumed, only to be halted again 
in 1879 due to Messent wishing to provide a stronger structure. He proposed 
that the blocks should be increased to 45 tons but, as the changes involved 
both the re-design of the piers necessitating Admiralty approval, and 
the design by Messent of the substantial cranes it was not until 1883 
and 1885 that the north and south cranes were completed, 
67 
so enabling 
work to continue, the piers by this time having been turned inwards, a 
prelude to completion. 
6.2.3 Docks: proposals and construction 
The Northumberland Dock, the first to be built on the river, was 
sanctioned by the TIC's Act of 1852, its design having led to some acrimony 
between Rendel 68 and Brooks 
69 
, the latter's proposals having been chosen 
and put before Parliament. Within six months, however, Brooks, so far 
as the dock was concerned, had been superseded by John Plews (1795-1861) 
recently involved in similar work at Cardiff. 
70 Tenders for the dock 
were sought in 1853 and that of David Thornbury, for E133,788, was accepted. 
Work began immediately and, seemingly without major problems the 51 acre 
dock was formally opened by the Duke of Northumberland in October 1857. 
During construction the , staiths had remained in use continuously, the 
the western end of the dock being closed only when the eastern basin had 
been completed. 
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Even as it was being built, consideration was given to its improvement 
and enlargement, the resident engineer, John Plews Jnr., submitting in 
1856 a plan for a 6: -,, acre western basin and entrance, not executed. 
Immediately afterwards, the Dock Committee reported on future developments, 
noting that coal shipments then totalled 1.3 m tons p. a. and the dock's 
benefits would soon raise the throughput to 3m tons. Greater demand, 
however, would necessitate the linking of the Northumberland dock to a 
new one at Coble Dene. 
71 The site suggested earlier by Hudson was inspected 
by Plews, who recommended a riverside canal linking the two docks, but 
discussionsý between the TIC and the Duke of Northumberland led to the 
latter suggesting modifications, at the same time seeking the free loading 
of coal from his collieries into ships lying in the canal, a concession 
unacceptable to - the TIC. Nevertheless agreement was reached, drawings 
were deposited 
72 
and in 1B57 the Act passed, legislating for a 28 acre 
dock, a basin and 75 ft wide gates. Additional borrowing powers were 
approved. 
73 
The forming of docks on the river was sought by bodies other than 
the TIC: Brooks put forward a proposal, already noted, for a series of 
docks 'along the coast north of the river; a dock at Low Lights was outlined 
by Joseph Locke in 1852; 
74 in 1854 the newly-formed NER revived plans 
for a dock at Jarrow, 
75 for which there had been seven earlier schemes, * 
from 1837 onwards; 
76 in 1854 a. company was formed to build docks at 
St. Peters, in Newcastle. 
77 The dock at Low Lights, like the others, 
was opposed by the TIC, although greater opposition emanated from the 
War Officeg concerned that Cliffords Fort, at the harbour's mouth, would 
be affected. The Bill for its construction was defeated in Parliament. 
78 
Its promotion would seem to have been a result of "the success which 
ha 
Is 
attended the - splendid docks at Sunderland,,, 
79 
combined with the fact 
that no other dock then existed on the Tyne. The seven acre dock was 
envisaged as being able to ship 3009000 tons of coal p. a., brought to 
* see Map 8.245 
it via some three miles of railway. 
At Jarrow, the NER continued its efforts to secure an outlet for 
the shipment, predominantly, of Durham coal, so continuing the policies 
of its predecessors. * On the Tyne its sole rail competitor was the BUR 
serving only the north bank of the river at Hayhole. The Act which finally 
legislated for the dock's cons , truction was passed in 1854 
so 
and construction 
by Jackson, Bean and Gow began in June 1855; 
81 
a false start - had been 
made, by Cail, in 1849.82 By March IB59 work had been completed at a 
cost of some L440,0004k With aý basin of 9-2 acres, the dock, designed 
by Harrison, was 50 acres in extent, with an entrance 80 ft wide. At 
Jarrow, Harrison returned to the loading of coal by spout, rather than 
by drops and two jetties -a further two could be accommodated - were 
provided at one end of the dock, each with ten shipping places, a marked 
contrast to the Northumberland dock where the existing spouts and drops, 
privately-ownedý continued to operate, the TIC having no desire to "become 
the proprietors of shipping staiths. , 
83 The passage of the NER Bill 
had not been easy, objections having been raised by the Admiralty, anxious 
that th6 reduction in volume of the Slake would damage the river. it 
was somewhat mollified by the opinions of Harrison and Cubitt, both supporting 
the dock's formation, but nevertheless sanctioned construction only on 
the understanding that dredging. ' be undertaken to replace the tidal storage 
lost. 84 
As construction of the two docks continued, other proposals were 
made: at St. Peters, on the site of Smiths' shipbuilding yard, a dock 
of 35 acres was projected in 1853 and although a company was formed for 
its construction and an Act 
85 
was obtained, nothing further transpired; 
a suggestion, which came to nothing, was made for a complex of docks in 
the Ouseburn valleyq the down-river limit of Newcastle Quayside, where 
Harrison in 1851 had reported to the YNOR on a dock at South Shields, 40 acres in extent 
(PRo: RAIL 772/25) 
# Tenders had varied from E344,475 to E446,400 
+ The ratio of dredging to volume lost was to be I to 4. 
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t, 
an elongated dock, entered through a basin was to extend for more than 
half a mile along the burn, providing an area of water of some 20 acres; 
86 
in 1855 an application was made to Parliament -Jor the North Shields and 
Tynemouth dock to be known as the Low Lights dock; * and in 1857 Palmer 
sought to build a dock at Jarrow, a move which, again, came to nothing 
in spite of the commissioners' acquiescence. 
The proposal to form a dock at Low Lights was to be the cause of 
much conflict, bitterness and indecision, involving'both the TIC and others. 
Its promotion led immediately to a further. dispute between TIC and Brooks, 
on account of the latter's involvement. One of the commissioners, Christian 
Allhusen (1806-1890) had earlier proposed that a record be kept as to 
how Brooks spent his time 
87 but it'was a letter from him to the TIC which 
led to further ill-will. In November lB55 Brooks wrote that he had modified 
his 1845 proposal for a dock on this site and now envisaged there a 30 
acre dock with a seven acre basin, the excavated material being absorbed 
by the pier construction and the dock wall serving to train the river's 
flow. He expressed the hope that the TIC would "unanimously give its 
sanction to a measure (to) ... increase the accommodation to' shipping. "88 
Instead of providing support, the commissioners censured Brooks for his 
involvement, in that he had "thought fit without (TIC) sanction to place 
himself in the inconsistent and conflicting position of projecting work 
as. Engineer to another Body"89 and gave him eight days to ' decide where 
his loyalties lay; he resigned from the Low Lights dock concern. The 
TIC had been urged by the river's shipowners to support 'the Bill for the 
dock's construction but it found itself unable to do so, in spite of rep- 
resentations by four of' its members, two of them from North Shields. 
The drawings 90 for the dock were lodged no engineers name was given 
- but the Bill was subsequently withdrawn, the TIC then giving an undertaking 
that it would inquire into the possibility of itself building a dock at 
Coble Dene, already noted. 
See map 10 
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Within the TIC the dock proposed at Coble Dene had, led to much dissent, 
Stevenson suggesting at one period that the Bill should be withdrawn, 
a move which found little support? 
' There were doubts, too, an the utility 
of the canal joining it to the Northumberland dock but the amended Bill 
was finally passed. The principal reasons for its having been suggested 
were that deeper enclosed water was required and the dock would provide 
the TIC with facilities for the handling of general cargoes, then lacking. 
The passing of the lB57 Act was not immediately followed by dock construction 
and in IB59 the Steam' Coal Owners, mining the area between the rivers 
Tyne and Blyth, again sought a dock at Low Lights, a deputation urging 
its construction upon the TIC. The dock was also backed by the Tynemouth 
Corporation, ostensibly on the grounds that it would be better placed 
than was Coble Dene and, with the forming of the piers, would be better 
protected from the sea than earlier; 
92 delay would lead to loss of trade. 
Similar views were expressed by the river's shipowners who stressed that 
the unimproved state of the river necessitated the construction of a dock 
at its mouth, so attracting to the Tyne the natural trade of Blyth. 
93 
Ure by this time successor to Brooks, reported that the Northumberland 
dock, almost complete, would be capable of holding 200 ships and he then 
compared the advantages of Coble Dene and Low Lights, pointing out that 
the three inquiries regarding the latter site - 184B, 1852 and 1856 
had all decided against it. , He noted that the dock entrance must face 
seawards for easy navigation, although susceptible to storm action, but 
nevertheless after much deliberation he stated a preference for the Low 
Lights siteg not least on the grounds of cost; a 61 acre dock at Coble 
Dene connected to the Northumberland dock, would cost E716,900 and a 41 
acre dock, plus a seven acre basin, at Low Lights, E432,500.94 
By 12 
votes to six - those against comprised three South Shields membersq two 
Newcastle and one life commissioner - the TIC agreed to seek Parliamentary 
powers for the new dock at Low Lights. 
95 
The Act including for the construction 
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of the dock was passed in 1861, stipulating that work was to begin within 
three years and be completed within ten. It led Brooks again to write 
to the TIC, complaining that the dock had brought him no recompense, although 
to his design and, critical of Ure's plan for dredging the river and the 
bar, he reminded him to "take it, for granted that it will be as practicable 
to drain the sea as to get rid of the bar of the Tyne by dredging. , 
96 
The TICIS reluctance to begin work was questioned by both the North 
Shields Chamber of Commerce and by the Newcastle Corporation. The former 
stated that a letter had been received from Joseph Laycock (1798-1881), 
chairman of the BUR, to the effect that lines had been built in anticipation 
and agreement had been reached with the Duke, of Northumberland to connect 
to his shipping places. So strongly did the BUR feel that it had commissioned 
John Furness Tone (1822-1881) to prepare plans for a 22 acre dock to cost 
c F, 220,000,97 a project opposed by Tynemouth Corporation, against construction 
by a private company but unable to fund the project itself. Further 
pressure by shipowners and coalowners led to the TIC instructing Ure to 
prepare drawings, providing an, additional entrance at the west end of 
the dock. 98 In the Newcastle Council, note was taken of the threat to 
the Tyne posed by docks projected at Blyth "which would necessarily divert 
trade from the Tyne"99 and so reduce the revenue of the Corporation, which 
maintained that funds for dock construction should come from Tynemouth, 
landowners, coalowners and the BUR, then seeking to -subscribe Z100,000 
to the Blyth dock project. 
100 
Heeding the criticism, the TIC sought estimates, a figure of f, 294,500 
being given by Ure. A sub-committee met with all interested bodies and it was 
resolved to adopt Ure's Parliamentary plan. The estimate of cost was 
revised to E325,000 of which the Duke would guarantee Z75,000. Similarly 
the B&TRt the Steam Coal Owners and the Corporations of Newcastle hnd 
Tynemouth agreed to guarantee E50,000 each. What was of great significance, 
too, was the discovery that the Blyth Dock Bill would be withdrawn if 
the Low Light dock were to proceed and the sub-committee ended its report 
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with the hope that 7by the construction of the Tynemouth Dock a harmony 
of feeling and interests in the Tyne will, we think, be secured, 11101 enabling 
the Tyne to retain unopposed its position as the leading port on the north- 
east coast. The TIC confirmed this recommendation, but not unanimously, 
and with much ceremony, and only four days short of the expiry of the 
Parliamentary powers, the foundation stone of the Tynemouth dock was laid 
on 23 June 1864, the Northern Daily Express noting somewhat sourly that 
,2 it would be the third dock in the river "and let us hope the most successfull'lo 
Within the TIC the debate had led Cowqn to view a dock at Blyth "attracting 
from the Tyne a large proportion of its trade", 
103 
analagous to Seaham 
Harbour; the Marquis of Londonderry had sought facilities on the Tyne, 
had been refused and had subsequently built Seaham and provided assistance 
to Sunderland. 
Criticism was levelled at the actual design of the dock, as it was 
at the financial involvement of the TIC itself, especially as the dock, 
like that at Jarrow,, would be likely to prove unprofitable. A further 
fear was expressed that Hartlepool and Sunderland would continue to threaten 
the Tyne and attention was drawn to a new danger; if the commissioners 
"took the statistics at Cardiff, they would see how much that port had 
advanced upon the Tyne, and it was all through its docks. , 
104 Later, 
Laycock admitted that Blyth "was not so suitable a place as the Tyne" 
105 
ts abandonment was solely due to the TIC 's decision to build at Low and it 
Lights. 
The ceremonial inauguration of the dock's construction did not lead 
to further progress although the need for further accommodation was acute 
and in 1862 had led to a revival -of the earlier Ouseburn schemeq again 
without result. 
106 The TIC, meanwhile, continued its preparatory work 
for the Low Lights dock and to regularise the position, a further Act 
of Parliament was obtained in 1865. Ure's latest version included- an 
additional western entrance 
107 to -the dock which would be "accessible 
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to the largest Class of Vessels which can enter the River. 11108, The Act 
confirmed the financial involvement of the BUR, the Duke of Northumberland 
and Lord Hastings, like the Duke possessing substantial mining royalties. 
In 1866 Ure produced two reports on docks and shipping places. 
In the first he pointed out that, although the Northumberland dock had 
been developed to its capacity, he now considered it unsafe to build the 
Low Lights dock as the piers' progress-had not been sufficient to- provide 
protection to it. Analysing the trade of the Northumberland dock, Ure 
had found that during its life coal s6pvner4 had risen from 1.35 to 2.06 
m tons p. a. *. of which the tonnage carried in steamships had risen from 
36,000 tons to 363,000 tons p. a. He now suggested extending the dock 
and providing river staiths at Whitehill Point, the spur between the North- 
umberland and proposed Coble Dene docks. This arrangement "would give 
facilities toýthe Screw Colliers for loading in the River, provide additional 
deep water accommodation for Sailing Ships in the Dock" 
1 09 
and also provide 
for an import trade. The dock extension would be 1B acres and the complete 
scheme would cost - The second report considered the several options 
available for dock additions, principally so that the TIC could reserve 
for development such lands as it thought necessary. Ure was concerned 
that it could be seven or eight years before the Low Lights dock could 
proceed as the Board of Ordnance was proving difficult regarding Cliffords 
Fort replacement and he put forward 
. ýin 
substitution two versions, 38 
and 20 acres$of the Coble Deno dock and also-outlined again his Northumberland 
dock extension. The larger version would cost E650,000 and the smaller 
E550,000, both in addition to the extension dock, connected by canal to 
Coble Dean. Such was trade increasing that, , in his opinion, land should 
be reserved for a merchandiseýdock at, Coble Dene. 
101 
Ure's reports resulted in a further Act being obtained to set back 
the river line at Whitehill Point and to build coal spouts there 
ill but 
this proposal, too, led to dissent within the TIC. The view was expressed 
By 1866 the throughput of the NER's Tyne Dock amounted to c 2h m tons p. a. 
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that the Whitehill Point scheme be dropped and a dock built at Coble Dene 
instead, a suggestion' soon followed by an enquiry from Tynemouth as to 
whether or not the TIC intended to build a dock at all. 
112 Subsequently 
a deputation of coal-owners met the TIC, which then resolved to proceed 
at Whitehill Point. Meanwhile, however, a further deputation, including 
the former promoters of the Low Lights dock, asked whether the TIC, at 
113 best luke-warm to the idea, would permit the private building of the dock, 
a request which was refused. 
In 1870 Ure relinquished his position as engineerg although continuing 
to act as consultant, and in the same year two further proposals for docks 
were made. The first of them was proposed-by the Scotswood, Newburn 
and Wylam Railway and Dock Company amongst its promoters William Haswell 
Stephenson (1836-1918), to become a commissioner. The dock was to be 
only seven acres in extent, 
114 located on the north shore of the river 
immediately downstream of Scotswood suspension bridge but it, like others, 
was duly abandoned in 1876 because of its construction becoming "useless 
by reason of the river Tyne not having been dredged upwards to' such a 
distance as to allow of access thereto. , 
115 The second proposal was 
a revival of Lock and Errington's 1853' version of Low Lights, this time 
proposed by Bell and Miller. Ure reported upon it, his opinion being 
that construction of the 17 acre dock, in two parts, should be delayed, 
principally on account of the slow progress on the pier construction. 
116 
The exposed location of the Low Lights site, exacerbated by the slowness 
of pier constructiong and the lessening necessity for dock provision at 
all brought about a cessation in the demands for a dock near the river 
mouth. Nevertheless Tynemouth Corporation continued to press for a further 
dock on the river, in spite of the Whitehill Point work proceeding, as 
did the . South Shields Trade and Commerce Committee, and in October 1871 
a report on the feasibility of constructing a dock at Coble Dene was made 
by Ure. He again stressed the changing requirements brought about by 
steam propulsion. Such ships were not so dependent upon docks and he 
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envisaged a reduction in shipping costs should a new import dock be built 
contiguous with the Northumberland dock rather than distant from it. 
He was critical of th e older entrance and also the lack of deep water 
in the Northumberland dock and planned a 46 acre dock, a 16 acre passage 
to the older structure, and a 4-2 acre tidal basin with an entrance 100 
ft wide; high water depth would be 30 ft. 
117 A disadvantage of the 
scheme, Ure noted, was that the coal-owners would be forced to provide 
new staiths in order to benefit. A warehouse was envisaged as part of 
the development and Ure estimated that the whole scheme, which could be 
built in four sections, would cost E1.182m of which E243,000 was for the 
canal, in his view a vital element. 
118 The TIC accepted Ure's report, 
negotiations were undertaken with the Duke of Northumberland (1810-1899) 
regarding land acquisition, drawings were deposited 
119 
and a Bill presented 
to Parliament, as might be expected leading to a revival of the conflict 
between Newcastle and North Shields, in this instance centred principally 
on the funding of the work and the programming of construction. Neverthe- 
120 less, the Act was sanctioned. 
The river wall at Whitehill Point was completed in 1872, borings 
to ascertain ground conditions relating to Coble Dene were made in 1873 
and excavation began the following year 
121 to a plan revised as a result 
of the site investigation. The beginning of this work was marked by 
significant changes in the TIC; - in 1873 Cowen died and was replaced as 
chairm&n by Thomas Ridley (1804-1885); John Clayton, Clerk since 11B50 resigned 
in the same year and was succeeded by Guthrie; Ure reduced his obligations 
to the commissioners and Messent took over more of his work. So far 
as Coble Dene was concerned, its building did not continue smoothly and 
in 1876 work was restricted for a period of some 18 months, 1,600 of the 
3,000 strong workforce being laid off. TIC dock income had fallen as 
a result of reduced trade and in an effort to reduce expenditure the com- 
missioners, after some disagreement, decided that dock works must bear 
the brunt of the reductions. Some disappointment was expressed by Stevenson 
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who noted sadly that in deciding where the cuts should occur, an attempt 
had been made "to awaken the old sectional jealousies which we thought 
we had got over in this river , 
132 
and references were made ` to progress 
at other local ports which, largely due to the recession in the iron trade, 
had so been enabled to ship surplus coal. To safeguard completion of 
the dock, the TIC sought a further Act to permit it to be funded from 
the Northumberland Dock revenue rather than stand separate. 
123 
By 1680 work o. n the dock was again continuing normally, although 
it was far from complete, - Messent then estimating that the expenditure 
outstanding totalled E228,000. At this time the building of a warehouse 
was discussed, a move perhaps-initiated by the completion of a new structure, 
independently financed, on the Newcastle Quayside and following inspections 
of such buildings at London, Liverpool and Hartlepool the commissioners 
subsequently approved ý construction. 
124 The dock Was opened on 21 August 
1884 by Prince Albert, its name then changing from Coble Dene to Albert 
Edward; 
125 the warehouse was completed some three months later., As 
built, the dock was 24 acres in extent and provided 2,600 ft of quay with 
an 80 ft entrance and a 350 ft by 60 ft lock, providing 30 ft of water 
at high tide, the greatest depth, according to Messent, of any lock so 
far built. 126 In its construction, 5m tons ofspoil had been removed, 
much by dredging. Its cost had been 099,000 compared with the E352,000 
of the Northumberland dock and E206,500 for its extension. 
127 
Since the opening of the Tyne dock in 1859 the NER had undertaken 
few major improvements largely on account of the generous 60 and 80 ft 
entrances provided initially. There had, however, been a continuous 
capital expenditure on gradually enlarging it and progressively augmenting 
128 
the coaling facilities, increasing the jetties from two to -four. 
Relations between TIC and NER were a little uneasy, as early as 1860 the 
NER, on hearing that the commissioners sought to build a further dock, 
expressed the view that they "should instead... direct -their attention 
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, 129 to deepening the water on the bar and in the river... In 1869, by 
which time the capital cost of the, Tyne'dock totalled Zkm, the NER, answering 
criticism regarding its expense, countered with the statement that shipment 
totalled 2.38 m tons, more than double the quantity shipped by the company 
before its construction. 
130 Expenditure continued at a variable rate 
it averaged E15,000 p. a. -- until 1883 when it ceased. At that time 
shipments totalled c5m tons p. a. 
131 
compared with the 1.8 m tons from 
the Northumberland dock. 132 The. Tyne dock had proved a valuable outlet 
for. - the traffic of the NER. 
* * * 
In order fully to cover the affairs of the, TIC, three further strands 
of its development must be considered. From the year of its formation, 
1850, the commission engaged in much discussion - and dissent - amongst 
its members regarding first, the revenue paid to Newcastle Corporation 
on account of its having in the 1850 Act retained the, income of -5/8 of 
coal shi pped; second, the representation of the commission; and third, 
finance related both to revenue and to capital. 
With the Northumberland Dock in operation, the TIC took the understand- 
able view that commission expenditure was being appropriated for the benefit 
of the town of Newcastle through its share of income from coal shipments. 
A move, opposed by the Newcastle members, was made to purchase the Corporation's 
share and agreement was reached between, the two bodies, in turn' leading 
to a deputation meeting with the Board of Trade to regularise the position. 
It was reported to the commissioners that the board had proved "inexorable 
(but) did not seem to understand the , question and its own interests 
It is a great happiness to know that the Tyne and its destinies are beyond 
the powers of such men. , 
133 The proposal to purchase was withdrawn, only to 
be resurrected three years, later, by Ure, seeking revenue to enable the 
needed capital projects to be funded, a suggestion which, again, was not 
taken up. 
134 In 1868 the TIC revived the matter, a deputation 
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meeting the Corporation and offering to purchase the dues for ten times 
the annual revenue. 
135 The Corporation's Finance Committee, headed by 
Isaac, Lowthian Bell (1816-1904)3 was unable to recommend the sale of the 
dues, declared Newcastle's rights as inviolable and declined to have the 
price fixed by an outside body; it did, however, offer to discuss the 
matter further,, "well aware of the importance of cultivating and maintaining 
an amicable understanding! ' 
136 
with 'the TIC . "In view of, the fact'that 
the dues were a significant source of the town's income the committee-! s 
views were logical and Bell, explaining the report, stated that the inhabitants 
of Newcastle would be reluctant to put their interests into the hands 
of North and South Shields. The view of the TIC was that as the Corporation 
had contributed nothing to the river's well-being, it should not benefit 
from the commissioners' management. Stalemate led ý to the TIC deciding 
to obtain Parliamentary powers, a move again opposed by the Newcastle 
members,, but with the Bill in Parliament, accommodation was reached with 
the Corporation and a sum of E130,000 agreed*, the Corporation having 
rejected an earlier offer L5,000 less. 
137 
The constitution of the TIC had been the subject of much controversy 
at its inception and sporadic outbursts on this matter- occurred during 
the early years. In 1869, however, ' an attack was made upon it by Tynemouthq 
principally regarding the works undertaken by the commission, but also 
deploring the constitution, - "never.. -. acceptable to the public" 
138 
- and 
favouring Newcastle, a view refuted by the TIC. In 1871, representation 
was requested by Jarrow -and, , soon afterwards,, a- Bill was presented to 
Parliament to amend the TIC's constitution by the addition of 13 members. 
139 
It was opposed by- the commissioners on the grounds that the TIC had proved 
a success and that to amend it- would raise earl i er-express ed antagonisms, 
especially those involving Newcastle and Shields. The Bill was subsequently 
withdrawn only for a similar one to be presented in 1874, this time -with 
such promoters as Palmer, Bell, Andrew Leslie and Tone; 
140 it sought 
The Corporation's share of the dues had risen between 1851 and 1870 from E6,382 to Z16,480 p. a. 
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an increase of 15 members, to be 'shipowners, coal-owners and traders. 
Reflecting the growth of industry which had taken place along the river 
between Shields and Newcastle, largely due to men such as Palmer and Leslie, 
the Bill was opposed by the TIC, jealous of its position as the appointed 
conservator. Following discussions, the Bill's promoters offered to 
withdraw it, subject to the TIC making certain concessions, namely the 
introduction immediately of a similar Bill by the TIC, the principle 'of 
representation of the payers of' dues, the increase to 24 of the membership 
141 
and a moratorium on the increasing -Of river dues for a short period. 
Discussion led to 'agreement, with modifications, *and a 'Bill was presenýed 
by the 'TIC itself, largely in accordance with the suggested principles 
but involving the addition , of - only six members, two each representing 
shipowners, coalowners and traders. 'On this 'basis an Act was sanctioned, 
the election 'of the new members, serving for three years, -to be operative 
from September 1875.142 
The finances of the TIC did not prove easy in spite of the fact that 
between 1850 and 1885 revenue rose from c E20,000 to c L265,000. Expenditure 
had been substantial due' to the work ý undertaken having been ' to a scale 
greater than originally envisaged and borrowing rose to almost E4 m by 
1BB5. The principal problems involved the piers which although originally 
estimated at E180,000 , had cost c Elm plfjs- 
VR. accumulated interest. 
Similarly, the Northumberland-dock, estimated at E150,000 had cost 052,000. 
Some problems had' been due to ' th&-, face that "several separate and distinct 
funds were originally operated, River Improvemment, Piers and Northumberland 
Dock, and difficulties were experiencedin'-borrowing on individual securities. 
It was due to the acumen of Guthrie that the funds were "consolidated 
into one Trust fund for borrowing purposes, , 
143 
a move of vital significance 
in the commission's operations; Parliamentary powers for this reorganisation 
were incorporated in the Act of 1872. A further alteration to the structure 
of the dues payable was achieved 'by 1877 Act when the long-standing Town 
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and Quay dues were replaced by River Dues and the opportunity was taken 
of imposing a duty on ships passing the newly - completed Swing Bridge, 
the passage for ships of -less than 100 tons being at half the rate charged 
for bigger vessels. 
144 
That the Tyne, in the nature of its trade, was different from many 
other rivers was recognised early and in 1876 James Craig, newly appointed, 
commented that the commissioners could not--shut their eyes to the fact 
that all their trade was "based on the simple article of coal and that 
when the coal is worked out, however many manufactories there may be on 
the Tyne, many will then no longer be able to work as at present. Men 
will find cheaper coal. ..,, 
145 
and trade would move to it. Between - 1850 
and 18859 coal shipments rose from 3.36 to 9.6 m tons but of the other 
trades on the, Tyne, fortunes were mixed. Shipbuilding in iron had prosperedt 
largely due to men such as Leslie and Palmer, and by 1BB3 new tonnage built 
had reached aý, figure of 217,000 tons. 
146 
, What is of interest in this 
regard is the relationship between the size of ships using the river and 
those built upon it., Since 1850 the , average size of vessel clearing 
the river had risen from 150 to 428 tons - the largest was 4,000 tons 
- utthe size of ship built had risen to c 10,000 tons, , admittedly an 
extreme example. Nevertheless the river was able adequately to accommodate 
both the large numbers of ships using it - 14,253 in 1885 - and the increasing 
tonnage of the ships built upon it. In line with shipbuilding, an engineering 
industry flourished in Newcastle and Gateshead due principally to railway 
expansion and the growing use-of steam-powered ships; by 1885 more than 
half of the ships using the river were steamers. 
148 Engineering had 
also expanded at Elswick - where the factory established by Armstrong in 
1847 had grown and diversified, to the extent of building warships there. 
This move had been made possible only by the replacement of the Tyne bridge 
and, in 1883 the TIC was informed of, Armstrong's intention of building 
at Elswick ships "of - the, greatest -dimensions which can safely be passed 
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through the bridges" . 
The Tyne industry which was not prospering was that of chemical manufacture, 
Stevenson and Allhusen being among the proprietors. The -alkali trade's 
fortunes had been variable but a combination of the introduction of the 
Solvay process into England in 1873 and the discovery on Teesside of salt 
depositsq the trade's raw material, brought about a decline. Ironically 
it was the three major proprietors, Tennant, Allhusen . and Stevenson, who 
had established salt ., works on the Tees and had so, "prepared the way for 
their own destruction. , 
150 
-1 - 
It is difficult to over-emphasize the extent of, the bitterness, rancour 
and jealousies expressed by the representatives of the several towns appointing 
members to the TIC. The two principal causes were the long-standing 
quarrels between North Shields and Newcastle, the shipowners of the former 
constantly seeking - river improvements atý the, expense of the merchants 
of the latter and the rivalry between the bodies of North and South Shields. 
In contrast, Gateshead was little involved. Disputes in this period 
were legion, many due to the proprietorial attitude of Newcastle towards 
the river ,a feeling present to a lesser extent within the TIC itself. Several 
examples have been noted but another perhaps typifies the attitude of 
Newcastle., In 1880, when nominations were sought for chairman of the 
commission, Cail and Plummer, both of Newcastle, proposed Ridley, 
also a Newcastle nominee and for six years chairman in succession Ao 
Sir Joseph Cowen. Stephenson, however, proposed Stevenson on the grounds 
that Ridley had, in the past, refused to travel to London on TIC business. 
151 
When the election of Council members to the commission next took place 
Stephenson was severely taken to task for his effrontery in I having turned 
Ridley out of office. The -somewhat specious argument was that the TIC 
chairman had always been, and always must be, a representative of the 
town of Newcastle! 
152 
_ Stevenson, one of the original life commissioners 
was the Liberal member for South Shields, in the' eyes of many Newcastle' 
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councillors a severe disability. 
In' contrast with the histories of other ports, disputes between the 
TIC and the railways serving it were of little significance. After 1854 
a growing proportion of the river's coal trade was handled by the NER, 
and, to a lesser extent, the B&TR. So Far as the latter was concerned, 
relations between company and commission were amicable, ' in spite of the 
fact that it was the BUR which had attempted to spur the TIC into building 
a dock at Tynemouth by promoting 'rival facilities at Blyth. It later 
complained to the TIC that expense had 'been incurred in the p. rrovision of 
rail 'links to a non-existent dock. When amalgamation of the BUR with 
the NER came about in 1874 the TIC presented opposition but nevertheless 
the NER succeeded in tightening its hold on the region, its amalgamation 
with the N&CR having taken place in 1862,, at which time some antagonism 
between NER and TIC is apparent, principally due to the disputes concerning 
the old Scotswood bridgeand the railway company's refusal to meet the 
TIC's conditions in replacing it. 
In general, relations between NER and TIC were unstrained, perhaps 
because its operations at Tyne Dock were self-contained and affected very 
little the operation of the river. It was Fortunate, too, that the dock 
was virtually opposite the commissioners' own dock, in that channel improvement 
on its behalf benefitted the NER. Following the attainment of its monopolistic 
position some discord arose due to the NER's 'rates, a complaint from the 
TIC receiving the response that the NER was "desirous to avoid drawing 
away any traffic from the Northumberland to the Tyne Dock, and in fact 
in the question of rates (it acted) just the same as (it) should do were 
the Northumberland Dock the property , 
153 
of the railway. The final step 
in the NER's progress was the absorbtion in 1883 of the Scotswood Newburn 
and Wylam Railway and in 1885 the commissioners, still concerned as to 
its monopolyý recorded their view that the NER, on its formation, had 
undertaken to give equal rates for long-distance traffic and the move 
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it 'was then making to amend this arrangement would lead to traffic being- 
diverted to Hull. 154 
In contrast, relations between the Newcastle Corportion and the NER 
were less happy, in -several debates criticism being directed against it. 
In 1881 it came under attack regarding its rates, considered to be'unfavourable 
to Tyneside, especially as "the history of the company was interwoven 
with that of Newcastle. , 
155 It was noted also that Newcastle's influence 
had declined, largely the result of the removal of the head office from 
Newcastle andwith an, -office 
in York, the development of the Tees had 
been promoted. Bell, -a member'of 
the Newcastle Council but with commercial 
interests on the Tees, was also the subject of criticism in that he, a 
director of, the -NER,, had, furthered the interests of Hartlepool and the 
comment was made that Newcastle had not been sufficiently represented 
on the company's, board. It was pointed out that the NER had done little 
to provide warehousing facilities; such a provision had been made at 
Tyne dock only after the , Grain Warehousing Company and the TIC had built 
accommodation at Newcastle and Coble Dene respectively. There was some 
truth in this allegation but it is difficult now to avoid the conclusion 
that Newcastle's expenditure, more than V4- m, on *its quay, had been injudicious 
and the building of the three warehouses had been undertaken too late 
to attract a trade diverted largely to Hartlepool and Hull. The situation 
had, however, been somewhat ameliorated by warehouse building, the Warehousing 
Company claiming in 1882 that it was only its operations, not altogether 
viable, which had saved the Newcastle Quay development from being a financial 
disaster. 
156 
The 35-year tenure of the river's conservatorship by the TIC had 
transformed the Tyne into a major shipping artery. Piers were largely 
built, two docks constructed, the river deepened over the 101', miles to 
Newcastle and above the town for 3 miles and ships of up to 4,000 tons 
register, perhaps 7,500 d wt., were using the river. By its works, Newcastle 
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had been enabled to build a'. deep-water quay and the NER to operate its 
dock. The cost of the works had been considerable. Capital expended 
on the Tyne's improvement amounted to E2.15 m, on piers, ZO. 81 m and on 
docks Z1.09 m, a total of 4.1 m. 
157 On its part the NER had spent c 
E900,000 on its own dock and the BUR, now absorbed, had invested heavily 
in its facilities on the north bank of the river. The Newcastle Corporation 
had expended c Ekm on its quay, - the other authorities much less. In 
this period the principal grievance of the TIC was the refusal of Government 
to grant funds for the piers' construction and it was noted in 1883 that 
of its borrowings, E3.32 m had been, made available privately and only 
050,000 by the - Public Works Loan Commissioners; it was recorded that 
the "Royal Commission on Harbours of Refuge, which reported in 1859, recommended 
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a grant of E250,000 ... No grant has, however, been made" . In spite 
of this disappointment, perhaps-even more so because of it, the commissioners 
Could view with pride their transformation of the river. 
6.3 River Wear. 
In 1854 the improvement of the river Tyne had just begun; on the 
Wear it had been virtually completed with the most significant improvement 
having been made by the Sunderland Dock Company (SDC). A dock on the 
north bank of the river, the Wearmouth dock, had been brought into use 
in 1837 but had not proved as successful as had been hoped. The SDC, 
with George Hudson as chairman, had opened its dock, the Hudson dock 
as it was named in 1871 - in 1850 and by 1854 the quantity of coal shipped 
through it reached 641,000 tons p. a. compared with 140,000 tons at Wearmouth. 
A total of 1.09 m tons was still shipped in the river, principally from 
the staiths immediately upstream of the bridge. 
When Parliamentary powers had been sought for the dock it was envisaged 
as being 27 acres in extent, opening to both river and sea. Having sought 
the advice of Rendel the SDC initially decided against forming the sea 
entrance and instead built a dock of 18-'2 acres with access only to the 
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river; as revenue increased the dock system would be extended. Such 
was the dock's initial success that', with the prospect of the Marquis 
of Londonderry shipping more coal thereq extensions were put in hand in 
1853 so as to increase the water area to 32 acres, at the same time continuing 
with the construction of the sea entrance, begun in 1850. The dock extension 
was completed in 1855 and the sea entrance in the year following. 
The works undertaken by the SDC were substantial. Built by both 
contract and direct labour the dock had .. a tidal harbour -and a half-tide 
basin, each of 2-2 acres, at its north end - opening onto the river-and 
a PI-2 acre half-tide basin at the sea outlet, leading into a channel broken 
through the rocks and protected by breakwaters. In turn, these protecting 
arms, the northern one incorporating groynes, enclosed a tidal harbour 
providing an area of -18 acres at high water. Originally it had been 
the intention of the, SDC to construct the dock with sloping sides, a form 
of construction used initially bn the Tees and adequate when the provision 
of projecting gearing was envisaged. Later, in order "to execute the 
wholeg as first-class docks, for the general use of commerce, as well 
as for the shipment of coals"' the walls 'were formed of near-vertical 
masonry. As engineer to the SDC, John Murray suggested that in order 
to provide additional berthing the western side of the dock should include 
a series of jetties projecting into the dock, with coal drops built on 
them. By this arrangement four ships could load coal simultaneously 
at each ofýthe jetties. 
When the decision was made to enlarge the Hudson dock the SDC also 
decided to provide a greater depth of water to accommodate ships of increasing 
dimensions. In the dock a high-water depth of 24 ft was provided with 
the north gate cill giving a corresponding depth of 20'-6"; the width 
of entrances from both river and sea was 60 ft. At the sea entranceg 
however, built when ship dimensions were seen to be increasing as,, a result 
of iron constructiong the cill was placed so as to provide 241-6" at high 
water, six feet greater than the river's bar". In order to keep open 
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the southern tidal harbour, sluices were provided so as to allow water 
from the dock to be used for scouring. * Reflecting technological change, 
both sluices and dock gates at the sea entrance were operated by an Armstrong 
hydraulic system. In the dock extension, Murray adopted angled jetties 
for the loading of coal, so reducing ship handling, and continued the 
. use of the 
higher west side of the dock for this purpose. By 18559 
15 drops were in use and ten more were planned while, in addition, almost 
Vj miles of quay had been made available. The dock complex had- cost 
E650,000 but its formation had by 1856 led to c -. m tons of coal passing 
through it, bringing to the SDC a revenue of L34,103 p. a. 
2 
, In spite of the apparent success of the dock, the directors in 1855 
expressed some disappointment, principally in the lack of revenue generated 
by the coal trade, in spite of the fact that up to 170 ships, had been 
seen together in the dock. 
3 It was considered, however, that the impending 
completion of the south outlet would provide a means of increasing revenue 
by freeing ships from the need to use the river. Could not they be freed 
from paying dues to the River Wear Commission (RWC)? The SDC was-conscious 
of the fact that , some recompense must be made to the RWC and discussions, 
already detailedg took place in. 1855 between the two bodies, leading eventually 
to the SDC's Act of 1855,, whereby increased dues were authorised. Opposition 
by the RWC was presented being, naturally, that the new dock should be 
4 "part and parcel of the port of Sunderland" . The Act authorised the 
SDC to raise additional capital, to build a graving dock and to extend 
the time within which its authorised works should be completed. 
5 it 
did not, howeverg exempt shipping using the dock from RWC dues. - In 1853 
Thomas Meik, engineer to the RWC, had ý put forward his -view that every 
facility should be provided for the building of , iron ships on the river. 
His views were partially heeded by the SDC in that the drawings deposited 
in connection with the Act showed a 345 ft long graving dock opening from 
* sluices had earlier been provided at Hartlepool. 
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the northern tidal harbour and a repairing shipway at , 
the south end of 
the Hudson dock extension. Realising that opporttinity had been given 
6 for an import trade, a ten-acre timber dock was also planned., 
Additional to a growing timber trade, the SDC, like West Hartlepool, 
realised that provision should be made to broaden the trade of its dock 
and a substantial grain warehouse was projected, designs for it being 
prepared by Dobson, although, it became the subject of much discussion 
concerning its size. The contract, eventually awarded to Cail, was completed 
during 1857. At this period the works- of the RWC were, by comparison, 
of a minor,... nature: dredging continued; a wrought-iron lighthouse was 
erected, on'the South pier in 1856; screw moorings were laid in the river; 
and discussions took place with the TIC regarding the proposal to form 
a harbour of refuge on the north-east coast, the RWC considering that 
Hendon Bay would make an excellent site. The commissioners sought the 
assistance of- Hudson, as M. P. for Sunderland, to promote the scheme, in 
spite of the fact that the building of the Tyne piers had actually begun. * 
Due to the financial problems of the SDC disputes with the RWC took 
place vis A vis dock and river. dues and they, in turn, led to the presentation 
of a Parliamentary Bill by- the SDC in 1857. As noted, the Bill had been 
opposed by Lady Londonderry, fearful that any arrangement between company 
and commission would prejudice- her interests and the Bill was subsequently 
withdrawn. - Among its provisions was the further enlargement, -southwards, 
of the, dock system with a further deep-water dock in place of the timber 
dock and a new timber dock further south still. 
7 Unusually, and presumably 
due to the resignation of Murray in 1856, the drawings were prepared by 
Tone, engineer to the B&TR. Discussions on the Bill had brought into 
the fray the NER, with E75,000 invested in the SDC. As the Bill progressed 
it was given qualified approval by the NER, -YJ which put forward the proposal 
that if the SDC would desist from attaching "a preference to their present 
*A rival scheme was put forward by the Hartlepools. 
# In 1854 the NER had instructed its representatives on the SDC board not to sanction any 
expenditure which would benefit Lady Londonderry. NER Board Minute Book, 6 October 1854 
(PRO: RAIL 527/8) 
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unissued ordinary shares" 
B the NER would subscribe E25,000 to the dock 
on condition that the SDC would place 08,750 of the shares in the name 
of the NER; shares were later issued. The SDC also sought to borrow 
E50,000 from the NER, security being provided by' E75,000 in 41% preference 
shares. It was after, this that the Bill was withdrawn. 
The merging of RWC and SDC was revived almost immediately, a proposal 
to this effect being first made by the RWC in October 1858.9 The SDC 
immediately formed a committee to engage in joint discussions, urgent 
in view of the dock company's problems, both financial and operational. 
Income was insufficient to meet outgoings and in 1858 it was found necessary 
to raise dues to- the authorised maximum. At the same time the NER asked 
that the next board vacancy , be filled by a railway director, perhaps an 
indication of its concern as to the SDC's financial standing. Disputes 
with Lady Londonderry continued and complaints from the NER became evident, 
principally regarding the lack of water at the northern coal drops, those 
first built. The NER complained that it was restricted to the use of 
the staiths , in the original dock- while the Londonderry interests, for 
some five years in -dispute with the SDC, had available the new staiths 
in the Hudson dock extension with its superior berths. It sought to 
have track modifications made so as to permit some interchange. 
Negotiations led to drawings being deposited in 1858 and a Bill presented 
the following year. 
10 The drawings, prepared by Meiký indicated works 
virtually identical with those put forward by Tone the previous year - 
the dock was slightly enlarged - but the Bill was much different in its 
principal aspects, the most far-reaching of which was the amalgamation 
of the two bodies. Discussions as to terms were prolonged and involved 
the NER, on whom the SDC had, to some extent, been dependent. The railway 
company was asked to "give equality of terms for the Jarrow and Sunderland 
Docks"911 in return for which the RWC would meet dividends at a slightly 
higher rate of interest. It was not, however, able to guarantee the 
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rate sought by the SDC as it foresaw a high future expenditure on the 
dock. Under the terms of the Actq sanctioned in 1859, control of the 
dock passed to the RWC. 
During its nine-year period of trading the SDC had built up its coal 
throughput to cIm tons, its revenue to E40,622 and its capital expenditure 
to E724,000. ' 12 The construction of its docks had revived the trade of 
the Wear Where coal shipments rose from 1.519 to 2.606' m tons p. a. in 
the ten year period ending '1859, an annual compound growth rate of 5.5'. '0. 
Material success had led to financial difficulties. First, as Hudson 
later admitted, rates had been set at levels much too low to provide adequate 
profits; 
13 
second, the disputes with Lady Londonderry undoubtedly exacerbated 
the company's problems; third, changes in ship measurement* had led to 
a reduction in income from tonnage dues 
14 
, impossible to increase without 
a further Act of Parliament. Conversely, the dock had provided facilities 
such that' ships of 440' tons could now trade to Sunderland, whereas the 
earlier limit had been 250 tons, 
15 
and so had brought back to the Wear 
trade which had left it for Seaham and Hartlepool. 
In -'its, relationships with other interests'the SDC had been unfortunate. 
In general, it was opposed by the town of Sunderland which viewed with 
concern the possibility of a union between it and the NER, a combination 
which would form an"arbitrary and tyrannical spirit which would then govern 
the trade of Sunderland. , 
16, 'It was also in prolonged dispute with Lady 
Londonderry who, in the opinion of the SDC- and in fact- had, not brought 
to the dock the trade promised, although by 1858 she shipped 156,000 tons 
of her own coal at Sunderland, 
17 the Londonderry Railway, completed in 
1854, transporting a total of 419,000 tons to the dock. 
18 In its relations 
with the NER it would seem to have been more successful in that the railway 
company maintained its earlier investment in the SDC, provided additional 
funding and pressed for representation on the board. It did not, however, 
* For example, a 650 ton ship was reclassified as of 500 tons. 
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seek to take control of the SDC or to resolve completely its financial 
problemsq perhaps, as noted, because of the antipathy of the NER towards 
Hudson or perhaps because of the fact that much of, the coal shipped through 
the dock, c 4WO, was carried by the Londonderry RailW3y and hence was 
not assured. It is of interest to note-that the demise of the SDC coincided 
with the opening of the Tyne Dock, built by the NER. 'A Shipowner', 
in 1858 had put forward the view that soon the Wear must 11 compete with 
the Tyne and its improvements and the Jarrow Docks which must soon be 
opened... fostered by_ the powerful Company of the North Eastern Railway"19 
which would divert half of the Wear coal shipments to the Tyne. Coal 
from both north of the river and from the south, via the Victoria bridge, 
could be so taken to Tyne Dock. It is interesting to speculate as to 
how much longer the SDC could have SUrvived-independently. 
The most persistent of the SDC's disputes was with the RWC, jealous. 
of its, position as conservator of the river and, later, of the docks 
themselves. The attitude of the RWC was somewhat ambivalent. It had 
benefited in that the docks, attracted a better class of ship and so increased 
revenue but, an the other hand, it had lost much of the potential revenue 
from coal . Between 1849 and 1859, ýshipping dues rose from Z2,677 to 
L6,530 while coal'dues rose only from L8,496 to E13,954; they had, however, 
been as high as E13,200 in 1846.20 The RWC still received a substantial 
income from coal shipments, more than half of the port's throughput continuing 
to be shipped' from the privately-owned staiths of the Lambton, Hetton 
and Wearmouth collieries. ' In its 1858 Bill the SDC had included for 
contributions of between E2,000 and E3,000 p. a. from the RWC, dependent 
upon coal shipments, and the company, in return for this recompense towards 
the forming of the south entrance, would maintain the high-water depth 
at not less than 21 ft and, additionally, would reduce dues on ships merely 
passing through the dock to reach the river. The principal objection 
to the Bill was that a private trading company was not justified in seeking 
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public'funds although in a report presented to the Admiralty by its inspector, 
Thomas Webster, it was noted that, in his opinion, 
a work of the magnitude and novelty undertaken by the Company, 
of reclaiming so large a tract from the sea and making the 
Southern Outlet, would not in all probability have been undertaken 
by the River Wear Commissioners; and that the Company would 
not have prosecuted the Southern Outlet to completion except 
in anticipation of sooner or later obtaining some pecuniary 
assistance from, or abatement of the rates received by the 
Commissioners on coals shipped or delivered in, and vessels 
using the works of the Dock Company. 21 
In retrospect, it was inevitable that the two bodies should become united 
as without the ownership, or at least the backing, of a railway the 5D. C 
could not compete with the railway company's own dock. 
The Act which in 1859 legislated far the amalgamation of the SDC 
and the RWC laid do'wn, for the first time, the representation of the reformed 
commission, ostensibly much smaller than the earlier body. Under the 
Act of 1830 the number of commissioners had been 170 but wastage, without 
22 
replacement', had brought membership down to 56. The new commission 
52 strong, 'represented principa lly coalowners, shipowners and landowners 
23 
and was very different in character from the commissions governing the 
Tyne and the Tees, both of them much smaller, and its first act was to 
24 form a committee of management with 15 members, among them Nicholas 
Wood. Indicative of the perceived need for additional coal-handling 
facilities it -was decided immediately that further drops should be provided 
but Meikv after visiting Hartlepool, suggested that a hydraulic hoist 
25 
should be provided instead ,a -move resisted by the commissioners. 
Discussions took place with both the NER and Lady Londonderry, -the result 
of which was that the RWC undertook to provide a further five drops in 
the dock extension where the NER, expecting to ship more coal, sought 
deep-water berths. In return, Lady Londonderry was allowed to use one 
of the railway company's drops. In spite of the prospect of improved 
coal shipments, the commis3ioners expressed concern regarding other trade, 
especially the "import trade of the Dock (which) continues small" 
26 
and 
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which must be protected against unfair competition. , 
The new management of the docks would appear to hýave stimulated 
both the Londonderry interests and the NER into 
, 
increasing throughput 
but nevertheless the dock did not produce a profit although it was hoped 
that purchase would "be a profitable speculation irrespective of all other 
27 
advantages" . Completion of the new drops led to eight of them in the 
dock extension being allocated to Lady Londonderry and four to the NER, 
the commissioners then resolving to pursue a policy of offering "any inducement 
to that portion of the Coal Trade which is so equally balanced between 
the Tyne and the Wear to come to our Docks. , 
28 Whether or not due to 
this competitive outlook, coal shipments rose from 2.52 m tons in 1859 
to 2.88 m tons in 1860 and to -2.98- m tons in 1861,29 by which time the 
port was importing grain and exporting iron. 
A spirit of protection led the , RWC to protest against the 1861 Bill 
of the West Hartlepool company, especially to "the most objectionable 
clauses empowering that Company to become Traders as Steam Boat and Ship Owners 
and in conjunction with powerful , 
Railway Companies to carry on a Sea and 
Land Traffic at one charge to be apportioned as it suits their purpose 
and convenience. , 
30 In a, like., manner the spirit of competition led the 
RWC to anticipate that the completion of the trans-Pennine South Durham 
and Lancashire Union Railway (SD&LUR) in 1861, taken over by the S&DR 
the following year, would, . combined with the unparalleled deep-, water docks. 
at Sunderland, attract further trade to the town. To accommodate the 
additional traffic expected it was resolved to extend further the dock 
system and later to ask Harrison,. engineer to the NER, for his views. 
Harrison's recommendations - damage to the south entrance had brought 
about his involvement - led Meik, with Abernethy's concurrence, to prepare 
plans for the necessary extensions. When the Hudson dock had been enlarged 
a timber dock had been provided at its south end and Meik now proposed 
that it be conyet-ted -into a separate 20 acre dock with an independent 
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access to the south harbour, additional to that to the Hudson dock. 
A further graving dock was incorporated and powers were sought, too, for 
another dock,, further south, the construction of which would lengthen 
the dock' complex to c 7,000 ft. 
31 To put the projected work in hand 
the RWC sought assistance from the Public *Works Loan Commissioners, who 
having had the port inspected by Coode, granted loans of E100,000 at 331.5'o 
and E50,000 at, 5%6 
The RWC sought tenders for- the works in three sections; the Hendon 
dock and entrance, the forming ý of a north-east pier at the south entrance 
and the graving dock, located at the northern half-tide basin. For the 
dock, tenders ranged from L161,000 to Z239,000 and were rejected as too 
expensive, the works being undertaken by direct labour; those for the 
pier varied from L19,500 to L48,000 and consideration was deferred; 
prices for the graving dock extended from E14,000 to E32,000 and its 
construction was let to the ýlowest tenderer. Meik later revised his 
pier design and the contract Was awarded in the sum of E12,000 to Walter 
Scott, already building a new grain warehouse adjacent to the earlier 
one. As work progressed the RWC undertook improvement of' the river 
Wear upstream of the bridge, converted some drops to spouts to deal with 
the larger 'coal waggons 'adopted in place of the chaldrons and agreed 
to purchase a new and bigger dredger. 
By 1865, having expended the E100,000 loan, the RWC sought approval 
for a further' E50,000. * Presumably due to the extent of the works and 
to the manner in which they were being executed the Loan Commissioners 
immediately reduced the loan interest payable from 5% to 3--2/00 at the same 
time instructing Coode to report again on the port. Noting that Hendon 
dock was almost complete, he stated that, to date, c E123,000 had been 
expended, compared with the original estimate of E148,000. Approvingly, 
he reported that the dock "is well devised (and) its enlargement Will' 
not only provide for additional vessels of the largest class,, 
32 but would 
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ease traffic to the Hudson dock. Coode reported also on the entrance 
to the river and referred to a report made by D. & T. Stevenson in 1858. 
They had recommended that the river mouth be protected by two breakwaters, 
the northern 2,610 ft long and the southern 2,250 ft with their pier 
heads, at low tide, in 13 and 11 ft of water; the sea opening was to 
be 900 ft wide. Their report had been somewhat dismissive of the existing 
piers, in that they did not propose "to take the present piers ... as the 
types for future extension, but (would) adopt a style of work in the 
form of a rude but massive breakwater, which, while not nearly so expensive 
as the existing works , 
33 
would serve its purpose equally well. The 
cost of the breakwaters would be E180,000. Coode approved of the earlier 
proposals, -especially if the entrance were to be deepened, and he considered 
further the works in hand and projected, - recording that in his opinion 
a further E104,000 was needed, a total which did not include the breakwaters. 
A-sum of L100,000 was duly granted. ý I 
I. The Hendon dock had cost some E300,000 and, 11 acres in extent, it 
was, with -its 80 ft wide gate to the sea, opened in 1868, bringing to 
an end the major dock developments at Sunderland; * From 1861 coal shipments 
had remained at-- c 3m tons p. a., in no small measure due to the opening, 
of the Jarrow dock.. Revenue, toot had. remained almost static after 
the surge which followed the 1859 amalgamation. The principal change 
which had taken place had been . in the pattern of shipments - with 55', '0 of 
the coal passing through the south dock and only 2516 through the north 
dock. A small import trade had developed with c 100,000 tons , of 
timber 
and some grain passing through the port. 
The completion of the RWC's major works was followed by a period 
of relative inactivity on its part and by several years of virtual stagnation 
in trade. The dock working was improved by the extension of the hydraulic 
power system and several of the drops were replaced by spouts, in some 
instances with greater height SO 2S to accommodate larger ships. it 
* See Map 24 
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was decided to provide a third warehouse, on the eastern side of the 
Hudson dock entrance, to provide facilities for general trade; completion 
was achieved in 1874. In the river itself, an extensive dredging programme 
was undertaken, involving both the deepening of the berths at the private 
staiths and also of the channel generally where the low water depth of 
10 ft in 1868 had by 1873 been increased by some eight feet. Henry 
Hay Wake (1844-1911), resident engineer in succession to Meik, who had 
resigned in 1868, reported in 1873 that c1m tons of material had, that 
year, been removed but much more was required. Dredging had benefited 
the river to the extent that the tidal gain was c ý. - m cubic yards as 
a result of which scouring had been improved . 
34 The cost of this work 
was some Z15,000 and this level of removal was to continue for some years. 
The RWC had in 1859 inherited the SDC's problems at the Hudson dock 
where the Londonderry and North Eastern railways competed for facilities. 
The conflict had been temporarily resolved after the amalgamation but 
the succession to the title of the 5th Marquis of Londonderry (1821-18B4) 
in 1872 brought to the North-East a new interest in his affairs. The 
year following he asked the RWC to provide two new drops, on the basis 
that the 1855 Act of the SDC had stipulated that should the average throughput 
per drop reach 25,000 chaldrons (66,250 tons) p. a. the port must provide 
additional accommodation. 
35 On its part the RWC was reluctant to accede 
to this request and sought instead a judgement on the par t of the Board 
of Trade, outlining to it the history of the port and the background 
to the dispute. By 1859 the NER, had been allocated 14 drops in the 
Hudson dock while the Londonderry Railway led coal to three drops there 
and two in the deeper dock extension. Subsequently the RWC had built 
seven more drops, all capable of acceptin g4 ton waggons. All were 
assigned to Londonderry who gave up three of the older drops. One drop, 
suitable for loadi ng especially large ships was intended to be used by 
both railways but the Londonderry interests had "ever since exercised, 
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and still exercises, the exclusive right of shipping in all the deep water 
berths in the Sunderland Docks. , 36 
The RWC pointed out, too, that when the agreement was made, waggons 
had been of 2.65 tons, but capacity had since risen to 4 tons, so reducing 
the number of wagons needed. In addition, the change from drops to spouts 
had increased loading rates dramatically in that by the latter means it 
was possible to discharge three waggons simultaneously and, at the same 
time, avoid the relatively slow handling time at the drop. Such were 
the advantages of spouts that 12 of the original 17 drops had been so 
converted. The changes had resulted in spouts having a recorded capacity 
0fc -'-. M tons p-a., much in excess of the agreed earlier figure. it 
was also noted that whereas all NER waggon handling was undertaken at 
the docks by the RWC the Londonderry interests carried out all working. 
Now the RWC sought to change this procedure and carry out dock working 
itself, also providing the means for either railway to discharge to any 
spout. That the effect on traffic was considerable was confirmed by 
the fact that much coal had recently been brought into Sunderland by the 
Londonderry Railway in preference to the NER simply because of the former 
company's access to'deep water. 
The last vital matter put to the Board of Trade related to the new 
Hendon dock where additional drops were to be placed. Again, access 
was controlled by the Londonderry interests and negotiations had failed 
to resolve the problems leading the RWC to take the view that any future 
measures would "sooner or later have secured to his lordship a monopoly 
'37 of the proposed deep water shipping berths in the Hendon Dock , facilities 
which had been paid for from public funds on the authority of the Board 
of Trade. Agreement was subsequently reached; Harrison, engineer to 
the NER , was appointed as arbitrator; Londonderry and the NER were bot h 
given access to deep water; the RWC was not to be called upon to provide 
new staiths. Nevertheless, a new Act was sought by the RWC, its principal 
object being the control by the commissioners of the approaches to the 
dock. 38 274 
In discussions which had earlier taken place amongst the commissioners, 
Hugh Taylor, referring to Londonderry, had commented that the RWC "had 
a great property lying useless because of one member of the Commission 
- he did not say who it was because he was a lord '39 and he continued 
by remarking that Londonderry had not assisted Sunderland in any way. 
In spite of a committee having been formed to resolve the problem, nothing 
had been achieved; only an Act of Parliament would suffice. The matter 
was, however, discussed with Londonderry and agreement was reached by 
virtue of the RWC agreeing to pay him L6,000,40 in return for which his 
opposition to the B. ill would be withdrawn. 
41 By its Act the RWC obtained 
powers for the purchase of a section of the foreshore - 0,000 was paid 
for it and so ensured that it would be possible, at a later date, to 
extend the docks southwards. 
The works of the RWC were reported upon by Coode in 1876. He proposed 
that a greater depth should be provided in the river to improve both access 
and scouring but his major proposals concerned the protection of the port's 
two entrances. First projected by the 5tevensons in 1858, two piers 
at the river's entrance were suggested, the north., 2,100 ft long at Roker 
and the south, 1,710 ft long, an extension of the existing pier; a 55 
acre harbour would be so formed. To the south, Coode envisaged a 140 
acre harbour with a north breakwater extending 1, BOO ft from that existing 
and a new detached breakwater also 1,800 ft long, to the south. This 
harbour could be further extended Coode's proposals would provide a 
low-water depth of 16 ft at the junction with the river and 20 ft at the 
South entrance and he put forward his view that the piers' foundations 
should be "formed of large bags of concrete deposited in a plastic condition, 
so as to conform to the inequalities in the bottom, and arranged to produce 
a solid and compac t mass,, 
42 
upon which a masonry superstructure would 
be placed. The river piers were estimated at f, 261,667, the south outlet 
breakwaters at 075,490 and dredging at f40,510. The commissioners did 
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not immediately accept Coode's seaworks proposals but they agreed with 
his views on dredging as the river's improvement was thought to be more 
important. They also agreed to improve the south entrance to the Hudson 
dock where problems had resulted from damage to one of the gates, resolving 
immediately to convert the southern half-tide basin into a lock*, incorporating 
43 
entrances 65 ft wide with low-water depths of 12 ft. 
In 1BBO the docks were again reported upon by Coode, who noted with 
approval the conversion of the basin into a lock, necessary due to the 
growing use of steamships "in which the bulk of the Trade of Sunderland, 
49 in common with the other northern Coal Ports, is now carried on He 
was most sanguine as to the port's future trade, envisaging that the lock 
would permit access at all states of the tide but nevertheless, in view 
of the increasing dimensions of ships, he recommended that the tongue 
of land between the two sections of the Hudson dock should be removed, 
work which the RWC put in hand immediately. 
Two major decisions were made in 1881 by the RWC, by this time with 
James Laing (1823-1901) as its chairman. # Due to long-standing problems 
regarding wave action in the harbour the RWC met with the NER to discuss 
the provision of a wave trap, a suggestion turned down by the NER as land 
in its possession would be required. The Works Committee of the RWC 
thereupon turned its attention to the future of the dock complex as a 
whole, agreeing to take steps for its sale "to the North Eastern or any 
, 45 other Railway Company. Doubts as to the wisdom of this suggestion 
were soon apparent and, a month later, the motion was withdrawn. All 
commissioners were not in agreement but, regardless, no further action 
was taken due to a lack of interest on the part of the NER which had at 
that time recently completed a major redevelopment of the Hartlepool docks. 
The other major decision was that to undertake "the proposed North 
46 Pier at the Harbour Entrance as recommended by Sir John Coode" in 1B76. 
With a length of 480 ft it was opened by Lord Durham in 1880. 
# [3etween 1859 and 1868, when Laing was appointed, there had been three chairmen; Joseph 
Simpson,, Sir Hedworth Williamson and Christopher Maling Webster. 
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A report was prepared by Wake, setting out his suggestions as to the form 
and dimensions of the pier. - It! -would be 35 ft wide at, the top, 3B to 
65 ft wide at the base and, in line with Coode's proposals, would be founded 
on concrete bags weighing between 65 and 100 tons. The pier head, founded 
at a low-water depth of 20 ft would be of 50 ft diameter and would incorporate 
a lighthouse;, construction ý would comprise the building of ' an iron or 
timber caisson, floated out and filled with concrete. Wake estimated 
that the north pier would cost E167,166 and the south - if built, it could 
be of a lighter construction -a further E125,000.47 His plans* were 
adopted, the Board of Trade approved them, land on the foreshore at Roker 
was purchased and work 'began in January 1884.4B Powers for the pier's 
construction had been generally granted by the 1877 Act and this fact, 
together with the works affecting only the Admiralty, rendered itunnecessa. ry 
to deposit the usual Parliamentary-plans. 
The 25 - year -period which ran from the amalgamation of the RWC and 
the SDC up to the beginning -of the north pier's construction in 1884 had 
led only to a slow growth in prosperity, in spite of the substantial civil 
engineering works which had been undertaken. Coal shipments had increased 
from 2.98 to 3.96 m tons p. a., the corresponding figures for the river 
being 1.51 and 1.86 m tons, for the south docks 1.38 and 2. OB m tons, 
and for the north dock, still under the control of the NER, 90,500 - and 
19,400 tons. 
49 The pattern of carriage into the south dock system had 
also changed and whereas in 1870 the NER brought in 1.03 m tons and the 
Londonderry Railway 0.73 m tons, by 1879 the figures were virtually- reversedý 
to 0.66 m tons and 1.02 m tons respectively. 
50 Of the coal shipped from 
the river in 1879 almost half was from the Lambton concerns and the remainder 
from the Hetton and Wearmouth collieries; of the coal carried by the 
Londonderry Railway, a third was from South Hetton; and of the coal shipped 
in the south docks " the greatest producer was the Ryhope colliery with 
c 400,000 tons. ' The revenue of the RWC had increased slowly from E77,800 
See Map 24 
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to E139,200 'in '1883 with ýa sudden surge in 1871. Capital expenditure 
was- modest compared with the earlier spending of the SDC. In 1859 the 
capital of the reformed RWC was listed as E7249000 for the SDC and Z231,000 
on its own behalf. By 1880 the total capital expenditure was L1.676m 
51 the increase divided almost equally between new works and the south harbour. 
The registered tonnage of shipping using the port had remained almost-. 
steady at some 2m tons p. a. - in spite of increasing trade. This apparent 
paradox is accounted for partly 'by changes in ship measurement and partly 
by the growing number of steamships in use and measured differently. 
In the, portý'as a whole, 7,858 ships cleared from it in 1880. Of this 
number no fewer than 3,191 'were of less than 150 tons and only 103 of 
more than' 1,000 tons and it is indicative of the dock's advantagesv or 
the river's shortcomings, that of the' 103,97 used the docks. For ships 
of 500 to 1,000 tons the corresponding figures were 1,050 and 793. The 
growth of steam propuls'lon. is also shown by the figures: 5,959 ships 
cleared in the7'coasting 'trade, 1,769 to Europe and 130 beyond; of these 
totals' the figures for steamers were 2,149,902 and 32; the average ship 
tonnage at the three classes'*of trade were 232,403 and 689 respectively. 
52 
Concomitant with the -shipping trade was that of shipbuilding, the only 
one apposite ýto this study. Between 1854 and 1885 the tonnage launched 
on the Wear varied between 37,000 tons in 1859 and 135,000 tons in 1872, 
roughly comparable with the output of the Tyne. 
53 Unlike the Tyne, 
howeverg the change from wood to iron had been at a slower rate and it 
was not until 1868 that'iron-hulled ships predominated, so far as construction 
was concerned. The year in which the balance changed on a national basis 
was 1862.54 Of the iron ships launched in 1862 the total tonnages were 
for the Tyne 32,200, for the Wear 15,600 ton and for the Tees 9,700 tons. 
Shipbuilding on the Wear was not easy due to the narrowness of the river, 
the steep banks and the lack of sufficient flat ground, the maximum river 
width available being no more than 400 ft. 
55 
This configuration led 
to angled berths being adopted as the dimensions of ships increased. 
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The needs of Sunderland had been governed by the narrowness of the 
Wear and hence a lack of berthing facilities. This restriction had, 
in turn, led to the provision "of floating accommodation on an extensive 
scale for the shipping of coal in the docks according to the most improved 
modern systems , 
56 
and this philosophy had brought about major capital 
expenditure - at times unprofitable - by both the SDC and the RWC. The 
RWC was in 1883 accused, without proof being given, of having used river 
revenue for maintaining the docks, in effect subsidising them, but even 
this procedure had not led to the vastly increased trade which might have 
been expected after the dock's initial success. In this light it is 
understandable that the NER, in turn, was criticised for attempting to 
kill Sunderland by diverting the major part of its coal traffic to Tyne 
Dock and Hartlepool, 
57 in the case of the latter port an unjust accusation. 
6.4 River Tees 
The first meeting of the Tees Conservancy Commission (TCC) was held 
in Stockton on 22 November 1852. In accordance with its enabling Act, 
the commission comprised three Admiralty nominees, one of them Joseph 
Pease, together with five members each from Stockton and Middlesbrough, 
the latter town's members including Henry BolQkow and John Vaughan; Yarm 
was represented by two members. 
I Charles Trotter (1798-1877) of Stockton 
was appointed chairman and two committees, Finance and Workswere constituted 
to undertake more expeditiously the commission's work. Bolo-kow and Vaughan 
2 
were their respective chairmen. 
The Admiralty had earlier confirmed the intention of the promoters 
to build breakwaters at the mouth of the Tees and the commissioners, in 
the same year, noted that the Admiralty, through Edward Cdlverq intended 
to survey the estuary. In its plans to improve the river the TCC enthusias. 
tically endorsed the earlier suggestion and in 1853 asked Pease, when 
in London, to attempt to secure funds for the construction of the two 
breakwaters? In anticipation of future major works William Bald (1789- 
z79 
1857), who had reported upon -the river in 1851, was appointed as engineer 
with James Johnson as superintendent of works. After his death in 1854, 
Johnson was replaced by John James Fowler (1824-1888). 4 The TCC perceived 
rightly that dredging was one of the principal factors in the river's 
improvement and by lB54 a new machine had been purchased. 
In spite of these early moves, the initial years of the TCC were 
not easy, principally on account of a lack of revenue, the result of competition 
from the Hartlepools and also paradoxically, the discovery and exploitation 
of the Cleveland ironstone deposits. The development of West Hartlepool 
and the partial migration of the coal trade from the Tees to the dock 
built by Ralph Ward Jackson is outlined elsewhere but it was the iron 
industry which was most to affect the river's development. 
The presence of ironstone 'deposits in the area had been known since 
1822 and subsequently the Tyne Iron Company "had collected nodular ironstone 
on the beach, and shipped it to their works during the summer months"; 
5 
later, it had been shipped to the Birtley Iron Company's works. A small 
rolling mill had been first 'established in Middlesbrough by, Bolt, ý_Ow' and 
Vaughan in 1840, without it being realised that iron deposits lay adjacent, 
and the), had built furnaces at Witton, at the head of the SOR, to use 
local ores and fuel. It was Vaughan who, with John Marley, first traced 
fully the presence of ironstone deposits in north Yorkshire in 1850 and 
from that 'time the mining of ironstone expanded rapidly, furnaces were 
established in Middlesbrough and the production of pig-iron began. Although 
the new industry was to have a' dramatic effect upon the economy of the 
area it militated against the TCC in that the ironworks themselves became 
the major fuel users while their product, pig-iron, was largely used by 
the area's industries and, as such,. the commission derived little benefit 
from the growing prosperity. It was the SOR which derived the greater 
revenue from the transport of increasing tonnages of ironstone, coal and 
limestone, the-latter extensively used in the iron's production. 
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Such were ýthe financial, problems that the TCC rather than- LLse its 
dredging plant, was forced to rent it to other authorities and in 1853 
moves had been made to modify the original Act which stipulated that the 
first call upon-revenue should be payment of interest on the original 
company shares. The 1854 Act 
6 
placed operational expenses first, then 
the interest on , the capital sums of' Z107,000 and Z32,000. At the same 
time the TCC gave consideration to again leasing the port dues' to the 
S&DR, a procedure which would have repeated the earlier arrangement, due 
to end,, which had been made with the Tees Navigation Company (TNC). 
The S&DR, however, proved unwilling to renew, a move sensible in view 
of falling shipments, and the -TCC found its income from dues reduced from 
L6,900 to E4,800. Total revenue in 1854 was E7,333 and in 1855, Z4,825. 
To bolster income the commissioners in 1858 sought to purchase anchorage 
and plankage dues from Stockton and the Ecclesiastical Commission, paying 
E4,700 and E2,400 to the two bodies. 
8 
In spite of a low income, used almost exclusively to pay the interest 
on the- TNC's shares, the commissioners were able to spend a modest amount' 
on capital works,, made possible by individual commissioners, Pease, Bolc: tow 
and Vaughan, guaranteeing the loans. 
9 Delays in receiving Admiralty 
approval for down-river works was used as an excuse to dismiss Bald in 
1854 and although work on the river's improvement began the following 
year it was not until 1857 that the Admiralty sanctioned the next stage 
of the work, from the dock to the Ninth Buoy, midway between Middlesbrough 
and the sea. - With this consent the TCC sought a further Act, passed 
in 1858, its major provisions being thnse regarding the reclamation- of 
land, financep the involvement of the S&DR, the Stockton dues and the 
power of the, Admiralty. -, "to lay down lines for depositing slag and other 
materials below high water"10-to form training walls. 
When the 1852 Bill had been in Parliament, the promoters - had estimated 
that revenue, assuming a 25/00 increase in traffic, would amount to LIO, 9BB 
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p. a. 
11 but the reduction -, in coal exports had caused income to fall in 
1855, although a subsequent increase had been experienced. The TCC had 
been empowered to raise L80,000 on mortgage but a debt of almost E40,000 
had been inherited and it was to rectify this situation that the 1858 
Act was gained, enabling, the TCC to borrow L40,000 from the SOR "much 
interested in the Preservation and Improvement of the Navigation" 
12 
and 
the principal source of- revenue. Another - aspect was the reclamation 
of land, a matter i, n which the TCC was unique in the North-East. The config- 
uration of the river Tees was such that, unlike the Tyne and Wear, it 
possessed an expansive estuary -and the river itself meandered through 
low-lying country. The improvements begun by the TNC had tended to reduce 
the, river's width, leading to the possibility of land reclamation, principally 
for industrial use. The Act stipulated how the -revenue from the sale 
of these areas was to be distributed; half to the TCC, a quarter to the 
landowners and a quarter, to the "Commissioners of Her Majesty's Woods, 
13 Forests and Land Revenues" Land retrieval and river improvement were 
inter-related in that whereas river works under the TNC had comprised 
the forming of groynes at right-angles to the river's flow, the new proposals 
were for longitudinal training walls, initially to half, or third-tide' 
height but later to full height. Even without these walls the groyn6s 
had proved ef f ective and had advanced "the foreshore of . 
the river to the 
extremities of. the groynes, thereby reducing, in some parts the width 
of the original channel , '14 by half. 
The TCC had, in 1854, opposed the formation of the NER on the grounds 
that it would be "prejudicialto the Port of Stockton.,, 
15 The same view 
was strongly held by Stockton itself, fearful that it would be deprived 
of the benefit of competing railways, an opinion misconceived as Stockton 
was the town - Seaham, Harbour excepted - likely to be least affected by 
amalgamation; it was also served by the SOR and the WHH&R. As the 
Bill progressed through: Parliament the Stockton representatives there 
reported that "some protection was necessary to save Stockton and other 
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places where the amalgamated railway companies had no interest besides their 
railway - from the tyranny of railway directors - this protection is given 
in the strongest manner the deputation were able to obtain" 
16 
mainly by 
persuading the NER to char'ge in a manner which would favour the town. 
Similarly, the TCC opposed the 1855 Act of the Hartlepool Port and 
Harbour Commission, the Bills promoted by the S&DR for railways in north 
Yorkshire, the Durham and' Cleveland Union Railway Bill and the Middlesbrough 
Extension Bill; only the Darlington and Boroughbridge branch railway 
was supported. In the years following 1850 railway activity in the Cleveland 
area was the result of the exploitation of the iron ore deposits. Many 
lines, both private and public, were built and, not 'to be detailed here, 
they have been well described by Tomlinson and others. The mining of 
of ore developed rapidly and by 1858 output had reached 1.367 m tons, 
almost all of it brought by rail to Middlesbrough where furnaces had been 
established by Bol6kow-Vaughan in 1852, by Gilkes Wilson and Leatham in 
the same year, by Innes-Hopkins in 1853, and by Cochrane in 1854.17 
On the north bank of the river, Isaac Lowthian Bell had established blast 
furnaces at Port Clarence on land made available by Jackson. Bell, one 
of the few industrialists of the 'North-East to have interests on Tyne, 
Wear and Tees was in 1862 appointed a director of the WHH&R and on its 
demise in 1865 became a director of the NER, a position which he maintained 
until his death, almost 40 years later. 
The formation of new'railways in the area brought the TCC into conflict 
with their promoters. In 1857 two proposals were put forward, one by 
the S&DR and the other, On behalf of the Durham and Cleveland Railway, 
by the WHH&R. The TCC1s' involvement concerned the river crossings; that 
proposed by the S&DR comprised a swing bridge with two 90 ft spans located 
18 downstream of Stockton and the other a pair of piers, with a ferry', 
19 
downstream of Middlesbrough dock. The case of the two railways came 
before Parliament in 1858, the inquiry on their rival merits lasting for 
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20 days. Paraphrasing Tomlinson, the conflicts were complicated: Stockton 
opposed the bridge as affecting navigation; Middlesbrough opposed the 
ferry as it was intending to operate such a service itself; the TCC opposed 
both schemes; the landowners, in general, opposed the S&DR. 
19 Opposition 
polarised into a personal struggle between Jackson and Joseph Pease but 
neither party was victorious. No river crossing was approved, only part 
of the Durham and Cleveland line was to be built and the S&DR was empowered 
only to extend its lines to Saltburn. Under the title of the Cleveland 
Railway - Bell and Jackson were later directors of it - an Act 
21 
was granted 
which authorised the building of some 11 miles of track between Guisbrough 
and Skinningrove. The S&DR, unsuccessful in its attempt to prevent the 
incursion of the WHH&R into Cleveland attempted later to make itself the 
link between Cleveland and the WHH&R but 
, 
the latter, through Jackson's 
Upsall, Normanby and Ormsby Railway, sought to circumvent the S&DR monopoly. 
It was the location of Bell's furnaces on the north bank of the Tees, 
placed there to provide a convenient access for south Durham coal and 
limestone, which in 1860 brought about, indirectly, a further conflict 
between Jackson and the TCC. Jackson, who had already discussed the matter 
with the NER, 
22 in that year introduced a Bill for the construction of 
the railway, including a jetty projecting into the Tees at Cargo Fleet, 
downstream of Middlesbrough dock. From the jetty iron ore could be shipped 
by barge to Bell's furnaces at Port Clarence or despatched elsewhere. 
The S&DR, considering that its rights to the foreshore of the Normanby- 
estate would be infringed, opposed Jackson's Bill and Parliament, in its 
consideration of the matter, brought about its defeat but at the same 
time upheld-Jackson's rights to the foreshore. In 1859 a further dispute 
occurred in relation to the Cleveland Railway seeking to dredge its shipping 
place, considered by the TCC to be its responsibility. 
23 The TCC1s view 
had been that it "did not think that there was any evidence to show that 
(the shipment of iron ore was) likely to be of any importance , 
24 
and considered 
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that the dock should suffice for any shipment- required. When Jackson's 
Upsall project became known, the TCC determined to oppose it* and Thomas 
Meik was retained to investigate and report. The promoters of the railway 
were, with Jackson, John and Lowthian Bell and, displeased by the fact 
that work had begun, the TCC applied for an injuction to prevent further 
work on the jetty, intended to project 1,000 ft into the river from the 
high-water line. The TCC1s move was unsuccessful and Fowler was instructed 
11 to take such steps as will prevent any further erection , 
25 
of the jetty, a 
move which led to the 'battle of the Tees' in which Jackson's employees 
were physically obstructed, by barges, from undertaking their work -and, 
in riposte, Jackson cast the vessels adrift and then protected the pier 
works with chains, a move which subsequently led to a hand-to-hand battle 
with Jackson and Fowler commanding the opposing forces. 
26 Late in 1860 
Jackson re vived his' plans for the jetty and, perhaps in emulation of 
earlier events at Blyth, suggested that from it loaded waggons of ironstone 
would be transported across the river "in open barges sufficiently large 
27 to take twenty-four waggons each" . This scheme too was opposed by 
the TCC but nevertheless was sanctioned. 
28 
The last of the new railways which was to af fect the Tees was the 
trans-Pennine SDRUR, its formation opposed by the NER, which had earlier 
rejected involvement in it. It was built to meet the needs of the iron 
industryg and its promotion was a result of the foresight of the S&DR. 
Jackson, too, had been invited to be party to the railway's formation 
and use but had declined, in what was "one of the worst decisions , 
29 - of 
his career in that it could have provided him with useful connections 
to the west coast. ' Transporting the higher grade iron ore, haematite, 
from the west coast and in the reverse direction, carrying coal and limestone, 
the SDRUR was, in effect, an extension of the S&DR, running westwards 
for 44 miles via Barnard Castle and Kirkby Stephen to 'Tebay. Amongst 
its directors were members of the Pease family and other Teesside industrialists. 
30 
In 1858 Jackson had been in personal dispute with the TCC, resulting from his involvement with 
the Royal Commission on Harbours of Refuge. 
2R5 
Completed in 1861 the line became, part of the S&DR the following year. 
Railway competition in the Cleveland and south Durham areas ended 
within a short period. Relations among the three companies had been 
amicable but competitive and although a somewhat desultory move had been 
I 
made in 1860 to combine the two smaller undertakings, nothing had transpired; 
31 
32 neither had talks involving the NER, the S&DR and the WHH&R brought results., 
In 1863, however, the NER sought to amalgamate with the S&DR. The proposal 
was initially objected to by both Stockton and the WHH&R 
33 but arrangements 
made with both bodies resulted in the Bill being unopposed in both Houses 
and receiving the Royal Assent in 1863. The NER gained 200 route miles 
and, through the Middlesbrough dock, was brought into direct contact, 
for the first time, with the TCC. 
In 1860 the capital of the S&DR had totalled Z3 m, having risen from 
c El m in 1852. In the same period coal revenue had increased from E48,000 
to E78,000 p. a. and for limestone the figures were E28,000 and Z59,000; 
merchandise receipts had doubled to E31,000 and passenger income had increased 
likewise, to E16,000.34 Of its capital, the S&DR had spent E295,000 
on its track, E162,000 on the Middlesbrough dock, c Zkm on rolling stock 
and c E25,000 on shipping places. Before having been absorbed into the 
NER it had grown even further, to a capital value of c 1.3.5m. 
35 Two 
years later the amalgamation of the NER with the WHH&R brought the north 
bank of the Tees under the control of the same company. By these two 
moves the NER had achieved, with the exception of the Blyth and Tyne and 
the Londonderry railways* a territorial monopoly over the coalfield with 
docks on Tyneq Wear and Tees, and at Hartlepool. 
The achievements of the TCC had matched neither those of the S&DR 
nor the WHH&R in that by 1862 its revenue had recovered only to little 
above the figure for 1853. Until 1860 the amount spent on capital had 
averaged c E10,000 p. a. but subsequently it increased to E35,000 in 1864.36 
In concept the projected civil engineering works were simple and at the 
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formation of the TCC consisted of the Stockton dock, river training walls 
and the construction of breakwaters at the river's mouth. The dock had 
been envisaged as similar to Bristol's 'floating harbourl, the conversion 
of the river's course into a dock with gates at each end, the flow of 
the river being accommodated by a new channel formed in the south-facing 
bend of the river immediately downstream of Stockton bridge. 
37 To effect 
its formation the 1852 Act had included for a Stockton Dock Committee 
to be established but the town, fearful that if Middlesbrough should come 
to dominate Sto6kton the dock would not be built, in the same year sought 
to free the dock from the TCCIs control and build it from the town's rates. 
38 
A Bill, was prepared in 1853 but although the TCC petitioned in favour 
of the change it was rejected by the House of Lords, principally on the 
grounds that rate support was unprecedented; a sum of E70,000 had been 
envisaged. 
During 1859 and 1860 discussions took place between the TCC and the 
Admiralty regarding the line of channel to be formed through the Tees 
estuary, a subject of much discussion in the port, and at the same time 
the commissioners entered into negotiations with the ironmasters and the 
SOR regarding the supply of slag for use in the training walls. 
39 Claimed 
- and disputed - as the first use of this material it was true to say 
that never before had it been used on the scale now envisaged, a use 
which brought advantages both to the commissioners and to the ironmasters, 
and revenue to the S&DR, to be responsible for its transport. 
Breakwaters had been envisaged at the mouth of the Tees since 1852. 
In 1855 they had been reported upon by Rendel who had estimated their 
cost at L300,000; * 
40 
and they had been shown on a plan submitted to the 
Harbours of Refuge Select Committee in 1857 by Fowler. 
41 After some 
pressure the Admiralty sanctioned the construction of both breakwaters 
in 1861 and the commissioners resolved to seek the loan of L100,000 needed 
for their construction. # Due reflection reduced this figure to E10,000 
This sum has been given elsewhere as E600,000. 
# under the powers of the Harbours and Passing Tolls Act, 1861 
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p. a. for three years and Henry Pease and the Earl of Zetland were asked 
to negotiate with the Public Works Loan Commissioners on behalf of the 
commissioners. 
42 It was agreed that the southern breakwater should be 
built first, in view of the availability of materials an understandable 
decision. 
The establishment of the iron industry had led to growing quantities 
of slagg the furnace waste;. becoming available and difficult to dispose 
of. The formation of the Tees improvement works, especially the. breakwater, 
provided an ideal opportunity for its disposal and negotiations between 
the TCC and the ironmasters resulted in slag being made available, in 
two to three ton blocks, by Boltkow-Vaughan, Gilkes-Wilson and Cochrane; 
the ironmasters were to pay l-, d per ton to the TCC while it in turn paid 
,, d per ton 
tb the S&DR. The cross-section of the breakwater varied but 
was principally of slag blocks, cast for the purpose, and faced on the 
seaward side with a, mass concrete wall. The extremity of the breakwater 
was to be protected by 30 to 40 ton concrete blocks, placed in a random 
manner. In 1857, John Dunning (1826-1895), engineer to the Middlesbrough 
owners, had advocated the use of slag blocks of comparable tonnage for 
the whole of breakwaters of a much larger harbour of refuge then considered 
43 
but the use of blocks of this size would have created transport problems 
and it is significant that the TCC, for the pier head protection, used 
concrete. 
The beginning of the breakwater construction* virtually coincided 
with two significant changes within the TCC; Joseph Whitwell Pease (1828- 
1903) was appointed as member in place of his father and Isaac Wilson 
(1822-1899) was appointed chairman in place of Trotter. # It was possibly 
these changes which led the TCC in 1862 to present a further Bill to Parliament, 
among its provisions being the raising of dues on shipping - vital 'if 
the improvement of the river were to take place - and the enforcement 
* The South Gare breakwater was officially -inaugurated in November 1863. 
# Trotter was chairman 1852-1860; Wilson 1860-1884. 
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by the TCC of wharf maintenance by owners, indicative of the growing development 
44 
of industry on the river's banks. Royal Assent was given in July 1863. 
In its effects the Act was successful. Between 1864 and 1870, gross 
receipts rose from E10,545 to E19,146 and so enabled the TCC, through 
its contractor, John Anderson, to pursue the works necessary. 
45 
The prospect of improving finances led the TCC to purchase a new 
dredger in 1864 and to continue its policy of land reclamation, some of 
the area so treated being sold for E400 p. acre. * The expansion of industry 
and of the town of Middlesbrough itself, led the TCC in IB65 to ask the 
NER to consider additional dock and warehouse facilities. Lack of response 
led the commissioners to proceed with a further Act, a move which revived 
the controversy regarding a dock at Stockton. The Chamber of Commerce 
of that town suggested to the TCC that in addition to its continuing worksg 
for which E150,000 additional borrowing was sought, a dock was essential 
for the efficient use of the river by shipping. The committee appointed 
by the TCC concluded that no dock construction should be undertaken "out 
of the ordinary funds of the Commission and that it must rest with the 
parties locally interested tIo provide the needful funds , 
46 
and noted 
that the proposed Tynemouth dock was to be financed by the BUR, land 
and colliery-owners, municipalities and the TIC, thought likely to create 
a precedent. ' The TCC coul d not agree to provide a dock at Stockton as 
it considered that the wharfs there had been too long neglected but it 
suggested that the NER could perhaps improve its communications to the 
town. On its part, Stockton put forward the view that no river I improvement 
proposal should omit the removal of the old bridge and suggested also 
that the length of the river within the town boundary should be placed 
under municipal control. The drawings deposited prior to the Act showed 
only a graving dock at Middlesbrough, down-river from the dock, and a 
47 
branch railway from the former Clarence Railway to Stockton quay; the 
Act, howeverg sanctioned construction of the North Gare- breakwater and 
* This value was, later, to rise substantially. 
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the widening of the river downstream of the Old Cut. 
48 
Dissatisfied by the earlier response of the NER to the river's needs 
the TCC again attempted to persuade it to improve its docks, this time 
with some success. The NER*noted that the matter had 
again been brought before the Directors by influential deputations 
from mercantile bodies connected with commerce at Middlesbrough 
and the surrounding districts, who represented the trade of 
the locality as being placed under great disadvantages, and 
seriously curtailed in consequence of the present inadequate 
dock accommodation (but) ... as Cleveland has now become one 
of the largest iron producing districts in the Kingdom, and 
possessing at the same time the requesite elements of further 
extension, the Directors, after carefully considering this 
case, have felt that they could not, in justice either to 
the important trade in question, or the the Company' s own 
interests, refuse to bring this matter forward... 49 
Although perhaps the decision was not directly due to the TCC, nevertheless 
in 1869 modifications to the dock wereput in hand under the direction 
of Harrison. 
# 
At a_, cost of c L128,000 a river entrance was provided, 
55ft wide in place of the previous inadequate 30 ft, and the dock was 
enlarged from nine, to 12 acres, vertical walling being formed in place 
of the earlier embankments. 
50 The reluctance on the part of the - TCC 
to put works in hand could be explained by the relative finanaces of the 
two undertakings: the revenue of the NER in 1867 was E3.84 m and of the 
TCC E14,060; capital stood at E2B. 4m and c Ihm respectively. 
Due to problems in its construction. , work on the South Gare breakwater 
was suspended in 1869 and the TCC 
I 
called in Harrison to report upon it. 
A bed of quicksand had been encountered in one of the river channels and 
its thickness, 
- 
30 to 40 ft, was such as to lead to a three-year, cessation 
of work, principally on financial grounds. 
51 Harrison also conferred 
with the TCC regarding the construction of a railway bridge - of swinging 
form - between Newport and Middlesbrough and suggested that the commissioners 
visit Goole to see the similar bridge there; he would provide "a 
train for the purpose of the proposed visit',, 
52 the first of many such 
The NER informed a deputation for Middlesbrough that expansion of dock would be accompanied by 
higher rates, in line with those on Tyne and Wear. NER: Board Minute Book, vol 6., 24 July 1868) 
(PRo: RAIL 527/12) 
# See Map 20 
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favours. Still dissatisfied, the TCC agreed to oppose the NER Bill, 
in spite of its assurance that rail traffic would be subordinate to shipping. 
Undeterred, the NER in 1873 made known its intention of forming a tunnel 
under the river at Port Clarence 
53 
and, in spite of Fowler's only condition 
being that the river must be capable of being deepened to provide 20 ft 
of water at low tide, the commissioners again opposed the railway' company. 
Despite the 'Act having been obtained the NER did not build the tunnel 
and, simila*rly, the Bill presented earlier by the Hartlepool and Cleveland 
Junction Railway, which envisaged a similar tunnel, was withdrawn. 
54 
By the time the Middlesbrough dock extensions had been completed 
in 1873 (or 1874) the nature of the trade of the river Tees had been transformed. 
Since 1850 it had changed from being a coal-exporting river to an iron 
producing district, its output of 2m tons p. a. of pig iron being one third 
of the U. K. total. Writing in 1872 Bell recorded that this output required 
5m tons of ironstone, 5 m' tons of coal or coke, lkým tons of limestone, 
so "there must be put in motion, for the yearly production of this quantity 
of crude iron, something more , 
than 12 millions of tons of raw material. , 
55 
He estimated that the manufacture , of the iron employed 6,000, ironstone 
mining 10,000, coal extraction and coking 20,000, limestone quarrying 
2,000,, in total,, 40,000. To keep pace with this output of iron the coal 
industry had doubled its capacity to 28 m tons p. a. and its price had 
56 risen correspondingly; in 1850 it had been "a drug in the market" .I 
Much ofýthe iron, both cast and malleable, was used locally but a proportion 
was carried from the river, where coal shipments had fallen 'from c -2m 
tons in 1850 to c 100,000 tons. In view of Bell's comments it is perhaps 
surprising that the NER, in its dock extension, had provided for improved 
coal handling plant.. 
The stimulus to, trade provided by the iron industry spurred the river's 
industrialists to greater efforts. In 1872 plans were prepared for a 
dock and timber pond on the south bank of the river downstream of MiddlesbroUgh 
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and two years later the TCC proposed that two timber ponds- be formed 
at Greatham Fleet, on the north bank of the estuary. 
57 Neither proposal 
materialised. The earlier suggestion was for a wet dock of some 27 acres, 
with a timber pond of similar size, connected by rail to the NER line 
from Middlesbrough to Redcar. 58 A Bill for its construction was promoted 
by, amongst others, Joseph Dodds, Henry Boltkow, Jeremiah Head, Thomas 
Vaughan, John Gjers and George Neesham, all active in the iron trade. 
The capital of the company was to be-Z275,000 and its formation, in combination 
with the NER dock, was seen as being likely to make "the Ironopolis of 
59 the North one of the largestshipping ports in the Kingdom" . The TCC 
found itself in a difficult position in that Dodds, solicitor, prominent 
industrialist and M. P. for Stockton, was Clerk to the Commissioners while 
Bolr-kow, soon to become M. P. for Middlesbrough, was a commissioner and 
chairman of the Finance : Committee. In spite of their involvement the 
TCC decided to oppose the Bill which, introduced into the House of Commons 
in February 1873, was reported upon the following month as having been 
withdrawnt for reasons unspecified. 
60 
The TCC, although opposing the Tees Dock and Railway Company, -was 
not averse to further docks being built on the river and in May offered 
the town of Stockton the, chance of building a dock in Portrack Slake; 
61 
if it were not to be built, the TCC would reclaim the land. Proposals were 
duly submittedý by Sir John Hawkshaw- (1811-1891), acting for Stockton, 
and they indicated a re-adoption of the scheme suggested a quarter of 
a century earlier, the construction of a new cutting, approximately half 
a mile longý to permit the river itself to enjoy a constant water level. 
62, 
In spite of having negotiated - with the Stockton authorities concerning 
the new dock there, the' TCC nevertheless opposed the Bill, later withdrawn. 
The last of the dock proposals in this period was that for a dry dock, 
sanctioned by the 1867 Acts. In 1873 land was acquired for it from the 
Middlesbrough Owners, a contract for its construction was placed in April 
292 
1874 and it was opened in November 1876, so obviating the need for shipowners 
to use other ports to repair their, ships, with the concomitant loss of 
revenue. 
In 1874 a new survey of the Tees was undertaken by Calver, , who had 
reported upon the river in 1853. This report revealed the extent of 
the commissioners' efforts. On all counts, width, depth and straightness, 
the improvements had been marked. Training walls had been formed and 
a depth of six feet at low water had been provided to Stockton. The 
greatest improvement, however, was in the estuary where "the substitution 
of a direct and wide channel for the two narrow and tortuous passages 
which formerly existed , 
63 had provided the port with a greatly improved 
access. In twenty years, though the amount of dredging undertaken had 
amounted only to c4m tons, "a quantity less than that which has at times 
64 - been removed from the bed of the Tyne in a single year", the improvement 
had, nevertheless, been of great value and Calver drew the conclusion 
that the ; TCC should, by the results achieved, be encouraged to continue 
its efforts. 
The growth of the iron industry had led to the greatest population 
increase taking place in Middlesbrough and its proportion of trade had 
increased accordingly. As a result it was natural that in 1870 a proposal, 
not taken up by the commissioners, had been made to amend the constitution 
of the TCC and a Bill to that effect had sought representation for the 
payers of port dues. Four of the promoters were members of the TCC but 
the Bill failed in Parliament. In 1B74, however, the Middlesbrough Corp- 
oration resolved that "no extended Parliamentary powers should be granted 
(to the TCC) without the constitution being reformed so as to give proper 
representation to all interested an the river , 
65 
and suggested that the 
river's importers, exporters, shipowners and wharfingers should be included, 
as should the new towns.. The matter had been the subject of much debate 
in the Middlesbrough Council meetings and it led to an interchange of 
29ý 
letters between BoXtow and Dunning, a prominent member. 
. 
BolcXow suggested that ship-owners, importers and exporters should 
each elect two members to the TCC while Middlesbrough should elect fourp 
its present number. He continued by advising "that no attempt should 
be made to claim any preponderance in the Commission for Middlesbrough 
as (he) had a strong impression that such an attempt would fail before 
66 the Committee in the House of Commons" . His views were treated by 
Dunning with surprise. 
I am utterly astonished at gentlemen' like yourself Mr. Wilson 
and Mr. Dodds who may be said to take a prominent part as Liberal politicians thiowing overboard one of their most notable 
arguments, na 
, 
mely that representation should follow taxation, 
and propose that Middlesbrough and the works lower down the 
river which produce 8/10 of the dues should only have equal 
representation with the remaining 2/10.67 
Dunning, at the same time, voiced his disquiet as to the fact that the 
TCC was about to contribute U0,000 to the rebuilding of Stockton bridge; 
0/ 8056 of that sum had originated in Middlesbrough. Proposals for amending 
the constitution of the TCC came from three sources, as follows: 
1852 Act M'bro Corpn. Chamber of 
Commerce 
TCC--, 
Ad miralty 3 3 3 3 
Stockton Corporation 5 5 4 4 
Middlesbrough 
Corporation 5 5 4 4 
Yarm 2 2 1 2 
Shipowners: Stockton ( 2 
M'bro 5 4 2 
Traders: Stockton ( 2 
MIbro 5 5 2 
Landowners 2 2 2 
Wharfingers 5 
South Stockton 1 
Eston 1 
Port Clarence 1 
Docks and Railways 3 
Total 15 38 23 23 
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The proposals which had been put forward by the Chamber of Commerce, the 
chairman of which was Bell, were more realistic than were those of Middlesbrough, 
which, while ostensibly maintaining parity between Middlesbrough and Stockton, 
was in fact attempting - understandably to favour the down-river interests. 
The Chamber of Commerce sought - rightly a much smaller body with parity 
virtually maintained while the suggestions of the TCC were much nearer 
to the views of the Chamber of Commerce than to Middlesbrough, envisaging 
the same total meaLbership of 23 but, with scrupulous fairness, insisting 
that shipowners and traders be evenly matched between the two towns. 
The TCC did not wish itself to be seen as favouring Middlesbrough and 
so leading to the dominance of the town in the affairs of the river but 
it did amend its proposals in one regard, the landowners, a body for long 
represented on the Wear. The TCC Bill excluded them completely and their 
opposition was assuaged only 
- 
when the TCC promised that no further land 
reclamation would be undertaken without Parliamentary powers being sought. 
68 
The Act was duly passed in accordance with the TCC proposals. 
69 
- 
Stockton Corporation had pleaded in 1866 that the TCC should undertake 
replacement of the bridge there on the grounds that, as at Newcastle, 
it impeded navigation and restricted the development of the river above 
it. In July 1876, a month after the opening of the Newcastle Swing Bricige, 
a committee was formed to investigate the matter 
70 but it was not until 
1880 that the TCC offered to contribute Z5,000 towards the cost of bridge 
and to dredge the river. Later, the contribution was increased to E6,000, 
finance was offered by the roads authorities on both banks of the river 
and in 1881, considering the costs involved to be high for Stockton to 
bear alone, the TCC was requested to increase its contribution, perhaps 
to E10,000. About to do so, the TCC was informed by Middlesbrough, by 
the shipowners and by the Chamber of Commerce that they objected strongly 
to being called upon to subsidise Stockton, whereupon the offer was withdrawn. 
74 
An Act of Parliament was obtained for the bridge's construction in 1881 
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- it sanctioned borrowings of Z120,000 - and work began the following 
year. 
The NER agaiq came into conflict, with the TCC in '1876 when it, toog 
wished to construct a bridge at Stockton to replace the one built in sub- 
stitution for the original suspension -bridge. Harrison submitted details 
but the TCC considered that the bridge, like that at Goole, should be 
capable of being opened. The NER view prevailed and fixed spans were 
adopted. 
72 Stockton did not relent in its desire to improve its shipping 
facilities andq having been unable to provide a dock, sought instead a 
new town quay, some 500 feet in length. 
73 To the design of Hawkshaw 
74 the quay was sanctioned in the Corporation's Act of 1878. 
During the . -years following 1870 the TCC again found its revenue in- 
sufficient. In both 1871 and 1876 income was U19,000, rising between 
those dates only to -c L20,000. In 1875 the commissioners astutely asked 
Sir Stafford Northcote, Chancellor of 'the Exchequer, to lay the foundation 
stone of the new graving dock and in 1877 having unsuccessfully. sought 
a grant for the breakwater, Pease, Dodds and Fallows met with the Chancellor, 
following which application was made for a E50,000 loan. 
75 The same 
year the TCC sought a furthex Actq principally to increase dues so as 
to reduce debt. * Meanwhile, to restrict expenditure the north railway 
was abandoned and the North G6re: breakwater was postponed; dredging, 
however, continued. These -temporary restrictions, the TCC hoped, would 
obviate the raising of dues, a measure applauded by the ironmasters and 
the Chamber of Commerce, both of which nevertheless urged the commissioners 
to reduce borrowings. Apparently without controversy the necessary Act 
76 
was passedg with the result that by 1880 revenue had been raised to Z53,000 
p. a., an increase possible, perhaps, only on the Tees, without a competitor 
in the North-East. 
Although municipal prosperity increased, the TCC received little benefit 
and between 1880 and 1885 the numbers of ships using the river, but not 
- Debt was charged as E540,000 to capital and E137,000 to breakwaters. 
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their tonnage, fell. 77 Revenue remained almost static, averaging only 
some L55,800 over a six -year period. In these circumstances the TCC 
continued to press for a grant and sought further loans, both for dredging 
and for the breakwaters, the first of which was now approaching completion. 
In an effort to bolster trade the commissioners sought of the NER a reduction 
in rates, a move which was rebuffed by the railway company, 
78 
suffering 
to the same extent as the TCC; in the six years noted its revenue, too, 
was virtually static, averaging c E6.5 m p. a. 
79 Again in an effort to 
further-its interests, the TCC requested the Board of Trade to present 
the statistics of the separate ports as a single entity, a move made also 
on the Tyne. Although each -town of both the rivers was jealous of its 
rights, nevertheless, in adversity or competition they were forced to 
combine. 
80 
In the 30-year period which had followed its establishment the TCC 
had continued its programme of river improvement. The South Gare- breakwater 
had been largely built, the North tare. breakwater begun in 1882ý* The 
river had been dredged to the extent that 16.56 m tons of material had 
been removed and a total 'length of 20 miles of slag training walls had 
been built. A graving dock had been formed and was operated by the commission. 
Problems howeverg continued. In 1883 shipowners trading with grain to 
Stockton complained as to the river's inadequate depth, a deficiency which, 
they claimed, was leading to trade leaving the Tees for Hartlepool; additionally, 
Stockton was "the dearest port in the Kingdom. "81 In response the TCC 
made proposals to extend the port limits, a move which led to some conflict 
with Hartlepool, recently in concert with the TCC concerning plans for 
a harbour of refuge in the Tees Bay. At the same time, the TCC sought 
additional dock accommodation and coal-loading facilities, 
84 the NER having 
been . -requested earlier 
to restore its plant at Port Clarence; it was 
allgreat disadvantage ... not having any coal drop at Middlesbrough , 
83 
which 
could be used without -entering the dock. In this instance the NER had 
See Map 11 
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moved ahead of the TCC, reporting to its shareholders in 1883 that 
the traf fic at the Middlesbrough Dock has, during the last 
few years, so largely increased that, in the opinion of the directors, the time has come when additions should be made to the accommodation at present provided, and accordingly, 
it is intended to deepen and extend the dock, and to enlarge 
and improve the entrance from the river Tees, the estimated 
cost of the works contemplated being about E250,000.84 
The TCC, formulating its plans for port extension, asked the NER to delay 
its works, with the result that it was not until the TCC had obtained 
a new Act 
85 that work began. 
The initial development"of the river Tees had been due to coal but 
the second phase had been the result of the locally-mined iron . ore. 
From its first mining in 1850, iron ore production had risen to a peak 
86 , of 6.756 m tons in '1883 with a corresponding production, in 1881, of 
1.792 m tons of -pig iron in Middlesbrough and Thornaby alone and a further 
quantity north of the river, a proportion of the 800,000 tons made in 
Durham county. 
87 In that 'year, of a total of 116 furnaces in blast in 
the region, no fewer than 99 were on Teesside, inferring a total production 
there of c 2-. m tons. The principal beneficiary of this industry had 
been the NER, successor of the SOR and WHH&R with their extensive mineral 
traffic. In 1860 the S&DR conveyed 1.529 m tons of ironstone and 310,000 tons 
of limestone in addition to 2.045 m tons of coal. 
88 Under the NER these 
figures were to rise substantially with c 12 m tons p. a. of raw materials 
being brought to Teesside. 
The production of iron in the region was one of the spurs for the, 
transformation of the Tees shipbuilding industry. Wooden ships- had been 
built at Yarm and Stockton in the 18th century but whereas at the former 
town shipbuilding ceased in 1844 - in fact Yarm ceased as a port from 
1860 89 - at the latter it continued with the change-over from wood to 
iron for hull construction, rising between 1854 and 1866 to 14,000 registered 
tons and to 34,000 in 1885; of this latter total only 8,000 tons was 
credited to Middlesbrough. 
90 Output reached a peak of 82,000 tons, perhaps 
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50 ships, in 1883, a figure not to be exceeded until 1889.91 Also associated 
with the iron industry was the establishment of heavy engineering works 
at Darlington, Stockton, Middlesbrough and Hartlepool. Their output 
included bridges, marine and stationary engines, iron-making plant, iron 
girders and rail sections and the labour drawn to Teesside led to the 
populations of Middlesbrough and Stockton, between 1851 and 1881 , rising 
respectively from 7,631 to 55,373 and from 10,172 to 51,209. 
Considerable financial problems had been experienced by the TCC in 
its conservatorship. Shipping had not increased as might have been anticipated, 
grants for the harbour were not forthcoming, revenue was often inadequate. 
Conversely, the iron industry had provided cheap waste slag for the river 
works, no less than E56,671 having been paid by the ironmasters to the 
TCC for its disposal, reducing the. cost of the south breakwater to E212,650.92 
Additionallyo by 1875 the TCC had expended almost E200,000 -on dredgingg 
E50,000 on the river training walls and E79,000 o: n the reclamation of 
c 1100 acres valued at E215,500. With the f, 110,000 of inherited capital 
the TCC had spend Z723,000 on the river. Borrowings of E734,000 had 
been granted but notý fully used, mortgages totalling Z314,000 had been 
arranged and the Public Work Loan Commissioners had lent E, 175,000.95 
6.5 River Blyth 
The Blyth Harbour and Dock Company (BH&DC) held its inaugural meeting 
in July 1854.1 As noted earlier the company had initially intended to 
include within its scope the formation of railways to Hartley and to Cramlington 
but, due to opposition, these provisions were withdrawn. An' earlier 
proposal for a railway to Blyth had been made by the Newcastle and Berwick 
Railway in 1846 2 but the town, after the passing of the BH&DC Act, 
3 
continued 
to rely on the Blyth and Tyne Railway's link to the south . James 
Abernethy, respcnsible for the initial proposals, was duly instructed 
by the directors to prepare detailed plans and specifications for harbour 
improvements, generally in accordance with the new company's Parliamentary 
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powers. Abernethy suggested that 'the authorised works be undertaken 
in three stages: harbour improvement and the formation of an effective 
breakwater; the 
, construction of 
the half-tide basin and the "trumpet 
entrance; ,4 and lastly the forming of the principal dock, with its locked 
entrance and bridge. 
5 The directors resolved to proceed immediately 
with the first stage, to undertake the second when funds became available 
and to defer the third. Plans were approved by the Admiralty, arrangements 
made to provide a dredger for the use of the contractor and the tender 
submitted by Michael Scott, in total E27,956, was accepted. 
From its inception the BHOC was hampered by a lack of funds, a problem 
which beset both Tyne and Tees. The Parliamentary plans had originally 
shown a 25 acre dock with a seven acre half-tide basin - another version 
showed them as '19 and seven acres 
6_ but by the time a prospectus was 
issued the areas had been reduced to 16 and 4-ý acres respectively. Situated 
to the east of the town and its staiths, the docks would have "the great 
advantage of being so situated that vessels from sea will gain immediate 
access to them on entering the harbour. ,7 The E150,000 authorised capital 
would appear, to have been difficult to raise and in 1855 a further prospectus 
was issued. It noted that it was still necessary to ship coals 'via keels, 
that the state of the river was such as to force ships to make for the 
Tyne in bad weather, and that coal owners were so compelled to ship much 
of the area's coal on the Tyne; - nevertheless, the ports throughput was 
250,000 tons. 
8 It was noted, too, that ships of up to 60b tons register 
were built at Blyth, in the prospectus claimed as being an area favourable 
for building in iron. 
Regarding finances, the prospectus noted that the completion of the 
eastern breakwater wouldpermit the company to begin to charge pier dues 
on ships using the harbour, so generating revenue and, anticipating coal 
shipments of - 750,000 tons p. a., * total revenue of Z16,562 was foreseen, 
with working costs of E4,140 p. a. The projected returns would amply. 
The corresponding register tonnage would be 562,500. 
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justify investment. Financial restrictions were eased somewhat by Sir 
Matthew White Ridley, chairman of the BHO C gifting to it the foreshore, 
a move approved by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests. By it, the 
company was given possession of the land needed for the formation of the 
western training wall to the estuary. 
As construction of the first stage of the-work continued the directors 
turned their attention to the best means of acquiring "a due share of 
the coal traffic of the district. " 
9 It was agreed that this could be 
best achieved by building a branch line to connect with the NER at Cramlington. 
A survey of the line was undertaken by Abernethy but Harrison, engineer 
to the NER, * opposed this proposal whereupon the engineer to the BUR, 
Tone, sought a meeting with the' BH&DC, a move which led to the BUR deciding 
-I to extend its line at Blyth. Disagreements ensued as a result of the 
BHOC attempting to safe-guard its rights but an agreement was eventually 
made whereby the BUR was to 'be encouraged to extend to the dock area 
while the dock company would expedite the provision of shipping facilities. 
10 
Nothing further transpired. ''' 
The need for the new company to attract traffic, and revenue, was 
acute. Due to earlier arrangements, the harbour itself formed part of 
a lease made between Charles Carr, the lessee, and Ridley. The BH&DC, 
anxious to improve the harbour, sought to purchase the lease and agreement 
was eventually reached in the sum of Z9,000. Perhaps due to reluctance 
on the part of investors to subscribe, the company was forced to seek 
loans from its principals and in 1857 L10,000 was aproved "on the personal 
,, 12 ý) tA security of the Directors, four individuals, eat5' lending E5,000; in 
the following year mortgage bonds totalling E6,000 were issued. The 
dilemma facing the company was serious. With the prospect of an insuffidient 
return, capital could not be raised to construct the works needed to attract 
trade while conversely, the coalowners and railway companies were reluctant 
In 1854 Harrison had discussed the transport of coal from Ashington, five miles north of Blyth, 
for shipment at South Shields or Wearmouth dock. (PRo: RAIL 527/8) 
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to invest in Blyth as the Tyne, now with the docks of both NER and TIC 
in operation, offered facilities of a much higher standard. 
With few other options available it was decided to seek a further 
Act, principally to extend the 'time by which the several works should 
be completed. In 1853, the company had proposed a seven - year period 
but the Act had reduced it to five years; now, the 1858 Act sanctioned 
an extension, the outer works to 1859, the basin to 1862 and the dock 
to 1865.13 Capital remained at E150,000. The preamble to the Act noted 
that only 02,313 had been expended and although it claimed that the harbour 
was much safer, nevertheless some L50,000 remained unissued. Construction 
could not proceed until the financial. position improved. 
The work undertaken had been virtually limited to building a new, 
eastern, breakwater and to dredging the channel for ships of 15 ft draught. 
Initially the breakwater was built in masonry but after 1,800 ft had been 
constructed the stone was found to be unsuitable and the remaining length 
was formed from timber frames placed at ten foot intervals, tied together 
by wallings and open planking on both faces, the interior being filled 
with rubble. Jhe length of, this part of the breakwater was 4,000 ft. 
14 
The cheap and rapid method of construction was criticised by other engineers 
but Brooksq well acquainted with the site, later defended the principles 
adopted in that the breakwater was not exposed so much as were others 
in the region. The outer part of the rock outcrop on which - it was based 
offered protection, reinforced by the much earlier artificial dyke. 
15 
I 
By 1856 the timber breakwater was almost complete and work was in 
progress on the forming of a timber-faced wharf to direct the river's 
flow into a proper channel and also to provide facilities for coal handling 
until such time as the dock should be built. The work had cost Z18,808, 
of which E3,181 was for dredging. 
16 From this time the extension of 
the eastern- breakwater was sanctioned in comparatively short lengths, 
presumably as funds became available, and it was completed in 1859. 
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As work proceeded, it was agreed to build a matching western breakwater, 
to half-tide height and 4,000 ft long, but its completion virtually coincided 
with its being breached, an event which led to some disenchantment regarding 
Abernethy. * The works had, by this time, cost a total of E67,320. 
The BH&DC did not cease in its efforts to expand its trade. In 
1859 negotiations were completed, for the shipment of coal from Cambois, 
to the north, and from Bebside, recently opened, to the west, moves logical 
in view of the fact that the collieries to the south traded to the Tyne 
at Hayhole. The agreement led to the Cambois Coal Company investing 
Z10,000 in the BH&DC and Joseph Straker, one of its owners, becoming a 
director. The BH&DC agreed, to build the necessary wharf and the colliery 
the drops or spouts to be sited on the north side of the river, the first 
development there. 
In 1860 the BH&DC obtained a further Act of Parliament, financial 
in character. 
17 By its powers the company was authorised to levy additional 
tolls and rates and also to extend again the time of completion of works 
and in 1862 a magistrate's certificate enabled it to begin charging dues, 
its - first-stage works having been completed. No decision regarding the 
forming of docks would seem to have been made by the BH&DC but in 1862 
conflict with the BUR is apparent in that the railway company gave notice 
of its intention to extend its operations so as to form a 45-acre dock 
IB 
with a new south breakwater on a site to the south of that earlier put 
forward by the BH&DC. The notice was followed in 1864 by two Bills being 
presented in Parliament, the first by the BUR itself and the second by 
a client companyý some if its promoters directors of the BUR, seeking 
the formation of a separate dock company, a situation analagous to that 
which had occurred on the Tees. 
That there were opposing factions in the port of Blyth is made apparent 
*, Abernethy's appointment was terminated in 1862, although he remained as 'a consultant. 
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by the events of 1863. The publication of notices concerning the Act 
sought by the BUR was followed immediately by a. deputation - un-named 
but presumably members of the BH&DC - meeting the directors of the NER. 
The deputation asked the NER to give consideration to building a line 
from either Dudley or Cramlington to Blyth and to build docks there for 
the shipment of coal. The 'accommodation at present provided "by the 
Blyth and Tyne Company was inadequate for the trade of Blyth and... the 
inhabitants were dissatisfied with the manner in which their requirements 
were met by that , Company" 
19 but, 'what was of greater interest, signifying 
some lack of prosperityý was the fact that the deputation considered that 
the shareholders of the present company could be "acquired on easy terms. , 
20 
The NER, resolving to await the plans of the BUR, took no further action 
in the matter. 
The BUR's Bill ' noted that the dock proposed by the BH&DC in its 
1854 Act had not materialised and the railway company now sought powers 
to abandon its intended branch to it and to substitute "a railway, to an 
intended dock near to the mouth of the river Blyth, for powers to construct 
which dock ' application is made in the present Session. .. , 
21 The second 
Bill had among its promoters Joseph Laycock and Joseph' Davidson, directors 
of the BUR, with Straker, of the Cambois Coal Company. The promoters 
sought capital of E400,000, anticipated that construction could be completed 
withing five years and envisaged the purchase of the BH&DC. 22 Opposed 
by the BH&DC, neither ýBill proceeded and, although not recorded elsewhere, 
it is noted in a letter written by Dees, solicitor to the company, that 
the BH&DC were to sell the undertaking for 9,120,000.23 That doubts -existed 
as to the viability of the port of Blyth is evident in a report to Dees: 
"I feel ... assured that any plea that some day or other the Blyth Harbour 
will be a formidable competitor with the Tyne or that the Blyth and Tyne 
Railway would themselves seek relief by the construction of Docks there 
,, 24 would fly in the face of facts ... 
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The moivbs made by the BUR spurred the BH&DC into improving both 
its coal handling equipment and the port's berthing arrangements, in spite 
of coal throughput remaining at a low level; shipments had "not increased 
in proportion to the Improvement in the Harbour. , 
25 Limited standage 
for loaded waggons caused congestion of shipping and the loading cycle, 
often over two tidesq caused the larger colliers to ground and incur damage. 
In addition, the breakwaters suffered intermittent damage and the harbour 
was prone to problems of swell, necessitating the breaching of the western 
breakwater to alleviate them. It was against this background and against 
the increasing competition from the Tyne through the growing use of screw 
colliers there that the BH&DC sought the views of Thomas Meik, engineer 
at Sunderland. 
Meik presented the directors with his proposals in June 1866. For 
added protection the pier should be'. extended while, to attract shipping, 
further dredging should be undertaken. He envisaged a cost of E50,000 
being involved, whereupon the directors resolved to attempt to persuade 
the port's coalowners to subscribe E20,000, at the same time the BH&DC 
borrowing 00,000 from the Public Works Loan Commissioners. Meik was 
instructed to put in hand only the forming of a wave trap, a minor work, 
but new dredging plant was purchased. The trap proved successful but 
Meik expressed concern in 1867 at the meagre sums being spent on port 
maintenence, 
26 
a measure forced upon the directors by the continuing low 
throughput of the port. Still conscious of the need to attract trade 
the directors considered that only dredging would suffice, even if all 
revenue were to be so absorbed; a "large increase to the shipments will 
necessarily follow.,, 
27 
The new north berth. proved satisfactorily and the Cambois colliery 
began to ship coal from it in 1867 although construction was not completed 
until the following year. Still restricted by lack of revenue the BH&DC 
concentrated its efforts on the new north staiths, a move which led to 
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complaints from users as to the state of those on the scouth shore and 
although Meik suggested the construction of a bridge his proposal was 
not adopted. The improvement programme brought results in 1870 when 
the Bedlington Coal Company sought spouts on the north shore and Tone 
informed the company that Bebside and Choppington collieries wished to 
increase shipments; conversely in 1872, by which time half the port's 
coal was from Cambois, the Cowpen and North Seaton collieries gave notice 
that their steamers would cease to use the port until the channel was 
completely dredged. With a rising revenue - it was to be short-lived 
- the BH&DC was again challenged by the BUR in 1872 when the latter sought 
powers to build a dock at Blyth. 
The plan put forward by the BUR was for an up-river dock, 
28 
a marked 
contrast with that suggested in 1863 and which had involved a site at the 
river's mouth. Some ten acres in extent the dock was to be virtually 
opposite the north staiths, a location which would have brought problems 
in river navigation. The" BH&DC decided to petition against the dock, 
furnishing the Board of Trade with a statement outlininq the company's 'history. 
It Was noted that the outlay on the harbour now amounted to L120,000 and 
that as a result the river provided ' deep-water moorings for loaded ships. 
Financially, the problem was that the company was not empowered to borrow 
money until the necessary shares were issued and the shares were not being 
subscribed for as no dividends had been paid. Nevertheless, improvements 
had been substantial and 'whereas sailing ships of only 300 tons burthen 
had formerly been able to use the harbour now vessels of 600 tons could 
do so. On the north shore the new berths were able to accept screw steamers 
Of up I to 1,000 tons, up to 12 ft of water being available at low tide. 
29 
In the view of the BH&DC it was preferable, and cheaper, to provide river 
berths rather than a dock but it was also pointed out that for the harbour 
facilities to be improved the co-operation of the BUR was necessary. 
It was the facft that negotiations had broken down which had led to the 
proposal for a dock and a railway to it. The Bill, the last to be promoted 
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by the B&TR9 did not proceed. * 
The improvement in trade which began in 1870 ended within five years. 
Decline was due partly to the depression in the coal trade but it was 
due also to the harbour itself, still inadequate in spite of the works 
undertaken. Unsolicited, Meik report&d.. to the directors on the harbour's 
shortcomings and on its future. It had been found necessary to restrict 
the use of the dredger and to offer it for hire, as a result of which 
expenditure had been reduced. Other ports, too, had suffered but none 
so badly as Blyth, forcingMeik to observe "that there is something peculiar 
to the case which has made the depression so ... marked. , 
30 He recommended 
the company to provide further coal-handling facilities and to raise dues, 
a move pressing as "Blyth is now at a crisis in its history and , unless 
- inevitably go back. , 
32 a move is made forward it must 
In 1867 Ridley died and his place as chairman was taken by- his son, 
again Matthew White Ridley (1842-1904), to become the lst' Viscount. 
The concern of Meik soon came to be shared by Ridley. In 1879 Meik reported 
that the harbour could accommodate ships only of 1,000 tons but if ' the 
piers wbre-, to be extended this limit could be raised to 2,000 tons. The 
port, he thought, had "a prosperous future... if capital can be found to 
enable it to keep pace with the time.,, 
31 He considered that the loading 
of ships could be improved by the use of hoists, rather than spouts - 
a view logical in the light of the flatness of the area - but the greatest 
need was for a railway to North Blyth, the site he envisaged as being 
suitable for further development. Ridley duly wrote to the NER regarding 
rail communicationsg a move to prove of some significance to the port. 
At first the NER proved reluctant to discuss the matter but later 
the question of rail connections was fully deliberated and the several 
options considered. The BH&DC at first sought a line to connect Ashington 
with the NER branch to Newbiggin, a curve at Sleekburn enabling coal to 
be brought to the North Shore staiths. Later it was thought that a new 
The BUR was amalgamated with the NER in 1874. 
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line from the NER at Longhirst should link with Ashington but a further 
discussion involving Tennant and Harrison brought a conclusion: the 
NER would extend its rails to the south shore at Blyth if the BH&DC would 
improve wharf facilities and provide water of sufficient depth for 2,000 
ton ships. 
34 Harrison suggested that 15 ft depth at low water should 
be provided. The BH&DC accepted the offer of the NER and suggested that 
double spouts be provided at three new staiths. The quay walls would 
be to the approval of the NER and were estimated to cost E14,000. Success 
in negotiations was matched by a personal achievement by Ridley; in May. 
1881 he was appointed a director of the NER. 
35 
The agreement brought a report from Meik, long concerned by the harbour's 
finances. The BH&DC quay and the NER staiths together would make more 
apparent the need for a greater depth of water, obtainable by further 
dredging and extending the piers. Meik suggested that the company was 
not well placed to borrow money publiclyg neither had it found it easy 
to raise money privately. The solution, as he saw it, was to dissolve 
the company and form a "Public Harbour Trust or Commission consisting 
of representatives of the different interests involved. , 
36 Suggestions 
were also made concerning the Trust's constitution, principally Ridley, 
Cambois colliery, other coalowners and shipowners; only by taking such 
a step could the future of the port be assured. The directors agreed 
with Meik's suggestions and it was resolved to form the Commission suggested, 
at the same time continuing the construction of the works resulting from 
the NER agreement. Some dispute, however, took place : regarding the - 
new spouts. Originally the NER had wished to provide six but the BH&DC 
suggested that two berths, each with two spouts, would provide for an 
additional 600,000 tons of coal p. a., an increase which would suffice 
for several years. For once, the BH&DC erred on the side of pessimism, 
understandable in the light of its somewhat unhappy existence. Up to 
1880 it had expended capital to a total of E131,400, an expenditure which 
had not been matched by an increase in trade. 
37 Broadly the throughput 
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of coal had remained static at 250,000 tons p. a. and as a result revenue 
had not increased, so making the payment of a dividend a rarity., 
6.6 The Hartlepools 
The establishment and subsequent expansion of harbour facilities 
at both Hartlepool and West Hartlepool had led to the reconstitution of 
the harbour commission, responsible for the maintenance of the port. 
In 1851 a new Act of Parliament was obtained, legislating for the construction 
of a pier from the Heugh to protect the haven. It provided, too, for 
a governing body of 16 members, six original commissioners, three members 
from the west docks and three from the east docks - since 1849 under the 
control of the York, Newcastle and Berwick Railway - the Collector of 
Customs at Hartlepool, the mayor and two others. The commissioners, 
however, were responsible only for the old harbour and the channel leading 
into it; both sets of docks remained the sole responsibility of their 
1 
owners. 
The interests of the west docks and the Stockton and Hartlepool Railway 
were merged in 1852 when the two companies became the West 'Hartlepool 
Harbour and Railway 
2 
with powers to lease, or purchase the Clarence Railway, 
earlier the subject of offers of Purchase by both Hudson and the Leeds 
and Thirsk Railway. 
3 Under the management of Ralph Ward Jackson the 
amalgamation brought into being a strong competitor to the Stockton and 
Darlington Railway, both undertakings seeking trade in the same area. 
Although the formation of the WHH&R* pre-dated the founding of the North 
Eastern Railway, it was, nevertheless, aresult of the events leading to 
the later large-scale amalgamation. As early as 1849 discussions had 
taken place between the Leeds Northern Railway and the YNOR regarding 
the former company's plans to seek a line to Newcastle and although no 
progress was then made further meetings , took place in March and July 1852 
when a jointresolution in favour of an amalgamation resulted in the formal 
* It was capitalised at fl. 994 m. 
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agreement of 1854.4 The prospect of the amalgamation alarmed Jackson 
as he had been "developing the facilities and accommodation at West Hartlepool 
in the expectation that it would become the chief port of the Leeds Northern 
and a major exporter of West Riding and East Lancashire goods. ,5 From 
the NER's formation he did, however, extract the acknowledgement that 
the WHH&R would receive special consideration regarding rates should it 
be found that West Hartlepool suffered vis A vis Hull. Jackson later 
attributed to this arrangement the fact that West Hartlepool had enjoyed 
a decade of remarkably swift expansion. It was against this background 
of railway reorganisation and competition that the Hartlepools, the twin 
ports of the NER and the WHH&R, were to develop. 
As noted earlier, Jackson's relationship with the Hartlepool Port 
and Harbour Commission (HP&HC), of which body he was a member, had been 
somewhat less than felicitous. The HPOC's Act of 1851 again brought 
conflict between Jackson and what he saw as the controlling east dock 
interests. The commissioners had employed James Walker to report upon 
port improvements and, after discussions with Jackson and Casebourne, 
he had recommended the pier at the Heugh. When the Bill was first introduced 
into Parliament it was opposed by Jackson, who called in James Meadows 
Rendel to give evidence against it and, even after the . 
Act had become 
law, he still maintained that Rendel should be consulted, a view with 
which the commissioners could not concur. 
6 Jackson thereupon objected 
to the form of the pier, stating that it should be of near-vertical 
ashlar walling, and costing some E134,000, as opposed to the rubble masonry 
battered-wall structure estimated at E52,000 by Robinson. * The dispute 
came before the Admiralty, which initially rejected Robinson's plan. 
A compromise design was then -adopted - concrete blocks were used for the 
inner face of the pier - tenders were received, construction began in 
1853 and by 1855 the pier's length had reached 720 ft., when having cost 
* Robinson was engineer to the HP&HC. 
310 
E15,384 its construction was suspended. 
7 
In September 1853 Jackson stated that co-operation with the LNR had 
not brought the benefits expected - it was anticipating amalgamation - 
but nevertheless almost '-,, m tons of coal had been shipped from the port 
in 4,394 ships; in addition the railways had carried a further 306,000 
tons of coal for landsale. What was significant was the fact that the 
directors of the company were at this time urged by Jackson to make provision 
for a timber trade and to meet this request it was agreed that a third 
dock should be built, with a timber pond. 
9 It was from this date that 
the character of trade began to change from almost exclusively coal to, 
additionally, timber, grain and cotton. 
10 
Although the WHH&R had put in hand further extensions to its docks, 
the NER appeared content to operate its Hartlepool dock in its initial 
form, in spite of that fact that insufficient water led the owners to consider 
using lighters to load the colliers 
p It is probable that the NER's 
involvement at other ports was such that expansion at Hartlepool, while 
it provided competition with West Hartlepool, was not considered economical, 
especially as the NER retained an investment in the docks at Sunderland 
and had begun construction of its major new dock at Jarrow, on the Tyne. 
Additionally, the NER continued to face competition from the S&DR, operating 
, -o 
the Tees, and also the Londonderry Railway, running between Seaham 
and Sunderland. As a result of NER policy, coal shipments at (east) 
Hartlepool remained virtually static at 1m tons p. a. over the period 
1850 to 1865 but with the completion of the 14 acre Jackson dock in 1852, 
again with coaling facilities, throughput of coal at West Hartlepool amounted 
to 696 000 tons in 1854. 
In 1854 the HP&HC, perhaps at Jackson's insistance, brought in Rendel 
"to report on the capabilities of Hartlepool as a Harbour of Refuge, " 
12 
a move which was later noted approvingly by the WHH&R in that it would 
appear that a harbour of some 800 acres could be formed. Presumably 
acting for the HP&HC, a proposal for a harbour of this scale had earlier 
-; 11 
been made by Abernethy and Meik and they had suggested, in addition, that 
an 80 acre wet dock, the 'Great Float'i should be formed within the much 
13 larger Slake, the natural feature . To obtain the fullest benefit from 
the dock it was to be connected to the sea both at the tidal harbour of 
the eastern docks and at the harbour of the western docks; a line from 
the NER's Hartlepool branch would lead to 14 loading staiths along its 
western side. Rendel's plan did not amend the wet dock but he proposed 
a very much larger harbour of refuge, formed by extending a north pier 
from that at the Heugh and a south pier from a rock outcrop, the Long 
Scar; the piers were to be some 5,000 and 8,000 ft long respectively. 
14 
The subsequent Act legislated only for the construction of the harbour 
but it included also for a reconstitution of the membership of the HP&HC; 
it was to include three members each from the western docks, the eastern 
docks and the shipowners, together with one representative each from Hartlepool 
and West Hartlepoolt with three others. 
15 
Although the 1855 Act had authorised the construction of a harbour 
of refuge by the HP&HC, lack of funds precluded a start being made, although 
work re-commenced on the Heugh pier. As noted, no further work was carried 
out at the eastern docks while at West Hartlepool the completion of the 
Swainson dock in June 1856 brought to an end the first phase of the. work 
of the WHH&R: perhaps it also marked the zenith of the career of Jackson, 
to whom the port owed its creation. 
16 Since its formation the ports 
en-largement had been dramatic: the tidal harbour had been enlarged from 
its original 13 to 44 acres; the Coal, Jackson and Swainson docks, the 
last handling only merchandise, were of 8,14 and 10 acres respectively; 
a 10 acre timber dock had been formed; two gr6. ving docks had been built; 
and the length of quay totalled 10,500 ft. In addition the population 
of West Hartlepool had risen from 400 to BtOOO. 
17 
At this time of relative inactivity the original Hartlepool Dock 
and Railway Company in 1855 sought an amalgamation with the NER, 
18 to 
which company the works had been leased since 1849. In turn this proposal 
* See Map 13 
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brought about discussions between the NER and the WHH&R as to a formal 
asso ciation, the latter company giving notice in 1856 of a Bill to achieve 
this object. * The advantage of such a move would be "that two sets of 
docks in the same area would then come under one management, "19 an event 
not to take place for several years. The Bill - wherein the WHH&R sought 
Z450,000 for "additional docks, shipping staithsý wharfs, warehouses, 
piers, harbour and sea works , 
20 
_ was lost due to the fall of Palmerston's 
government in March 1857, at which time it was referred to as a proposal 
,, 2ý "from the North Eastern Railway Company for a permanent union... and 
was resuscitatedlagain without result, in 1859; the Act for the amalgamation 
of the original company and the NER was passed in 1857.22 
In 1857 the Select Committee on Harbours of Refuge published its 
report. Evidence had been presented to it on the part of the HP&HC 
by Jackson and George Leeman, representing the two major interests. 
Naturally all the ports of the region had made representation to be considered, 
including the Tyne where work was actually in progress on the forming 
of a refuge harbour. Jackson noted that Rendel had estimated his proposals 
at cm and mentioned that no better location than Hartlepool could 
be found. He recorded also that whereas the trade of Hartlepool was 
static, that at West Hartlepool was flourishing, a comment perhaps not 
quite accurate. Jackson attempted to portray West Hartlepool as having 
a trade greater than the Tyne's and, to do so, compared the declared Customs 
values of shipments of merchandise from the Tyne with those of West Hartlepool. 
His figures indicated that West Hartlepool's trade "was within E83,000 
of the total merchandise exports of the ports of Newcastle, Sunderland 
and the Tees , , 
23 
a comparison which, if true as to value, was incorrect 
in terms of shippingif figures presented to the, Committee wgr: e- to be believed. 
They showed that 15,400 ships cleared the Tyne, 12,500 . 
Sunderland, and 
6,600 Hartlepool. 24 In spite of the Hartlepool Bay proposal being supported 
by Calver no firm conclusion was reached. 
The NER Board minute Book (PRO: RAIL 527/9) records in November 1856 an approach from Jackson 
concerning amalgamation. Following objections from coal-owners, and other-, the union, at Jackson's 
instigation, was dropped. 313 
Two years later the subject was re-introduced, this time by a peripetetic 
Commission, hearing evidence at North Shields, Blyth, Sunderland, Hartlepool, 
Redcar and London. As before, a case was made on behalf of each port, 
Hartlepool with Jackson as its main proponent. Again Jackson misinterpreted 
the port's traffic figures, ' claiming that its trade, together with the 
Tees, was greater than that of all other north-east ports together, an 
argument specious in view of the fact that the provision of a harbour 
of refuge should be principally related to numbers and-size of ship together 
with mode of propulsion. Jackson claimed, wrongly, that 10,406 ships 
had used the port in 1856 and forecast that the port's coal trade would 
continue its rapid increase as "this district really and truly is in its 
infancy , 25 although he admitted that there had been a down-turn in shipments; 
he commented that the area's collieries were exploiting deeper seams and 
looked to a recently-opened coalfield to the west and south-west of Hartlepool 
as being likely to bring greater trade, ignoring the fact that the NER 
was in a position to ship coal at any rival port. The proposed harbour, 
Jackson thoughtg would cost lbetween 
L2-, - and 2-2m, depending on which of 
the variants was chosen and would provide 1,526 acres with a depth of 
IS ft and 1,400 with a depth of 24 ft. The breakwaters would total 8,400 
ft in length. In all, four designs for the harbour were analysed in 
the subsequent report, by Rendel, Mossman, Washington and Jackson. 
In this instance the Commission was more forthcoming than had been 
the earlier body and recommended that a harbour of refuge should be built 
at Hartlepool, perhaps anticipating that its recent rapid expansion would 
continue. The comments concerning funds were not so optimistic in that 
the Commission could not 
hesitate to recommend its construction; but after a careful 
consideration of the relative amounts of national and local 
benefit to be derived from it, being of opinion that they are 
equal, we submit, that a Grant not exceeding 500,0001 should 
be made in aid of the construction of a harbour, partly national 
and partly local, at Hartlepool, on condition that an equal 
amount is raised in the locality to be applied to the same 
purpose. 26 
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The Commissioners found themselves unable to recommend any one proposal 
for Hartlepool and instead delineated on a chart the suggested limits 
of the harbour; any engineering works within this area must be such as 
not to preclude its further use. After giving evidence in London, Jackson 
returned home to a hero's welcome, acclaimed as "the person to whose untiring 
and indefatigable efforts this happy eventis due. , 
27 As would be expected 
it was not found possible to raise the capital necessary and, in addition, 
the change from sail to steam propulsion and ever-increasing ship sizes 
made less vital the need for such a harbour. 
Between 1857 and 1859 the trade of West Hartlepool was depressed, 
the revenue of the WHH&R being c Z177,000 in each year, against a capital 
of c F, 2-4m. Jackson had made great claims for the growing merchandise 
trade of the company but in 1859 it was reported that of the total revenue 
of E178,497, f, 97,499 was for coal, E40,721 for merchandise and E21,986 
for port dues. 
28 A significant proportion of the coal traffic was for 
landsale, 504,000 tons as against the 839,000 tons shipped, partly a result 
of the growing use of coal in the burgeoning Teesside iron trade. 
With the port of West Hartlepool relatively moribund some irregularities 
in the operations of the WHH&R were made public. In February 1859, at 
the meeting of shareholders, it was reported that "certain attacks (had) 
been publicly made upon your Chairman and Directors... by parties having 
an interest adverse to the prosperity of this undertaking ,29 but stated 
that an investigation had revealed no irregularities. The attack had 
been made by Benjamin Coleman a member of the London Stock Exchange who, 
having purchased a single share in the WHH&R, proceeded to pursue an invest- 
igation into its affairs. This attack was directed almost exclusively 
against Jackson and the motives behind it were never fully made clear 
although Jackson held the view that Leeman, vice-chairman of the NER, * 
In 1856 Harrison, and other officers, had been instructed by the NER board to undertake an 
investigation into the financial affairs of the WHH&R. 
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was responsible, a view uncorroborated; 
30 there were perhaps other personal 
reasons, involving Jackson's brother. 
31 A "Committee of Assistance 9 
32 
headed by Thomas Sturge, a shareholder, was formed to investigate the 
allegations and the report which resulted noted the improvements made 
to the port but brought to light the fact that Jackson had purchased 
coal royalties on behalf of the company, to the extent of 9,000 acres; 
shipping interests had also been promoted. The committee exonerated 
Jackson from fraudulent intent and a vote of confidence in him was expressed, 
Jackson being thanked publicly by Nicholas Wood, a member of the committee. 
The investigation into the company's affairs did not deter Jackson 
from promoting its interests further, both concerning local matters and 
those of a more far-reaching nature. As noted, the WHH&R had, in opposition 
to the SOR and through the Cleveland Railway, been involved in the formation 
of the Upsall, Normanby and Ormesby Railway, bringing iron ore from North 
Yorkshire to the rapidly proliferating furnaces of Middlesbrough, in which 
venture Jackson was brought into conflict with 
(' 
he Tees Conservancy Commission. 32 
The second matter concerned Jackson's negotiations with the London and 
North Western Railway (LNWR), in 1861 seeking alink with the north-east 
ports. The WHH&R supported the LNWR in its plans to form a railway through 
the Pennines which would link with the SD&LUR - promoted by the SOR and 
approaching completion - and so enable traffic to reach West Hartlepool; 
the aim of the company should always be "to encourage the most free and 
wide-spread interchange of traffic in all directions and with all companies , 
34 
and it was accordingly agreed to provide full facilities for,, the outside 
company's use of the port. 
In order to make the necessary provisions, the WHH&R promoted a Bill 
which would enable the LNWR to purchase land from the promoters and to 
build warehouses, at the same' time authorising it to subscribe to the 
WHH&R to the extent of a quarter of its share capital. In the expectation 
that an Act would result, the LNWR purchased dockside accommodation and 
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17 
warehouses for the sum of L100900035 but, on the Bill being rejected, 
the arrangement was rescinded and the WHH&R was called upon to return 
to the LNWR the purchase price; to do this a further Act was sought so 
as to permit the raising of the additional capital 
36 but, in fact, it 
was not until 1865 that the NER repaid to the LNWR its investment of Z100,000.37 
At this time the authorised capital amounted to L2.014 m, half raised 
since the merging of the three Jackson interests; only a further E86,000 
was sanctioned. The cost of providing further warehousing was met by 
Sturge to the extent of some 00,000. Although it is difficult to believe 
that the trade of West Hartlepool expanded to the extent claimed by Jackson, 
nevertheless it was proposed in 1861 that the two timber ponds, formed 
as an adjunct to the Swainson dock, be converted into two docks each of 
sone 12 acres in area, 
38 
a move which came to nothing, perhaps the result 
of the company's delicate financial state. 
The struggle between Jackson and Coleman has been detailed elsewhere 
but, as an explanation for the future of the WHH&R, an outline must be 
given. The Committee of Assistance reporting in 1859 had found that 
Jackson had invested in both collieries and shipping - for the company's 
benefit - although neither investment had been disclosed and both exceeded 
the Parliamentary powers granted. In addition, capital expenditure exceeded 
by E-12m that authorised. The committee, without criticising Jackson personally, 
noted that there had been errors of judgement, especially as to future 
prospects, and advised caution "against leading any to expect that such 
prosperity will be more rapid than, the ordinary increase in mercantile 
advancement. , 
39 The report led to consideration of the advisability of dis- 
posing of the coal royalties and shipping and it led also to a further 
investigation by accountants Quilter Ball & Co., and to a legal 'case in 
Chancery, instigated by Coleman, who had claimed that Sturge had grossly 
underestimated the overspending of capital and that the figure should 
be c Elm. 
40 Coleman was also extremely sceptical as to Jackson's trade 
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figures for the port, maintaining that the timber trade had been drawn 
from Hull by subsidising it and claiming that colliery receipts were fictitious, 
in that 755'a of the coal traffic revenue was notional, from collieries 
owned by the company and which did not pay for railway and port use. 
The dispute continued with the investigation into the company's finances 
by the accountants, acting on behalf of the holders of debentures. Naturally, 
it was again shown that the company's financial state was unsound but 
this later inquiry had the effect of causing Jackson to resign from the 
chairmanship, suggesting that his successor should be Henry Robertson 
41 
Sandbach, already a director. Jackson's resignation had been suggested 
at the company's annual meeting in February when Wilkinson, Coleman's 
solicitor, had taken issue with Jackson as to the state of the finances, 
especially as concerning claims by debenture holders exceeding, in total$ 
F, 600,000.42 The report produced by Quilter Ball & Co., showed that capital 
borrowing had exceeded authorisation by L933,393, an event made more serious 
by the fact that the company's share capital had not been fully subscribed. 
Debentures had been issued instead of shares and "the excess over the 
arbitrarily assumed limit of one-third borrowing power is no less than 
E2744686". 
43 Assets, however, were substantial but the company's ships 
and collieries 'should be sold, although it was pointed out that merchandise 
revenue had been largely the result of the WHH&R owning its own ships. 
When resigning, Jackson had written to Sandbach to the effect that 
the docks themselves had 
absorbed the greater portion of the (later) outlay and capital, 
and I fearlessly assent that nothing of the kind has been 
produced in this Kingdom equal to them at so low a cost, now 
combining, for their extent, the like general adaptation, 
capabilities and economy of construction (and he continued 
by noting that ) capital expended so rapidly... cannot be expected 
to produce an adequate amount of revenue from such works alone, 
without more time for development. 44. 
Jackson's falsifying of accounts had grossly overestimated profits and 
in 1862 it was noted that whereas receipts were Z216,600, Jackson had 
given working expenses as E151,142; however, "after deducting the losses 
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on the steamboats, collieries and other items, there was a net deficiency 
in the revenue account for the year of E153,596" . 
45 It was also made 
known at this time that "the interests and dividends of every class ... have 
to a very large extent, been paid out of capital.,, 
46 
Jackson's repignation. brought to an end the first phase of the development 
of West Hartlepool, a change perhaps signified by the ship Ward Jackson 
being re-named Ocean Queen. 
47 A settlement between Coleman and the former 
directors of the company was finýalised, the new directors having found, 
when taking office, that Jackson had instituted proceedings against the 
WHH&R with respect to the repayment of his debenture, then due. To prevent 
him receiving priority over the other holders the directors had executed 
an assignment of all the company's property, a move which had resulted 
in a receiver being appointed. When the company's operations had been 
in Jackson's hands, little documentation had resulted: board meetings 
comprised only two or three members; the receipt of tenders and their 
letting were not recorded; agreements with other undertakings were not 
noted; the purchase of ships and collieries was concealed, as were the 
arrangements whereby colliery owners were allowed rebates on dues arising 
from railway use. After Jackson's departure, at which time Casebourne 
was dismissed, 
48 
records improved but still did not indicate the decision 
to apply for a further Act of Parliament, to rationalise - and to legalise 
- the WHH&R finances. 
The application to Parliament resulted in yet another investigation, 
by House of Lords Select Committee. It was somewhat critical of, Sturge's 
findings, especially in the conclusion that no fraud had been discovered, 
and, noting all irregularities, found itself unable to recommend, that 
the Bill should proceed but, nevertheless, proposed that the relevant 
information should be given to the House. The Committee's main concerns 
were the exceeding of borrowing powers, the use of capital for unauthorised 
purposes and the "continued and systematic publication of false accounts , 
49 
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The Committee noted that whereas the total sum raised amounted to E3.73 
m, expenditure upon docks and railways totalled only Z2.57 m; the balance 
had been illegally expended. The operation of a shipping line had cost 
the WHH&R L118,000 and its collieries E311,000 while it was doubtful as 
to whether the LNWR had powers to hold property in the WHH&R. With amazement 
evident, it was recorded that the witnesses examined 
have deposed to a series of transactions of so extraordinary 
and unprecedented a character that the Committee consider 
it a duty to lay the facts of the case before the House, with 
the view that the House may, if it think proper, take steps 
for the prosecution and punishment of the guilty parties, 
and that some measure may be adopted by Parliament to prevent 
the recurrence of similar frauds and illegalities. 50 
The Actq which increased the company's capital limit to Z3.949m, was later 
passed, contingent upon the sale of the collieries. It was noted that 
the revenue of the WHH&R was insufficient to cover dividend payments. 
51 
The malpractices unearthed in the running of the WHH&R were referred 
to in a leading article in The Times. The findings of the Lords' Committee 
were applauded and, criticising the over-issue of debentures it was stated 
that, although legal limits may, in the past, have been exceeded elsewhere, 
,, 52 "a deliberate and permanent excess of debt is not known , except at 
West Hartlepool. The transfer of power within the company led to rationalisation. 
Ships were sold to Pile Spence & Co and the collieries advertised for 
sale by tender. The prices offered for them were so low, however, that 
they were temporarily retained, although it was found possible to reduce 
53 the losses on their operation from E31,000 to ZB, 800 for the half-year. 
After the completion of the Swainson dock in 1856, engineering works 
at West Hartlepool had been, of a relatively minor nature, being confined 
to the formation of two timber ponds and the building of the four warehouses 
needed for the general merchandise 11 -rade which had begun in 1853. At 
the eastern docks, now under the direct control of the NER, no further 
work had been undertaken, other than routine dredging by the HP&HC. 
In 1863, however, a report was submitted to the directors of the WHH&R 
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by Murray, now acting in place of Casebourne. A section of wall in the 
Swainson dock had collapsed but, in addition, storms had damaged the piers 
sheltering the harbour. It was suggested that the restoration of the 
south outer pier, originally of timber, should be in masonry, the views 
of James William Brunlees (1816-IB92) being sought prior to the work being 
put in hand. At the old port the commissioners were concerned by two 
matters, the improvement of- the port and their inability to undertake 
the construction of the harbour of refuge authorised in 1855. Coode, 
one of the commissioners investigating refuge harbours, was requested 
to comment on proposals made both by Robinson and Casebourne. Coode 
considered that it would be injudicious to attempt to effect improvements 
to the entrance of either dock complex before improving the harbour, especially 
as works of similar scale were already in' progress on the Tyne; "it would 
appear that the time has arrived when some further advance in the same 
direction should be made at Hartlepool. , 
54 Robinson had- proposed to 
extend the Heugh breakwater, a move approved by Coode, and to form a detached 
breakwater in the bay, thought by Coode to be a potential threat to any 
large-scale development of the harbour. Instead he suggested a rubble 
mound breakwater with a squared masonry block wall on it to run as a virtual 
extension - but with a 1,000 ft gap - to the Heugh pier. In line with 
Coode's suggestionsý estimated at L117,900, Robinson prepared the drawings 
necessary for Parliamentary approval 
55 but no' Act resulted. 
In 1863 the amalgamation of the NER with the SOR was 'noted by the 
WHH&R but no opposition was, presented to the Bill. The following year 
it was agreed that the Cleveland Railway should be sold to the NER, the 
WHH&R having exceeded by some 50'/'0 its authorised investment of E60,000. 
The resignation of Jackson had brought in as director Isaac Lowthian Bell, 
active in industry on both Tyne and Tees. but after a short period he resigned 
as he wished to purchase certain collieries of the WHH&R. In 1864, however, 
he was re-elected to the board* and in the following year discussions 
*A general manager was appointed, for the first time, in 1864. 
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took place with the NER, the latter company offering to ý pay 40oo p. a. on 
all WHH&R stock. The board agreed to the terms, a decision, however, 
"not arrived at until ... resources and prospects in every direction and 
under every contingenc Y,, 
56 had been considered. In view of the fact 
that any future call for capital would prove impossible, it was later 
agreed that amalgamation should proceed and with an annual revenue of 
c L-,, m the WHH&R became part of the NER in July 1865,57 the Act then recording 
that the capital invested in the West Hartlepool undertaking stood at 
L4.249m. 58 
Gaining control of the two dock systems at Hartlepool did not lead 
the NER to formulate immediate plans for their development on a major 
scale. In 1865, however, plans for timber dock in the Slake, still undeveloped, 
were submitted by Harrison, on behalf, of the NER, to the HP&HC for approval, 
followed by extended discussions between commission and company as to 
future port development. It was eventually agreed that Harrison would 
prepare the plans necessary and in 1868 his proposals for a large outer 
harbour were agreed, the HP&HC later submitting the scheme for Parliamentary 
approval under the name of its new engineer Thomas Dyke (1834-1906), appointed 
only six months earlier. 
59 The drawings showed a sea wall between the 
two Hartlepools with two new piers to protect the entrance to the old 
harbour; a detached breakwater - concave on its sea-face - was located 
opposite to the entrance. The Act which resulted noted that the commissioners 
had been unable to finance their earlier grandiose scheme and sanctioned 
only the smaller piers and sea wall. With the subsuming of dock 
control by the NER, - it became entitled to have five representatives on 
the HP&HC. 60 The port of Hartlepool was subjected to much competition, 
intensified by the consolidation of railways and the formation of the 
NER. The SOR shipped coal from Middlesbrough, although the growing 
iron trade had reduced the quantity available for shipment; facilities 
were available at Sunderland, where the NER had invested in the dock; 
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and the Tyne dock was completed in 1859. The result of this competition 
was a reduction in the throughput of coal at the Hartlepools from 2.032m 
tons in 1861 to 1.584 in 1865 and 1.491 in 1870; the number of ships 
using West Hartlepool alone fell from 5,964 in 1861 to 4,139 in 1870.61 
This situation caused the NER to seek means whereby trade could be stimulated 
but meanwhile the HP&HC sought a loan of E50,000 to enable work to proceed, 
appointed John H. OWKins (1839-1906) as engineer, received E30,000 from 
the Public Works Loan Commissioners and, from c 1870 appears to have lost 
the presence of Jackson at meetings. 
The NER had, in 1865, put forward plans for a timber dock in the 
Slake 62 although work on it did not proceed and it was not until 1871 
that the NER and the HP&HC met in York to discuss additional deepwater 
dock accommodation. 
63 In Harrison's view, the depth of water in the 
docks was insufficient and had already been the cause of the import of 
iron ore being undertaken elsewhere. It was agreed that the entrance 
should be dredged by the NER, which was urged to improve both its docks 
and the entrances, now inferior to the channel. The NER anticipated 
that the entrance to the Jackson dock would soon be closed for improvement 
and 'Harrison propounded his scheme of development whereby the two sets 
of docks would be connected, enabling ships to enter at one end and leave 
from the other. He concluded his plan by noting that the principal entrance 
must be through the old harbour; "the difficulty of maintaining that deep 
water channel would always be much less than that attending similar efforts 
at the entrance to the West Harbour, " 
64 
an- indictment of Jackson's plans. 
Concerned that Harrison's proposals for new docks would deprive the harbour 
of water for its sluicing, the HP&HC called upon Howkins who duly reported 
that the sluice gates had been kept closed for a year while the NER was 
carrying out dock works and, as a result, it had been proved "conclusively 
that the scour from the Slake is not necessary to keep open the access 
to the harbour. , 65 
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1. fiar,, icý: ool Bosin, opened 1835 
2. Victoria Dock, 1840 
3. Coal Dock, 1847 
4. Jackson Dock, 1852 
5. Swainson Dock, 1856. 
6. Timber Dock, 1864. 
7. Union Dock, 1880 
8. Central Dock, 1880 
9. North Basin, 1880. 
N 
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By 1873 the HP&HC had expended on its works the E50,000 authorised 
and so sought from the Board of Trade approval to levy dues. Agreement 
was reached with the NER regarding its dock enlargement and that company 
duly obtained an Act, although the planned'dock works were not delineated 
66 
on any deposited Parliamentary plan. Acting under Harrison, William 
George Laws (1836-1904), later City Engineer in Newcastle, was probably 
responsible for the design work67 but details of this major dock enlargement 
are scant: under the direction of Charles Augustus Harrison (1848-1916) 
the work was executed by Walter Scott, responsible for many railway contracts. 
68 
Begun in 1875 the three docks of 3,13 and 121-2 . acres respectively were 
opened on 6 July 18BO without ceremony, having cost c E480,000.69 The 
HP&HC had suggested that they be inaugurated by the Prince of Wales. 
The opening of the new docks - they were viewed as being capable 
of materially changing the condition of the port for the better, and of 
affecting to a very considerable degree the trade of the North-East 
70 
_ brought 
the major development of Hartlepool to an end. To the east the 19 acre 
Victoria dock, the Old Harbour and the recently-formed Commissioners harbour, 
were in use, principally for coaling and the landing of timber, while 
to the south the dock areas totalled 65 acres and the West Harbour was 
of 44 acres; in addition, timber ponds had been formed. 
71 As at other 
portsof the region, the principal cause of improvement was dredging, carried 
out continuously and to such extent that by 1877 a depth of more than 
11 ft was available at the lowest of tides. 
72 In common with the other 
ports, a shipbuilding industry had been established at Hartlepool - with 
no tradition of building in wood - where the WHH&R had built graving docks 
and leased them to shipbuilding engineers. The NER continued this practice. 
In spite of the early success of the twin ports, founded by Tennant and 
Jackson, their coal trade, which never rose appreciably above Im tons 
from either concern, showed evidence of decline from the 1860 s and under 
the NER it declined even further. The fall was counterbalanced by a 
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growing import trade, principally in timber, for which the Hartlepools 
had become the region's premier centre; in 1870 almost 250,000 loads 
were imported and 357,000 in 1880.73 
6.7 Seaham Harbour 
The' death of the Marquis of Londonderry in 1854 and his succession 
by the son of his first marriage brought the management of the Seaham 
properties to his widow, Frances Anne, whose family had been re3ponsible 
in part, for their original development. The completion of the railway 
to Sunderland had brought her into dispute with the Sunderland Dock Company 
under the chairmanship of George Hudson. As a result of the disagreements 
which ensued, the quantities, of coal shipped by the Londonderry collieries 
at Sunderland did not-nearly reach those which had been guaranteed earlier, 
George Elliot, successor to Buddle, having indicated that the throughput 
in 1855 would be some 450,000 tons p. a. 
1 
although in that year the total 
amounted only to some 71,000 tons. 
2 The differences between Hudson and 
Lady Londonderry a mutual antipathy - would seem to have led her to 
have had made a re-assessment of the capabilities of Seaham Harbour, 
a move perhaps accelerated by the growth of the transport of coal by steamship. 
In 1845 the harbour had been the subject of an investigation by Brooks 
and he had then suggested that a new, bigger, dock should be formed to 
the south of the existing complex. Without gates it was to open directly 
into a large refuge, encircled by protecting piers and the entrance between 
them would give a depth at high water of 161-611; in the dock the depth 
was to be 18, _O,,. 
3 
, Although no further works resulted from Brooks's 
plan it is possible that its scale was such as to induce Londonderry to 
build instead his railway to Sunderland. Nevertheless, the proposed 
expansion of 'Seaham was again considered in 1855 when reports were received 
from several consul-ting engineers. 
The scheme submitted by the Edinburgh consultants, D. & T. Stevenson, 
was in form very similar to that put forward earlier by Brooks, the main 
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difference being the provision of gates to the projected inner dock. 
Stevensons considered that the 'main requirement was that of increased 
depth, the present shortcomings leading, at times, to 30 or 40 vessels 
lying off-shore, a phenomenon which led ships to seek other ports. They 
also anticipated that the "recent introduction of screw colliers is calculated 
to ef fect a great change in the coal trade ,4 and propounded the view "that 
by far the safest as well as the most advantageous course is to seek extension 
in a southern direction, ,5 providing the new dock with two sets of gates 
leading into the protected harbour. One of the advantages of their proposals 
would be that the new facilities could be built without affecting the 
existing traffic. The operation of the Londonderry quarries at Penshaw, 
and the railway from them, would reduce costs to an estimated E76,500. 
John Murrayq from Sunderland, also -submitted a report. In contrast, 
he suggested only that the existing piers be lengthened to give a greater 
harbour area but be also proposed, in contrast to Stevensons, that the 
principal development should be to the north where a four-acre tidal harbour 
and a five-acre dock could be provided. Adopting principles used at 
Hartlepool, he suggested that sluicing of the dock entrance be adopted 
with, if necessary, the opening up. of the adjoining Daldon Dean "and thus 
permit the tidal water to flow up it to some extent, which, if retained 
and aided by ý the waters of the brook would give additional scouring power; 116 
his proposals would cost E68,000. 
The third of the engineers to report at this time was Brooks who 
put forward proposals for extensions to both north and south. The scale 
of the works 
_ 
was somewhat greater than had been the proposals of Stevenson 
and Murray. Brooks envisaged a north dock of 18 acres, with a seven 
acre harbour, having two 60 ft entrances; the dock would be 1,400 ft 
long and would cost E180,466. Conversely, if a dock were to be formed 
to the south it could be 23 acres in extent and would cost, if built as 
an addition, a further Z142,357. Flatteringly, but perhaps erroneously, 
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Brooks concluded his report by noting that "the creation of Seaham Harbour 
is a noble instance of private enterprise... (and it) need fear no competition 
from the neighbouring dock at Sunderland where the charges must be higher 
than will be necessary to be levied at Seaham. ,7 
The three reports were duly considered by Elliot who in turn commented 
on them to Lady Londonderry. His views were confined only to engineering 
matters, not " the Propriety of the Outlay in a commercial point of View". 
8 
He was somewhat dismissive of the Stevensons' proposals, mistrusting both 
the cost and the benefits; Murray, he thought, had underestimated the 
finances available and had envisaged too little depth of water; Brooks's 
scheme he thought expensive but satisfactory, in that it embraced deep- 
water access and docks. The views of Lady Londonderry are not recorded 
but subsequently Brooks's report was sent to Stevensons for their comments. 
Surprised by the extent of the scheme put forward, the Stevensons noted 
that they did not envisage any 
such , Outlay on a 
Private Harbour but if your Ladyship is still desirous to have our material views on a scheme embracing a depth of not less than 9 or 10 ft we shall be glad to have 
the honour of considering the subject in that light and submitting 
our opinioh thereon. 9 
They were more than doubtful as to the expediency of providing such a 
depth of water - Sunderland had only some four to six feet at low water 
and the Tyne 6--2 ft - and questioned the expenditure of Vkm on a private 
enterprise. Considering the matter further they recommended that the 
expansion of the port should be limited and suggested only the formation 
of a 4-, acre dock to accommodate 11 ships together with. a lk acre tidal 
harbour, both of them to the south of the port. If completed as a single 
contract - some criticism of past practice is here implied - the work 
would be completed within two years at a cost of E66,000. 
The differing opinions led to Robert Stephenson bei. ng consulted. 
His conclusions were unlike those of his colleagues, whose reports he 
had perused. He reported that during his short visit to Seaham "several 
hundred vessels passed the Harbour... of which I was informed a large number 
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would have made it, if practicable, while at the same time the docks were 
full of loaded vessels, none of which Could put to sea. 1110 To him, the 
answer was obvious; provide an entirely new entrance, additional accommodation 
for shipping and a method of construction whereby traffic would not be 
impeded. His solution was to build a new dock to the north of the port 
and he recommended that it should be not less than ten acres in extent 
with an outer harbour of six acres. The new harbour would be entirely 
separate from the old, the only connection being a 65' wide waterway between 
the two docks. His works would cost E130,000. 
Still indecisive, Lady Londonderry sent Stephenson's report to the 
Stevensons. They were critical of it, especially his methods of wave 
suppression, and considered that a five foot depth of water would be sufficient. 
They pointed out that the requirements of Seaham were different from those 
of the Tyne and Wear as it was dependent upon only one trade, the export 
of coal. They suggested that the north dock would be unsuitable and 
instead put forward a 7-. acre dock to the south with berths for screw 
colliers and a 41,, acre basin for light vessels, to be made into a dock 
later if needed. Still unhappy as to the costs involved, they concurred 
in Mr. Stephenson's views as to the heavy responsibilty of 
recommending so bold an undertaking, for although we were 
not restricted as to the amount of estimate, still we understand 
it is to be your Ladyship's desire not to embark on too large 
or doubtful a project as such a course seemed more suited 
for a public company than for private enterprise. 11 
It was presumably the final comment from the Stevensons which brought to Lady 
Londonderry the realisation that port improvements at Seaham would incur 
too high an expense for the economical shipment of coal by larger vessels; 
it would be better to reach agreement with the SDC and ship more coal 
therell Following this policy, shipments from Sunderland were increased 
rapidly from 71,. 000 tons in 1855 
12 to 133,000 two years later and to c 
km tons in 1863. In this later year 295,000 tons of coal were shipped 
Between 1852 and 1856 Londonderry coal was shipped at three outlets: Sunderland dock, 62,000 
69,000; Tyne, 30,000 - 62,000; Seaham Harbour, 304,000 - 373,000 tons p. a. Shipments totalled 
503,000 tons in 1852 and 432,500 tons in 1856. 
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1here was seemingly some indecisiveness or confusion in the mind 
of Lady Londonderry in these years, witness her reluctance to ship coal 
at Sunderland in spite of the completion of the railway and her seeking 
of advice from perhaps too many engineering consultants. With the dispute 
at Sunderland 'in progress, however, she was able to write sensibly to 
her London solicitor: 
It is nonsense to 'go on as we are doing losing the profit 
of the railway, getting into scrapes with the collieries for 
the non-fulfillment of contr. acte, and victimised by all these' 
people who have their own interests and jobs and go on humbugging 
and laughing at us-14 
The letter could infer that the dispute was not of her making and yet 
the evidence regarding the proposed Seaham enlargement would seem to indicate 
that she was very much in control of her affairs, even to questioning Stevensons 
on their theory of wave-control. In addition to -. negotiating with the 
SDC reigarding shipments there she was also referred to by Elliot for 
advice and in 1856 he reported to her on the state of the harbour and 
suggested that the dock be deepened2 at a cost of some E4,000, by some 
2-'2 ft t'o accept ships of greater tonnage. 
15 The improvement of the harbour 
remained in her mind and in 1858 Stevensons submitted yet another version 
of their south dock extensions. This later scheme indicated a new entrance, 
some 1,500 feet to the south, with. - a harbour of almost six acres. 
Landward of the harbour were three docks, of 8,4 and 4-2 acres respectively, 
the last forming a junction between the old and new systems. 
16 
It was not until 1674 that further consideration was given to expansion: 
Lady Londonderry had died in 1865 and her step-son, the 4th Marquis, 
in 1872. He was succeeded by George Henry, the 5th Marquis of Londonderry 
(1821-1884), her son and inheritor of the estates. 
17 To investioate 
the port's potential the engineers Meik and Nisbet, # involved on the Wear 
and at Blyth, were consulted. All earlier schemes for improvement were 
laid before them; all were rejected. In their place was suggested a 
# William David Nisbet (1837-1897) 
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much less ambitious project, namely a single five-acre South dock formed 
from the two existing small enclosures, * with a protected harbour formed 
by extending the existing north pier by some 400 ft and providing a corresponding 
detached south pier 800 ft in length. A deep-water channel would lead 
from the entrance between the piers to the docks. 
18 As had happened 
earlier, no work was undertaken at Seaham but increased * colliery output 
was taken by rail to Sunderland where the Londonderry Railway, by 1876P 
carried more than Im tons, p. a. into the south docks. 
19 
Itis apposite to consider further the railway commuication between 
the Seaham collieries and Sunderland. The opening of Seaham Harbour 
had brought with it the waggonway from Rainton to the sea and this, in 
turn, had been intersected by the Durham and Sunderland Railway (D&SR) 
in 1836; a later connection had enabled Rainton coal to be shipped on 
the Wear. # The intervention of Hudson into Sunderland's affairs had 
resulted in the absorbtion of the D&SR into, eventually, the NER and Lady 
Londonderry in 1857 saw herself as being able to break its monopolistic 
position, a "monopoly that would otherwise have been created, undisturbed 
and kept (to the disadvantage of the coal-owners of the north) in the 
20 hanO of a railway company every day becoming more alarmingly powerful . 11 
By attempting to convey coal by her own railway between Sesham and Sunderland 
- opened in August 1854 and built without an Act of Parliament as four 
miles of its s ix were on Londonderry land 
21_ 
and load it via her own 
reserved staiths she had felt able to challenge both Hudson and the NER. 
Her anger had resulted from Hudson having accused her of having attempted 
to create, on her part, another monopoly. 
Between 1854 and 1885 the port of Seaham stagnated and although shipments 
ofc -4 m tons p. a. are recorded in the 1850s, they did not exceed this 
figure by 1885 and, in fact, for several years in the 1870s they were 
less than -2 m tons. Virtually no capital had been injected into the 
* The original docks were 2 and 2-1-2 acres in extent. 
# In 1852,83,000 tons of coal was so routed. 
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harbour the only item of work undertaken being a short spur breakwater, 
perhaps the start of a new north pier, its building seemingly unrecorded. 
22 
The neglect is due to several reasons: the building of the Londonderry 
Railway in 1854, its subsequent improvement leading to increased shipments 
at Sunderland rather than at Seaham; the death of Lady Londonderry in 
1865 and an apparent lack of interest, or perhaps available capital, on 
the part of the 5th Marquis; and the rapid increase in the use of steam- 
ships, ý their tonnages rising at a rate whereby any port improvement would 
need to be substantial to be worthwhile. The doubts of the Stevensons 
were justified: such capital as was 'required could be obtained only from 
public sources. 
6.8 Warkworth Harbour, Amble. 
In 1854 coal was shipped from Amble at a rate of 78,000 tons p. a., 
the harbour then having been in operation for ten years. Its finances 
had been very 'closely interlinked with those of Radcliffe colliery and 
in 1854 the colliery again changed owners, coming under the control of 
John and Joseph Harrison, of Newcastle. John Harrison was appointed 
to the Warkworth Harbour Commission (WHC) in April 1855 1 although as recently 
as'a month earlier he had been in contact with the Sunderland Dock Company 
regarding arrangements' for Warkworth coal to be shipped at Sunderland, 
spouts being provided thare by the dock company, 
2 
an arrangement which 
can only have been due to a wish to ship into larger colliers than could 
u'se Amble or to the lack of shipping facilities there. Harrison immediately 
requested the WHC to provide a new berth, a piled quay 300 ft long, but 
the commission was reluctant to undertake the work due to lack of funds; 
Robert Ladbroke - the holder of the major debenture - however, was able 
to offer E600 for the work to proceed, a sum later increased to E870.3 
In 1856 the Blyth and Tyne Railway sought to obtain powers for a 
branch line between Bedlington and Amble, the railway approaching from 
4 the south and connecting with the existing river staiths. The following 
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year Harrison, conscious of the need for a dock, produced to the WHC a 
plan and estimate "prepared by Messrs J ohn Green of Newcastle, - Architect 
and T. W. Bell, Civil Engineer for making a Dock behind the South Jetty 
and present shipping staiths at an expense of E17,798. ,5 The WHC agreed 
to implement the scheme if finance were made available. The report produced 
by John Green (1787-1852) suggested that the dock should be at the extremity 
of the NER branch and noted that the termini of both colliery railways, 
Radcliffe and Broomhill, were located there. The dock would be 4-ý. acres 
in extent, would hold 50 ships of up to 400 ton capacity and would provide 
a depth of water of 20 ft at high tide. Due to the fact that the dock 
would be built in an area predominantly of rock, Green suggested that 
dock walls would not be required "on about two thirds of the circumference 
,, 6 of the dock so reducing its cost, while in addition the excavated 
material could be used to reclaim some 12 acres of the south foreshore. 
An additional dock of 2-, acres could be formed in the quarry site to seaward 
and connected by canal with the larger work. No construction operations 
followed. 
The following year the commissioners noted that a Parliamentary Committee 
was then considering the question of Harbours of Refuge and it was agreed 
that representation be made concerning the feasibility of such a provision 
at Coquet Island, a harbour which would have the advantage of being built 
by public funds but at the same time rendering more favourable the river 
at Amble. The WHC presented a memorial, noting that several smaller 
harbours on the north-east coast would be better than a single large refuge. 
At the same time and as part of the scheme, proposals were made to extend 
by 900 feet the north pier ,a move partly made necessary by the fact 
that its seaward end was deteriorating badly and had been inspected by 
James Leslie, involved earlier. 
7 The south pier, too, suffered damage 
but such was the lack of money that only minor repairs were put in hand. 
By 1860 the quantity of coal shipped totalled 88,000 tons, generating 
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revenue of U, 022 from port dues and E376 from staith rents. Against 
this small income was set L825 as loan interest and E171 as salaries, 
the former sum providing a negligible return on the L184,800 borrowed 
8 for the construction of the harbour. Although the low throughput of 
the port could be partly explained by a colliery QutpUt lower than anticipated, 
nevertheless it was also due to some inadequacies, borne out by a memorial 
prepared by shipowners. They complained of a lack of water at the staiths, 
especially those of the Radcliffe colliery, and a committee was formed 
to investigate, Harrison amongst its members. The committee suggested 
that new berths for loading should be provided between the gears of the 
two collieries at a cost of some Z3,000 and recouped by the levy of an 
additional -2d on dues, bringing to the WHC an increase of L105 p. a., if 
based on 1858 It was noted that "if such facilities were 
made the* existing collieries would be enabled to ship the whole of their 
produce at the harbour. "9 Without funds, the commissioners again approached 
Ladbroke, thinking of abandoning the harbour, but found him unable to 
raise the capital necessary whereupon Browne asked the NER whether it 
was "disposed to purchase the harbour at Warkworth which he (thought) 
may be had at present for L15,000,1"0, an offer which the NER refused immediately. 
Meanwhile further attempts were made to improve facilities, Harrison in 
1862 producing plans for a new quay and, the following year, a new dredger 
was reported as being at work. 
Harrison, from 1863 Treasurer to the WHC, died in 1866 being then 
credited as having "'accomplished great things as regarded improvements"" 
at Amble*. Some doubts exist as to the port's financial arrangements. 
It is recorded that the harbour debentures had been sold - the date is 
12 not known for E8,000 to the Radcliffe colliery owners, presumably 
Ladbroke but perhaps Harrison. In turn they were sold to Hugh Andrews 
in 1869, the NER having been asked by "the executors of the late James 
4A Newcastle Councillor, Harrison was proposed as a member of the TIC but was not elected. 
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Harrison of Newcastle, if the Company will purchase their interests in 
the harbour at Warkworth, , 
13 
a request which was refused. Andrews, a 
Belfast merchantt became involved 'with the WHC in 1870 an da partner 
in the Broomhill colliery# the following year. 
14 
The condition of the harbour, combined with improved rail transport 
and dock accommodation elsewhere, resulted in coal shipments falling to 
42,000-tons in 1869, a trend which caused the commissioners to appoint 
Meik and Nesbit, consulting engineers, to put improvements in hand. 
Meik was appointed as a commissioner and an extensive dredging operation 
was later undertaken, the intention being to provide eight feet of water 
at low tide. In 1878 Meik had been able to report that, even then, "a 
great and most beneficial change, has been effected in the harbour. Formerly 
the tidal water from the river channel leading to the harbour berths impinged 
,, 15 on the quays and so caused their silting, but this had been obviated. 
The results of the harbour improvement 'were most marked and by 1880 the 
colliery companies were shipping 187,000 tons of coal. The improvement 
of the river's channel, at times providing 20 ft of water at the pier 
head, enabled ships drawing up to 16 ft of water to use the port. Improvement 
had been almost solely the result of dredging, 2589000 tons of material 
having been removed during the year*. 763 ships, 346 of them steamships 
registered at U. K. ports had used- the harbour. Although a dock had been 
suggested earlier no work had ensued but nevertheless the need for some 
enclosed basin had continued and in 1881 Meik reported that "the Tidal 
Basin, or Fish Dock, in -the upper part of the Harbour is nearly completed 
and will afford increased accommodation to the fish and general trade 
of the Port. , 
16 It was of I only a small area but it, and the extension 
of the south quay, had brought about significant improvements. 
In 1863 Warkworth harbour was reported upon by Meik, an investigation 
seemingly undertaken for . 
Andrews in connection with a claim being made 
# The colliery, too changed hands in 1869. 
* In 1877, dredging had totalled 90,000 tons. 
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for the establishment there of a harbour of refuge. In his report Meik 
referred to the two types of harbour envisaged, "a National Harbour, available 
at once as a Harbour of Refuge and as a Military or Strategic Harbour , 
17 
or the latter only. Noting that the 1859 Commission on the subject had 
not seriously considered Warkworth and, although piers had been built 
at the Tyne entrance, without Government funds, he now propounded the 
view that an extensive harbour, a version of the earlier proposals, could 
be formed so as to embrace Coquet Island. The cost would be E1.5m, or 
Z1.25m if convict labour, housed on the island, were to be employed. 
Alternatively, a smaller harbour could be formed by extending the north 
pier and building a new south pier. With dredging and extending the 
existing berths, the total cost would be E120,000 for a depth of 12 ft 
at low water. If it were found necessary to provide a depth of 20 ft, 
the piers'would need to be extended still further at a total cost of E180,000. 
At the hearing by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, Meik 
again put forward his view thatýWarkworth should be built as a national 
harbour 18 but the scheme did not find universal approval and the publication 
Enqineering, noting that the merits 'of Warkworth were such as to make 
it the best choice, nevertheless recommended "that the matter should be 
allowed to drop altogether". 
19 
So far as Warkworth was, concerned the sole result of the inquiry 
was that it was decided to seek Parliamentary powers for a harbour improvement. 
Drawings by Meik- were depositýed inNovember 1883; they showed proposals 
very , similar - to those put to the Committee, 
20 
a north pier extended by 
960 feet and a new south pier 13BO feet in length. A Bill was duly prepared 
and, in addition to the propcsed works, it sought additional capital in 
view of the fact that the harbour, "owing to the increased size of modern 
vessels ... is insufficient to accommodate , 
21 them. In spite of its being 
recommended to proceed to Committee stage, the Bill was withdrawn by its 
promoters in March 1884.22 
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In the years before 1885 the port of Amble was in scale much smaller 
than any in the region so far as its coal shipments were concerned, in 
no small measure due to its isolated geographical location and the fact 
that it served only a small detached coalfield. As had occurred elsewhere, 
coal shipments increased when capital, principally expended on dredging, 
was injected but Amble was an example, too, of a port which had initially 
failed in spite of high capital expenditure; in this case almost L200,000 
had been spent by 1854 when coal shipments were averaging only some 70- 
80,000 tons. By 1884, shipments reached 226,000 tons, an increase of 
no less than 40,000 tons over the previous year. 
22 The number of ships 
used in this trade was 691,361 steam powered, U. K. registered and 184 
U. K. registered sail; their draught was between 16 and 18 ft. The increase 
in shipments had a marked effect on the WHC finances. Revenue in 
1884 was Z5,111 and after expenses a balance of Z3,840 remained, sufficient 
to allocate E1,400 towards quay extensions. The two collieries had by 
this time improved their harbour works; Radcliffe, now owned by the Radcliffe 
Coal Company improved its staiths and the Broomhill Coal Company sought 
to deepen to 10 ft at low water its berth so as to enable continuous loading 
to take place. On its part, the WHC had continued dredging so as to 
improve the shipping channel between staiths and sea. Negotiations with 
the NER had led to its being connected to the quay and'modifications had 
been made regarding the working of the staiths, so enabling them to operate 
by gravity alone. Served by its two railways, the NER from Broomhill 
and the colliery line from Radcliffe, the port had trebled its throughput 
between 1854 and 1885; during that period it was the most rapid rate 
of increase in the region. 
6.9 Summary 
Between 1854 and 1885 the output of coal in the North-East, three 
quarters of it from Durham, had continued to increase steadily, although 
at a rate less than the figure for the United Kingdom as a whole. Compared 
33 6 
with the previous quarter-century the annual compound rate of increase 
was significantly lower, 2.8% compared with 3.25%; in addition the North- 
East's share of output had fallen from 24%. The annual rate of increase of 
Coal Output and Shipments, 1855-1885.1 .I 
, 
1855 
(000 ton) 
1885 
(000 ton) 
1855-1885- 
P. a. 
U. K. output 
N. E. output 
64448 
15431 
159351 
35091 
3.1 
2.8 
Ol NE/UK, c 24 22 - 
NE shipments 
NE exports 
8271 
2839 
16773 
c9407 
2.4 
4.1 
Exports 'o 34 56 - 
shipments of coal had also fallen but the greatest change had taken place 
in the quantity of coal exported, increasing from 34'% to 565'a and reflecting 
the growing demand from foreign markets as industrialisation there developed. 
The increasing size of ships, and their better construction, made safer 
the exportation of coal over greater distances. 
So far as the, North-East was - concerned the changes in coal shipments 
were marked. Whereas in the earlier period it had been the South Durham 
ports which had expanded at the expense of the Tyne and the Wear, now 
it was principally the Tyne which had benefited, while the share of the 
Wear remained almost static. 
Shipments of Coal from the North East, 1855-1885 
2 
1855 1885 
000 tons 01 "0 000 tons 0' 
Tyne 3663 43 9877 59 
Wear 1891 22 39B1 24 
Tees 298 4 126 1 
Blyth 196 2 533 3 
Hartlepools 1612 19 1215 7 
Seaham 735 9 788 4.5 
, Amble 
59 1 253 1.5 
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There were two reasons for the change. The first, and perhaps the more 
important, was the development of the Teesside iron industry, increasing 
to such 'magnitude that it absorbed the output of its captive collieries 
and brought coal to Teesside from further afield. The manufacture of 
2m tons of pig-iron alone was said in IB72 to require 5m tons of coal. 
The combined throughput of Hartlepool and the Tees was reduced in absolute 
terms but, proportionally, their decline was much more severep falling 
from 235% to 85'a of the North-East's shipments. The other factor was the 
enormous improvement which was made to the river Tyne by the Tyne Improvement 
Commission aided to a great extent by the building by the North Eastern 
Railway of its dock at Jarrow, its effect pignificant upon the Wear. 
There, the formation of the Sunderland Dock Company had arrested an earlier 
decline and the annual growth rate which had resulted from it had increased 
to 91-, 1/10 p. a. by 1860. However, coinciding with the opening of the NER's 
dock on the Tyne, this figure fell to only 1.25'0. On the river Tyne, 
the increase over the 30 year period remained fairly constant, averaging 
D/ 3.4/o. 
Coal Statistics: annual percentage increase (compound); 1855-1885. 
Dates 5'o Compound p. a. 
Tyne 1855-1885 3.4 
Wear 1855-1860 9.5) 2 5a 1860-1885 . r. 1.2) 
Tees 1855-IBB5 -3 Blyth 1855-1865 1 
Hartlepool 1855-1885 -1 Seaham 1855-1885 - Amble 1855-18B5 5 
The -contemporary 'view was that by the efforts of the TIC "the Tyne 
(had) regained its supremacy in the North"; 3 it was perhaps more due 
to the fact that its development occurred so much later than at other 
ports* and so was of greater magnitude. In the previous period the expenditure 
The Tyne's throughput of coal had never been overtaken by any of the other ports. 
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of capital on dock facilities at Seaham, Hartlepoolp Middlesbrough and 
Sunderland had resulted in increased trade and likewise, on the Tyne, 
the building of Tyne Dock produced the same effect. 
On the Tyne -the NER proved successful in its developments, the TIC 
less so. The commissioners had been responsible for the Northumberland 
Dock, the river's firstv serving the collieries of Northumberl6nd via the Blyth 
and Tyne Railway. In its relations with both coal-owners and railway 
the TIC allowed itself to be persuaded that further dock accommodation 
was required, leading to, first, the aborted Low Lights proposal and later 
the Coble Deneg or Albert Edward, dock, designed to provide both import 
and coal-handling facilities for ships of a tonnage greater than could 
use the Northumberland dock. Built'at a time when ship sizes were increasing 
to such an extent that docks were becoming less necessary, if not actually 
a hindrance, it is understandable that many reservations were held as 
to its utility. -This dock's building had. been, in effect, the result 
of blackmail 'on the part of the Northumberland coal owners and the TIC 
had submitted to the threat of losing a proportion of its trade to that 
port. It was not until the BUR became part of the NER that improvements 
were made at Blyth - at the instigation of the NER - to accommodate the 
Northumberland coal trade. 
South of the Tyne, the Wear was affected to an extent such that it 
was claimed that the NER was "attempting to kill Sunderland ,4 by shipping 
all its Durham coal at Jarrow. The problem on the Wear, however, pre- 
dated the opening of Tyne Dock. In spite of its early success the SDC 
had not prospered and it had been taken over by the River Wear Commission, 
later accused of subsidising the dock from river revenue. The situation 
at Sunderland was further complicated by the proximity of Seaham and the 
antipathy of Lady Londonderry towards both Hudson and to the NER. it 
was possibly this hostility which led the NER not to develop the docks 
at Sunderland where the 'small Wearmouth dock had been in railway ownership 
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for many years and where the NER had a large investment 4n the SDC. 
Its reluctance to invest further was perhaps due to the fact that much 
coal was transported to Sunderland via the Londonderry Railway, both from 
Londonderry collieries and from others, some a protest at the monopoly 
of the NER. Had further port development at Seaham been undertaken the 
picture may have been different in that it would have increased its throughput, 
traffic on the -Londonderry Railway would have declined and the NER could 
have exercised its near-monopoly at Sunderland. 
Furtherýsouth, the developmentsl at the Hartlepools and the Tees were 
interlinked, a, result of the formation of the West Hartlepool Harbour 
and Railway by Jackson and the subsequent migration of trade from the 
Tees. Here, events were complicated by the iron industry. A fall-off 
in coal shipments was more than balanced by an increased inland trade, 
a diversification into grain and timber importation at Hartlepool and, 
later, an import trade in iron ore at both Hartlepool and the Tees. 
It was the growing internal trade, and the need to exclude rival companies, 
which led the NER to take over the Stockton and Darlington Railway and 
the WHH&R, so tightening its grip on the economy of the North-East. By these 
takeoversý the NER became possessed of further docks making possible an 
extension of its facilities both at Hartlepool and at the Middlesbrough 
dock, formerly belonging to the SOR. Although the (east) Hartlepool 
dock had been railway property for some time, the fall-off in coal shipped 
on Teesside had precluded enlargement there. Absolute control, dating 
from 18659 changed the railway's position in south Durham, B, y 1874, with 
the region firmly in its control the NER was able to develop its outlets 
at Blyth, increase its facilities on the Tyne, augment the Hartlepools 
and improve Middlesbrough; after 1859 the Sunderland dock had come under 
the control of the RWC and the NER could do little, as to ship there would 
deprive it of the profits from its own docks. 
The combination of NER power and the ration alisation of port control 
brought about the greatest changes to the Tyne and Tees where river straight- 
340 
ening and deepening were undertaken with grebt benefits. The Tyne was 
improved to an extent such that Newcastle was able to put in hand extensive 
quay improvements and the replacement of the bridge there opened up the 
river above it, so permitting industry to expand and enabling the NER, 
later, '! to take further advantage' of the work of the TIC. The railway 
company did not, however, seek to build a further dock, neither did it 
seek to improve the shipping points in the inadequate docks of the TIC, 
preferring instead to ship its coal at Blyth. On the Tees, the commissioners 
there 'undertook considerable works, improving the river to Stockton so 
as to enable that town, like Newcastle, to put quay works in hand. The 
mouths of both Tyne and Tees were protected by piers, the latter with 
some expediency in conjunction with the ironmastera by the use of their 
waste products. 
Relative to these two rivers the Wear declined. The RWC extended 
its docks, in spite of problems experienced with the sea outlet to the 
south of the river's mouth, but their trade was so restricted that in 
1881 the RWC considered selling them to the NER, a move later reconsidered. 
Like the Tyne, much of the coal shipped was loaded at privately-owned 
river staiths and constant improvements were made, to the river berths 
to permit larger ships to use them. 
Of the ports to the south, Seaham remained in private hands and, 
with the construction of the railway to Sunderland and the provision of 
staiths there no port modifications were undertaken, the understandable 
result being a complete lack of increase in the port's throughput. 
At Hartlepoolq however, from 1865 totally in the ownership of the NER, 
major extensions were completed in 1880 when three new docks were formed, 
to link the two earlier systems. At Hartlepool, as at Sunderland, problems 
were experienced with the entrance to the south docks and it was Harrison 
who had recommended that the two systems be connected, the south entrance 
closed and access provided only at the north end, a dredged channel being 
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maintained by the port commissioners, a body much less powerful than 
its counterparts on the region's -rivers. In spite of the diminution 
of, coal exports, the Tees - maintained a significant trade, principally 
in iron ore, pig iron and engineering products. To meet this trade, 
and to enable bigger ships to use the dock, the NER both increased its 
capacity and improved its entrance, work being completed in 1873. 
The dock improvements undertaken in the region were paralleled by 
the rather more prosaic execution of dredging, universal in application 
and varying only in extent. On the Tyne, 70 m tons of material had been 
removed from the river by 1883, on the Wear in that year l-2m tons was 
removed while on the Tees almost 9m tons had been dredqed*, Am tons 
in the past year. It was only the removal of materials on this scale 
which had enabled the rivers toýbecome capable of receiving ships of increasing 
tonnage; it . was the resultant increase in river capacity which enabled 
them to keep clear the entrances. Improvements to this scale had been 
made possible only by the continuous development of dredging equipment, 
some of it designed by the engineers themselves. The management of the 
plant was a major task; by the end of the period the Tyne employed six 
dredgers, 13 screw hoppers, ten tugboats and 70 hoppers, continuously 
5 
employed in removing material and depositing it at sea. 
Throughout the period the port authorities strove to keep abreast 
of - or ahead' of - increasing ship dimensions. Figures have, already 
been given but, as an example, it should be noted that for the Tyne between 
1854 and 1885 the average size of ship clearing the river rose from 149 
to 428 tons register 
6 but what was really indicative of the improvements 
brought by the TIC was the fact that in 1885 Armstrong could consider 
the building of a '10,500 ton battleship at his works above Newcastle. 
Although to a smaller scale the Tees and Wear had been improved proportionally. 
In hand with shipping had gone shipbuilding, revolutionised since 1852 
when Palmer had built the John Bowes. Again, statistics have been -given 
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but so cyclical was the trade, that is is difficult to show trends; it 
is perhaps enough to give Tyne and Wear, by 1885, as producing c 200,000 
tons p. a. , Hartlepool and the Tees perhaps half that figure. By this 
time Palmer's works was it its zenith, building 57,000 tons of shipping, 
7 
Armstrong merged with Mitchell in 1883 and Hawthorn with Leslie two years 
later; ships built averaged c 2,000 tons although it should be pointed 
out that Leslie, in 1854 had built a ship of 1,000 tons. 
8 
Although this period witnessed the eclipse of men such as Hudson 
and Jackson, nevertheless it is impossible not to consider some of the 
individuals involved in the region's further development. Of the three 
commissions, those of the Tyne and Tees were the most progressive, both 
including industrialists of stature. For much of the period the chairman 
of the TIC was Cowen, involved in its establishment, with Stevenson one 
of the 'life commissioners' and later chairman also. Their task was 
complicated by the internal dissent amongst members, principally between 
the rival factions representing Newcastle and Shields, each group striving 
for advantage. The Newcastle members evidenced some conflict in their 
loyaltiesq commission or council, and to a certain extent they reflected 
the negative attitude ofen expressed in council discussions, especially 
in their antipathy to the NER. Dissatisfied by its monopolistic powers 
the council, unsuccessfully, sought competition to it and it was written 
that they were "a standing disgrace-as a mercantile community... (and) 
richly deserved to have the chains of monopoly rivetted about their necks 
were it not that others would suffer along with them. 119 The member most 
critical of his colleagues was Cail, striving always to expedite the TIC's 
civil engineering works and, although not specifically recoýrd-ad, his views 
w--re often at variance with those of the engineers, Ure and Messent. 
The Tees Conservancy Commission included amongst its members several 
of the men through whom the river, and especially Middlesbrough, was developed, 
[301CýkDw and Vaughan included. They sought to further the interests of 
Middlesbrough in opposition to Stockton but it was through their efforts 
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that the breakwaters came to be constructed so economically. The Pease 
familyp its- interests far-reaching, were also of great influence and, 
as on the Tyne , it is surprising that so much was achieved. Somewhat 
different was the RWC, its members not of the stature of the other two 
bodies -Itwas hampered by its size, more than double that of the others. 
At first in conflict with the dock company it later brought to the Wear 
a more professional approach, seemingly through its chairman, Laing, 
.1. n office 
from 186B until 1900. Its engineers, Murray and Meik, were 
eminent in their profession,, undertaking consultancy work also, as on 
occasions did Messent. 
Little development took place. at Blyth and Seaham, in effect owned 
by the Ridley and Londonderry families and at the Hartlepools, following 
the ousting of Jackson, the NER operated the port under the guidance 
of Harrison, in many ways the spiritual successor of Robert Stephenson, 
and consulted throughout the region. 
Although employing their own engineers the several port authorities 
found it necessary at times to seek the views of consultants: the Tyne 
sought the advice of Walkerg Rendel and Coode; tfle Wear , Coode; the 
Tees, Bald and Rendel; Blyth, Abernethy; Seaham, the StevensonS Robert 
Stephenson and Murray; and Hartlepool, Coode. All of these engineers 
were knownnationally and all contributed to the extensive * developments 
which took place, an expansion of the region's ports through, in part, 
what later became known as the "great depression"10 which lasted from 
1873 until 1896. As it moved upwards from its trough of 1879 the economy, 
and especially that of the Tees, began to revive in response to a growing 
demand for steel in place of wrought iron. 
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7. THE EFFECTS ON PORT DEVELOPMENT OF THE MONOPOLISTIC 
POSITION, OF THE NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY, 1885-1914. 
7.1 Introduction i 
In 1900 the North Eastern Railwayý(NER) achieved by further amalgamatiop, 
a policy pursued since its inception, a complete monopoly of public rail 
transport in the region, so forming the principal link* between the coal 
producers and the places of shipment, several of them owned by the railway 
company itself. 
Between 1885 and 1914 coal production in the region continued its 
upward trend with a tendency towards larger units with higher production, 
the principal-evidence being the development of the large coastal collieries, 
winning coal from under the sea, extending from north of Blyth to Horden. 
Their development' was to lead - especially to the later expansion of Blyth 
and Seaham Harbour. In 1889, some 100,000 men were employed in coal 
mining in. the North-East, threequarters of them in Durham, producing one 
quarter, of the total for England and Wales. 
1 By this time collieries 
extended to a depth of 1,800 ft in Durham and 1,200 ft in Northumberland. 
Of the coal mined in the North-East in 1887, shipments to London totalled 
3.74m tons, other coastal destinations 3.9m and exports 6.9m; a total 
of 8.7m tons was used locally or despatched from the region by rail. 
2 
By 1913, London # alone received 9m tons of coal 
3a 
substantial part the 
result, of the policy of the London Gas Light and Coke Company in chartering 
ships to convey coal by contract to the Thames, such contracts involving 
as much as 100,000 tons each. Later, special vessels, "flat-irons, ,4 
were built to pass under the Thames bridges and, eventually, the Swing 
Bridge when loading at the Dunston staiths, oft ýIne, Tyne, 
So far as other industries were concerned, the chemical trade had 
contracted to an extent such that only two of the many earlier works remained 
in production but "marine, locomotive and general engineering (held) in 
conjunction with its sister trade of shipbuilding,, 
5 
a position second 
* many private colliery lines continued to operate. 
# Not all this coal was from the North-East. 
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only to ýthe coal trade. In shipbuilding, the region had maintained its 
supremacy and, building now in steel, the rivers of the North-East in 
1888 produced more than half the United Kingdom total of 903,687 tons. 
6 
What was to be of great significance, also, was the fact, ý that an electrical 
industry had been founded on the Tyne, its pioneers Swan, Parsons and 
Merz, and it was. their foresight which was to bring to the North-East 
the most -effective of the nation's electricity supply undertakings, enabling 
power to be applied more conveniently to the ports' coal handling appliances. 
Although by 1B85 extensive, the NER suffered competition from one 
railways the Londonderry, running between Seaham and Sunderland. Its 
aquisition in 1900,, together with -its extension southwards, enabled the 
NER to increase coal shipments at Hartlepool, in the same way that, its 
purchase of the Blyth and Tyne Railway had opened the way to the development 
of Blyth. The, NER, unlike others, remained predominantly a mineral railway 
and between 1885 and 1914 minerals contributed some 60% of the company's 
revenue; 
7 
some three quarters- of this traffic was in coal and coke. 
8 
To meet the demands of the coal trade the railway network had been increased 
from 720 route ý miles in 1854, to 1,278 in 1870 and to 1,730 in 1913, by 
which time it carried annually 54m-tons of minerals. 
9 
Greatly dependent upon the iron and steel industry the NER had been 
affected by the 'Great Depression' buts from 1885 it began an economic 
climbýout of it, a result of the change from iron to steel-making which 
had then but recently been made. ' Jhe recessioq in the industry had led 
to the adoption in 1881 of the "Cleveland Sliding Scale"10 whereby rail 
charges became dependent upon prices ruling in the iron and steel industry 
and other, bodies sought agreements similar to that involving the steel 
manufacturers. Links between the railway and ironmasters were strengthened 
with research, financed by the NER at the instigation of Isaac Lowthian 
Bells into freeing. Cleveland ores from phosphorus so as to compete with 
11 
the Cumberland haematite. 
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To meet the demands of the coal-owners and of the NER, port expansion 
continued, albeit different in character. By 1885, except for Blyth 
and Seaham, the initiative of the port authorities had largely been subsumed 
by the NER. The 1 earlier, major, developments had been either completed 
or were- in progress and the era of dock construction had ended, in effect, 
with the opening of the Albert Edward dock in that year; subsequent development 
was to be principally at the behest of the railway company. The period 
witnessed also two final changes in port ownership, at Blyth and Seaham. 
They -were the first since mid-century and brought all ports other than 
Hartlepool and Seaham into public ownership. * 
In an attempt to assess the relationships between the ports and the 
NER it is instructive to' compare their relative sizes. Of the ports, 
revenue in the early 'years of the ' 20th century amounted, approximately, 
to- E480,000 , for the Tyne, E150,000 for the Wear, Z70,000 at Blyth and 
L130,000' for the Tees, in all less than Elm. In contrast, the NER, with 
some 50,000 staff; enjoyed revenues of c ZlOm p. a. and Tyne Dock alone 
was credited as generating revenue approaching A2m p. a. and Dunston of 
almost E200,000, figures including haulage. 
12 The strength of the NER 
was evident, too, in its general manager, George Steaman Gibb (1850-1925), 
appointed in 1891 as successor to Henry Tennent (1823-1910), who, in turn, 
had followed Harrison. Under Gibb, management was reformed and it is 
understandable that the railway came to dominate the region's ports and 
affect so markedly their future development. 
7.2 River Tyne 
With the completion of the Swing bridge in 1676 and the Albert Edward 
dock in 1884 the Tyne Improvement Commission (TIC) was able to concentrate 
its efforts on the improvement of the river above Newcastle and the completion 
of the piers. Dredging of the upper river had been undertaken on a large 
scale immediately the bridge could be opened to permit dredgers to pass 
up-river; it was a move long-awaited by those with riverside interests. 
Hartlepool was administered jointly by the NER and the port commissioners; Seaham was operated 
by a limited company. 
357 
In 1860, Ure, engineer to the TIC, had suggested that from Newcastle to 
the limit of the commissioners' jurisdiction a depth, of some ten feet 
at low water should be made available while the river itself should be 
shortened and straightened by means of two cuts. As the river's development 
had continued it had been decided that' 'the' depth should be increased to 
15 ft but, naturally, this move had involved a greater expense, so much 
so that the improvements above bridge had already cost twice Ure's original 
estimate but in' 1890 still required a further E163,000; some E400,000 
had been expended upon it. 
1 
By 1885 a 'depth of 22 ft had been provided to Newcastle and 18 to 
Armstrong's works at' Elswick, enabling the 10,500 ton H. M. S. Victoria 
to be launched there in 1887; ' up-river, deepening continued. Shortening 
of the river, to a scale smaller than originally envisaged, had been under- 
taken only at Blaydon Haugh. *These improvements were thought by several 
industrialists to be insufficient and in 1890 they presented a petition 
to the TIC to that effect. 
2 Led by Joseph Cowen Jnr., they sought further 
deepening of the river to give 23 ft at high water, principally for the 
benefit of the owners' of staiths on that section of the riverý so enabling 
them to compete with the NER, then providing a new outlet for its coal 
traffic on the deepened river opposite Elswick. A further move towards 
opening up the river was made in, 1886 when the West Durham and Tyne Railway 
was promoted with the i6tention of shipping gas coal from west Durham 
through new staiths at Dunston, so avoiding the complicated and expensive 
rail journey to Tyne Dock. 
3 Opposed by' the TIC, the subsequent Bill 
was rejected by the House of Lords, but on the understanding that the 
NER would itself promote a similar Bill. The NER duly prepared plans 
for a rail link to a three-berth staith and, having received Parliamentaýry 
assentq 'work was completed in 1893, following which within a year, the 
shipment of coal 'from Dunston increased from 20,000 to 130,000 tons per 
month. 
4, 
358 
Further moves to attract industry to the upper reaches of the river 
were made when the Newburn Bridge Company, the Duke of Northumberland 
indirectly involved in its promotion, sought powers for a new bridge, 
completed in 1893. At the time of its promotion in 1886 it was recorded 
that large tracts of ducal land at Newburn could be developed and, at 
the same time, attention was drawn to "the extraordinary collapse of the 
alkali trade in Tyneside and its probable removal to the Tees", 
5 
an event 
which could provide further sites for riverside industry. Consideration 
of the upper river's future led the TIC to investigate the matter fully 
and it was reported in 1892 that dredging and other works above Newcastle 
should "be gradually carried out to completion, ,6a decision reflecting 
perhaps the concern of the TIC regarding further expansion at a time of 
depression in trade. 
As noted, the Tyne piers were, in relative terms, approaching completion 
in 1885. Cranes had been built to place more easily the much bigger 
concrete blocks, nowý 45 tons, used in the construction of the seaward ends 
of the piers and in'1887 Messent, successor to Ure, reported to the commissioners 
his proposals for terminating theýpiers, a matter of some earlier discussion. 
Originally they were to finish in 13 ft of water but Walker had recommended 
that this depth be increased to 36 ft, later reduced to 30 ft. Walker 
had also proposed an opening of 1,100 ft between the pier heads and Coode, 
reporting in IBB4, had suggested 1,200 ft. Messent now drew attention 
to the-fact that the dredging of the river had increased its tidal capacity 
and hence the flow between the piers, resulting in his recommendation 
7 
that 1,300 ft be adopted. Agreed to by the commissioners the piers 
were extended a further 159 and 137 ft, the rubble mound foundation being 
partly of ironworks slag from Teesside. 
8 Violent storms in 1893 and 
1894, washed the cranes into the sea and severely damaged the north pier, 
although its construction later continued and the roundheads of both piers, 
and their lighthouses, were completed iW1895.9 
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The steady rise in the tonnage of coal shipped from Tyne Dock led 
the NER 'in 1890 to improve facilities there, the directors reporting that 
"an additional jetty is being constructed ... (and) 2 new and deeper entrance"10 
was being planned. -The new staiths were operational by July 1891 but 
it was not, until 1894 that the new entrance was completed. Improvement 
at Jarrow had cost L130,000, compared with the L210,000 spent at Dunston. 
11 
The new 70 ft entrance, its gates hydraulic, provided at high water a 
minimum depth of 27 ft over the sill. 
The improvements, noted earlier, made to the river had caused Newcastle 
Corporation to extend its quayside facilities and to permit the building, by 
private capitalp of warehouses. Between 1866 and lB79 some 3,300 ft 
of quay wall had been built at a cost of c L-,, m but in 1886 a slip occurred 
in an, older section, leading to Messent and William George Laws, city 
engineer, producing a joint report upon its rebuilding. They noted that 
some 1,200 ft remained unimproved and they strongly recommended that it 
be rebuilt to give a minimum depth of water of 18 ft. They were doubtful 
as the efficacy of the last- completed mode of construction, noting that 
cast iron caissons were costly, and they recommended the sinking of "monolithic 
concrete blocks of large size", 
12 the total cost of which would be Z60,900. 
Naturally, the debate in Council brought to light conflicting views, the 
opinion being expressed that expenditure on the quay had been of doubtful 
value while the opposite view was that the quay, and its grain warehouse, 
had beený such a success that the TIC works had been quoted "as an argument 
in favour of th e Manchester Canal. , 
13 Nevertheless, figures given during 
the debate claimed that the Quay brought to the town revenue of only E8,000 
p. a. on its V-4m cost -, a gross return of only 3, "0. Unwilling to spend 
the total sought,, the Corporation sanctioned only LB, 000, although between 
1888 and 1893 some 300 ft of quay wall was replaced at a cost of some 
Z181000- 
14 
The debate concerning the quayside led to further recrimination, 
360 
the wisdom of the grain warehouse's having been built becoming the subject 
of discussion. It was claimed that L84,000 had been invested in it but 
the shareholders had received a return, in total, of only 10% on their 
investment, while Newcastle had received L9,955 in rents and L9,220 in 
additional dues. The NER had given consideration to purchasing the warehouse, 
a move abhorent to the Council, to be deprived of L2,000 p. a. ' should 
the railway company close the warehouse and concentrate its trade at Jarrow. 
15 
The TIC was also criticised for its expenditure of Um o. n the Albert Edward 
dock, worked at a loss, but the commissioners were defended by Cail, who 
stated that "the work of the Commissioners, together with the railways, 
16 had had more to do with making Newcastle prosperous than any other thing" . 
The Corporation was 'critical , too, of the NER, principally of the fact 
that its dues were such as -to encourage the use of Tyne Dock, and even 
to make it economical for coal to be shipped at ports other than Newcastle, 
a result of the NER's efforts to arrange "equal privileges ... to all shippers 
at any port on the north-east coast. , 
17 A deputation later met directors 
of the NER to discuss Newcastle's problems, principally the falling import 
trade. ý Such would appear to have been the lack of sympathy on the part 
of the NER that Stephenson, , 
later TIC chairman, expressed the view that 
another railway to Newcastle was required to break its monopoly and when 
such a line, from Manchester, was proposed the Corporation petitioned 
in favour of it. 
is, The policy of the NER in appointing directors was 
also questioned although its success was in no small part due to them,, 
their interests bound to it. In 1890 its board included Sir Joseph Pease, 
Sir Isaac Lowthian Bell, Viscount Ridley, Earl Grey, Sir David Dale - 
of the Consett Iron Company - and Sir William Gray, of Hartlepool, 
19 
causing 
one of the Newcastle councillors to comment that only "a country man or 
somebody interested, in some great industry in the County of Durham" 
20 
was likely to be considered. There appears, at this time, to have been 
little ill-feeling between, TIC and NER. 
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Within the TIC, however, animosity was still apparent, principally 
a result of the lack of success of the Albeit Edward dock, in 1886 exporting 
only 87,000tons of coal compared with*the 1.79m tons from the Northumberland 21 
and the c5m from the Tyne dock. Fears were expressed regarding competition 
from Blyth, Yorkshire and South Wales and it was noted by Shields members 
that Newcastle appeared to have benefited most from the endeavours of 
the TIC. In spite of dissatisfaction the commissioners decided to build 
further staiths at Whitehill Point, between their two docks, at the same 
time removing the projection into the river, said to be dangerous to shipping. 
As had happened earlier the question of undertaking the work by contract 
or direct labour was raised. Cail, as a contractor himself, favoured 
the former method but the decision was- made to carry out the works by 
direct labour. During construction the wisdom of undertaking the work 
at all was questioned several times, principally on the grounds of the 
lack of use of the Albert Edward dock and the fact that the new staiths 
wereto be' used only by the Backworth collieries, bringing little revenue 
to the TIC. The staiths were begun in 1888 and completed in 1891.22 
Shipments of coal from the TIC staiths in 1892 comprised 1.765m tons from 
the Northumberland dockg 273,000 tons from the Albert Edward and 349,000 
tons from Whitehill Point, but the commissioners, and other interests, 
still considered that the NER *was controlling trade to an extent greater 
than was desirable, especially as the Dunston. staiths would soon come 
with use. In fact, their commissioning brought about a great increase 
in river traffic, to the extent that the Swing Bridge, earlier looked 
upon as- an ill-advised investment, brought an increasing revenue to the 
TIC; in 1894,1.289 m tons of coal was shipped from Dunston in 1,037 
vessels. 
23 
In 1896, the problems regarding docks were over-shadowed by the discovery 
of the extent of the damage incurred by the north pier during earlier 
storms, Messent reporting that another violent storm would endanger its 
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Nortn Pier 
Map 24: Protective Piers, 1855-1908 
stability. 
24 He later reported that it had been undermined and recommended 
that a ship be purchased, loaded with 1,800 tons of concrete and sunk 
to provide protection. These measures proved ineffective, the pier was 
breached and the Piers Committee resolved to "seek the best independent 
scientific advice , 
25 for its repairs. John Wolfe Barry (1836-1918) as 
president of the Institution of Civil Engineers, recommended the firm 
of Coode Son & Matthews, Coode agreeing to undertake the work only if 
associated with another engineer. Barry himself was the eventual choice. 
Although Coode had intended to seek the views of Messent this proved impossible; 
he died before he could be approached, his death attributed to the failure 
of the pier on which he had spent so much of his working life. Messent 
had taken the view that the pier could, with deeper foundations, be rebuilt, 
a view endorsed by his assistant, Charles Goldson, who recommended that 
a low-water depth of 28 ft should be sought. 
27 He envisaged rebuilding 
by direct labour at a cost of L70-F, 80,000. 
The consultants suggested two alternatives, rebuilding a 750 ft length 
from the inner end of the breach or building a new straight pier 1,500 
ft in length. Of the two, the first was preferred as it would cost less, 
28 c and could be completed within three years. Measures were taken 
by Goldson to prevent the enlargement of the breach but, on their proving 
uselessy the commissioners sought a further meeting with the consultants, 
deciding then that work should be by contract, to Barry's designs. In 
the meantime, a report had been submitted to the TIC, outlining the pier's 
history and concluding that collapse was "due to one cause only, viz: - 
to the insufficient depth, below low water, at which the foundation blocks 
were laid on the rubble base , 
29 
and it propounded the view that a depth 
of not less than 35 ft should be sought. The pier would be similar in 
plan to the old one but the revised cost, it was suggested, would be E302,000. 
Messent's death led to James Walker (1853-1910) being appointed as 
engineer in 1897, he being responsible for all work other than the piers, 
matters concerning which were not resolved without difficulty. It was 
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agreed to seek a further Act of Parliament to enable the works to proceed 
and Utrick Alexander Ritson (1842-1932), another former contractor, assumed 
the mantle of Cail, who had died in 1893, in pressing for reconstruction 
to be undertaken by contract. In discussion, it was stated that E37,000 
had already been spent on the necessary repairs but John Lawsong of Tynemouth, 
proposed that the pier should be built to a new line, within the old, 
so enabling protection to be obtained, a sensible suggestion. 
30 Problems 
arose due to the inability of the commissioners to appreciate contractual 
procedure, pressing Barry to provide a specification for the work but 
anticipating that supervision would be undertaken by others. Barry, 
naturally, would not do this, neither would he state his terms until the 
TIC had resolved the matter of supervision. The niceties of the situation 
were appreciated only by Ritson and Stephenson and it was at their instigation, 
with John Lucas, of Gateshead, that it was finally agreed, by 13 votes 
to 10, to rebuild by contract, under the direction of Barry. 
31 
The contract was awarded to Sir John Jackson Ltd. and, again, the 
commissioners became involved in an immediate dispute, seeking sureties 
of ZIOý000, a move with which Jackson, as a reputable contractor, could 
not agree. He maintained his position and the TIC thereupon agreed to 
retain Z10,000 until that sum had been expended on the works, a procedure 
to which Jackson assented. 
32 Jackson's tender for the pier amounted 
to E404,950 and work began during 1899, continuing until 1908, seemingly 
without major mishap but at a slightly higher cost, c E450,000. Additional 
work was undertaken by Jackson, the repairing of both the inner length 
of the north pier and the south, damaged in 189B. Further repairs became 
necessary in 1909 and all work was completed by 1915.33 
The Act which provided for the rebuilding of the pier included also 
for the reconstitution of the commission itself. In the Act 
34 
of 1886, 
Jarrow had been granted a representative but it was not until 1897 that 
it was put to the commissioners that the upper-river interests should 
be represented and that the large-scale cuttings should be made. 
35 Some 
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monthsylaterg representation again was discussed, the result of a Bill 
introduced "by certain dues payers in Newcastle , 36 to make municipal rep- 
resentation a minority by the appointment of six additional members elected 
by, the payers of dues. Stephenson, to become chairman in 1900 following 
the retirement of Stevenson, strongly maintained that Newcastle must remain 
adequately represented, the town and, its mercantile interests having "spent 
some millions in improving their quays. , 
37 A meeting was subsequently 
held with the promoters of the Bill, Lucas stating that the payers of 
dues were already adequately represented by the municipal members. Never- 
theless, the T1C agreed to increase representation by one member for each 
class but the Act, when passed, provided powers for each class to increase 
from two to five. 38 _ 
Although the rate of change on the Tyne had slackened considerably, 
improvements were undertaken by bodies other than the TIC. In 1901 the 
Redheugh bridge 
39 
was replaced due to its having become unsafe and in 
1898 the NER sought powers to build a new river crossing, 
40 
what was to 
become--t-he King Edward bridge, completed in 1906. In 1901 a proposal was 
made for a 
'transporter bridge between North and South Shields, 41 the span 
of 850 ft and headroom of 200 ft providing unimpeded navigation on the 
river; regardless of this fact, its construction was successfully opposed 
by the commissioners. Such had been the success of the Dunston staiths 
that in 1898 the NER sought powers to duplicate them, 
42 
at the same time 
forming a9- acre tidal basin for the retent -ion of shipping, a move to 
which the commissioners were not averse and in 1898 the Consett Iron Company 
sought to build staiths at Derwenthaugh, by 1900 brought into operation. 
The Dunston extension was commissioned in 1903, having cost E165,000. 
The TIC remained concerned about its docks and coaling facilities, 
giving consideration to deepening the Northumberland dock and dispensing 
with its gates. Reporting in 1899 Walker commended this scheme as permitting 
ships "to approach and leave the Staiths and Dock at all states of the 
tide , 43 rather than at restricted periods. He later developed his plans 
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further, putting forward a suggestion that river staiths should be built 
by the commissioners, so eliminating docking problems and permitting ships 
of up to 600 ft long to load. In 1901 the TIC decided not to undertake 
any further dock works but to Concentrate on its river staiths. Much 
discussion and research then took place into two aspects of their operation, 
anti-breakage measures and the ability to handle the much larger waggons, 
up to 23 tons gross, recently introduced by the NER. * Modifications 
to all five staiths at Whitehill Point were put in hand, provision being 
made for hydraulic hoists, spouts and travelling-band conveyors, the last- 
named for use only when tides were of such a height as to preclude normal 
loading. This work was completed in 1907.44 
Such had been the success of the two up-river staiths - in 1907 Dunston 
shipped 3.24 m tons and Derwenthaugh 442,000 tons - that- the NER in 1908 
put forward a proposal for a further staith at Derwenthaughý Walker intending . 
then to provide an 18 ft channel to that point and to dredge a berth 25 
ft deep. The move was later opposed by the TIC, concerned as to encroachments, 
but in 1911 the Consett Iron Company sought to extend its staiths while 
the NER approached the TIC regarding staiths at West Dunston, sanctioned 
in its 1909 Act; six spouts 
1were 
to be provided with berths 25 ft deep. 45 
The town of Newcastle had, in that later period, undertaken both repairs 
46 
and extensions to its quay, the former beginning in 1895, while in 1898 
Stephenson, as chairman of the town's finance committee, put forward a 
report which zought- c Ehm for improvement; the expenditure would be 
phased. 
47 The report led to long and involved discussion in Council, 
impossible to detail here, and the matter was resolved only in 1902 when 
it was decided not to proceed with further extensions. In 1905, however, 
the matter was revived although it was noted at the time that the quay 
revenue was insecure and the Grain Warehousing Company, of which Stephenson 
was a director, I 
had been forced to write down its capital from 01,690 
to E35,845.48 In spite 
- 
of this, a decision was made in 1906 to extend 
The 23 ton waggons did not find universal approval, the TIC taking the view that the NER was 
attempting to impose its policy by force and was in a position to divert coal traffic to its own 
docks. 
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the quay eastwards from the Ouseburn and Cyril Kirkpatrick (1872-1957), 
successor to Laws, envisaged building a length of 360 ft for c E60,000. 
The Corporation agreed to his proposals, and also to a suggestion to build 
storage shedsý and the TIC was approached regarding the work. Like the 
earlier quay it was to be formed of concrete monoliths some 40 ft in depth 
topped with an ashlar-faced concrete wall; now to be 445 ft in length 
the wall's foundations were to be' 36 ft below low water. 
49 By 1911 the 
Corporation had completed the works sanctioned by its 1904 Act, LlB5,000 
having been spent on rebuilding quay walls, providing railway tracks, 
extending the quay eastwards, building sheds and providing electric cranes. 
Interest charges were given as E9,000 p. a. but income was expected to 
be only E6,200 p. a. In the customary debate it was pointed out, in defence, 
that Newcastle had suffered under the NER whereas Hull, its development 
feared by Newcastle, was fortunate in "having three railway companies 
at its disposal. , 
50 
In spite of the earlier momentum of expansion having been lost, the 
Tyne, in the 30 years preceeding 1914, continued its growth. Coal shipments 
between 1885 and 1913 rose from 9.84m to 20.3m tonsq 621% and 77% being 
the respective proportions of exports. In the same period the corresponding 
figures for the Northumberland dock were 1.417 and 1.695m tons, for the 
Albert Edward dock 41,000 and 835,000 tons, for Whitehill Point 385,000 
and 1.813m tons. 
51 On its part the NER had increased the throughput 
of its Tyne Dock from c 5m to 7.14 m tons while at Dunston shipments had 
risen to 3.042 m tons by 1913. West Dunston staiths had not begun to 
ship coal but Derwenthaugh was, in the same year, supplied with 425,000 
tons of coal by the NER. 
52 
Of the other industries on the river shipbuilding, now principally 
in steel, remained cyclical with output varying between 83,000 tons in 
1886p a figure untypically low, to 413,000 tons in 1911.53 The engineering 
industry, too, had prospered, the prime example of its success being the 
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works of Armstrong, from 1882 merged ýwith Charles Mitchell and building 
warships at Elswick together with merchant ships at Walker. In 1895 
some 12,000 men were employed by the Armstrong concerns and by 1914 this 
figure had increased to more than 20,000. Unlike the river's other industries, 
the chemical trade was in decline and in 1890 the companies still in business 
were merged to form the United Alkali Company, following which all but 
two of the works, Tennant's and Allhusen's, we re closed. 
54 
The TIC could look back with much satisfaction to the works it had 
undertaken since its formation, especially those of the earlier period. 
The improvements made to' the river had been such that ships of 10,000 
tons could reach Newcastle, and above, and the Tyne piers, completed after 
much travail, have been described as "an outstanding example of the adoption 
, 55 of converging piers with internal spending beaches to reduce wave 
action. The TIC had not been free from controversy, much of it from. ' 
within its membership, and it is perhaps remarkable that in view of the 
many pressures imposed upon it, it managed to achieve so much. 
7.3 River Wear.. 
The construction of the north, or Roker., pier at the mouth of the 
river Wear was officially inaugurated on 30 September 1885 when a commemorative 
stone was laid by the chairman of the River Wear Commission (RWC), James 
Laing. 
I The work of building the 2,800 ft long pier, first projected 
some 25 years earlier, was carried out by direct labour rather than by 
contract and was under the direction of'Wake, sincel86B the RWC's engineer. 
The pier was designed to have a foundation of concrete in bags, surmounted 
by a substantial masonry structure, the blocks of which were to be of 
concrete, faced with Aberdeen granite. Preparatory work bpgan early 
in 1884; tenders were sought for the crane needed for placing the 45 
ton'concrete blocks but, on prices proving too high, the RWC itself undertook 
the building of the'crane. It was completed in time to lift, by hydraulic 
power, the'concrete block placed by the chairman. 
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In order to clarify the narrative of this ' last period relating to 
the Wear, the construction of the Roker pier is best dealt with in its 
entirety as it was un-related to river or dock improvements. The pier 
foundation was formed by first excavating by means of a suction dredger 
the sand overlying the rock formation to a depth of up to 16 ft. On 
the base so formed were placed "long, flat 56 ton and 116 ton bags of 
concrete ,2 and their upper surface was levelled prior to the concrete 
block masonry being laid upon it. Built as two separate walls the space 
between the inner and outer faces was filled with concrete blocks. The 
seaward extremity of the pier, the round-head, was executed as Wake had 
envisaged it initially, by constructing a steel caisson 101 ft long and 
66 ft wide, floating it into position when partially filled with concrete 
and then sinking it into place using more concrete as ballast. Clad 
in granite-faced blocks the round-head contained some 23,000 tons of material 
and supported a masonry lighthouse. 
The construction of , the Roker pier continued steadily and uneventfully 
and by 1896 it had been formed to the point when a decision needed to 
be made as to its final completion. Wake reported to the RWC that the 
pier could be slightly shortened and an opening of 600 ft obtained, 
3 
rather 
than the 500 ft planned initially. This suggestion was agreed to, the 
design and construction of the caisson was put in hand and it was sunk 
into position on 2 Auqust 1901 when Laing, with some pride, claimed it 
as "something new in engineering (and was) a feather in Mr. Wake's cap . 11 
4 
Final completion was achieved in 1903 when Lord Durham laid an. other commemorative 
stone on 23 September; the pier had cost E287,229.5 
Competition from other ports in the region, where the Hartlepool 
extensions had been completed in 1880 and the Albert Edward dock on the 
Tyne in 1.885, was presumably responsible for the suggestion made in 1886 
that the northern part of the Hudson dock should be deepened by some five 
feet at a cost of Z23,000.6 This suggestion led to a further reconsideration 
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of this dock and it , was decided to reconstruct the gates leading into 
its north end so as to give a width of 65 ft and a maximum depth of- 27 
ft. Both works were thereupon put in hand and were completed in August 
1889. Consideration had already been given to improving the dock system 
further by converting coal drops to higher capacity spouts but Such was 
their usage that the RWC did not feel able to suspend operations so as 
to permit reconstruction and the necessary deepening of the berths. 
In 1888 the Traffic Committee rightly perceived that the key to re- 
construction lay in No. 19 berth which should be equipped with two spouts, 
each with a lateral movement of - 20 ft. 
7 At the same time a new berth 
385 ft long should be formed and the resulting facilities used jointly 
by the NER and the Londonderry interests; the higher capacity so obtained 
would then permit further work to proceed. Improvement was vital as 
ships were being forced to complete loading in the Hendon dock due to 
lack of water in the Hudson; to accommodate the bigger ships using the 
part it was agreed also to provide greater height at the new berth. 
All work was completed in 1890 when the staith was used to load 5,600 
tons of coal into a single ship. 
8 
In 1891 the decision was made to deepen the Hudson dock over an area 
of 10-', acres, four of which would be 28ft and two to 26 ft., at the same 
time forming a goods wharf at its southern end. As the work continued 
modifications to coaling plant were put in hand: No. 21 berth was rebuilt 
to give a greater elevation and the railway companies' lines were modified 
so as to permit either of them to discharge at any of three high-capacity 
staiths. 
9 Concurrent with this work was the improvement of the South 
Outlet where a greater depth of water was provided by dredging the approach 
channel to a low-water depth of 14 ft over a 160 ft width. 
Although the Sunderland docks were seemingly well used, nevertheless 
the commissioners looked to improving trade in - the port. Timber imports 
were increasing but the grain trade was in decline. Exports were still 
principally coal and in 1893 dues on coal totalled Z25,070 whereas on 
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other goods they totalled only E4,995.10 In 1894 the commissioners looked 
closely into the rates imposed by other ports and noted that, with minor 
exceptions, the rates at all ports - Tyne, Wear, Seaham and Hartlepool 
- were similar. 
11 In 1897 Wake, as one of the region's leading river 
engineers, was asked by Londonderry if he could undertake designs for 
the improvement of Seaham Harbour, then stagnating. Uncertain as to 
his reply, Wake sought the advice of the commissioners. who, realistically, 
advised him to accept, noting that if he declined-, the work would still 
be undertaken. 
12 The fact that the works were designed by Wake did not 
preclude the RWC from petitioning against the resultant Bill, seeking 
both to form a much more substantial harbour and to form a company to control 
it. The RWC, which had spent considerable capital in improving facilities 
for the shipment of Londonderry coal, naturally was concerned by the prospective 
fall in revenue which would occur if Seaham expanded; additionally, it 
was not immediately clear how the Hendon dock could be made available 
to any company other than Londonderry's. The petition claimed that it 
was Sunderland's superior facilities which had drawn to it the Londonderry 
and South Hetton trade and the RWC foresaw disaster should Seaham be built, 
a situation similar to that of 1830. The RWC also noted the fact that 
the new Seaham docks would "enable the Marquis and his new Company to 
intercept at Sesham new traffic from time to time arising from the 'opening 
of new coal pits and the opening of new railways and other works southward 
of Seaham , 
13 
and which the RWC - perhaps disregarding Hartlepool - envisaged 
as being the natural perquisite of Sunderland. The RWC expressed some 
dismay that the proposed, new dock company would later be able to embrace 
both coal an. d railway interests and, as virtually a private body, challenge 
the RWC- The existing situation was, in fact, no different. 
The immediate reaction of the RWC to the passing of the Seanam Harbour 
Act 14 was to review the dock facilities at Sunderland. The Traffic Committee 
suggested that the Hudson dock' be enlarged* by setting back the east quay 
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wall and deepened to give 30 ft of water*, together with the reconstruction 
of the north gate to 70 ft width, improvements for goods handling at the 
warehouse and a new coaling berth and staith; the work would cost E261 697* 
15 
An earlier report made jointly by Wake and the general manager, Charles 
Henry Dodds (1835? -1921), had noted the increased tonnage of coal brought 
to Sunderland by the NER's Penshaw branch, a fact which precluded the 
use of the Hendon dock and so emphasised the need for futher facilities 
in the Hudson; the new jetty would be accessible from both west and south. 
It was this report, too, which had first suggested the dock enlargement 
and its deepening. 
16 The work envisaged by the committee was begun in 
1900 when contracts for the 8 acre dock enlargement and the entrance improvement 
were awarded to Sir John Jackson in the sums of . 11'94,444 and L31,736# 
respeQtively. 
17 
Work began immediately; a dredger was hired to the contractor by 
the RWC, a concrete cofferdam was used at the north entrance in order 
to reduce the space sterilised by construction work and the dock walls 
-were built to the new line. 
** By 1904 Jackson had completed his work, 
the dock having cost E105,800 and the gate improvement Z39,000, 
is 
whereupon 
the RWC immediately began the construction of the new staith, No. 22. 
Built at a cost of c E25,000, it was brought into operation in October 
1905 but the RWC was then forced to review-its operations due to a falling 
revenue, the result of the opening, in that year, of the new harbour at 
Seaham. From E151,200 in 1905, revenue fell to L135,385 in 1906; the 
RWC had been justified in its fears. 
The Hudson dock hadt by 1905, been deepened to 28 ft over half its 
area. In spite of this phase of the work being still uncompleted Wake 
put forward his views concerning the further development necessary "to 
meet the requirements of the larger class of vessels now in use and also 
to enable the Port to successfully compete with the neighbouring Ports 
*A depth of 27'-6" was envisaged at Seaham Harbour. 
# The highest tender total was E380,000 
See Map 24 
372 
for trade". 19 He also outlined what had been achieved, not least the 
ability of the new staith to ship more than ý, -, m tons P. a. Problems with 
the protecting breakwaters of the South Outlet had been experienced, principally 
due to their age and inferior construction: the northern, built in 1852 
had been breached and its flimsy construction should be strengthened; 
the southern, dating from 1865, had occasioned damage to its round, -head 
which, due to Wave action, had suffered from the drawing-out of the hearting. 
The financial constraints placed upon the RWC had led to a review 
of its works. It had proved impossible to undertake simultaneously the 
improvement of both river and dock and, similarly, it had been found necessary 
to suspend for a time the construction of the south pier, outlined later. 
In the riverg dredging was undertaken for the Lambton, Hetton and Wearmouth 
collieries, the costs being shared equally by commission and companies. 
As the river bed was of rock, deepening proved expensive but nevertheless 
was undertaken in 1906, following which William Simpson (1871? -1933), 
successor to Wake, put forward his recommehdations for further river works. 
Simpson noted that the tides tended to cause silting in the docks 
whileg converselyg the progressive improvement of the river had increased 
its tidal range and reduced silting. In 1901 Wake had proposed a 20 
ft low-water depth to the bridge, 15 ft to Ravens Wheel, 10 ft to the 
Tile Quay and 6 ft to Hylton. * Simpson considered Wake's proposals to 
be still adequate, except that the 20 ft 'depth should extend above bridge, 
to the Hetton staiths. Ironicallythis length of the riverg perhaps the 
most criticalg was the narrowest and the river there was "lined on both 
sides with Coal Staithsq , 
20 
still shipping c 2.5. m tons p. a. In the 
lower harbour silting amounted to -: ý4m tons p. a. and in the upper, 418,000 
tons p. a. Simpson's concern in the river continued with his production 
of an extremely full report in 1910, suggesting that, in addition to enlarging 
the channel through the bridge, the river should be further deepened and 
* Hylton is three miles upstream of the bridge. 
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and a swinging basin formed. 
21 Deepening the river- c lm tons of material 
was removed each year - had the effect of causing the colliery companies 
to improve their shipping berths; in 1911 improvements were made to the 
Lambton quay where 20 ft of water was available and in 1913 the Lambton 
and Hetton collieries provided new staiths at the Hetton berth: it had 
been with much justification that Simpson was able to claim in 1910 that 
"the operations of the last three years have converted the River Wear 
as far as the Hetton Staiths into a third dock, , 
22 
enabling it to be used 
by 6,000 ton ships. 
As the dock improvements had progressed the RWC had put in hand its 
last major work, the building of the South Pier. * In his report of 1876 
Coode had put forward the idea' of building an enlarged South pier as a 
continuation of the old one, but he had suggested as an alternative a 
new pier 990 ft south of the existing. 
23 In 1890 'Wake reported on the 
matter again, now giving three options: the extension of the old pier 
to form a 69-acre harbour at a cost of F, 180, ooo; -a pier 990 ft to the,. -,, 
south of the old one, enclosing 109 acres and costing Z168,000; and a 
pier 1,500 feet south of the existing which would enclose 125 acres at 
a cost of. E172,000. Wake preferred either of the second or third versions 
but made no firm proposal. 
24 The matter was reported upon again by Coode 
in 1891 and he recommended 'firmly that the third of Wake's schemes should 
be built but the line of it should be slightly modified so as to give 
an entrance 500 ft wide, although this was a matter best left until the 
pier had been bui-It to a length of 2,700 ft. Coode pressed the RWC to 
begin work as soon as possible as the north, or Roker pier, although protecting 
the river and -south outlet from the north-east, was acting to its detriment 
with south-east winds. 
25 Heeding Coode's advice the construction of 
the pier began in July 1891, at which time the Roker pier had been built 
to a length of some 2,250 ft. Both piers were built under the powers 
of the 1877 Act. 
26 
Wake reported upon the piers in 1896, when the So. uth had scarcely 
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progressed and the north was almost 1,500 ft long. He now envisaged 
the entrance as being 600 ft wide 'and proposed that the south pier be 
amended slightly to conform and in what was perhaps a response to the 
damage recently incurred by the Tyne piers he suggested that the pier's 
width be increased from 35 to '41 ft at coping level. Construction of 
the pier continued from this time, the mode of operations being similar 
to the north pier, and by 1903 only 540 ft of its length was outstanding. 
Although Wake resigned from full-time employment with the RWC, his res- 
ponsibility for the south pier continued and in 1908 he pressed the commissioners 
to expedite its completion as he, considered it susceptible to damage otherwise. 
Although its revenue was then somewhat reduced the RWC dredged the site 
for the pier's roundhead in 1908 but then ordered postponement and it 
was not until 1912 that Simpson advocated stopping the pier at its existing 
length and completing its terminal point, again by caisson. 
27 Work re- 
commenced, the 60 ft diameter steel caisson was built by Doxfords shipbuilding 
works and in August 1914 it was ready for sinking, only for work to be 
"temporarily stopped owing to the outbreak of War. , 
28 It did not seriously 
resume. * 
The effective completion of the piers was of vital importance to 
the RWC as problems were being experienced with the South Outlet where 
on more than one occasion heavy seas breached the protecting pier. In 
addition, the old piers at"the' river's entrance were deteriorating badly. 
Repairs to both defective areas were undertaken, reinforced concrete piles 
being used to replace the deteriorating timbers. Problems were also 
encountered- with the many sets of lock gates, several of them old, and 
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the maintenance of the port 
had been allowed to lapse during Wake's tenure as engineer, understandable 
in view of the extent of new work undertaken, the lack of finance and 
the vast expense, c E550,000, of the new piers. The problems concerning 
the South Outlet did not induce the RWC to reconstruct it, presumably 
In 1931 the caisson was still docked in the river. 
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because of the cost which would be involved and also the fact that the 
river itself was now able to accept much bigger ships and permit their 
entrance to the docks from the north, a situation similar to that at Hartlepool. 
Of the commission's income of Z131,461 in 1910, interest payments on the 
piers consumed c E25,000 and the RWC in that year obtained a further Act 
to increase its dues. 29 
The RWC claimed that the rates extant were such as to result in a 
loss to the commission through ships discharging in the improved river 
while such was "the ingenuity of the shipbuilder in so manipulating the 
measurement of new ships that they now carried a much larger quantity 
of cargo per net register ton", 
30 
a figure which had risen from 1ý2- tons 
per ton register to 3 tons. The RWC sought to levy dues an ships clearing 
the port but, conscious of competition, sought no increase on coal shipped. 
The negotiations prior to the Act's sanction brought a request from the 
town of Sunderland that it be represented on the commission but the move 
was resisted by the RWC on the grounds that its Bill was financial only 
and, in any case, the 52-strong commission was the largest such body in 
the U. K. 
31 
Since 1885 the works undertaken on the river Wear had been substantial: 
two piers had been built; the Hudson dock had been enlarged and new staiths 
provided; access between river* and dock had been vastly improved; the 
river itself had been deepened and widened in vital locations; and dredging, 
both for deepening and for maintenance, had been continuous. Such had 
been the improvement that a ship carrying 8,200 tons of coal had made 
the sea; with a draught of 24-, ft it was 400 ft in length and of 52 ft 
beam. Both the collieries and the RWC had improved their staiths although 
all were not yet capable of handling the 10-ton waggons used generally 
by the NER; certain drops, handling individual waggons, had been converted 
to much more effective spouts. 
The quantity of coal shipped from the Wear had risen from 3.98 m 
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tons in 1885 to 4.86 m tons in '1915, an increase not commensurate with 
the capital expended, some Elm. Similarly, although revenue had increased 
from c E120,000 to c L151,000, the latter figure had already been 
achieved in 1904. The subsequ ent decline had been caused by the revitalisation 
of Seaham. What had thrived in this period was shipbuilding and, although 
by nature cyclical, it had increased substantially: ' in 1885 the Wear 
built some 62,000 tons; in 1913,78 ships totalling almost 300,000 tons 
were launched. 
32 The RWC had improved the river to an extent such that 
it had capacity sufficient for its shipbuilders. 
7.4 River Tees 
By 1885 the character of industry on the Tees had again been the 
subject of change. The manufacture of steel had been developed to such 
an extent that its cost vis 6 vis iron had led to its supplanting the 
earlier material. In addition, the first steps had been taken towards 
the establishment of a trade new to the river, salt extraction. Neither 
development in itself required special physical improvement in the river 
but both led to changes in its commerce, the importation of foreign iron 
ores to supplement local supplies and the export of salt and other chemicals. 
The requirement to import foreign iron ore affected the revenue of the 
Tees Conservancy Commission (TCC) more than did any other factor. 
The manufacture of steel on Teesside was a natural development of 
the earlier iron industry, which in part continued. Bessemer's steel 
-manufacturing process had been developed in 1855 but it was not able 
to use the high-phosphorus Cleveland ores and it was not until the introduction 
of the Thomas and Gilchrist process in 1879 that Teesside was able to 
begin steel making on a large scale. Before this, however, Bolckow- 
Vaughan had made steel at a new works at Eston using the Bessemer process 
2 
with iron manufactured from Spanish ore. The production of pig-iron 
had been concentrated in Middlesbrough whereas the manufacture of wrought 
iron had been shared between Middlesbrough and Stockton, the latter pre- 
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dominating. In the 1870 s the demand for wrought iron rails - steel 
was little more expensive - had fallen to an extent such that by 1880 
only half of the finishing works had been in operation, an event which 
had made it incumbent upon the Tees industry to broaden its base and enter 
the steel- mak. ing business. 
3 One effect which the new process was to 
have on the district was the relocation down-river of the new steelworks 
so as to render more easy -the importation of the richer foreign ores..; 
their growing use, supplanting the transport of Furness ores by rail, 
necessitated the-provision of riverside facilities by the iron manufacturers. 
In the decade beginning in 1881 the production of steel on Teesside rose 
from 277,000 to 897,000 tons. 4 
Salt depositsp a bed 'of rock salt 100 ft thick at a depth of 1,300 
ft, had been first located by Bolkhow-Vaughan in lB63 when drilling at 
South Bank, and in 1874 its presence was confirmed on the north side of 
the river by ; saac.. - Lowthian Bell. It was not until 1884, however, that 
the Allhusens, owners of one of the largest of the Tyne's alkali works, 
sought permission from the TCC to drill for salt. 
5 From 3,000 tons in 
1883, output was to rise to c 300,000 tons in 1890s, two thirds of it 
for use on the Tyne. 
6 
Of the works of the TCC9 of which body Joseph Whitwell Pease was 
appointed chairman in 1884, construction of the South Gare breakwater 
was approaching completion - it was finished in 1888 - and the North , 
Gare was being formed in a similar manner, by using waste slag from the 
ironworks. * The building of training walls in the river was a continuing 
process, as was the dredging needed both to provide and maintain an increased 
depth of water in the river. Land reclamation continued but in 1885 
the legality of the arrangements made earlier regarding the apportioning 
of the benefit was questioned by the TCC. Counsel's opinion was that 
the proceeds should be disposed of to the Crown and to the bommissioners 
on an equal basis but the TCC determined to press for full ownership, 
* See Map 11 378 
a. matter now of much greater importance as a result of the preserce of 
mineral deposits and the realisation that their working could be the basis 
of an alkali trade on the Tees. 
7 Seeking Parliamentary powers, the TCC 
became involved in both a lawsuit and an arbitration. In the former, 
the TCC appeared as the defendent and was gratified by hearing judgement 
in its favour, the most important finding being that "the expression 'reclaimed 
lands' ... includes all mines and minerals under such lands. 118 The arbitration 
involved, on the one hand, the TCC and the Crown and, on the other, the 
frontagers or claimants to the land reclaimed. On behalf of the TCC, 
evidence was presented by Fowler and Messent but delays in both law-suit 
and arbitration - the award was made in March 1887 - had led Pease to 
meet the Secretary to the Treasury, Jackson, to discuss with him the problems 
relating to reclamation. Pease informed him that as a result of the 
TCC's operations the Crown would receive more than ZlOOtOOO "without having 
used the slightest exertion to obtain it; 119 on its part the TCC had spent 
E88,574 and had been reimbursed only to the sum of E96,205 and it was 
only the possible future sales of land which would bring significant profit. 
Propounding the view that the "Commission, working gratuitously, has rendered 
great and lasting National Service", 
10 for which no grant had been received, 
he sought Treasury good-will towards the Bill envisaged by the TCC. 
In 1881 Stockton Corporation had obtained an Act for the replacement 
of the century-old multi-arch masonry bridge by a three-span steel structure, 
thought necessary both on account of increased road traffic and as an 
improvement to the navigation of the river in that it would benefit above- 
bridge development. The new bridge was completed in 1887. at which time 
the old one was dismantled and the town of Stockton looked to the TCC 
for further river improvements, principally in the form of an additional 
two feet of water as down-river dredging had depressed the low-water river 
level at Stockton. This request brought about dissent, both within and 
without the TCC. Pease, seeking an overall view, suggested that a report 
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be sought from Alexander Meadows Rendel (1829-1918)9 a move which was 
then defeated, and the TCC decided to expend Z10,000 to undertake the 
11 
work. Some months laterg however, Hugh Bell (1804-1931) in July 1888 
sought to have the decision rescinded but was defeated by 14 votes to 
five, whereupon the town of Middlesbrough, for some years concerned by 
its lack of representation - or perhaps power - on the TCC, instructed 
its Town Clerk to obtain "'an injuction against the Commissioners expending 
additional money on the upper reaches of the river, also upon the question 
of obtaining power to elect additional representatives for Middlesbrough*11 
12 
Meetings with shipowners and payers of dues followed but nothing further 
appears to have taken place. 
On its part, Stockton Corporation put in hand improvements to its 
public quay which had, over the past five years, been operating unprofitably; 
with expenditure between Z5,102 and Z5,702 p. a., revenue had varied from 
L2,891 in 1881 to E4,373 in 1884.13 Plans were prepared by the surveyor 
to the Corporationg scrutinised by Fowler on behalf of the TCC and further 
subjected to the inspection of Messent. In his report Fowler approved 
the use of bearing piles, rather than the newer method of sinking iron 
cylindersq principally on the ground's that they would resist "forward 
pressure better than cylinders , 
14 
and he calculated that the new quay 
would cost' E17,500. Messent expressed greater caution than had Fowler. 
He was concerned as to the factors which had led to the failure of the 
earlier quay and commissioned boreholes to ascertain ground conditions. 
Satisfied that the "cause of the land slips (had been) the sliding of 
the artificial or made ground , 
15 he recommended the use of land ties to 
prevent the future movement of the wall. The quay was some 600 ft' long 
and was intended to provide 15 ft of water low tide. The tender of 
Nelson and Strachan, for E16,498, Was duly accepted and the work was completed 
by 1890.16 Within three years the wall had begun to move into the river, 
a direct consequence of the TCC having formed, by dredging, a deepwater 
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berth, a move made in response to Stockton's initiative. 
The completion of the South Gare breakwater was commemorated in October 
1888, bringing about a virtual end to the major works of the TCC. The break- 
water, in which c 5m tons of slag had been used, had been built to a length 
of 2h, miles while its net cost had amounted to E2199158. The North 
Gare breakwater had, at a cost of L57,642, by this time absorbed some 
-'4m tons of slag and was of a similar construction. River improvements 
had been effected by the formation of 20 miles of training walls and the 
river had been continuously dredged, to the extent that the removal of 
material amounted to 22.7 m tons with more than 2m tons dredged in 1887 
alone. Land reclamation totalled c 2,000 acres of which half remained 
in the hands of the commissioners and this work had comprised the building 
of 14 miles of embankment. 
17 The greater part of the work had been under- 
taken under the direction of Fowler but his death in 1888 resulted, after 
a short interval, in the appointment of George James Clarke (1852-1920) 
18 
as engineer. 
Problems with the breakwaters soon became apparent. Even before 
its completion, the south breakwater had been breached in 1880 although 
the repairs undertaken, using concrete in bags, would appear to have proved 
effective. To prevent further damage, 30 to 40 ton concrete blocks were 
placed round the head of the breakwater, crowned by an iron light-house. 
Immediately after itsinaugqration the pier suffered -further storm damage 
and Messent: again reporting, suggested the use of chains to break the force 
of the wave action. 
19 A further inspection was undertaken by Messent 
and Rendel and their report was submitted in July 1869, at which time 
also the Finance Committee of the TCC sanctioned the expenditure of E4,664 
on the repairs - 'necessary. 
20 Two years later another report was submitted 
by the same engineer s, principally regarding the north breakwater. Concern 
had been expressed in 1889 as to the effect the tipping of clay was likely 
to have on the -soft sands which were to be crossed and two years later 
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disappointment was expressed at the little work undertaken. Nevertheless, 
the two men were confident that the cessation of the breakwater short 
of its planned termination would have no adverse effect upon its planned 
utility and they recommended that it should be "stopped about 340 feet 
short of the point to which, under the present :. contrabt, it is to be carried" 
21 
at a length of ý, 330 ft. It was recommended, too, that the river training 
wall on the north bank should be extended down-river to Greatham Creek. 
Their comments, somewhat critical of Clarke, * were replied to by him the 
following month and he pursued further the value of the concrete blocks 
in protecting the breakwaters, expressing a preference for the use of 
concrete in bags, 50 to 60 tons each. He asked the commissioners to 
note that the south breakwater had been further protected by these means, 
pointing 'out that undermining to a depth of five feet had taken place 
and the concrete blocks had subsequently been "bound together by concrete 
in situ; had this not been done... a serious breach would again have 
22 
been made in the Breakwater" The commissioners in 1892 decided to 
su'spend the formation of the north breakwater, at which time the contractor, 
23 George Dawson, requested that the TCC take over his plant, now un-needed. 
In 1883 the NER had begun the improvement of its dock at Middlesbrough 
and the work was completed in 1889 at a cost of E176,000.24 The dock 
had been enlarged from 12 to 15-'4 acres and the entrance to it deepened 
from 23 to 28 ft.; the total length of quay provided was now more than 
3,000 ft. 
25 Nevertheless, no further facilities had been provided for 
the shipping of coal, an item thought by the several authorities to be 
vital to the river's trade. In 1892, a result of the NER's Bill seeking 
to take over the Hull docks, the railway company discussed again with 
the TCC the question of staiths at Port Clarence, formerly the property 
of the West Hartlepool company and not used since 1872.26 It was noted 
at that time that, other than in the dock, the only staiths on the river 
were those of the NER at Stockton, little used, and privately-owned installations 
Clarke had earlier worked under Rendel. 
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at Portrack and Newport. The NER was said to have contributed nothing 
to the improvement of the Tees, a matter of some concern as half the ships 
bringing iron ore into the river were forced to leave it for other ports 
to load coal; 
27 the only alternative was to use the dock and so incur 
full dues. 28 
The question of staiths again brought Stockton into conflict with 
the TCC, deploring the lack of improvement to the river and seeking deeper 
berths and a turning basin at Stockton. 
29 Criticism came also from within 
the TCC, Pease commenting that fur ther dredging, costing some Z50,000, 
was needed to maintain the river's standing; an order for a ship of 7,000 
tons had recently been placed in Hartlepool and 4,000 ton ships were now 
using the Tyne. 
30 Stockton was still concerned by the fact that its 
importance on the river was declining and it was concerned also by the 
facilities which the town itself provided. Earlier, the TCC had been 
unable to dredge at Stockton for fear of quay collapse and dissent within 
the Stockton Council became apparent in 1892, when the wisdom of maintaining 
port facilities was questioned. The wharf had already cost L54,000 and 
a further E25,300 was now required to restrain it from moving. Traffic 
was in decline and the quayloss was L4,300 in 1891.31 Stockton's problems 
were given greater emphasis in 1893 when Thomas Wrightson (1839-1921), 
M. P. for Stockton, revived the earlier scheme for an extensive dock to 
be formed in the river, with its flow carried by a new cut. 
32 The principle 
had been first propounded by Brooks in 1845 but Wrightson sought to enlarge 
the dock to 56 acres by increasing the length of the new cutting to some 
9,000 feet, by- passing Thornaby as well as Stockton. Wrightson, his views 
endorsed by Alfred Giles (1816-1895), estimated that the work would cost 
E400,000 but envisaged it, somewhat inexplicably, as being undertaken 
by the TCC and NER together. In his view, expansion of the port of Stockton, 
losing trade to Middlesbrough and Hartlepool, was much more important 
than was the NER's incursion at Hull. 
33 
Wrightson's plan* did not proceedt 
His initial scheme had been modified; it was now to be a half-tide basin. 
3S3 
perhaps due to the perception of others that. it was not viable; the economics 
of providing extensive up-river improvements were questionable. In addition, 
the Stockton quay exhibited further problems and Rendel again reported 
upon it, suggesting that it be tied back to provide added stability, a 
procedure later to lead to its failure. 
34 Stockton had originally sought 
the services of Clarke to undertake the quay repairs but the TCC could 
not agree to this procedure, so leading to Rendel becoming responsible 
for the modifications. 
35 Although certain Stockton representatives had 
questioned the wisdom of maintaining the town as a port, it is ironic that 
it was that subject which led to the resignation of Sir Raylton Dixon 
from the TCC in 1895. As a representative for Middlesbrough, 
Dixon had nevertheless advocated a policy of whole-river development, 
believing that no one town should benefit. Disturbed by his apparent 
championship of Stockton, Middlesbrough called him to order, inferring 
36 
a vote of no confidence, and so forced his resignation. 
The revenue received from Stockton shipping by the TCC remained virtually 
static at c L9,500 between 1894 and 1900; for Middlesbrough the figure 
was c E60,000. Nevertheless, the TCC put in hand river improvements 
to provide a greater depth to Stockton, a move instigated by Hugh Bell. 
37 
Some widening of the river was also undertaken and the improvements so 
made led to the many private wharfowners being called upon to strengthen 
their property. Further quays, financed privately, were built as iron 
ore imports rose from a trickle in the 1860 s to c 1.9 m tons in 190038 
and t. histraffic, with the export of finished iron and steel, made up the 
greater part of the Tees trade. By the end of the century both grain 
imports and coal exports had ceased, to a certain extent counterbalanced 
by the exploitation of"the area's salt deposits. 
39 River improvement was 
sought, somewhat improbably, above Stockton in 1896. The Works Committee 
duly reported that some 20 miles of river bank would require protection, 
absorbing c 300,000 tons of slag, then being disposed of to the south 
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east of the south breakwater. In 1899 representatives of Yarm sought 
deep water to that town but the TCC, pledging itself only to continue the 
improvement of the river, gave no assurances. 
40 Press comment was to 
the effect that any scheme of this type was unworkable and too late; 
development should be at the river's mouth. 
41 
The merchants of Middlesbrough, too, werenot inactive. In 1896, 
the Corporation there asked the NER to modify the dock to accept ships 
42 
of greater tonnage, perhaps in response to a meeting, held a few days 
earlier, of the town's shipowners and merchants. Dixon, no longer a 
commissioner, suggested that the Middlesbrough dock should be "increased 
or extended by taking in the present dock cut and thus allowing for larger 
gates at the entrance and for increased area-. , 
43 Immediately following 
the meeting a deputation met directors of the NER in York and pointed 
out that Middlesbrough's trade had now outgrown the dock, a request to 
which the NER proved sympathetic, perhaps because of the fact that Pease 
was now chairman of both the TCC and the NER. 
In IB96, the NER deposited ýplans 
44 for a major extension of the 
dock, increasing its area from 16 to 26 acres, its entrance width from 
55 to 80 ft and its depth from 28 to 33 ft. 
45 The proposal was aiven 
qualified approval by the press which noted that it was "a fair response 
to the representations made by the great captains of industry and trade 
in the Cleveland district , 
46 
and an Act was sanctioned in 1897; 
47 
work 
was put in hand the following year and this entrance was completed in 
1904. * The outstanding work was finished in 1906, by which time 057,000 
had been expended. 
48 Concurrently, efforts had been made by the TCC 
to persuade the NER to provide a railway on the north bank of the river, 
a facility which the TCC considered essential for the development of land 
in its ownership. The NER was reluctant to make a move as "for many 
years to come any traffic there might be on the line would be so small 
as to be uneconomical;, '49 it could go ahead only if the TCC provided 
the land and made a contribution of E6,000. Pressed further, the NER 
* See Map 20 385 
agreed to build a line from Port Clarence to Greatham and later, from 
Haverton Hill to Stockton although this section became the subject of 
some contention in that ' the NER in 1900 sought to suspend its formation, 
although pressed by the Office for Woods and Forests to complete it and 
50 so open up for development lands, owned by the Crown. The railway to 
Greatham was, opened in 1901, the NER then informing the TCC that it was 
"in the unique position of being a railway without any traffic, because 
apparently there is none to carry , 
51 
and pointing out that the onus was 
upon the TCC, which had asked for double tracks, to stimulate trade. 
In 1901 the reality of the increasing dominance of Middlesbrough in 
relation to Stockton was-made manifest when the new TCC headquarters 
was opened in Middlesbrough. A move had been first suggested in 1896 
and some argument had later become apparent. In debate it was recorded 
that the Stockton members were "jealous of any of their own institutions 
being snatched from them to the detriment of the town's importance , 53 
and it had been only the fact that Yarm, with two other individuals, had 
deserted the cause that had led to the move to Middlesbrough being agreed; 
53 the result had been decided only by the chairman's casting vote. With 
the increasing size of ships* using the river rendering impossible their 
use of Stockton and the vast improvements made to the dock, Middlesbrough 
had become pre-eminent on the river. 
By the end of the century the revenues of the TCC had been almost 
static for five years and in 1901 they suffered a further fall to E75,960, 
from the average of c E88,000. Pease, in a review of the year's results, 
indicated that revenue from imports, iron ore, timber and grain, had fallen 
as had income from exports, principally pig iron, finished iron and steel 
goods; although national figures showed reductions, the Tees had suffered 
disproportionately. He noted the fact that whereas the average size 
of ship using the river was 438 tons, the maximum size was 8,050 tons 
dwt., slightly bigger than the largest built there. In the last ten- 
Ships of 8,000 tons dwt could enter the river. 
3ý6 - 
year period dredging had cost almost L200,000, only Z33,000 of it being 
charged to capital. Pease also noted that the fortunes of land reclamation 
had changed from being a debit balance to a credit; costs totalled E139,000, 
revenue E161,000. Some 850 acres remained in hand with the reclamation 
of a further 200 acres continuing. He pointed with some pride to the 
fact that the TCC had spent E25,283 on roads and railways on the north 
bank, the Crown repaying a quarter, "the first sum they have paid towards 
the cost of improving the district. , 
54 
The early years of the 20th century were marked by three major events 
concerning the TCC: they were the resignation, due to the financial failure 
of other enterprises, of Pease and his replacement in 1903 as chairman 
by Hugh Bell, who similarly became a director of the NER; the construction, 
after much discussion, of new staiths; and the construction of a bridge 
between Middlesbrough and Port Clarence, replacing the earlier ferry. 
As the iron trade had prospered, the export of coal from the Tees 
had fallen, and virtually ceased. In a report on the trade of Stockton, 
written in 1900, it was stated by the quay manager, Cowburn, that he had 
"commenced the Coal Trade... in the year 1896 and (was) happy to state 
this business has been most successful, last year our shipments exceeded 
15,000 tons. , 
55 In Middlesbroughq agitation for coal-handling facilities 
had been incessant, it being considered that the Tees, with the assistance 
of the NER, should attempt to compete in the export of coal with the other 
ports of the region, especially Hartlepool. Not only was an export trade 
sought; bunkering facilities were of even greater importance as much 
trade was lost due to ships leaving the river for bunker coal and, additionally, 
repairs. In 1893 it had been noted that with c 10,000 tons of coal per 
month needed for motive power, staiths were of prime importance and the 
"Tyne, Wear and the Hartlepools (had been) fattene-d' at the expense of 
the poor neglected Tees. 
56 Both the TCC and the Chamber of Commerce 
had discussed the matter with the NER, without result. In 1898 drops 
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at Port Clarence were suggested in order to enable ships to coal without 
using the NER dock, the lack of staiths being an example of the river's 
shortcomings, but "when it is pointed out that the North Eastern Railway 
CI ompany's interests and the river interests are not identical, that the 
railway company have means of representation on the Board, the eyes are 
opened! " 
57 By 1905 nothing further had happened although the NER, having 
enlarged its dock to accommodate bigger ships, sought the assistance of 
the TCC regarding dredging. A channel 500 ft wide and 15 ft deep, from 
the sea to the dock, had been formed the previous year. The following 
year Middlesbrough expressed its concern that the NER had not taken the 
matter furtherg a concern understandable in view of the fact that it was 
claimed by the TCC that of 2,189 ships entering with cargop 1,077 had left 
light to load cargoes elsewhere, 783 at other north-east ports. Surmising 
that this would not have happened had bunkers been available on the Tees 
three sites were suggested, Haverton Hill, opposite Cargo Fleet and at 
Greatham Creek. That the NER should make provision was imperative as 
it had spent nothing on the river while "the increased revenue which the 
company has gained through the extended facilities afforded to trade must 
have been great. , 
58 By this time the TCC had expended more than Zlm 
cin the river. 
The NER in 1907 informed the TCC that it was not able to finance 
new staiths, estimated at c 05,000, but should the latter provide them, 
the railway company would assist with rail links. 
59 Meanwhile the TCC 
confierred with all coal-owners likely to use the staiths but it was not 
until 1910p with some prompting by the Middlesbrough borough engineer 
as to the most suitable site, that the NER itself suggested a conveyor 
system, able to load at 150 tons per hour, located at the entrance channel 
to the dock. 
60 The loading system, an electric belt conveyor, was put 
61 in hand immediately and was completed during 1913, at which time a 
similar device was provided to supplement the hydraulic coal hoist installed 
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in the dock in 1906.62 
The last of the TCC's major involvements with outside bodies concerned 
the bridging of the river. In 1905, approval was sought from the TCC 
for a light railway and transporter bridge, crossing from Middlesbrough 
to Port Clarence. 63 The company, * seeking capital of E200,000, proposed 
to build a bridge with a clearance of 120 ft butthe commissioners, knowing 
that ships requiring 171 ft had been built on the Tees, objected to the 
scheme, in principle similar to one emanating from Hartlepool in 1873.64 
The TCC considered that the bridge would present a threat to navigation 
but, in any case, sought headroom of 175 ft, quoting heights of 177 ft 
at Runcorn. and 210 ft for the bridge suggested - but rejected - on the 
Tyne. The bridge was opposed, also, by Bolkhow-Vaughan and the Middlesbrough 
Owners, as landowners, and by Middlesbrough itself, although by the latter 
in a manner somewhat ambivalent; after a long discussion in Council it 
was agreed that Middlesbrough should oppose the scheme but, if the Bill 
were to be rejected, the town would itself promote a similar scheme. 
65 
The TCC withdrew its opposition on the understanding that headroom of 
160 ft would be provided over a width of 300 ft; the Bill was withdrawn, 
only for Middlesbrough to undertake construction of the bridge. An Act 
was obtained in 1907 
66 
and the bridge 
# 
with a clear span of 570 ft and 
headroom of 160 ft, was opened in October 1911. ' Its opening was a matter 
of some importance to the TCC, interested in the development of land to 
the north of the river, an area for long somewhat neglected. Earlier 
it ha d' pressed the NER for rail links and had also provided roads on 
a small scale but the completion of the bridge caused the commissioners 
to seek Parliamentary powers for "the construction... of a direct road 
on the north bank of the river between Port Clarence and the Hartlepools" 
67 
and the sanctioning of its Act 
68 led the TCC, the following year, to seek 
* The engineers involved were Charles Watson and Charles Edward Straker. 
# Designed by Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Company; erected by Sir Wm. Arroll & Co. 
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tenders to a value of c E55,000.69 
In spite of the fact that the revenue received from trade at Middlesbrough 
assumed a greater proportion of the TCC's annual income, nevertheless, 
revenue on behalf of Stockton continued to increase slowly. In 1904, 
when it was reported thatý at Stockton bridge the water was only 41-311 
deep at low tide, the TCC asked its Works Committee to investigate the 
provision of 15 ft, of water-to the dock and 9 ft to Stockton. Reporting 
back, it noted that the cost would be E49,000 while to deepen a further 
2 ft would entail another E42,000.70 By 1910 the commissioners had completed 
dredging to these greater depths, the process having - involved the removal 
of c -4mcu. yds. of material annually. They had, in addition, undertaken 
river, widening projects, both to permit shipping to reach Stockton more 
easily and on behalf of shipbuilders, an industry established both at 
Middlesbrough and Stockton. 
Following the founding of a steel industry on the Tees the use of 
this material in shipbuilding superseded' iron, as it did elsewhere, and 
in 1891, of the 71 ships built on the Tees, 49 were of steel. With two 
building yards at Middlesbrough and three at Stockton, the river in that 
year produced 120,000 tons of shipping, * a slight decrease compared with 
the previous year but a vastly greater tonnage than the figure of 20,000 
tons in 1886.71 Between 1891 and 1914, shipbuilding on the Tees varied 
cyclically between 57,200 tons in 1908 and 151,000 tons in 1901.72 At 
the time of lowest output, the TCC, concerned that its dry dock was becoming 
inadequate, held discussions with Smith's Docks, long established on the 
Tyne, who proposed to build a 600 ft dock at Cargo Fleet. 
73 Terms were 
arranged, the works were designed by John Mitchell Moncrieff (1865-1931), 
a contract was awarded to John Aird & Co. , and the shipbuilding yard 
opened in 1909, albeit with its dry dock slightly shorter than originally 
proposed. 
74 
* In 1891 the Tyne's output of shipping was 185,000 tons and the Wear's 192,000 tons. 
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In the 30 years which ended in 1914, when the river was "practically 
taken over by the Naval and Military Authorities , 75 the works of the TCC 
had been, in civil engineering terms9 pedestrian, in that they had- been 
confined principally to channel improvements, the disposal of slag and 
land reclamation. The works necessary for the import of iron ore, which 
reached a total of 2.37 m tons in 1910,72 were undertaken by the ironmasters 
themselves and the NER was responsible for dock improvements and the provision 
there of cargo-handling equipment. Teeside had maintained its earlier 
pre-eminence in the iron trade and had additionally brought into being 
a steel-making industry. During this period the output of Cleveland 
ore was maintained at between 5m and 6m tons p. a. , and the area produced 
between 2m and 3m tons of pig iron; of this latter product 1.75 m tons 
was shipped in 1907,1.22 m tons abroad. 
77 Due to the needs of the iron 
trade, shipments of coal declined from 126,000 tons to only 41,000 in 1892, 
subsequently increasing to 270,000 tons by 1914, largely the result of 
the staiths recently completed by the NER. During the closing years of the 
19th century the extraction of salt, using the brine process, had begun 
and in 1890,128,000 tons of it were shipped from the river. Due to 
land reclamation the TCC had been able to claim ownership and the following 
year leased the workings on the north bank of the river. Output was 
to more than double. 
78 Other trade on the river was of a relatively 
minor nature. Grain and timber were imported, the former to Stockton 
where in. the 1870 S it began to decline before ceasing completely. Timber 
was imported at Middlesbrough, the quantity rising steadily to c -2 m tons 
in 1913.79 
To cope with the increasing river traffic the TCC had engaged in 
operations markedly different from the other ports, principally the construction 
of its breakwaters and the reclamation, by 1913, of some 2,500 acres of 
land, Where it had been similar, however, was in the need for dredging, 
as on the Tyne a continuous operation, both for improvement and for maintenance. 
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Although the low-water depth at the bar* increased only from 18 ft in 
1886 to '20 ft in 1906 the depth in the river had been greatly augmented, 
if only as far as Middlesbrough. 
80 The fact that Stockton had been relatively 
neglected rankled in that town, claiming that of the L800,000 expended 
by the TCC, by 1887. only 00 had been spent on the river between Middlesbrough 
and Stockton, so causing ships of greater tonnage to use Middlesbrough, 
rather than the up-river port of Stockton. 
81 The efforts of the TCC, 
with those of the NER regarding its dock, led to the port being enabled 
to accept bigger ships and in 1905 one of 10,000 tons dwt. berthed in 
the dock which 30 years earlier had been able to accept vessels only one 
quarter of that size. 
82 The maximum size of ship using the river did not give 
the complete picture. In 1913, the average size was some 700 tons, only 
01 22.6 of the total clearances being above 1000 tons. Middlesbrough had _'. 
decisively taken over from Stockton as the dominant port, by the same year 
generating no less than 92, o of the TCC revenue; 5,170 ships berthed at 
Middlesbrough and 806 at Stockton. By this time the increasing tonnages 
of ships and the relative inadequacies of the river above Middlesbrough 
had led to differences in the shipping using the ports. Of ships above 
1,000 tons, 1,014 ýcleared from Middlesbrough while from Stockton they 
totalled only 69.83 
Only the rivers Tyne and Tees exhibited rivalry amongst the towns .01 
on them but whereas on the Tyne, Newcastle maintained its early dominancel 
Stockton-in a position very similar - was deprived of its supremacy 
by Middlesbrough, a transformation partly brought about by the increasing 
size of ships using the river but, principally, by the expansion of the 
iron and steel industries. 
7.5 River Blyth 
The Blyth Harbour Commission (BHC), authorised without opposition, 
held its first meeting in July 1882 under the chairman-ship of Sir Matthew 
* In 1852 it had been only 2k feet. 
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-, 1 White Ridley. The objectives of its Act were the transfer of responsibilities 
from the earlier company to the BHCa widening of representation, 
powers to borrow for capital works and the construction of harbour works, 
a result of the new co-operation with the NER. Under the regime of the 
dock company borrowing, related to the c. npitai issued, had been limited 
to L40ý000 but the new Act sought its upward revision to Z182,000, necessary 
to finanace the envisaged works programme. 
When seeking the Act, its promoters had considered carefully the 
constitution of the commission and had studied the membership of bodies 
such as the Tyne and Tees conservancies. As a result, the BHC comprised 
Ridleyq a nominee appointed by him, one shareholder of the former company, 
one landowner, three coalowners, two shipowners, one trader, one representative 
of the town of Blyth and one from Cowpen; a total of 13. The BHC continued 
to pay dividends - little had been paid earlier - to former company share- 
holders and provision was made for redeeming the company's capital. 
Drawings for the projected works had been prepared by Thomas Meik, 
now practising from Edinburgh. He proposed a 1,000 ft extension to the 
east pier and the construction of a new west pier, to a line similar to 
that of the 1863 proposal and some 2,500 ft in length. 
3 Meik's plans 
were commented upon by James Abernethy, involved earlier, who approved 
only the extension of the east pier. He did, howeverg agree with the 
plans to deepen the channel to give 14 ft of water and suggested that 
the excavated: material be used to reclaim land to the east - the north 
bank - which he had "always regarded as the proper site for the shipment 
of coal. ,3 The work would cost 03,000 spread over four years. 
The BHC duly decided not to continue using the services of Meik and, 
looking for an engineer more locally based, retained John Watt Sandeman 
(1842-1927) of Ne-,,, 4cestle to act on its behalf. Sandeman suggested that 
the two piers be formed as suggested by Meik and that even further dredging 
be put in hand, sufficient to provide an additional two feet of water. 
4 
In line with other such bodies in the area the BHC formed a Works and 
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Finance Committee, empowered to meet more frequently than did the main 
board and it was this committee which initiated further negotiations with 
the NER in an effort to persuade it to provide additional coaling points 
on the north bank of the river. The BHC offered to erect the staiths 
if the NER would bring coal to the harbour. 5 This suggestion was not 
acceptable but subsequently the NER undertook to carry out further improvements 
to the staiths on the south shore, their completion in 1888 forming a 
complete loop of railway lines to feed the staiths. 
Since the formation of the BHC port improvements had comprised principally 
the forming of new berths and the building of a new quay on the south 
bank to accommodate the NER staiths. The problems were notinconsiderable, 
necessitating the blasting of rock from the river bed and the construction 
of a timber-piled river wall with concrete backing, the upper section 
tied back to solid ground by chains. 
6 The dredging of the harbour had 
been undertaken partly by the BHCIs own plant and partly by equipment 
hired from Sunderland and Dumbarton. The BHC continued to press the 
NER to proceed with the construction of the extra staiths on the north 
shore and in 1892 the NER announced its intention of applying for Parliamentary 
powerJ Agreement between the two interested bodies was finally reached 
in 1894 and the NER, by then having completed capital works at Dunston, 
on the Tyne, began the construction of an extension from its Newbiggin 
branch to the staiths. 
8 The new coal-loading facilities. were brought 
into use in July 1896 having cost the NER a total of Z78,028 spread over 
three years; the cost to the BHC has not been ascertained. 
Since its formation, the works undertaken by the BHC had been of 
a much more substantial nature than had been those of its predecessor 
and they included the construction of the west breakwater 2,470 ft long 
- but not the west pier -a 300 ft concrete extension to the eastern pierg 
the dredging already noted and the building of quay walls to form a base 
for the NER staiths. The combination of BHC finance and NER co-operation 
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had made a very substantial change to the harbour. Between 1883 and 
1896 the throughput of Coal increased from 150,000 to 2.562 m tons and 
revenue rose accordingly. In 1884 the port had been shown to be cheaper 
than the Tyne: ships to U. K. ports, Blyth 3d, Tyne 4d p. ton; to Europe, 
Blyth 4d, Tyne 6-34; elsewhere, Blyth 6d, Tyne ll-4d p toný.. 
9 
The policy 
of low costs, continuous improvement and railway backing proved successful 
and shipments from the port continued to increase. 
In 1904 Ridley* died and was succeed by his son, the 2nd Viscount 
Ridley (1874-1916) who immediately took the place of his father o. n the 
NER board. By this time the formation of the south harbour had been 
completed, necessary because of the growing numbers and size of ships 
using the river, as many as 91 lying there for a 14-day period in 1892; 
10 
the 23 acres so added brought to 40 acres the deep-water area. In 1907 
the timber and rubble construction of the east breakwater was encased 
in concreteg a new timber superstructure was added and the structure was 
extended by a 900 ft long concrete addition with a lighthouse. 
11 
By 1909 total shipments of coal exceeded 4m tons. From the NER 
staiths on the north shore were shipped 2.349 m tons, from 'the Cowpen 
staiths 452,000 tons, from the NER south shore staiths 1,213 m tons. 
Of the ships using the harbour, 757 were U. K. registered steamships, 539,000 
tons; 46 were U. K. sailing ships, 6,200 tons; 2,011 were foreign steamships, 
1.. 451 m tons; 72 were foreign sailing ships, 21,000 tons; in total 2.016 
m tons register. Imports comprised principally 14,000 loads of timber. 
12 
The coal was shipped from ten staiths, each with two spouts and 24 ft 
13 
of water and appliances to prevent the breakage of coal were provided. 
In the first decade of the 20th century some diversification of trade 
took place. Shipbuilding and repairing had earlier been established 
but attempts were made to found a fishing industry and to expand the imports 
of timber, Pyman, Bell of West Hartlepool making their first approach 
* Created Viscount in 1901. 
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in 1909.14 The newly-found success of the port led to plans for its 
further expansion. In 1907 Sandeman reported that further dredging should 
not be delayed by more than seven years and it should be undertaken so 
as to provide not less than 24 ft of water throughout the harbour, * including 
the bar which was much shallower. He also advocated that the west pier 
should be set back to provide a better entrance and estimated that, such 
were the revenues of the port, the cost of Z173,400 could be expended 
from surplus revenue over 'a period of seven years. 
15 Three years later 
Sandeman was requested to investigate the possibility of making the "Upper 
Harbour into a non-tidal Basin , 
16 
'but, having briefly considered the matterv 
he replied by producing a plan for three docks - in total 70 acres - at 
. the extreme southerly end of the port complex, 
17 the site of the 1863 
proposal. Assuming the docks were needed at all, it would seem to have 
been a much bOtter solution than that suggested by the commissioners. 
He also indicated his suggestions for additional staiths, located in the 
upper part of the river on its north bank. 
On the basis of Sandeman's proposals the BHC resolved to seek further 
Parliamentary powers, principally for the staiths, but no direct move 
was made and it was the NER, instead, which prepared the drawings necessary. 
18 
The provision of a major new work caused the commissioners to seek the 
services of Coode, Son & Matthews, earlier employed on the rebuilding 
of the Tyne piers, to approve Sandeman's proposals and drawings for the 
staiths were deposited in 1911.19 To support its application for the 
Bill the BHC inquired deeply into its operations and finances. It was 
noted that with coal exports exceeding 4m tons the gross revenue attributable 
from that and from an additional expected Im tons would be E80,000 p. a., 
a net sum of E53,000. New tradeý however, of a general nature would 
bring in only a further L4,000 p. a. but nevertheless the surplus monies 
would enable the BHC to seek total borrowing powers of Z1.134 m. The 
cost of the proposed works was estimated at Z770,000, the major items 
being some E200,000 for various items of dredging and Z170,000 for an 
* This work was completed by 1912.396 
extension to the east pier the substructure for the proposed NER staiths 
would cost L35,000.20 It was agreed to include E85,000 for the purchase 
of 'the original shares in the company. Comparisons were made with the 
Tyne, Wear and Seaham port authorities and it was noted that whereas Blyth, 
having spent a total of E890,000 on the port, recorded only L100,000 as 
liability, the Wear with the same throughput had Lý. 153m, Seaham L579,000 
for a throughput of less than 2m tons and the Tyne L4.278 m for shipments 
of 20 m tons p. a. 
21 
As the BHC was, in 1911, preparing. -its Bill, another wab promoted bý the 
Blyth coalowners in an attempt to alter the constitution of the commission. 
22 
Concerned by the power of Ridley on the commission, the promoters sought 
to increase the number of members fro6 13 to 20, a move opposed both by 
Ridley and by 'the BHC itself. The promoters, headed by Thomas Emmerson 
Forsterý himself a member of the commission, proposed that membership 
should comprise Ridley, his nominee, one NER representative, one landowner, 
four coalowners, three shipowners, three traders, four Blyth representatives, 
one from Bedlington and one' shareholder, a total of 20. The BHC responded 
with a proposal that it should itself amend its constitution in. its forthcoming 
Bill, a move perhaps anticipated by the coalowners. The BHC accordingly 
proposed a body with a membership of 17 together with a representative 
of the shareholders, but Ridley, stating that the proposals"were not calculated 
to lead to the development of the various growing industries of the Port, " 
23 
complained that he would be deprived of long-standing privileges. if 
the other commissioners would not agree with him he would withdraw from 
all discussions, so leaving himself free to oppose the BHCIs Bill. 
Ridley duly 'petitioned against both Bills but within days of lodging 
his objections he reported to the BHC that, in order to avoid a Parliamentary 
contest, he had held discussions with the coal-owners, as a result of 
which the suggested body was to have 18 members, including six coalowners 
and four traders. 
24 The commissioners amended this agreement slightly 
397 
and the Bill received Royal Assent in August 1912p fixing at 19 the membership 
of the BHC: Ridley and his nominee; one each from the NER, traders. and 
Bedlington; six coalowners; four shipowners; and three members representing 
25 Blyth and one Bedlington. . The authorised works comprised principally 
the tidal basin at the western end of the harbour and a pier extension; 
to complete them within ten years, the BHC was empowereq to borrow up to .. 
Z800,000. Work soon began: a greenheart timber jetty was provided by 
the BHC for the NER at the new up-river staiths; further dredging*, was 
undertaken; the west pier, attacked by worms, was replaced; new offices 
were opened, reflecting the changed situation within the commission; and 
consideration was given to erecting a transporter bridge, as used on the 
Tees, to replace the ferry. 
The outbreak of war brought to an end, at least temporarily, the 
development of the port which by 1913 was shipping 4.73 m tons of coal 
26 p. a., almost half of the Northumberland coal shipments. Further improve- 
ments were still under consideration, including the forming at-i new wet 
dock at the Southern extremity of the port, but nevertheless the commissioners 
could look with pride on their achievement. During their governance, 
throughput of coal had risen from 150,000 tons to 4.73m tons p. a. and 
revenue had increased from E1,000 to E71,000 p. a. In the 30-year life 
of the dock company E131,000 had been spent to little effect; during 
a similar period controlled by the commission some Zlm had produced much 
more impressive results. 
27 
7.6 The Hartlepools 
When the NER had assumed control of the whole of the port of Hartlepool 
in 1865 it had been described as "a tempting bait"' by Harry Stephen Thompson 
(1809-1874) the company's chairman. 
# 
The view which he had then given 
is somewhat difficult to justify in that the purchase of the Hartlepool 
* In the past five years dredging had totalled 3, m tons. 
# Although revenue amounted to c Ehm p. a. gross irregularities had earlier been revealed; the 
company had been operated at a loss. 
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Dock and Railway had cost the NER Z440,000 and of the West Hartlepool 
Harbour and Railway, Z3.918m. 
2, Purchase had been succeeded by inactivity 
on the part of the NER, at that time undertaking work relating to Newcastle 
quay and then at its dock at MiddlesbrOLIgh, and it was not until 1872 
that capital had been injected into the dock complex at Hartlepool, presumably 
a result of the NER's intention to build a coastal line through the county. 
It was then envisaged that the constr UCtiDn of some ten miles of track 
would suffice "to give Newcastle, South Shields, Sunderland, the Hartlepools, 
Stockton and Middlesbrough direct and Convenient railway communication 
with each other. ,3 To extend the docks, approximately V-2m had-been expended 
by 1880t followed by a further E35,000 on the provision of a new dry dock, 
completed in 1885.4 
From the viewpoint of the NER, trade had been depressed between 1876 
and 1880 and, although not so recorded, it is difficult to believe that 
the company was not disappointed in its investment: between 1865 and 
1885 coal exports had fallen from 1.584 m tons to 1.215 m; general merchandise 
exports had remained static; the only significant change was in timber 
imports which had risen from 130,000 to 232,000 tons. 
5 Shipbuilding, 
begun in 1854 with the construction of a dry dock, had become a significant 
industry, Pile Spence & Co., being established in 1859 and William Gray 
& Co. , in 1871; in 1884, Christopher Fdrness 
(1852-1912) began building 
ships. Between 1880, and 1690, the tonnage of new shipping varied between 
30,000 and, 128,000 tons, 
6 figures comparable with those for the Tees. 
On the part of the NER the completion of work at Hartlepool marked 
a cessation for 20 years in its capital investment there. However, the 
Hartlepool'Port and Harbour Commissioners (HP&HC) continued with the lengthening 
of the Heugh pier to af ford greater protection to the bay and at the same 
time continued to deepen the channel into the harbour, removing up to 
ý4- m tons of material each year; 
7 by 1912 the low-water channel depth 
had reached 20 ft. 
8 The extension of the pier - it cost E100,000 - continued 
slowly and it was not until . 
1902 that it was completed, at which time 
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the HP&HC was empowered to collect the full dues authorised by earlier 
legislation. Some indifference to the port's well-being is evident during 
this period. In 1891 the HP&HC accused the NER of not undertaking its 
dredging requirements and in 1898 the NER was asked to submit for approval 
its plan of improvement, the year following being informed that the port 
was"suffering in consequence of this work being delayed". 
9 
10 By its Act of 1900 . the NER purchased the Londonderry Railway, running 
from Seaham to Sunderland, and under the powers of its 1894 Act, began 
in the same year the building of a railway from Seaham -to Hartlepool, 
first considered in 1871. In effect an extension southwards of the Londonderry 
Railwayq the NER line was planned to transport coal from the large collieries 
sunk between Seaham and Hartlepool in order to exploit the deeper seams 
located under both land and sea. Plans for the line had first been deposited 
in 1892 11 when a railway, seeking running powers over the Londonderry, 
had been promoted by Furness, Burdon, Havelock and others, mainly coal- 
owners in the area, and it was then estimated that 12,000 tons of coal 
per day would be taken to Hartlepool, at that time looked upon principally 
as a timber port. 
12 the ensuing Parliamentary Committee, the NER In 
had put forward the view that it should build the line as it "could make 
it more cheaply and more effectivel Y,, 
13 than could any new company. 
This view prevailed; the Bill was rejected after "a few minutes deliberation"; 
14 
drawings were submitted by the NER in preparation for the next Session; 
15 
and Parliament sanctioned the railway in 1894.16 
The NER was, ýhowever, somewhat frustrated in its efforts by the Londonderry 
interests and it was not until 1905 that the railway which had cost E338,877 
was , in modified form, 
brought into use. 
17 By this time the NER had 
prepared plans for the construction of a further dock at Hartlepool and 
it is indicative of the rivalry between Hartlepool and Seaham that at 
Seaham too, major reconstruction had been put in hand. The intention 
of the NER at Hartlepool was to form a dock*of some ten acres within the 
* See Map 22 400 
Slake, formerly used to sluice the tidal harbour, from which access would 
be gained; 
18 the necessary Act, was obtained in 1905.19 
The NER did' not proceed with the authorised dock but instead entered 
into discussions with, the HP&HC regarding alternative plans, namely the 
widening of the dock entrance and the conversion of the Victoria dock 
into a tidal basin, maintaining that' if this were to be done ships of 
a greater tonnage could use, it. Further dredging would be required, 
a fish dock would be incorporated and new staiths would be built, the 
whole of the work costing Z125,000. The NER, 'having decided not to proceed 
with the new dock 
20 
, latef informed -the commissioners that it was intended' 
to widen the entrance to the dock complex via the North Basin, completed 
in 1880, and also to widen, the entrance to the former West Docks at a 
cost of c 05,000.21 
Between 1880 and 1895 the total capital expenditure of the NER had 
averaged c E400,000 p. a., ' a relatively low level. From the latter date, 
however, it increased to c Z1.4m in 1904, before again falling and it 
was in this decline that the next phase of development at Hartlepool took 
place: 
22 unusuall 
I 
yli ` the costs of the extensive works were not recorded 
in the NER accounts as capital expenditure and only the estimates for 
the work were noted. By 1912, a new quay had been provided for the fish 
dock and- the Victoria Dock converted into a 17 acre tidal harbour with 
a minimum high-water depth of 33 ft and an entrance 200 ft wide in place 
of the original 45 ft. New coaling facilities had been incorporated. 
Work on the West Dock entrance had also been put in hand, enlarging it 
from 42 ft to 65 ft wide, 
23 this work being completed in 1910. The completion 
of the Victoria dock and west gate modifications allowed the widening 
of other entrances to begin, although work was not to be completed until 
1919. In the past, the timber structures at Hartlepool had been severely 
attacked by marine borers, resulting in considerable expense when replaced 
by masonry. By the end of the century, however, concrete had become 
widely used and it was this material which at the Hartlepools, and at 
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other ports, replaced both timber and masonry. 
24 The efforts of the 
NER led to a resurgance in the dredging of the old harbour and the approach 
to - it, the quantity of material removed increasing from its average of 
. -m tons p. a. to 681,000 tons in 1909, I the maximum. In turn, dredging 
led to the undermining of the Old Pier, reputedly the oldest in Britain. 
Its rebuilding and strengthening was undertaken between 1910 and . 
1912 
when, as had happened at Sunderland a century earlier, the lighthouse 
was moved 30 ft to seaward. 
25 
The effect of the latest capital expenditure was impressive: between 
1900 and 1910 coal shipments rose by 50', 'o and by 1913 they had doubled 
to 2.4 m tons p. a.; in the same way timber imports rose from 774,000 tons 
in 1910 to 1.14m tons in 1913. The contrast with the 1880 extensions 
was marked. The former was undertaken in a peftod of declining coal availability 
but the latter, coinciding with "the outpouring of coal from the newly 
opened coastal portion of the Durham coalfield,, 
26 
proved the viability 
of the work undertaken, a result similar to that experienced at neighbouring 
Seaham Harbour. 
7.7 Seaham Harbour 
The succession to the title by Charles Stewart, 6th Marquis of Londonderry 
(1852-1915) presaged a substantial improvement in the fortunes of- Seaham 
Harbour. Whereas the control of the estates by his father had brought 
no change to the port, his death in 1884 led to an expansion of the mining 
interests and improvements to the harbour. 
The winning of Hetton colliery had had the effect of stimulating 
mining in Durham and further-improvements in mining techniques and geological 
investigations led to deeper collieries being worked, especially those 
bordering the sea. One of the earliest had been Monkwearmouth but the 
acquisition by Londonderry of rights to mine under the sea in the immediate 
vicinity of Seaham, ajoint arrangement made with the Easington Coal Company, 
made vital, the provision of suitable facilities at the harbour. As would 
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be expected the prospect of new collieries brought to the scene the NER, 
until this time not involved in Londonderry affairs, and it is against 
this background that this phase of the development of Seaham Harbour is 
viewed. 
Over the years the number of collieries worked by Londonderry had 
diminished from 11 in 1853 to seven in 1871 and was, by the end of the 
1914-1918 War, to be reduced to three, albeit of such a scale that some 
7,000 miners were in employment. 
1 Not only were the Seaham collieries 
bigger, those established at Easington, Harden and Blackhall were of a 
comparable size, and it was to serve these coastal collieries that the 
NER sought to build a railway between Seaham and the Hartlepools, so enabling 
coal to be shipped at its docks at the latter place. In opposition to 
this proposal the Marquis of Londonderry sought to expand both the output 
of . coal and the harbour, but rightly, envisaged that his own finances 
would not be able to absorb all costs. His solution was the formation 
of a limited company - or companies - to operate the part, the collieries 
and the railway from Seaham to Sunderland. 
2 
The Seaham Harbour Dock Company (SHDC) was established in 1898, its 
principal purpose being to extend the harbour, "now of insufficient extent 
and depth to accommodate vessels of the size now ordinarily used in the 
coal trade'. 113 Whereas ships of large tonnage could use the rivers Tyne 
and Wear, Seaham was limited to colliers of 900 tons, with a length of 
some 200 ft. 
4 Seeking an enlargement of the harbour, the SHDC was authorised 
to raise E450,0009 the dividend payable being not greater than 55'0; the 
works were to be completed within eight years. 
The first meeting of the new company was held in York on 28 February 
1899. Of the 8,835 shares of UO to be issued on account of the existing 
harbour works it was agreed that 7,500 of them should be ordinary shares 
and the remainder preference; 3,837 were placed' in the joint names of 
Lords Londonderry, Zetland and Farquhar. Significantly, the chairman 
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of the Easington Coal Company, John S. Barwick of Sunderland, was appointed 
a director as was Samuel J. Ditchfield, a Seaham shipowner. At this 
meeting the contract was formalised between the company and S. Pearson 
& Son Ltd. 9 the contractors for the projected harbour works, designed 
by Wake and Meik, * a feature of it being that Pearson was expected to 
take shares in the SHDC as payment. 
5 
The woýks put in hand were to a much bigger scale than had been those 
of Chapman. Two protective piers were to be built, the north of 1,383 
ft and the south of 878 ft., enclosing an area of 25 acres, and the requirements 
of the larger ships expected to use the harbour were to be met by the 
construction of a new dock, ten acres in extent and provided with a gate 
65 ft in width and giving 271-61' of water at high tide. 
6 Considerable 
excavation was needed to form the new dock, an additional 12 feet over 
the site of what had been the former dock. As on the Tyne, the piers 
were constructed by means of concrete blocks, weighing up to 28 tons and 
faced with masonry, placed by a Titan crane. 
7 To handle the increased 
quantity of coal, staiths were built along the west, or landward, side 
of the dock, whereq owing to the height, of the cliffs, some 50 ft9 "it has 
been possibleg as at Tyne Dock and Sunderland, to dispense with the use 
of engines, and do the work by gravity, "B locomotives being used only 
to return to the railway the empty waggons. 
The construction of the harbour began in March 1899 and it was opened 
by Arthur J. Balfour on 11 November 1905.11 Work had proceeded satisfactorily 
in spite of two major incidents, one in 1901 when the seas broke over 
the outer wall and, having led to a section of the wall giving way, stopped 
work, and the other in 1903 when a section of the east wall of the dock, 
then containing water, collapsed. Some 450 ft of the wall fell into 
the dock and the two mishaps had resulted in some delay to the contract. 
As would be expected) the failures led to some recriminations involving 
client, consultant and contractor. Meik asserted that some of the problems 
Patrick Walter Meik (1851-1910). 
See Map 24 
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were the result of the I old walls being poorer than anticipated9 but so 
far as the major collapse was concerned the contractors, rejecting an 
offer of E5,000, threatened to take the resulting dispute to arbitration. 
10 
I The value of the contract undertaken by Pearson was inititally Z378,000 
and the final cost computed at E419,000. With interest and legal costs 
charged as capital the total expended on the harbour by 1906 was given 
as Z576,000, of which L88,350 was, in effect, for the purchase of the 
11 
old harbour. The new facilities caused revenue to increase from Z5,883, 
in the first half-year of 1905 to E20,620 in the corresponding period 
of 1906.12 The throughput of coal had risen in line with revenue, from 
247,000 tons for the half-year ending in 1905 to 705,000 for that of 1906. 
The completion of the harbour by the SHDC coincided with the bringing 
into use of the NER's line from Seaham to Hartlepool. When this line 
had been first proposed by the NER it'had, understandablypmet with opposition 
from Londonderry who viewed it as being able, and likely, to divert coal 
traffic southwards. The proposed incursion into Londonderry's territory 
brought about much discussion and led to the making of two important agree- 
ments, one relating to the traffic of the Easington Coal Company and the 
other to the future of the Londonderry Railway, at that time regulated 
by its 1863 Act. The first of the agreements 
13 
resulted from Londonderry 
having withdrawn' his opposition to the NER, but only on the condition 
that not less than 2/3 of the output of the Easington Coal Company was 
transported by the NER to either Sunderland or Seaham, * a provision which 
he evidently considered appropriate in that the under-sea royalties were 
held jointly by the two concerns. The second agreement 
14 involved the 
Londonderry Railway and, again, the NER. As noted, Londonderry had earlier 
given consideration to providing his interests with limited liability 
but, so far as the railway was concerned, a more practicable solution 
was to sell it to the NER; with the completion of the new line, a through 
coastal route would run the full length of the Durham coast, the scene 
Londonderry capital had been invested in both ports. 
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of the most recent mining activity. Londonderry offered to transfer 
his railway to the NER for E400,000 but, in return, the NER was to build, 
as soon as possible, that length of the proposed Hartlepool and Seaham 
railway between Easington colliery and Seaham, so enabling the colliery 
to begin production. , The purchase of the Londonderry Railway was effected 
by the NER's Act of 1900,15 consolidating its power into a monopoly serving 
the whole of the coal-producing areas of the North-East. 
Although the sinking of the Easington colliery had begun in 1901 
it was not opened until 1910, the result of problems in its sinking. 
16 
In the same way as the dock company had been established, so Londonderry 
in 1899 formed the Londonderry Collieries Ltd., which took over the Seaham 
and Silksworth mines in addition to Dawdon, which did not begin production 
until 1907.17 Shipments at Seaham for Dawdon coal are not shown but 
those for Easington are first recorded in 1912, when 21,000 tons were- shipped 
in the half-year; by 1914 this figure had risen to 120,000 tons 18 and 
the total throughput of the port was 1.067m tons for the six-month period 
19 
and 2.659 m tons for 1913 as a whole, a record figure. 
The completion of the principal civil engineering works would seem 
to have been followed by some dibsention among the directors. Meik had 
been appointed as engineer following the incorporation of the company 
but perhaps as a result of the problems experienced it was Wake who was 
appointed in his place in November 1899, a position held only for a year 
before it was terminated. 
20 The design of the harbour had not been an 
unqualified success: the piers were extended as work proceeded; the 
dock gates were found to be vulnerable to heavy seas and to overcome 
the problem - too small a harbour - Meik suggested -building an inner jetty, 
in spite of considerable dredging, the harbour master reported in 1909 
that the water depth was still insufficient; and in 1912 it was found 
necessary to fit an anti: - coal-breakage device to one of the spouts. 
22 
In spite of the port's shortcomingsp the directors were soon pressed to 
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enlarge the harbour further, especially when in October 1911 the port 
lost the revenue from 9,000 tonsof coal which would have been shipped 
had the colliers been able to enter it. 
23 The directors responded to 
the call for expansion by appointing an engineer - Meik was aggrieved 
that he was not so appointed - to report upon the harbour, their choice 
being Moncrieff, earlier involved on the Tees. * His report voiced concern 
on two counts, the state of the piers below water level and the lack of 
water depth, less at the bar than the dock entrance. Puzzled, Moncreiff 
noted that there should not be a bar as "there is no river or outward- 
flowing water-- from the harbour which could cause (one to form and indeed) 
the shallower depths of water existing between the pier heads appear to 
be practically those to which the work was carried out.,, 
24 It is not 
recorded what work was subsequently undertaken but by 1912 a new berth, 
to give a greater water depth and accommodate ships of 4,000 tons, had 
been formed within the south dock at a cost of E24,200, go- raising the 
harbour's capital to E646,000. 
The capital structure of the company is problematical. When the 
old harbour was deemed to have been purchased it was valued at 188,350 
but subsequent to the company obtaining a second Act of Parliament 
25 in 
l9o8 - it authorised the raising of a further E90,000, withr. E30,000 of 
debenture stock - this figure was increased to E107,392,26 . more nearly 
approaching its initial cost. The effects on revenue of the capital 
expended have been noted although the only certain full-year figure available 
is that for 1912; it was then E46,847, derived from the shipment of 1.841m 
tons of coal. 
7.8 Warkworth Harbour, Amble. 
The rejection of the Bill promoted by the Warkworth Harbour Commission 
(WHC) in 1884 resulted in the harbour's improvement seemingly being restricted 
to the execution of dredging, financed by revenue. To enable further 
works to be undertaken the commissioners obtained a loan of Z15,000 from 
In partnership with J. W. Sandeman he had been responsible for the replacement of the Redheugh 
bridge on the Tyne. 
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the Public Works Loan Commissioners and it enabled them to improve the 
river's channel by removing its rock bed, to deepen the loading berths 
and to provide a new staith giving an extra six feet height. By 1886 
the new staith was in operation. 
I 
Although both trade and revenue had increased3the latter being Z6,159 
in 1890, nevertheless the commissioners felt concern regarding the state 
of the harbour-and Meik, having been requested to report, in turn, asked 
Messent, then engineer to the TIC, to give his opinion. Messent noted 
that the river's bar had not improved during the 20 years he had been 
familiar with the harbour and he stated that no improvement could take 
place until the piers were extended; although they were not in a perfect 
condition their repair should be on an ad hoc basis rather than a complete 
rebuilding. 
2 His comments led to the north pier being extended in concrete 
by 120ft. No Parliamentary powers were sought but construction work 
was later noted by Meik as "already having a beneficial effect on the 
harbour entrance. Vessels now find the harbour easier to take in rough 
weather and there - is less rough water on the bar. ,3 Further dredging, 
though, was still required as the harbour needed a greater tidal capacity 
in the upper reaches so as to increase scour. 
To raise additional funds the WHC agreed that a further Act of Parliament 
was required. Before powers were sought, it was recorded that "it was 
the intention of Mr. Andrews to release the Harbour from all claims for 
back interest which will amount to a very large sum and also to strike 
off about E14,000 of his debentures ,4 and, on this undertaking, the Act 
permitted the WHC to borrow up to E30,000 on the security of the harbour 
revenue. The Act, providing for the reduction of Andrews's debenture 
to f, 170 ý 000 , made provision for its repayment within a 60 -year period, 
5 
either by instalments or by the creation of a sinking fund . 
At this time the pattern of coal production in the area changed. 
Originally, the major source of Amble's throughput had been Radcliffe but 
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over the years Broomhill, through Andrewsq increased its share of shipments 
and geological problems at Radcliffe in 1892 led to its closure and to 
the sinking of new shafts at Newbrough; a mile distant. 
6 Later, in 
1900, all collieries came under one management and the Broomhill colliery 
formed its own railway to connect with the earlier Radcliffe line, so 
avoiding completely the use of the NER. Production of coal continued 
to increase and to accommodate the greater shipments the Broomhill quay 
was extended eastwards, Meik recommending that it should eventually stretch 
as far as the south pier, its line cutting off the southern part of the 
estuary and its open structure allowing waves to spend themselves on the 
beach. At this period, tooo the north jetty was extended to almost 900 
ft, its construction having had a beneficial effect on both the scouring 
action of the tidal flow and the dispersion of waves. 
In 1897 coal shipments, for the first time, reached --, m tons, 388,000 
tons from Broomhill and 109,000 from Radcliffe, and the increasing trade 
of the port caused the WHC to convene monthly. * \Radcliffe Colliery complained 
of dredging as being inadequate and to improve the harbour still further 
it was agreed to seek additional Parliamentary powers. A petition was 
prepared seeking"to construct New Piers, or Breakwaters, Tidal Dock, and 
subsidiary work, to Dredge and improve the Harbour (and) to reclaim : Lands 
and foreshore. ,7 Thomas Meikq active in the ports of the region for 
many years, had died in 1896 and it was his son! 
ý who prepared the drawings 
of the projected works. The intention of the WHC was to lengthen the 
north pier by some 1,000 ft and to provide a new south pier, 1,300 ft 
long, the two together embracing a much greatex harbour area. Perhaps 
the result of port congestion, the drawings also showed a tidal dock situated 
at the up-river end of the Radcliffe staiths and providing seven acres 
of water. 
8 Introduced into the House of Lords, the Bill was rejected 
in Committee. 
** See Map 15 
*A new purpose-built office was opened at this time. 
# Patrick Walter Meik, in partnership with David William Nisbet. 
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In 1901 Sir Christopher Furness became a member of the WHC, presumably 
by virtue of his having purchased land at Radcliffe 
9 
and his views would 
seem to have carried great influence within the commission, certain items 
being deferred until such time as he was present. A further extension 
of the north pier was undertaken and dredging carried out so as to give 
a water depth of eight feet at low tideq the dredger being purchased from 
the Hartlepool commissioners for Z1,500. Work on the pier was completed 
in 1903v having cost L4,582 and beenbuilt by direct labour. Problems 
with the bar were still prevalent, Meik in 1905 reporting* that they were 
due to silt being deposited by the river and sand by the tides. Under 
Meik and Nisbet dredging had been confined to the river and the increased 
scour had improved the water at the bar but still it was insufficient 
and they considered that it would be removed only by further pier extension; 
an elongation of 600 feet was likely to cost L609000 and so would perhaps 
10 be impracticable. Conversely, further dredging could be undertaken. 
The WHC accepted Meik's recommendation concerning dredging and in 
1905 Furness suggested that the final length of the south jetty be formed, 
linking it to the south pier which, in turn, should be extended by 240 
ft. The need for these measures was emphasised by the Broomhill Collieries 
Ltd., and it was agreed to form the jetty immediately provided that the 
colliery funded the operation; 
11 the pier extension, again in concrete, 
wasalso sanctioned. The cqlliery company was asked to guarantee the 
cost of the work, Board of Trade approval was given, work was put in hand 
and was completed in 1908 so bringing to an end the port developments 
undertaken prior to 1914. Their completion also brought about the severance 
of Meik's involvement and the appointment of John Sanderson as engineer. 
Dredging, amounting to some 150,000 tons p. a., had improved the harbour 
and resulted in 7 ft depth being available at low water. Coal shipments 
had continued to increase and in 1908 amounted to 758,000 tons, 418,000 
tons from Broomhillq 325,000 from Newbrough and 15,000 from Shilbottle. 
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Timber was virtually the ports only import and by this time 6,270 loads 
were brought in, some 7tOOO tons. 
12 
From 1905, problems were encountered regarding the north pier, where 
settlement occurred and cavities appeared. Repairs put'in hand comprised 
the casting of 20 and 30 ton concrete blocks and their somewhat random 
placing to protect the older work. The concrete wall built to extend 
the north pier landwards experienced undermining and slag from Hartlepool 
and Middlesbrough was used to protect it. Its success was such that 
in 1913 it was recorded that "the blocks and slag deposited on the seaward 
side of the extension have saved this part of the pier from total destruction. , 
13 
The dependence of the harbour upon the collieries of the immediate 
area had been complete and at no other port had the mining interests been 
so dominant. * At all times, works expenditure had been sanctioned by 
the collieries and although the 1893 Act had made provision for the repayment 
of debentures, by 1909 the figure still stood at E170,000. The Broomhill 
Colliery Ltd. ý was in addition creditor "for L9,030.19.8. cash advanced 
for improving the accommodation of the harbour,, 14 and the WHC was asked 
to increase revenue in order to meet itsliabilities, the first such request. 
The solution was to increase from 3d to 4d the rates on both ship tonnage 
and on coal and it is perhaps significant that these increases, apparently 
imposed, were followed by a reduction in the throughput of the harbour. 
7.9 Summary 
The period which spanned the end of the century was especially notable 
for the development of the port of Blythý accomplished by the formation 
of a commission and the co-operation of the NER, and for the relative 
decline of the Wear as a coal exporting river, principally due to renewed 
competition from 5eaham Harbour. The output of coal both in the United 
Kingdom and in the North-East had continued to rise, but at a -rate 
lower 
than beforeý the relative fall-back on the part of the region evidenced 
by the annual compound growth rate of 1.8% as compared with the earlier 
* Seaham Harbour remained, in part, in a situation similar to Amble. 
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2.8% The shipment of coalq however, continued to increase and although 
exports rose at a somewhat less rapid rate, nevertheless by 1913 they 
made up 72% of the total. 
Coal Output and Shipments, 1885-1913. 
18851 
000teirs 
1913 2 
000 vons 
1885 -1913. 
Ot 00 P. a. 
U. K. output 
N. E. output 
159351 
35091 
287411 
58676 
2.1 
1.8 
Ot N. E. /U. K. a 22 20 - 
N. E. Shipments 
N. E. exports 
16773 
c9407 
35204 
25473 
2.7 
3.6 
Exports ', 'o 56 72 - 
The proportions of coal shipped from each of the ports changed significantly 
in the years immediately prior to the 1914-18 war. Shipments from Blyth 
increased nine-fold, to 4.73 m tons. The Tees and Hartlepool both doubled 
their throughput but in percentage terms remained steady. The ports 
to suf fer were the Tyne and the Wear. By its take-over of the Blvth 
and Tyne Railway the NER was able to ship Northumberland coal at Blythq 
through its own staiths at river berths, without being forced to use the 
Northumberland Dock staiths of the earlier BUR or the TIC staiths adjoining. 
The deprivation of Northumberland coal was masked by the acquisition of 
additional Durham suppliqs, again shipped through the NER's own staiths 
at Dunston, a process which rapidly proved a success, cheapening transport 
and to a certain extent relieving the NER from the necessity of enlarging 
Tyne Dock, by then. shipping 7m tons p. a., more than one-third of the 
river's total. It was claimed that more coal was, in aggregate, shipped 
from the Tyne Dock than from any other in Great Britain. 3 
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Shipments of Coal from the North-East: 1885-1913. 
1865 1913 
000 tons Ot 10 000 tons Ot io 
Tyne 9877 59 19699 56 
Wear 3981 24 4857 14 
Tees 126 1 228 1 
Blyth 533 3 4732 13 
Hartlepools 1215 7 2400 7 
Seaham 788 4.5 2659 7 
Amble 253 1.5 629 2 
From its inception, the fortunes of Seaham Harbour had been inter-. 
linked with those of Sunderland but it was not until 1900 that the NER 
took over the Londonderry Railway with the intention of continuing it 
southwards to Hartlepool, so enabling coal from the recently developed 
undersea collieries to be shipped through its own docks. In this endeavour 
it was frustrated by an agreement whereby Easington coal was to be shipped 
at Seaham and the enlargement of the docks there precluded the NER from 
taking full advantage of its own port; nevertheless Hartlepool was able 
to maintain its share of shipments while those of Sunderland fell, diverted 
either to Seaham or to the Tyne. 
Coal Stafistics: annual prcentage increase (compound): 1885-1913. 
Period ot to compound p. a., 
Tyne 1885-1913 2.5 
Wear 1885-1913 0.7 
Tees 1885-1899 -2.4) 2 1 av 1899-1913 . . 6.2) 
Blyth 1885-1913 8 
Hartlepools do 2.5 
Seaham do 4.4 
Amble 1885-1899 5.4 )3 3 av 1899-1913 . . 1) 
Of the several ports, only Blyth, Seaham and Amble exceeded the average 
413 
figures of 2.7 'eo p. a. compound growth rate for shipments of coal from 
the region. 9 with 8,4.4 and 3.3% respectively. The figures concealed 
some irregularities in that at Amble the principal growth occurred before 
1900 whereas on the Tees an extremely rapid increase - from a low base 
- took place after that date; there, the earlier years of the period 
witnessed a reduction in the tonnage of coal shipped, on the Tees not 
necessarily a symptom of decline, but, to a certain extent, one of prosperity 
in that the demand for ironmaking was such that little coal was available 
for shipment. The relationship between the iron and steel industry and 
the NER was close and it was ship-building, a major user, which partially 
brought about. a recovery in the profits of the NER between 1886 and 1890, 
a recovery linkedýtooýwith both iron making and with the shipment of coal, 
the latter rising by 23% in the five-year period which ended in 1891. 
This increase "preceeded the general revival of activity and was maintained 
after the falling-off in shipbuilding and exports removed major expansionary 
impulses. ,4 There is little doubt that the pattern of port development 
was much, influenced by the policies of the NER, 11 before almost everything 
else, determined to promote prosperity throughout its area and not just 
(at) an occasional and highly favoured place.,, 
5 Other than at Seaham 
and Sunderland, it improved its facilities' at all ports. 
Relativelyq the greatest changes and improvements occurred at Blyth 
and Seaham, the latter virtually untouched for three quarters of a century. 
Whereas the three major rivers had come under the control of commissions 
in mid-century, Blyth remained a company and Seaham privately owned; 
it was not until 1882 that Blyth was operated as a commission and 1898 
that Seaham became the responsibility of a company. The changesbrought 
about major new works and a greatly increased throughput of coal, at Blyth 
by means of staiths on the river and at Seaham by means of a dock, necessary 
there on account of its location. 
During the period, no other new dock construction was undertaken. 
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The need to accommodate bigger ships made uneconomical their building 
and such were the rates of loadin g now available that it became advantageous 
for ships not to use them - they could be restrictive - but to lie at 
deep-water staiths in the river, so facilitating entrance and egress. * 
In spite of this change the port authorities were not able to abandon 
their docks, needed still to provide harbour space, and all put in hand 
programmes for deepening and improvements, the exception being the TIC, 
its Northumberland dock incapable of improvement and the Albert Edward 
Dock uneconomical. 
The period witnessed, too, further work on the protective piers considered 
essential for the harbours' operation. Those on the Tyne were rebuilt, 
those on Wear and Tees were completed and the pier at Blyth was extended. 
Modifications were also made to the sea entrances at Hartlepool and Sunderland 
while at Seaham, completely new piers encircled the enlarged dock. Although 
no longer an era of dock constructionp nevertheless capital expenditure 
remained high. The formation of deeper river berths involved extensive 
dredging, both to increase the rivers' depth and to maintain it afterwards. 
Whereas much of the earlier dredging had involved only the removal of 
sand and silt, more of that undertaken in this period was in rock, incurring 
considerable effort and expense. 
With the decline of the chemical trade and the few demands of the 
engineering industry it remained shipbuilding -and the shipping of coal 
which placed the greatest demands upon the ports. Shipbuilding - principally 
in steel - continued to increase, albeit cyclically, with merchant shipping 
output peaking in 1906 at over one million tons register. The total 
comprised 334 ships, an average of 3,000 tons. The peaks for the several 
ports did not coincide but, other than for Hartlepool, follow similar patterns. 
* The only completely enclosed dock system was at Seaham. 
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Shipbuilding: peaks in production. 
Year Port No. Tonnage Av. size 9. r. t. 
1901 Tees 46 161058 3501 
1906 Wear 97 326701 3368 
1911 Tyne 117 412959 3529 
1913 Hartlepool- 33 153071 4638 
1906 Total 334 1005148 3009 
So far as the use of the rivers was concerned, the average cargo 
size continued to increase and records indicate that, for the Tyne between 
1885 and 1913, average registered tonnage rose from 42B to 783. Assuming 
that all ships cleared with coal, the corresponding deadweight 
tonnages would have been 673 and 1,627; ships of up to 10,000 tons 
dwt used the rivers. 
It is apposite to consider the demographic change which had taken 
place in the region and which provided some impetus to adjustments which 
were made to the commissions' constitutions. Between 1851 and 1881 the 
major -changes in population took place in Durham, the Tees area - extending 
into Yorkshire - reaching an annual compound increase of almost 6,0. 
By the succeeding period this figure had fallen to 1.4', o but it had established 
Middlesbrough as the dominant town with a population approaching twice 
that of Stockton; in 1881 the two towns had been similar in size. The 
comparative decline of the port of Sunderland is reflected in its population 
change following 1881, the lowest rate of increase in the region. In 
Northumberland the position was reversed with the growth rates of both 
Amble and Blyth accelerating. The changes in the populations of the 
individual ports is paralleled by the figures for the counties as a whole; 
the Tyne, a port of both, maintained a constant rise. 
The growth of towns other than the four originally forming the TIC 
was significant and it is understandable that Jarrow should have become 
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North East Ports: Population 1851_19117 
1851 1881 1911 Compoun. qrowth, %. p. a. 
1851-81 1881-1911 1851-1911 
Amble 1040 2016 4881 2.2 3 2.6 
Blyth 6976 12888 30591 2.1 2.9 2.5 
Newcastle 89156 150252 266603 
Gateshead 24805 51304 116917 
North Shields 30524 46364 58816 
South Shields 35790 65480 108647 
Others 23795 68594* 137466# 
Tyne total 204070 381994 688449 2.1 2 2 
Sunderland 
. 
70576 139288 151157 2.3 0.3 1.3 
Seaham & Seaham 
Harbour 4267 10713 15757 3.1 1.3 2.2 
Hartlepool 9503 
West Hartlepool 4008 48613 63923 
Hartlepools total 13511 48613 63923 4.4 1 2.6 
Stockton 10172 51209 58521 
Yarm 1647 14B5 1617 
Middlesbrough 7631 55373 104767 
Tees total 19450 108067 164905 5.9 1.4 3.6 
Northumberland 303568 434086 696B93 1.2 1.6 1.4 
Durham County 390997 875166 f 369B60 2.7 1.5 2.1 
* Heworth, Jarrow, Wallsend. 
# Jarrow, Felling, Hebburp, Gosforth, Wallsend. 
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represented in 1886 and even more so that the dues payers, not necessarily 
sympathetic towards the municipalities, should take a part in 1898. 
on the Wear, the RWC suffered under the larg6st body of commissioners 
in the region, although at 52 it was only a third of its earlier size. 
it was the subject of some criticism and was referred to as an example 
not to be emulated. At Blyth a readjustment was made to the BHC, enforced 
by the port's users threatening to make changes from without, a ploy earlier 
used on both Tyne and Tees. The confidence of the commissions brought 
about the building of new offices, in Newcastle, Sunderland, Blyth and 
Middlesbrough, a' move not unique to the ports and paralleled by the water 
and gas undertakings on Tyne and Wear. 
Relationships between port authorities and municipalities were significant 
only on the Tyne and Tees, natural in view of their histories and representation. 
In the 1880 s the exhortations to complete the improvement of the upper 
reaches of the Tyne were many but the failure of industry to beattracted 
to the area above Scotswood led to a diminution in outcry. Nevertheless 
the improvements up to that point proved of inestimable benefit both to 
Armstrong and to the NER, with its new staiths at Dunston. Newcastle 
remained somewhat negative in its outlook and perhaps misguidedly undertook 
still further extensions to the town's quay. The corporationdid not 
enjoy good relations with the NER, as late as 1892 supporting another 
railway into Newcastle, so hoping to break the NER's monopoly. The corporation 
was sceptical also of the utility of the Albert Edward dock but, in spite 
of its own fears, Newcastle was looked upon by the other towns as the 
one which had benefited most from the works of the TIC. 
The TCC experienced similar problems, its municipalities both as 
members of the commission and otherwise exhibiting conflict. Here, too, 
the force was demographic, exacerbated by some down-river migration as 
iron manufacturers sought to build quays to off-load ore imports. Such 
were the struggles within the commission that one member was forced to 
resign while in 1888 an injunction was threatened by Middlesbrough to 
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prevent the TCC from expending further money on the upper river until 
the town's representation was increased. Stockton suffered, or thought 
itself to suffer, in the same way as did Newcastle. A dock was suggested 
there as late as 1893; it did not proceed but quay works did in spite 
of the fact that Stockton's share of the Tees's trade was diminishing and 
by the outbreak of war not more than 8ea of the river's revenue originated 
in Stocktont by then used principally by ships of lesser tonnage. 
Civic relationships at Sunderland and at Blyth were somewhat different. 
The river Wear had long been in the hands of a commission and, although 
now reduced innumbe: rs, it was in effect perpetuating the former body. 
Amalgamation with the dock company had brought little change, perhaps 
because of the containment of Sunderland and the fact that its industries- 
other. ' than shipbuilding, were fragmentary. There were there no powerful 
figures such as on Tyne and Tees and although the town authorities had 
been critical of the RWC nevertheless, as late as 1909, that representation 
was still sought. At Blyth, the Ridley family was dominant on the commission, 
as it had been within the company. Unlike the Tyne and Tees, Blyth paid 
only lip-service to municipal representation and when reform- was sought 
in 1911 - it led to Ridley threatening to withdraw from the BHC - it was 
on the grounds of inadequate representation by the river's users, a process 
seen earlier regarding both the TIC and the TCC; at Blytht the NER was 
represented nn the commission. 
In relation to port development, perhaps the major force in the region 
was the NER. Its influence increased after its take-over of the B&TR 
in 1874 and it was its ability to provide shipping outlets at will which 
governed the region's progress. In its policy of refraining from favouring 
specific ports the NER was successful; other than at Seaham and, to a 
lesser extent at Sunderland, it provided considerable capital in providing 
and improving docks and staiths at all of them. Nevertheless the NER 
was conscious of economicsý both in the transport of coal from the region 
419 
and also within it whether by sea or by rail, and it was as a result 
of this outlook that it had "entered into marine operations not... to diversify 
out of railways, but for the rational reason that if it had not done so 
it would have s, een important business lost to other ports and railways, "a 
By the end of the century Gibb, the NER's general manager, was to write 
that dock investment was no longer enough to ensure that balanced competitive 
trade could be held by local ports as "the connection between sea carriage 
and land carriage is very close. 119 It was this outlook, held by others 
a century earlier, which resulted in the NER undertaking capital projects 
at a time of relatively slow growth in revenue. Although the tactics 
of coal transport and shipment were decided by the several bodies of port 
commissioners it was the North Eastern Railway which largely dictated 
the strategy. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
8.1 General 
During the period 1815-1914 the North-East was a notable example 
of "the truism that the continued growth of coastwise shipping was dependent 
on massive investment in major harbour improvements"' on the part of colliery 
owners, railway companies and river commissions. This general conclusion 
was, however, not completely true and the Tyne, in the years prior to 
the 1850 shad shown that coal shipments could increase with little capital 
investment on the river - other than by the coalowners themselves - while 
Amble provided an example of a port on which an inordinate amount of capital 
was initially expended, with little result. 
Although the region as a whole had experienced a continuous growth 
in both industry and in population, neither had been uniform. From the 
point of view of coal production, the major influence on the development 
of the rivers, there were several phases within the century: near to 
the rivers Tyne, Wear and Blyth; from areas to the south and west of 
the old-established mines; the expansion of the Northumberland steam- 
coal area; and the move eastwards of mining in Durham county, culminating 
in the establishment of the undersea collieries between South Shields 
and Hartlepool. Each phase had established its own growth pattern but, 
againg they were influenced by other factors, principally capital expenditure 
on port facilities and the adequacy, or otherwise, of the rail links to 
the ports. The north-eastern ports had grown with the coal trade but 
their fortunes were inter-linked one with another, a relationship shown 
by the plots of their annual coal shipments. What is not obvious however, 
is the growth of the ports in the south; the Hartlepools' importance 
as a coal exporter declined as general trade and engineering increased 
while the Tees was transformed from a coal-exporting river to one almost 
wholly dependent upon the iron and later the steel industry. 
Growth in the North-East was the result of several major influences 
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other than coal production. Difficult to rate, they may be listed as 
follows: the development of the steam engine with its concomitant demand 
for coal; the evolution of the steam-ship, associated with the change 
from wood, through iron, to steel in construction; the development of 
effective steam locomotion for railway use; the introduction of the 
formation of railways under Parliamentary powers, the Stockton and Darlington 
Railway (S&DR) being the first such line in the region; the winning 
of the Hetton colliery; and the development of the mining of Cleveland 
ironstone with the establishment of Middlesbrough as the centre of iron 
manufacture. It was, perhaps, the rise in mining output and the ever- 
increasing dimensions and tonnage of ships which imposed the greatest 
demands upon the region's ports, the latter paralleled by the greater 
efficiency of rail transport and trans-shipment. Not least among the 
major influences was the North Eastern Railway (NER), a major transporter 
of minerals and the owner and operator of several of the region's port 
installations and even of the complete port of the Hartlepools. it 
was a situation not unique to the North-East. 
8.2 The North-East Ports in a National Context. 
Although the rivers, Tyne and Wear had been involved in the coal 
trade for some centuries prior to 1815, the development which took place 
after that date gave to the North-East a pattern of development elsewhere 
found only in South Wales. The major ports of the 18th century had 
been London, Hullp Bristol and Whitehaven, the two first-named, with 
Liverpool, having built docks to accommodate their growing trade; at 
Whitehavent predominately engaged in coastal shipping, vessels lay aground 
at low tide within protective piers. 
I The region with which the North- 
East bore most similarity was South Wales where coal had been mined early 
and a coastal trade, principally in 60 to 90 tons vessels, 
2 had operated 
in the Bristol Channel. Due to its remoteness the area had been unable 
to compete with the North-East so far as London was concerned but, although 
some impetus to trade had been provided by the formation of the Monmouthshire 
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canal, 
3 the greatest expansion was to follow the establishment of a railway 
network. 
The development of the north-eastern ports comprised three principal 
components, all of a civil engineering nature. Again difficult to place 
in order of importance they were river channel improvements, the provision 
of dock accommodation and the building of protective piers. The first 
was a phenomenon found elsewhere only. on the Clyde; the construction 
of docks was general throughout the kingdom and comparisons may be made 
with the major ports; pier construction was more akin to Admiralty undertakings, 
and foreign harbours, then to U. K. commercial ports. 
8.2.1 River Channel Improvements 
Glasgow, in a position similar to Newcastle and Stockton, was limited 
in its access to the sea' by the'. resttiction! f oF the rivef'Clyde, a situation 
which had led to the establishment downstream of Port Glasgow in 1668. 
In 1768 a scheme of improvement by transverse jetties had been implemented 
and longitudinal training walls built under Rennie had improved the river 
still further; by 1806 the depth had been increased to A, ft. at high 
water. By 1830, solely due to the use of steam dredgers, a maximum depth 
of 14 ft. had been achieved, to increase to 22 ft. by 1880 and to 264 
ft. by 1900.4 Although the river channel had been widened, deepened 
and straightened, a report by Walker in 1840 led to further extensive 
dredgingý the next 25 years witnessing the removal of some 14 m cubic 
yards of material; by 1880 the total had reached almost 24m, with lk 
m cu. yds removed ina single year. 
5 
By contrast the Tyne's early improvement - due to the inactivity 
of Newcastle Corporation - was greatly retarded, the Tees, administered 
by a company, less so; on the Wear dredging had begun in 1797, the first 
systematic steam dredging operation. On the Tees, channel narrowing by 
groynes was initiated by Brooks and it was not until he transferred to 
the Tyne in 1842 that Newcastle Corporation put in hand significant works 
there. 
. 
Change on Tyne and Tees was accelerated by the formation of river 
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commissions and in the case of the Tyne the appointment of Ure as engineer 
in 1858 brought with it a professionalism not earlier witnessed. From 
1845 Ure had been employed on the Clyde and under his direction river 
improvements there had been given some considerable impetus. 6 Similarly, 
his appointment to the Tyne at the instigation of James Cochrane Stevenson 
-a commissioner and himself from Glasgow - was to bring to the North- 
East the same urgency. The improvement of the Tyne was undertaken at 
a rate even more rapid that the Clyde's. From c -,, m tons in 1861, the 
annual rate of dredging rose to 5-. m tons* by 1866. The Tees, later and 
to a smaller scale, - sought to emulate the Tyne, increasing its maximum 
rate of silt removal to some 1m tons in 1876. On the Wear, too, dredging 
was undertaken, an advantage there being the fact that carriage to sea 
was much cheaper than on Tyne and Tees, due to the river's lesser length. 
Writing in 1880, Vernon-Harcourt# noted that the north-eastern rivers 
had been vastly improved throughout their navigable lengths but he warned 
that all of them had been dredged to an extent greater than their natural 
tidal capacity and they would, therefore, require continuous dredging to 
7 
maintain them He also gave credit to the several engineers involved 
in the portsy in that their solutions to the problems - transverse groynes, 
longitudinal training walls and dredging - had all been appropriate to 
the three rivers at the relevant stages of improvement. 
How did the up-river ports seek to retain their viability? Newcastle 
and Stocktont like Glasgow, were relatively remote from the rivers' mouths 
and it was only by virtually forcing the commissions to improve the rivers, 
that they were able to retain their importance. On the Tyne, improvement 
led to the construction of extensive quays and warehouses at Newcastle, 
although never profitable. Similarly Stockton was enabled to retain 
its role as a port for some time although it, too, was overtaken by increases 
in ship tonnage which in turn led to the major trade of the river taking 
* Equivalent to 3hm cu. yds. 
# Leveson Francis Vernon-Harcourt (1839-1907), professor of civil engineering, University College, 
London. 
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place in its lower reaches. The fact that Newcastle remained a supposedly 
flourishing port was quoted as having been partly instrumental in Manchester's 
decision to build the ship canal, so establishing that town as a major 
port. * Viewed with hindsight, the respite given to the up-river ports 
was only of a temporary nature. 
A more important result of river improvement became later apparent 
dn the Tyne. In 1876, the Scotswood Newburn and Wylam Railway abandoned 
its earlier plans to form a dock at Scotswood on account of the inadequate 
state of the river but such was its subsequent improvement that by 1893 
the NER was enabled to build high-capacity river staiths at Dunston# so 
as to reduce rail freight charges and circumvent its own dock at Jarrow, 
working near to its capacity. Such had been the growth in ship tonnage 
that it had proved cheaper to form deep-water river berths and so avoid 
delays in entering and leaving docks. The pattern of coal trans-shipment 
had turned through a complete circle, in principle reverting to the c 
1800 system. 
8.2.2 Dock Construction 
The provision of docks in the North-East, late by national standards, 
was initiated at Seaham, first operational in 1831. Docks provided three 
advantages: a constant water depth; the prevention of the grounding 
of vessels; and the provision of an additional area of water. It was 
the two last-named which were of the greatest importance as, unlike the 
Bristol Channel, tidal range was not a particular problem in the North- 
East; as ships increased in size certain dock gates came to be removed 
and the docks 'operated as tidal basins. + 
Dock construction in all three of the nation's major ports had begun 
in or before the 18th century*and by the 1830s the areas of the Londong 
Liverpool and Hull docks totalled approximately 290,180 and 40 acres 
Týe Act of Parliament for the canal wag obtained io 1885. 
#A similar procedure was adopted at Blyth. 
+A gated dock was completed at Seaham in 1905. 
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respectively, all for general -trade. Dock construction provided security, 
an Act of Parliament passed in 1803 
8 having legislated for the holding 
of certain goods in bonded warehouses; the provision had been extended 
by a second Act, passed in 1823.9 Enclosed docks with quayside storage 
followed at the major ports but with little general trade, no such provision 
had been made in the North-East. It was the need for a gated dock at 
Seaham, with no natural protection, which led to the formation there of 
two small docks, designed predominantly for the export of coal. To the 
successful sinking of the Hetton colliery can be attributed, too, the 
beginning of dock construct ion in the region. * 
The provision of docks in the North-East did not bring to an end 
the use of trans-shipment staiths on the river banks. Staiths, and their 
railways, had been widely used, and financed, by the coal owners and there 
was a natural reluctance on their part to write off their investment and 
provideý or pay for, new facilities at the docks. As a result, considerable 
tonnages of coal continued to be shipped on the Tyne and Wear themselves, 
clear of the docks, notable exponents of this procedure being the Bowes, 
Hetton and Lambton undertakings. 
Contrasting with the North-East, the Bristol Channel ports were not 
able to adapt their rivers for such use, a direct result of their vastly 
# 10%1) 
greater tidal range. The first of them to . have built docks was Bristol 
which in 1803 followed William Jessop's recommendations and formed the 
river itself into a 70 acre gated dock while providing a new channel for 
the river's flow. 
10 The dock was jointly financed, Merchant Venturers 
and town, suggested by Buchanan as being "a clever device on the part 
of the old and corrupt corporate bodies to achieve power without responsibility. "" 
Expensive to build, its dues relatively high and its access difficult, 
its form was the model upon which were based two unexecuted improvement 
schemes, at Sunderland and at Stockton. 
In reality, the first gated dock in the North-East was at Seaton Sluice in 1764. The new 
channel there had been provided at each end with gates. 
# The Bristol Channel tidal range was almost double that of the North-East. 
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Map 26: U. K. Ports and the North Eastern Railwa 
The development of the docks of South Wales has been recorded by 
Jenkins, Chappell, Daunton and John*and although it is not intended to 
chronicle their history, nevertheless a brief outline is appropriate. 
Docks were built at Cardiff, the principal coal-shipping port, from 1839 
and coal was brought to them by the Taff Vale and, later, the Rhymney 
railways, completed in 1840 and 1858 respectively. Initiated by the 
2nd Marquis of Bute the dock system was later enlarged and by 1907 the 
total dock area at Cardiff was 163 acres; further docks were built at 
Penarth and Barry, more accessible from' the sea, their construction reducing 
shipments from Cardiff. 
12 Such were the advantages of these later docks 
that the greatest expandion - in coal shipments occurred from 1890 onwards, 
a marked contrast with the North-East where the most significant later 
shipping places involved forming deep-water river berths on both Tyne 
and Blyth. 
Docks were built at all north-eastern ports other than Amble and 
Blyth, although projected at each. Costs, extremely variable, were 
dependent upon many factors, including area, depth, gate width, locking 
arrangements, coal-handling plant and the provision of quay walls. With 
time, gate widths and lock dimensions were increased and similarly greater 
depths were sought as ships became larger. As a result unit costs tended 
to increase with time, from a relatively cheap period of building between 
1840 and 1860, rising to the later Hendon and Albert Edward docks in the 
North-East and the Roath- Dock at Cardiff. Seaham Harbour's late rebuilding 
proved the most expensive of all constructiong understandable in view 
of its protective -piers and gates, and at Sunderland the outlet to the 
sea, separate from the river's mouth, inflated unit costs. 
* For details, see Bibliography. 
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Dock Construction: unit costs. 
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In both coal-producing regions docks were built largely in anticipation 
of trade, a hope not always fulfilled. Amble, Seaham and Hartlepool 
were examples of ports built, in effect, on virgin sites, with the two 
first-named almost private developments, each interdependent with its 
adjoining mining ared. At the other extreme was the Northumberland 
dock, built almost by accident to enclose a bight already heavily used 
for trans-shipment. Most dock provision lay somewhere between the two, 
built to increase and to attract to themselves an existing trade. 
8.2.3 Protective Piers 
Piers were built at the mouths of the region's rivers for four reasons, 
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to assist in removing the bar, to afford protection for ships entering 
port, to dissipate waves and so still the lower reaches of the river, 
and to form harbours of refuge; for the last three reasons they were 
built at non-river ports also. Pier harbours were constructed both for 
trade and for refuge. Such a harbour had been suggested. inl823 for Hartley 13 
- but not built - and it was often commented that the north-east coast 
was poorly served by such harbours, especially necessary for sailing ships. 
A single pier had been suggested at South Shields by Rennie in 18139 piers 
had been formed at the entrance to the Wear, a rudimentary pier had been 
constructed at Blyth but perhaps the best harbour - potentially - was 
that at Hartlepool, unusually for the region southwards- facing. Such 
were the havens prior to the building of Seaham Harbour. 
After 1831 piers were built at all ports, those of the Tyne, Wear 
and Tees designed to form refuge harbours, although no public funds were 
made available. The piers proved of inestimable value in suppressing 
waves by permitting them to expand after passing through a relatively 
narrow entrance* and the several pier designers deserve credit for their 
works. Wake was prai 
I 
sed for his work on the Wear 
14 
and the Tyne was 
later said by Moncrieff to have the best entrance on the north-east coast; 
he considered that a dock at Low Lights - its construction narrowly averted 
- would have destroyed the pier's benefits. 
15 All piers achieved their 
main objectives but as refuges their utility is questionable as ships 
became safe'r , as the century progressed. Nevertheless it should be noted 
that a refuge harbour at Peterhead was built as late as the 1890S. 
16 
Waves were suppressed at other ports in a manner somewhat different. 
At Blyth the long north pier was built with internal spurs to deflect 
through it waves running yp the harbour and at West Hartlepool the system 
of wave reduction - permitting the waves to expand and pass outwards through 
the piers - was later described by Stevenson as "ingenious and novel. " 
17 
The sea outlets suffered from both wave action and from sand build-upy 
Wave energy was dissipated on spending beaches. 
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at Hartlepool and at Sunderland sluices being incorporated to scour the 
basins. * 
8.3 The Ports and their Engineers 
The trade passing through the north-east ports was of much greater 
significance if considered on a tonnage basis rather than in terms of 
value. In 1885 the Tyne ranked third in terms of tonnage, fifth in value 
of trade. 
# To render effective the rivers to deal with the great volume 
of shipping using them a succession of eminent consulting engineers was 
brought to the North-East, to be followed by the appointment to the several 
controlling bodies of extremely capable resident engineers. 
By 1815, port engineering was no longer a completely new technique. 
What was new, however, was the scale on which river improvement and pier 
construction came to be adopted in the North-East. The traditional pattern 
was the inspection and survey by a consultant, his subsequent report on 
the work necessary and then its exebution - almost invariably by Act 
of Parliament - under his general control but through the day-to-day super- 
vision of a resident engineer. Invariably, the consultants were men 
of national standing, many of them quondam presidents of the Institution 
of Civil Engineers. + Some lesser works saw the employment of local engineers, 
nevertheless able men. The consolidation of powers in river government 
brought to the region men employed as full-time engineers , to the several 
port authorities: on the Tyne were Ure and Messent; o. n the Wear, Murray 
and Wake; on the Tees Johnson and Fowler; at Hartlepool, Harrison - Their 
professionalism was such that they were listened to with respect both 
regionally and nationally. In spite of their experience, however, mistakes 
were made and certain schemes - some unexecuted - were defective in concept; 
* Later, both sea outlets were closed. 
# In 1885 Vernon Harcourt ranked the North-East ports as follows: by tonnage; Tyne, 3; 
Sunderland, 5=; Tees, 13 =; Hartlepools, 16: by value; Tyne, 5; Hartlepool, 11 
Tees, 13 =; Sunderland, 17. 
+ The Institution of Civil Engineers, founded in 1818, included Telford, Walker, Rennie, Cubitt, 
Rendel, Simpson, Robert Stephenson, Locke, Bidder, Hawkshaw, Fowler, Vignoles, Harrison, 
Abernethy, Armstrong, Coode, Alfred Giles, Barry and Matthews amongst its presidents. 
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others exhibited faults in their detailing. Their major shortcomings 
were two -fold; an apparent inability to produce accurate estimates of 
cost and a lack of knowledge of the engineering properties of n6ils, the 
former greatly dependent upon the latter. Criticism is easy but unjustified; 
it is only within the present century ýhat effective site investigation 
and the study of soil mechanics have rendered less likely - but have not 
obviated - structural failure and foundation difficulties. 
What was new to the region's ports was the development of coal-handling 
equipment and the automation of dock plant and equipment. From simple 
staiths developed more efficient drops and spouts, leading later to hydraulic 
hoists and electrically-driven belt conveyors. This progression was 
aided by two of the region's major developments, the invention of hydraulic 
systems by Armstrong and the, production in the region of cheap electricity. 
' 
Hydraulic power was widely used' for the operation of dock gates, cranes 
and warehouse hoists and before the inception of electricity was the almost 
universal source of power. Such were its benefits that lock and dock 
gates for example, could be opened in one tenth of the time taken to operate 
by hand so rendering more expeditious the passage of traffic. 
2 
The other aspect of river improvement which was developed in the 
North-East was river dredging. Skempton has written on the first use 
at Sunderland of the steam dredger and its subsequent improvement; 
3 Riddell 
has outlined its later history on the Clyde. 
4 It was, however, on the 
Tyne that it reached its zenith with more than five million tons of material 
being removed in a single year. On the Wear and the Blyth dredging in 
places proved difficult due to the presence of a rock bed but such was 
the need for increased depth, principally in the formation of river berths 
in lieu of docks, that this expensive operation was undertaken by drilling 
and blasting. The Tyne, its bed alluvium* and its catchment roughly 
similar to that of the Clyde, was the object of dredging to an extent 
greater than was the Scottish river, the Thames and Liverpool, ostensibly 
The bed of-the Tees was similar. 
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much more important ports. It was in the improvements made to the rivers' 
channels that the North-East was pre-eminent. 
8.4 The Railways of the North-East Ports. 
Of South Wales, it has been written that dock construction "facilitated 
the growth of the mining industry, but such developments would not have 
been possible 'but for the enormous wealth stored in the coal measures. "' 
This comment applied equally well to the North-East where, again, the 
link between the two inter-dependent elements was the railway. The early 
waggonways were converted into, and supplemented by, composite railways 
and, later, by railways employing only steam locomotive haulage. * Psy- 
chologically, though, the principal change occurred in 1825 with the opening 
of the S&DR, built under Parliamentary powers; others followed. Like 
the second-stage colliery railwaysv the new lines ran in a generally west- 
east direction2 using down-river shipping points rather than employing 
keel transport on the then barely-navigable rivers. 
The inter-dependence of railways and trans-shipment facilities was 
appreciated early, the S&DR, like the Brandling Junction and Stanhope 
and Tyne railways, pr oviding its own shipping places. A further change 
was brought about by Hudson's influence, the principal result being the 
formation of the York Newcastle and Berwick Railway (YN&BR). Hudson, 
too, appreciated the relationship between rail and sea transport and he 
sought to control the railways between Tyne and Wear with docks at Jarrow 
and Wearmouth, a scheme not successfully completed. He also sought to 
build a Northumberland (Coble Dene) dock, a project frustrated by his 
being unable to acquire control of the railways to feed it. Hudson also 
became involved with the Sunderland Dock Company, potentially well-sited 
in relation to the Durham coalfield but unable to take full advantage 
of it. 
The successful formation of the YNOR, its major axis in a north- 
south direction, brought to the North-East a major influence, enabling 
Rope haulage was never completely superceded. 
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Railway or Dock Company 
Date of Act 18LO 1860 1880 1900 (or construc- 
tion) 1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 
IIIIIII 
Stockton and Darlington Railway 1821 
Middlesbrough Dock (1840) 
Newcastle and Carlisle Railway 1829 
asaaas 
Stanhope and Tyne Railway (1834) ýMM9 
Wearmouth Dock (1835) Mails" 
Great North of England Railway 1836 
Brandling Junction Railway 1836 
Durham Junction Railway 1834 
Newcastle and Darlington Junction Rlway 1842 
Durham and Sunderland Railway 1834 
Newcastle and North Shields Railway 1836 Ong 
York and Newcastle Railway 1846 
Newcastle and Berwick Railway 1845 
York Newcastle and Berwick Railway 1847 
Gt. N of E, Clarence & H. J. Rail way 1837 
Leeds and Thirsk Railway 1845 
Leeds Northern Railway 1851 
North Eastern Railway 1854 
Hartlepool Dock and Railway 1832 
Clarence Railway 1828 
Stockton and Hartlepool Railway (1839) 1111 
1842 I II 
1 
Hartlepool West Harbour and Dock 1844 
II 
11 
West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway 1852 1 
Blyth and Tyne Railway (1840) 
1852 
Scotswood Newburn and Wylam Railway 1876 
Londonderry Railway (1854) was 1863 1 
Railways servin2 the ports of the North-East 
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coal from any source to be shipped, at least in theory, at any port. 
At first co-existing with the SOR and with the West Hartlepool Harbour 
and Railway (WHH&R), the YNOR later perceived the incursion of the Leeds 
Northern Railway at' West Hartlepool as a threat to its operations, the 
amalgamation between the two major companies - with the York and North 
Midland - establishing the North Eastern Railway, its formation by progressive 
amalgamation shown on the accompanying bar-chart. 2 It was not until 
1863 and 1865 respectively that the SOR and WHH&R were absorbed . by the 
NER, so providing that company with access to all ports, excluding Seaham; 
it owned docks on Tyne, Wear and Tees, and at the Hartlepools. 
Due to its lack of monopoly at Sunderland, the development of the 
Northumberland steam coal area and the rapidly expanding Cleveland iron 
industry it was in the north of the region that the NER concentrated its 
trans-shipment facilities. River staiths were built at Blyth with the 
co-operation of the harbour commission there and at Dunston, where the 
improvements made to the river by the Tyne Improvement Commission (TIC) 
were used advantageously to reduce transport costs and by-pass the down- 
river docks9' the TIC dock inadequate and the NER dock working to capacity. 
As a result of these moves the NER became possessed of solely-owned facilites 
ableg by 1913, to ship 13.3 m tons of the combined throughput of 25.68 
3 
m tons from the two rivers. 
On the Wear, the role of the NER was relatively much reduced. Through- 
put at the Wearmouth dock fell while the Sunderland dock was supplied 
by ' both NER 'and the Londonderry Railway. Coal continued to be shipped 
at river staiths by the collieries themselves. As a result of what was 
in effect, ' the extension southwards of the Londonderry Railway after 1900 
and the opening of undersea collieries the NER was able to ship more coal 
at the Hartlepools which, although NER owned, can not have proved profitabley 
certainly so far as. coal was concerned. The reluctance of the NER to 
purchase the docks at Sunderland is understandable on two counts; the 
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ill-feeling between certain NER directors and Hudson, precluding purchase 
in the 1850s, and the later antipathy between the NER and Lady Londonderry. 
What is perhaps less understandable is the reluctance of the NER 
to purchase Amble and Blyth. In 1860 the NER was asked if it was "disposed 
to purchase the harbour at Warkworth which (may possibly) be had at present 
for E15 000,, 4 and in 1868 a similar request was madep the NER rejecting 
both overtures presumably on' account of the unprofitability of the harbour 
and the isolation of its captive coalfield. In view of later developments, 
somewhat even more inexplicable were the events occurring at Blyth in 
1863. The town asked the NER to provide both railway and docks to serve 
new collieries at C. ramlington as the Blyth and Tyne Railway's (B&TR) 
facilities were "inadequate for the trade... and ... the inhabitants were 
dissatisfied with the manner in which their requirements were met by that 
company. " 
5 It was further pointed out that the shareholders of the harbour 
company could probably be bought out on easy terms but, again, the NER 
turned down the proposal, apparently doubtful as to the intentions of 
the BUR. 
The NER has been well researched by Irvine and by Brooke, the former 
providing an invaluable analysis of its operations 
6 
and the latter a detailed 
description of its amalgamations. 
7 Both point to its attempts to serve 
the region as an entity, a policy which it achieved with some success. 
Relations between NER and the several port authorities were generally 
good; with the towns, less so. In dispute with the NER regarding its 
branch 'to the Quayside 
8 the Newcastle Corporation several times commented 
that the NER chose to ignore Newcastle and promote the interests of Hull. * 
This allegation may contain an element of truth in that the NER chose 
to build its coaling facilities at Jarrowq Dunston and Blyth, rather than 
on sites which would benefit the Corporation, as a body not noted for 
its entrepreneurial flair. 
The dependence of the north-eastern ports upon their railways was 
Coal shipments from Hull between 1900 and 1913 rose by 120%; the Tyne's increase was 40%. 
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paralleled in South Wales where the Taff Vale and Rhymney railways served 
Cardiff, the principal coal-exporting port. There were, however, differences 
in that the NER, from the lB60s, held a territorial monopoly, its'. only -': - 
but much smaller - competitor the Londonderry Railway. The power of 
the latter was nevertheless sufficient to keep out the NER from Seaham 
and to frustrate both its effective use of facilities at Sunderland and 
Hartlepool and its investment in both ports. In South Wales the situation 
was somewhat different with Taff Vale, Rhymney, Great Western and Barry 
railways striving for trade. Other than the Great Western, all South 
Wales railways were predominantly carriers of minerals as opposed to passengers; 
goods carriage formed a very small part of the non-passenger traffic. 
In 1894 the Great Western carried 22.6m tons of minerals, the Taff Vale 
13 m, the Rhymney 5.4m and the Barry 5m tons; by comparison the NER 
carried 34.9 m tons. 
9 Although the Great Western was important in Wales 
it did not wield such power as did the smaller companies, a reversal of 
the position in the North-East. In both regions the railway companies 
had built docks; in both regions, too, the coalowners had been responsible 
for dock and railway construction. 
8.5 The Ports and their Trade. 
The trade of the north-eastern ports, at least until mid-century, 
was principally the outward shipment of coal; imports were restricted. 
After 1850 the situation changed somewhat in that the growing Cleveland 
iron industry itself 'began to consume coal products originating in the 
southern part of the region, at the same time attracting from the ironstone 
mines to the Tees the ores used in manufacture. As a result coal shipments 
there were virtually halted as the railways, principally the S&DR and 
the WHH&R - -. and their associated companies - became the main carriers 
in the district; it was only when foreign ores came to be imported that 
bulk sea-borne cargoes again flourished. In contrast the more northerly 
ports continued their expansion, albeit uneven. Development was governed 
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by three main factors: the increasing demand for coal and hence port 
throughput; the ever-increasing size of ships; and the changeover which 
had taken place from sail to steam propulsion. Of these factors the 
graph noted earlier shows the trend of shipments from each of the region's 
ports but the accompanying table shows the trend - nationally - in ship 
dimensions and means of propulsion. 
U. K. Registered Ships, 1815-1913.1 
Sailing Vessels Steamships 
Tonnage No Av. Tonnage Tonnage No Av. Tonnage 
Year (000 net) (000 net) 
1815 2477 21861 113 1 8 125 
1830 2168 18876 115 30 298 100 
1854 3943 25335 156 306 1524 201 
1885 3457 17018 203 3973 6644 596 
1913 847 8336 102 11273 12602 894 
Sailing vessels continued to increase in size until near the end 
of the century although their average tonnage had only doubled in 70 years. 
Steamships, however, had undergone a six-fold increase within a hundred 
years. A further complication was the much superior utilisation factor 
of the steamship, its benefits being estimated in 1881 as its making four 
voyages compared with one by a sailing vessel. Taking 1 885 as an example, 
the relative effectiveness of the steamship would not simply be the relative 
tonnages 3.973 : 3'. 457 
1m 
but 15.892 : 3.457 or 4.6 : 11 a vastly different 
relationship. It was the necessity of employing fully the more expensive, 
larger. and more efficient steamer that led to the adoption of deep-water 
river . 
berths in - preference to gated docks; it was the limitations of 
the ports of south-east England, continuing to receive coal by sea from 
the North-East, which served to restrict the size of coastal colliers. 
In spite of this, the average size of ship leaving, for example, the Tyne 
inc reased at a rate similar to the national average, between 1854 and 
1894 from 150 to 4 85 tons. # Comparisons are not simple as the methods 
Mitchell and Dene show the national figures to be 158 and 422 tons. 
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of ship measurement* varied throughout the century considered and differed 
vis A vis wood and iron. 
In 1815 the vast majority of coal shipments were coastalp principally 
to London and the South-East. As overseas demand increased so a greater 
proportion of coal came to be shipped abroad although, in terms of tonnage, 
coastal shipments continued their upward trend. The proportion of exports 
was not uniform throughout the region and when shown graphically an envelope 
may be delineated, embracing the majority of figures. There are some 
inconsistencies v however, in that Amble and Blyth in the 1870S shipped 
abroad much higher ratios than did the other ports, perhaps a result of 
their development having been outside the traditional Tyne and Wear cartels 
and hence reaching different markets. 
North-East Ports: exports/total shipment (o'G) 
mble 100 
so- 
Cardi ff Blyth/ 
60- 
Tyne, Wear, Hartlepools 
40L 
20 . 0. 
Seaham 
1825 1850 1875 1900 
The high proportion of Tees exports is understandable. In terms of tonnage 
the export of coal was insignificant and it is likely that with foreign 
iron ore being brought into the Tees, coal would be exported in the same 
Notes on measurement are included in the Appendix. 
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ships. As coal shipments rose at the beginning of the 20th century so 
the Tees returned to the general pattern. Somewhat different was Seaham 
Harbour where the proportion of coal exported remained low throughout 
the port's unimproved period, rising only when major improvements were 
made and ships of greater tonnage were so enabled to use the port. In 
South Wales the proportion of coal exported was greater than it was in 
the North-East and, when plotted, the Welsh figures exceed all those for 
the North-East, the non-typical ports of origin excepted. 
Coal Shipments relative to Output, 1854-1913 (percentages) 
1814 1870 1885 1900 1913 
North East 
South Wales 
53 
30 
42 
59 
4B 
56 
53 
71 
60 
79 
A further difference between the two regions is in the proportions 
of coal shipped, relative to production. The reasons for the differences 
are threefold: the lack of a substantial traditional South Wales coastal trade; 
the development of the Cleveland ironstone deposits, consuming a significant 
part of the local output; and the lack of an engineering base in South 
Wales, so precluding the development of a ship-building industry. 
2 The 
lack of an engineering base did not, however, prevent the establishment 
of engineering and shipbuilding on Teesside although there the proximity 
of such industries on Tyne and Wear perhaps brought benefits. It is 
nevertheless surprising that no similar dissemination of technology became 
apparent in South Wales where an earlier metal manufacturing industry, 
receiving its raw materials from Cornwall, had developed into an iron- 
making trade based on local ores, the production of which exceeded that 
of Cleveland until 1858. Nonetheless production increased to an extent 
such that in 1913 Cleveland produced almost 6m tons of ironstone compared 
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with only 55,000 tons from South Wales. 
3 In terms of output of pig iron 
the North-East produced 285,000 tons in 1854 and 3.869 m tons in 1913; 
the comparable figures for South Wales were 750,000 tons and 889,000 tons. 
4 
Although the proportion of coal shipped coastwise decreased, the 
actual tonnage continued to increase, especially from Tyne to Thames where 
demands for the making of gas, and later electricity, grew. The coastal 
shipping trade had been affected by the establishment of a rail network 
from the coal-producing areas to the capital and in 1866 the two major 
means of transport each brought into London c 3m tons of coal. Thereafter, 
rail transport predominated and it was not until the late 1890s that sea 
transport achieved parity, each system then delivering c 7m tons. 
5 it 
was principally bulk contract procedures which had reversed the trend, 
a combination of the Tyne's up-river Dunston staiths and bulk carriage 
by sea direct to the point of use. 
Figures recorded in the Appendix and produced by Daunton 
6 have been 
used to show graphically, in terms of tonnage per acre, the utilisation 
of the several docks. Unexpectedly, it was Seaham which most nearly 
approached the efficiency of Tyne Dock and of Cardiff. Comparing Tyne 
Dock with Seaham, scaleand size of ships differed enormously but nevertheless 
each achieved results much superior to other ports. The relatively early 
demise of the southern docks as coal-handling specialists is also shown 
but two other points should be emphasised; the steady improvement at 
Sunderland and the fluctuations in the fortunes of the Northumberland 
Dock. 
Sunderland dock was initially formed without the support of the area's 
principal coalownersq who continued to ship on the river, and it was only 
the decision of Londonderry to ship at Sunderland that brought to the 
docks there a steady trade, albeit a dock under- utilisation compared with 
others. The unit throughput of the Northumberland dock fluctuated con- 
siderably. At first extremely successful the shipments increased 
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Dock Utilisation: coal shipments 
(000 tons per acre) 
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10 
\Wearmouth 
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with the development of the steam- coal mining in the Blyth area, then 
fell rapidly as a result of the ill-advised building of the Albert 
Edward dock and the development by the NER of facilities at Blyth. As 
Tyne Dock improved its efficiency, that of the TIC's Northumberland Dock 
declined. 
It is not easy to relate the efficiency of the coal docks to others 
although Stevenson, 
7 
writing in 1874, noted that Tyne Dock recorded a 
throughput of 40,000 tons per acre: compared with the 20,000 for London 
and Liverpool. * Upon the efficiency of a dock depended the need for 
its improvement. Again comparing events at Tyne Dock and Seaham it may 
be seen that completely different methods were adopted. At Tyne Dock 
* To correlate with the deadweight tonnage the figures must be net registered tonnage. 
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the process was one of transforming a large dock by more effective coal- 
handling; at Seaham it was the virtual replacement of the old docks by 
new. Both proved the point that the injection of capital into such facilities, 
providing that trade already existed, brought benefits in trade. Conversely, 
the formation of the Albert Edward dock, planned to cater for an intangible 
import trade, brought no benefit to the TIC. 
8.6 Port Finance 
It is not within the scope of this study 'to investigate in depth 
the capital investment in the region's ports, nor to analyse their generated 
revenues and ýoperating costs. Nevertheless, some general over-view is 
necessary to provide further indicators as to the success, or otherwise, 
of the several undertakings. The two authors who have researched this 
aspect in the greatest depth are Kenwood , who studied capital investment 
in the north-eastern ports between 1825 and 1850, and Irvine, 
' dealing only 
with the NER. Kenwood experienced problems in estimating the costs of 
private developments, a difficulty existing into the period here considered. 
From the Appendix and from railway company accounts have been taken figures 
for capital expenditure and revenue and from them unit costs have been 
calculated for each of the ports, capital on a cumulative basis. 
Port Capital Expenditure and Revenue. (per ton of coal) 
1855 1885 1913 
Capital Revenue Revenue/ 'Capital Revenue Revenue/ Capital Revenue Revenue/ 
p Capital p Capital - Capital p of p P 
ýmble 312 1.7 o. 5 c75 2 2.7 33 1.7 5.1 
Blyth c30 cO. 5 1.7 c55 1.9 3.5 25 1.6 6.4 
Tyne 5.4 1.1 20 48 2.8 5.8 32 2.3 7.2 
Near c30 c2.6 8.7 c50 3.2 6.4 52 3.6 7.0 
Seaham c30 - c25 - - 24 1.9 7.9 
; j1pools cloo 8 8 - - - 
Tees 106 6 5.7 
The statistics relating to capital investment cannot be considered 
as accurate. Problems arise due to lack of both financial information 
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and the relevant records but nevertheless the table -a crude indicator 
- emphasises both similarities and anomalies amongst the ports: Amble, 
as noted, proved extremely expensive until fully utilised; the Tyne was 
under-capitalised but by its scale was able to attract trade. Using 
Kenwood's figures as a basis, cumulative capital expenditure prior to 
1850 produces a unit cost of 23p per ton of coal 'shipped for the North- 
East as whole, a figure which emphasises the Tyne's under-investment. 
It should also be noted that the later considerable capital investment 
- largely to accommodate bigger ships - so increased throughput that unit 
costs increased only moderately over a sixty-year period. 
In an attempt to assess the cost of using each port, revenues have 
been used to calculate the income in p per ton of coal shipped. These 
figures too provide only a rough indicator. of the situation and one related 
only to gross revenue; operating costs and profitability are not taken 
into account. They show the general trend of costs of shipment and emphasise 
some anomalies, for example the extremely low revenue derived at Blyth 
in 1854, its cheapness by 1913 and the rising cost of shipping at Sunderland. 
Combining the two sets of figures, revenue/capital ratios have been calculated 
and they show, within fine limits, a general figure of c 7% prevailing 
by 1913; in 1885 the range had been 2.7 to 6.4%; in 1854 it had been 
kI 12 to MO. At that time the river most profitable to its owners had been 
the Tyne, the least Amble, grossly over-capitalised. 
With few exceptions all port improvement works were undertaken though 
powers granted by Parliament, amongst them limitations on the raising 
of capital. Not only were totals stipulated but so was the ratio between 
stock issued and borrowings. Capital was not always easily raised: 
proposals for docks and railways foundered due to lack of support; dock 
construction at Jarrow and-Hartlepool was halted due to financial constraints; 
the formation of the Tyne piers and the construction of the Albert Edward 
dock were suspended. In the earlier years of the period capital was 
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raised by private subscription or by borrowing from individuals. Later, 
as the scale of works increased, loans were at times sought from the Public 
Works Loan Commission. - The TIC, considering the Tyne piers to be works 
of national importance, sought - and was refused -a government grant, 
a Royal Commission having reported favourably on the project for a harbour 
of refuge. * In the absence of a grant, loans totalling 050,000 were 
later made available. Later still, applications for loans were refused 
and Johnson, writing in 1895 and reflecting on past grievances, noted 
sadly that "they lean upon a broken reed who put their faith in Parliament. ,2 
As the scale of improvement works increase'd, so the authorities borrowed 
capital and established sinking funds, financed from revenue, to repay 
them; as the stability of the authorities became assured, so the raising 
of capital became easier. 
Port revenue originated from three sources: dues on goods, mainly 
coal; river tonnage dues; and dock dues. The first was simply an impost 
on each ton of coal, or other commodity, leaving the river and the other 
two were dependent upon ship tonnage. As an example, the TIC in 1891 
received Z120,066 from river tonnage dues, E57,748 from dues on coal shipped 
from the riverside staiths, Z22,869 from dock tonnage dues and E20,209 
from coal shipped from the Northumberland dock. Dues on goods amounted 
to E31,570 and -the total revenue for the year was E308,732. Interest 
payments on loans amounted to Z166,528 and the surplus revenue was recorded 
as E41,736.3 The revenues received do not accurately reflect the tonnages 
of materials involved; in the year quoted coal shipments from the Tyne 
totalled c llm tons, goods 675,000 tons. Except at Hartlepool and on 
the Tees the same situation applied to all north-eastern ports, as it 
did too in South Wales, concealing the high tonnages passing through the 
ports. In terms of value, the relative proportions of the U. K. 's trade handled 
in 1913 by London, Liverpool, the Tyne and Cardiff were 29.3,26.49 1.8 
., 
4 
and 1.7%: in terms of tonnage the figures were-15.2,14.3,10.9 and 12.7,0. 
The Commission also reported favourably upon Hartlepool but the project there was abandoned. 
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As noted the measured tonnage of ships caused problems for the port 
authorities. Not only were steamships and sailing vessels measured differently 
but the rules of measurement were changed more- than once. As a result, 
the ratio between deadweight - the actual tonnage carried - and registered 
tonnage increased with time, leading to fewer ships being needed to carry 
the same tonnage of coal. So the ports suffered a reduction in income 
until such time as the tonnage dues, fixed by Act of Parliament, could 
be amended. Daunton shows the ratio of deadweight to registered tonnage 
increasing from 1.34 to 2.1 between IB53 and 1911.5 The later figure 
could, in exceptional cases, actually have been higher. 
8.7. River Government and Port Control 
In 1815 port control had been by private individual, companyq corporation 
and commission; by 1914 all of them, other than Seaham -a company - 
were operated by commissions, although at the Hartlepools the NER was 
the port operator with the commissioners responsible only for the harbour 
approaches. Each port strove to undertake such improvements as would 
enable it to retain, or even improve, its share of the growing coal trade. 
Physical improvement demanded capital and astrade expanded and ship dimensions 
increased so it became vital for the ports to raise the necessary funds, 
hence the progression towards commissions which, although more easily 
able to raise capital, suffered one grave defect, exemplified on both 
Tyne and Tees; inter-constituent rivalry... 
The TIC's problems principally involved Newcastle on the one hand 
and the towns of North and South Shields on the other. Strife was pro- 
longed and it was not until all docks had been built and the river improved 
beyond Newcastle that' dissent was reduced. On the Tees, the struggle 
was between Stockton and Middlesbrough, the latter - unlike the down-river 
towns of the Tyne - expanding rapidly and so assuming Stockton's traditional 
role. Of the other ports, rivalries were early experienced at Hartlepool 
while on the Wear the antagonism between commission and dock company was 
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resolved by their amalgamation in 1859. The River Wear Commission (RWC) 
was little influenced by the town of Sunderland but it6 . non-representative 
constitution and its large membership were much criticised. 
Only on the Tyne and Tees did the supremacy of Newcastle and Stockton 
respectively lead to expensive river channel improvements, principally 
to serve those two towns. Newcastle was of such traditional strength 
that it could not be challenged and Stockton was perhaps unable to believe 
that Middlesbrough could ever dominate it. As a port, Newcastle does 
not seem to have been a success but, paradoxically, the NER was able to 
take great advantage of the TIC's work when its up-river staiths became 
operational. - Although Stockton developed into an important centre for 
the iron industry, and for shipbuilding, its contribution towards the 
revenues of the TCC was very limited. There can be little doubt that 
an easier financial climate would have prevailed on both rivers had the 
voice of the dominant towns been muted. It is, though, unlikely that 
any effective river improvements would have taken place if the TIC and 
TCC had not been formed. 
Competition between ports was endemic. Durham coal was sought by 
all of the region's southern ports; the early Brandling Junction Railway 
was viewed apprehensively as being able to supply both Tyne and Wear, 
each concerned as to the others success; the Durham Junction Railway 
was promoted by Newcastle Corporation, amongst others, in an attempt to 
rob Hartlepool of its sources of coal; the Clarence Railway partially 
deprived the Tees of its coal trade, to the benefit of West Hartlepool. 
Threats could be as effective as action. The TIC was blackmailed into 
providing further dock accommodation by the threat of the Northumberland 
steam-coal owners to develop Blyth and it was the threat of Parliamentary 
Bills, sought by others, which led to the formation, and later amendment 
of the TIC and TCC. 
The decade of reform which brought change to Tyne, Tees, Wear and 
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Blyth was more far-reaching in its effects. Although the development 
of London and Liverpool - and also of Hull - had been principally through 
the dock companies, unified bodies were instituted contemporaneously at 
both ports. The Thames- Conservancy* was formed in 1858 and unified control 
came to Liverpool with the formation of the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Board in the same year. At Cardiff the situation was somewhat 
different - but analgous to Seaham - in that the interests of the Marquis 
of Bute were taken over by the Bute Docks Company in 1887 1 and it was 
not until 1922 that all docks and railways became part of the Great Western 
Railway. 
Behind the development of the north-eastern ports had stood the early 
railway companies,. several of the dock-building projects, and the provision 
of staiths, being railway inspired. From 1854 onwards the NER, with 
its geographical spread and its virtual monopoly from 1865, brought to 
bear an even greater influence. Compared with the ports themselves, 
its financial standing was such that it was enabled to dictate the pattern 
of coal shipments in the region, exemplified in its later facilities at 
Dunston, Tyne Dock, Blyth, Hartlepool and on the Tees. NER strategy 
was partially influenced by the improvements made by the TIC, the formation 
of a commission at Blyth, the lack of monopolistic powers at Seaham and 
Sunderland and a friendly relationship with the TCC. 
The development of the region's ports was the result, perhaps, more 
of mutual animosity than co-operation. Londonderry had early followed, 
his own path, his widow antagonised Hudson, the RWC and the NER; Hudson 
was viewed with some disfavour by the NER. Antagonisms are evident between 
the Newcastle Corporation and both the TIC and the NER, similarly between 
Sunderland and the RWC. Inter-town disputes were continuous within the 
TIC and the TCC. In spite of these differences the region prospered, 
in coal exporting, engineering and ship-building, and it is interesting 
to record that it was only in 1913 that South Wales, for the first time, 
The Port of London Authority subsumed its powers in 1908. 
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exceeded in quantity the shipments of coal from the* North-East. 2 
The decisions made by the port authorities regarding their policies 
were not always correct. Facilities were at times over-provided, at 
other times the converse. Technologically, the region's ports were amongst 
the nation's leaders but they suffered somewhat due to two problems, the 
im-balance between imports and exports and the fact that they dealt pre- 
dominantly in low-cost, bulky commodities. Because of their technology 
and effective rail links with the proliferating collieries in the region, 
the ports increased their trade any by 1914 had experienced a century 
of almost continuous growth in trade and in ship-building. It was this 
phenomenon of rapid and seemingly endless growth which masked all rivalries 
and as a result the port authorities "failed to recognise the fine line 
dividing adequate from excessive accommodation. 11,3 
The outbreak of war in November 1914 was to herald the approach of 
a then-unbelievable reversal in the fortunes of the North-East. 
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APPENDIX A 
PORT DUES AND SHIP MEASUREMENT 
The ports of the North-East, as elsewhere, charged dues upon shipping 
on two counts, the measured tonnage of the ship and the tonnage of coal, 
or other material, shipped into or out of the port. Assessment of the 
dues on cargo, especially coal, was simple in theory but more difficult 
in practice due to problems in correctly weighing the materials shipped. 
The assessment of ships' tonnage was more complicated: not only 
did the methods of measurement change with time but skilful design could 
result in the building of ships advantageous to their owners. Additionally, 
measurement rules were not enforced throughout the period 1815-1914, 
a situ. ati: on giving rise to some confusion. The several terms relating 
to'tonnage may be defined as follows. 
Burthen: old term to define the carrying capacity of a ship, based on 
the number of tons (or casks) of wine which could be accommodated. 
Term used to end of 18 C, and later. 
Builders Old Measure: 
calculated from 
beam. 
adopted through the Tonnage Act of 1773. Tonnage 
(L - 3/5 B) Bx -2B* 
94 involving only length and 
Remained in. use until mid 19 C due to its then having become unsatisfactory 
for ships with high length/beam ratio. 
Deadweight: the actual carrying capacity of a merchant ship, expressed 
in tons. 
Displacement: the weight of water displaced by a loaded ship (the actual 
weight); normally associated with naval vessels. 
Gross Tonnage,: measured capacity of a ship's hull in cubic feet, divided 
by 100. Introduced by Parliamentary legislation in 1836. 
* The depth was not measured but was assumed to be half the beam. 
Net Tonnage: as above, but adjusted to allow for crews' quarters, engine 
space, bunkers etc. Provides a more realistic basis for load-carrying 
than does gross tonnage. 
Registered tonnage: both gross and net tonnages entered on certificate 
of registration but term applied most commonly to net tonnage. Use of 
gross and net (registered) tonnage enforced in 1855. 
The Builders Old Measure proved inadequate following the introduction 
of bigger iron ships. Additionally, ships were built of greater depth 
so as to increase cargo space without increasing dues. In the later 
years of the 19C the ingenuity of ship's designers enabled a higher deadweight/net 
tonnage ratio to be achieved. The ratio increased from 1.34 in 1853 
to as much as 3 by 1911, so depriving the port authorities of anticipated 
revenue. 
Sources. 
M. J. Daunton, Coal Metropolis: Cardiff 1870-1914 (Leicester 1977) p 26. 
R. J. Cornewall-Jones, The British Merchant Service (1898). 22 : pp 238-245 
P. Kemp (ed), The Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea (1976). 
B. R. Mitchell & P. Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge, 1921) p 215. 
T. Walton, Know Your Own Ship (1957) pp. 288-328. 
COAL SHIPMENTS: COASTAL AND EXVORTED; 1815-1913 (000 tons) APPENDIX B 
Amble Blyth Tyne Wear Seaham Habour The Hartlepools Tees 
Ex- Ex Ex- Ex Ex- 
I 
Ex Ex- Ex Ex- Ex Ex- 5 Ex - Lx 
Coasý port T-ý)tal to' coast part Total 00 Coast port Total "' 'Coast to part Total o' to Coas t port Total A " Coast port Total Ot to Coast port Total 0, to 
1815 98 2 100 2 1722 
1 
111 1833 6 896 48 B95 5 
1820 144* 4* 148 3 2003 119 2122 6 1116 37 1116 3 
1825 132* 4* 136 3 1820 136 1956 7 1383 42 1330 3 
1830 2168 197 2365 8 1322 65 1387 5 c50 CHO 
1835 2261 309 2570 12 929 155 1089 14 270 66 c275 2 c50 678 27 391 4 
1840 2281 594 2875 21 868 443 1318 34 306 14 320 4 375 33 408 8 137B. - 13R 558 9 
1845 33 2444 1070 3514 30 153 -. 1 42 1414 22 551 726 158 884 15 816 128 c905 14 
1850 cBO 247 2270 1088 3358 32 206d' 47 lt 
1718 19 819 1232 330 1562 21 485 82 477 15 
1855 38 21 59 36 97 101 250 53 2075 1578 3653 43 1354 503 1891 27 594 70 664 11 1139 473 1612 29 142 92 234 40 
1860 9 79 88 90 109 114 224 512223 2041 4264 48 
1 
1822 9892979 35 603 38 663 6 1332 579 1901 30 218 121 338 36 
1865 1 40 41 98 103 1 144 243 50 
1 
2612 2552 5164 491 1737 115( 3036 40 504 32 573 6 1005 574 1584 36 192 146 338 1 4, 
1870 4 48 52 92 68 208 276 75 2511 3334 5845 57 1 1862 122[ 3227 40 478 59 549 11 847 641 1491 44 70 58 4" 
1875 28 43 66 61 43 184 231 812778 4140 
1 
6918 60i 
1 
1667 143S3298 46 325 80 428 20 690 684 1479 50 40 69 6ý 
1880 187 234 2972 5160 8132 63 3573 603 534 594 1249 53 22 86 U 
1885 253 533 3441 6160 9601 6 4! 2981 1549 
1 
3981 Y-5 788 471 563 1215 55 15 113 126 7E 
1890 361 1756 4061: 6668 10729 62! 24581 16030740 40 545 526 353 1042 40 10 82 102 BS 
1895 441 2485 4781 6570 11351 58 2726" 171 7 
ýý 4226 39 528 741 334 1277 31 4 64 88 94 
1900 476; 619 3042 3279 83 5089 9431 1452 65q 01 242 81 26i4- 4262 46 
1905 1 - r 
510 516 484 1209 48 1 69 104 95 
691 685 3386 3755 83 5342 11113 16 55 1 
68 2785 t538 4924 48 646 666 637 1611 49 27 63 155 7C 
1910 105 230 446 69 244 3537 4180 84 5028 13326 1054; 73 1526 2510 4291 62 922 719 1671 44 452 1086 1BBB 71 25 70 235 71 
1913 72 488 629 87 329 
I 
3988 
I 
4732 
I 
9 4640 
-- 
I 
15655 
I 
2029S 7 -1 
I 
1497 
i 
3058 4857 
-L-- 
67 
I 
IC59, 970? 2659 
I 
48 751 
I 
1258 
I 
2400 
I 
63 
I 
23 52 
- 
228 
f 
65 
Av---rage for five year period 
# Seaham shipments apparently included. 
CAPITAL EXPENDITURE (CUMULATIVE) AqD-REVENJI (8NNUAL. ): 1815-1913 
APPENDIX C 
Amble Blyth Tyne Wear Seaham Harbour The Hartlepool. - Tees 
Capital Revenue Capital Revenue Capital Revenue Capital Revenue 
Cum * p 
/T pa p/ T Cum P/T p. a. p/T Cum P/T p. a. p/T Cum. p/T p. a. p/T Cum p/T p. a p/T Cum p/T p. a. p/T Cum p/T p. a p/T 
EOOO. 
rE 
00G. - MOO MOO LOOO LOOO LOOO LOOC LOU ý000 ý000 TZOOO IZOOO_ 
ý000 
1815 24.1 1.3 1.2 
1820 21.1 1 1.3 
1825 24.1 1.2 1.5 
1830 24., 4 1 100 200 
1835 21.4 .8 
173 63 
1840 ! 17.6 0.6 29 1 193 60 
1P45 68 206 0.4 1.2 66 1 35.3 1 
1850 1 1.2 15.2 1.5 - 14 1 
1B55 1 184 312 1 1.7 ! 199 5.4 41.4 1.1 129 8 106 6 
1860 1 1.7 90 40 3 1.3; 688 1 16 73.7 1,7 955 32 77 2.6 100c 50 224 
12 114 7 
1865 1.5 3.6 104 43 3.7 1 .5 Ej 4 14 L 27 116 2.2 88 2.9 
(est (D 9 d) 
1870 1 1.9 119 43 4.4 
1 
1.62210 38 139 2.4 1395 43 89 2.8 29 16 
1875 2 3 129 56 3.4 1.5: 3227 46 179 2.6 1483 45 110 3.3 1156 
a) 
487 
ca 20 
cc 
1880 4 2.1 131 56 3.4 
t f 1.5 3939 48 253 3.1 1676 47 123 3.4 1465 -1 
cu 
--f 
676 
tj 
.,. q 50 
U 
-1 
1885 5.2 . 10 1.914665 48 265 2.8 129 3.2 152E 
ca 
U .0 840 
-. 4 51 -1 
18? o 185 51 5.5 1.5 4977 46 305 2.8 2030 54 128 3.4 
ca 
U 953 
CL 
CL 68 
CL 
cl 
199 45 8 1.8 5182 46 309 2.7 132 3.1 CL -4 1023; cc 73 
cc 
1900 207 43 7 1.5 
15133 
35 383 2.6 139 3.3 156 31 10? 1.9 152E CL 
1.4 
CL 1015 -w 72 -w 0 
, 1905 10 1.5 5713 35 421 2.6 151 3.1 520 80 12? 1.9 156! 
ca CL 1112 
0 
z 98 z 
1910 10 2.2 912 22 68 1.6 6035 33 437 2.4 2484 58 135 3.1 623 37 45? 2.7 1941 0 
ca 1186 113 
1913 207 33 11 1.7 1203 25 75 1.6 6539 32 477 2.3 2508 52 175 3.6 646 24 50? 1.9 197( z c 12B3 127 1 
APPENDIX D 
DOCK CONSTRUCTION: AREAS AND COSTS 
Date Cost Cumul- Area Cost Wharf Entrance 
(EOOO) ative (acret) per 
Cost acre length dimensions 
U000) (cum), (feet) 
(LOOO) (feet) 
NIumberland 1857 324 324 50+2-h 6.2 450 70(63)x24 
Dock 1880 558 10.6 
Albert 
Edward Dock 1884 799 799 22+3 36 3000 80(75)x3O 
Tyne, Dock 1859 549 549 50 11 8Ox24 ý 
1870 750 15 60x24 
1883 196 946 18.9 
1895 129 1075 21.5 11360 7002 
Wearmouth 
Dock 1837 120 120 6+1-"2, 16 1800 48x22 
Sunderland 1850 295 295 19+2 14 4700 60x2O(N) 
Dock 1859 772 32+3 22 7600 60x24(S) 
1868 300 1072 43+3 23.3 Box? 
1880 102 1174 43+3 25.5 65x27(locký 
1905 168- 1342 51+3 24.9 7000M 
MIbro Dock 1842 122 122 9 13.5 30x19 
1874 12B 250 12 20.8 55x23 
1880 176 426 15 28.4 3550 55x2B 
1904 820 1246 25 49.8 6842 8003 
Seaham 1831 118 118 3 21.5 33x17 
Harbour 
ý23,2 
1835 77 195 Sh 23 it 
1905 37B 573 13 44 65x25 
Hartlepool 1835 115 115 25 46 25' depth 
1840 160 275 42 6.5(9.4) 42x22 
1851 346 it B. 2(13.6) 11 
West HIpool 1847 53(? ) 53(? ) 8 6.60) 42x22 
1852 430) 96(? ) 22 4.4(? ) 
1852 346 it 15.7 
1856 500(? ) ., 32 
15.6(? ) 10500 50x22 
The HIPools 
(NER) 1880 480 13 
' 
16.8- 58x22&26 
12 '-2 
1885 1326(. 103 12.9(? ) 1 
26000 70x27(max) 
Annrkir%irv r, 
'TABLES OF STATISTICS 
Notes on Compilation 
It has proved difficult - in some cases impossible - to obtain for 
each port satisfactory figures relating both to coal tonnages and to 
finances. Correlation is complicated by several factors: the differing 
sources of statistics; amendments to port limits; the aggregation of 
shipments from one port with another; and the inclusion of bunker coal 
within certain runs of statistics. The figures on which the greatest 
credance may be placed have been used for the totals of shipments while 
others, perhaps from a different source but comparable one with another, 
have been used to obtain the export percentages. As a result, incon- 
sistencies become apparent. 
Details of finances have, again, been culled from several sources, 
principally the annual statements of the port authorities. Certain 
figures for capital expenditure have been taken from the records of the 
North Eastern Railway and the West Hartlepool Harbour and Railway; both 
should be treated with caution as the former did not always capitalise 
its expenditure and the latter company's accounts do not permit an accurate 
assessment to be made. 
Deposited plans, Ordnance- Survey plans and others have been used 
to ascertain dock dimensions. As a basis of comparison the cost per 
acre of the region's'docks has been adopted rather than using wharf length, 
in the case of coal-exporting docks thought to be inappropriate. The 
dimensions of the dock entrances and locks are included, depths generally 
being those obtaining at high-water. 
It has not proved possible to obtain figures to complete all tables. 
Nevertheless, they are sufficient to show the patterns of trade, finance 
and dock construction which developed in the North-East. 
Sources 
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Mineral Statistics of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, -from 
1882. 
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Parliamentary (or Deposited) Plans 
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G. Garbutt, Historical and Descriptive View ... of Sunderland (1819) 
S. T. Miller, The Progressive Improvement of Sunderland Harbour and the River 
Wear, 1717-1859 (1978) 
Seaham: Dock Company records held by SHDC. 
Ms records in DCRO. 
P. Barton, "The Port of Stockton ... ". Maritime History 
(1971) 
R. W. Sturgess, Aristocrat in Business, (1975) 
Hartlepool: Ms records in Hartlepool Library. 
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Railway companies' records in PRO, Kew. 
P. Barton, op cit. 
J. S. Jeans, A History of the Stockton and Darlinqton Railway (1875) 
G. A. North, Teesside's Economic Heritaqe (1975) 
Tees: Ms records of TNC and TCC at THPA. 
SOR material in Cl. CRO. 
P. Barton, op cit. 
J. Brewster, History of Stockton on Tees (1829) 
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